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So even the "existence" of what is perceived is not directly perceived, nor can it be until what is perceived is identified.

As what?

Again, I say, at the perceptual level, we know nothing.

Then how do we know anything? Are you a nominalist? I honestly don't understand your point.

Aquinas would identify the apprehension of existence and essence (which includes composition [the substantial unity of this particular thing] and division [this thing is not that thing]) as the "first act of the mind."

at the perceptual level, we know nothing.

Knowing requires thought, and thought requires reason.

Newborn babies find themselves launched into a world of sensual chaos. Even with all their on-board sense mechanisms working, they know nothing as to meaning within those sensual inputs.

Focusing the eyes is a learned function, even listening is a learned function (Please, people, read to your little ones).

Focusing the mind onto sensual inputs requires ... learning, and then ... knowing.

P.S. These thoughts are based on my reading of Ayn Rand's "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology" -- it is an incredibly impressive book.

I said: So even the "existence" of what is perceived is not directly perceived, nor can it be until what is perceived is identified.

You asked: As what?

Why, as existence, of course. But, before that can happen, a very long chain of learning and reasoning must go on as one develops their cognitive heirarchy at the conceptual level. First one learns to differentiate various percepts and to identify them in relationship to each other as concepts. One identifies objects, and people, and events. Having learned something about objects, one might discover that an expected object does not appear where expected. One looks where it should be, and finds it isn't. It is from such experiences one can develop the concept of existense, that is, of being, as opposed to not being. It is unlikely that "existence" as a concept could be developed where expected existence were never dissappointed.

"Existense," is a concept, a very complex concept as a matter of fact. We are conscious of what we eventually identify as "existense" long before we make that identification. It is correctly taken for granted, because, existense is axiomatic. Until the opposite concept, non-existense is conceived, there is no need for the concept existense.

Perhaps this will help. My cat is conscious, of herself, her food, of all the objects in her environment, be she does not know any of them exist, because my cat has no concepts at all, only percepts. All that my cat can be conscious of exists, but for my kitty, the questions never comes up.

I said: Again, I say, at the perceptual level, we know nothing.

You aksed: Then how do we know anything? Are you a nominalist? I honestly don't understand your point.

I have already answered this. All knowledge is in the form of concepts, and all our knowledge is about and derived from percepts. Percepts are our direct consciousness of material existense, but they are non-cognitive. It is at the conceptual level our percepts are identified, analyzed, and interpreted. That is why there is really no such thing as an optical illusion (or any other kind of perceptual illusion). The stick that looks bent in the water has not fooled our perception. The moon looking larger near the horizon is not a illusion to perception. The bent stick and the 'large' moon are true percepts, it is our interpretation of what the bent stick percept and large moon porcept mean that suffers from any illusion. Our conceptual assumptions about what the percepts mean is what is mistaken.

You said: Aquinas would identify the apprehension of existence and essence (which includes composition [the substantial unity of this particular thing] and division [this thing is not that thing]) as the "first act of the mind."

Aquinas would be wrong. Mysticism frequently clouds clear reason, as in his case. LogicWings comments about reification at post #216 correctly describe Aquinas' error.

Hank