Safeguarding Indian interests in the unipolar world

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980-early 1990s[i] impacted every player on the international stage. Its most direct impact on India has been the extraordinary extent to which American sensitivities have since influenced India’s relations with the world at large. As a matter of course, Indian decision-makers factor in possible U.S. reactions to potential Indian actions as a determinant of national policy[ii]. In other words, an increasingly large swathe of India’s external relations have to be viewed through the prism of the Indo-American relationship till a more multi-polar global scenario emerges.

This paper is an attempt to define an optimal approach for managing this relationship.

The dictum "no permanent friends or enemies, but only permanent interests" is regarded as a basic principle governing serious debates on geopolitics and international affairs. Further, even interests are not permanent but subject to constant modification and fine-tuning, thus resulting in actual policies and subsequently, plans.

In the 1940s[iii] and 50s[iv], it was in the Anglo-American interest to support and buttress the Indian republic as a role model for the emerging post-colonial world. India’s choice of democracy as opposed to communism or totalitarianism was only part of the motivation. The more significant issue was the Indian leadership’s conviction that India shall not bear grudges[v] against the west.

The Mahatma during the freedom struggle and Pandit Nehru after Independence had ensured that the Indian republic presented a supine and non-threatening picture to the outside world. But, a reading of the Mahatma’s Autobiography[vi] and Panditji’s numerous writings[vii] brings out subtle differences in their views. While the Mahatma’s belief in non-violent struggle was completely heart-felt, his decision to choose non-violent mobilization was driven primarily by his conviction that it was the only tactic with any acceptable probability of success. His responses to Lt. Gen. K.M. Cariappa’s[viii] queries on the subject during the Jammu & Kashmir operations of 1947-48 attest to this[ix]. On the other hand, like other leading figures of the era, Panditji derived his belief in the Mahatma’s methods of political mobilization second-hand from the Mahatma. Hence his understanding of the underlying logic was a tad superficial. The widespread fetishization of "Gandhianism" among the Congress leadership[x] well into the early 1980s is a direct result of this disconnect.

More than the events in Jammu & Kashmir during 1947-48, the 1962 debacle on the Tibetan frontier was a seminal event that illustrated to the thinking public in India that Independence had changed the rules of the game[xi] as far as national security affairs were concerned. It could be argued that Chairman Mao stood a better chance of acquiring India under his wing by largely non-violent methods centering around the Communist Party of India (CPI), than by his "teach a lesson" strategy”[xii]. But, such subtlety was rare in that dogged long-marcher[xiii].

The last twenty years have seen both generational and ideological churnings in the Indian body politic. The Indian self-image of an increasingly strong and prosperous nation is no longer easy to rubbish as wishful thinking by outsiders. Not that some will stop trying[xiv].

It is fair to say that the U.S. favors an India that continues to be non-threatening. That would mean that the U.S. would continue to deepen its economic, social, cultural and military ties with India. The more entangled and inter-twined the institutions of the two countries are, the better things look from the U.S. perspective as this enhances U.S. leverage on India. This inter-twining is largely in India’s interest as well, as it grants India access to technology and capital. But, India can expect periodic exertions of psychological, economic and political pressure from the U.S. to materialize whenever the U.S. feels the need to "guide" Indian behavior[xv].

A conceptual "box" exists within the minds of American planners and they will do what they can to keep India within that box. In other words, IT parks[xvi] are fine but ICBMs[xvii] are not. Mobilization against terror-sponsors is fine, movement against terror-sponsors is not[xviii]^,[xix]. Given their way, these planners would rather see an Indian elephant[xx] that resembles the hapless Gajendra[xxi] than the glorious Airavata[xxii].

