From your post 164 ...
The Aristotelian primary/secondary substance distinction was not synonymous with the Aristotelian soul/body distinction. For Aristotle, a primary substance could exist by nature, like an individual person, or it could exist by art, like a statue. And the secondary substances -- species and genus (as in man (species) is a rational animal (genus)) -- did not have bodies.
Compare Rand's words to your explanation about Aristotle's primary/secondary substance distinctions, and you can see how Rand improved on Aristotle's epistemology. Rand's work reflects 2000+ additional years in knowledge and technology advances, and she presents her epistemology in a clear and concise manner.
Meanwhile, the context of your final words ... (as in man (species) is a rational animal (genus)) -- did not have bodies ... seems to contradict what you're saying.
Meanwhile, the context of your final words ... (as in man (species) is a rational animal (genus)) -- did not have bodies ... seems to contradict what you're saying.Genus and species are rational concepts. They have no bodies. If you're suggesting otherwise, I'm all ears.
Compare Rand's words to your explanation about Aristotle's primary/secondary substance distinctions, and you can see how Rand improved on Aristotle's epistemology.I seriously doubt that Ayn Rand herself would have considered the proposition that one's nature (in Randian terms, a defined concept), rather than the person, is the agent of human behavior an improvement.