At a minimum, thinking Indians would like to "break out of this box". One indicator of a successful "break out" would be carte blanche to prosecute unlimited war against the perpetrators of periodic barbaric acts in India that sit fairly unmolested across the Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir and the International Border elsewhere in India’s northwest. Another would be a substantive and meaningful multi-lateral economic development roadmap that would enable India to take up a seat at such financial high tables as the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)[xxiii] and the G-8 (Group of Eight Industrialized Nations)[xxiv]. A third would be an invitation to join the P-5 (Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council)[xxv]. One need not have inherited Vishnu Gupta Chanakya’s[xxvi] genetic material to deduce that these are utopian expectations, to say the least.

"Winning the respect" of the Americans would lead to a successful "break out". Nations that have "won the respect" of the Americans include the British, the Germans, the Russians, the Japanese, the Chinese and the Vietnamese.

The British, in American eyes, are like the "Swayambu Lingam"[xxvii] in Shaivaite[xxviii] lore, imbued with noble qualities by nature. The Germans have earned their respect from the Americans time and time again, from Gen. Baron von Steuben[xxix] in the American Revolution, to the German exploits during 1914-1945. The Russians will go down in American history as the only nation to have posed an existential threat[xxx] to the Americans. The Japanese victory in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War[xxxi] was a seminal inflection point in the evolution of 20^th Century American policies in East Asia. The Chinese in Korea impressed[xxxii] Harry Truman, that paragon of American spunk. The Vietnamese can legitimately claim to have defeated 3[xxxiii]^,[xxxiv] of the P-5.

As elected leaders of a democratic republic, Indian decision-makers cannot consciously make choices that impose unacceptable costs on the citizenry[xxxv]. "Winning the respect" of the International Community as the Germans, the Russians, the Japanese, the Chinese and the Vietnamese did would be unconscionable, as it would entail many Indians dying and many more regressing into poverty. India will have to blaze its own trail towards respect, devoid of unacceptable deaths and destruction.

It is not uncommon among American families to have one member become a College Professor, another a Soldier, another a Stock Broker, and still another a Chef. Some individual Americans may even spend time in each of these diverse occupations through the course of their careers. Tocqueville interpreted this very commendable American phenomenon as "classlessness" [xxxvi] while Swami Vivekananda praised Americans[xxxvii] as "Karma Yogis"[xxxviii] and "True Vedantins"[xxxix] for the very same quality. Americans take this psychographic dexterity as a given[xl] both in themselves and among others, viewing its absence as abnormal and as a shortcoming.

Historically in India, these four professions would rarely have come together in the same family because they typify "Brahmin", "Kshatriya", "Vaishya" and "Shudra" trades respectively[xli]. The sooner this dubious interpretation of the “Chatur Varna”[xlii] construct gets shed in India, the better for the national interest. Till then, these misinterpretations will color outsiders’ perceptions of India, though they will not impair truly insightful deductions about the Indian republic.

Achievements of Indians and Indian-Americans in the Sciences and in Business are slowly making their way into the greater American sub-conscious. Characterization of Indians as being "a Math-Wiz"[xliii] and as being "well off"[xliv] is a fairly common phenomenon in 21st century America. In due course, Indians and Indian-Americans will get credit for being good, hard working, law abiding members of the "Service Professions" as well, as long as a modicum of Indian immigration to the U.S. continues. Sections of the extreme right in America have always complained about "demographic forward deployment"[xlv] by various other cultures, though an overwhelming majority of Americans are broad-minded and friendly to Indians.

But, of real relevance in the national quest to "win respect" are not these "Brahmin", "Vaishya" and "Shudra" accomplishments. The issue is to unmistakably demonstrate "Kshatriya" prowess to the Americans, without even remotely confronting them directly. Needless to say, this "Kshatriya" component of national respect will have to be won not on the North American continent, but in the sub-continental neighborhood.

The U.S. itself can serve as a very appropriate role model for an India seeking to establish itself as a legitimate Great Power. From the time of the American Revolution to the time it burst onto the world stage as a major player during World War I, the U.S. can be seen as having undergone a century-long rite of passage as an emerging nation.

· The trans-oceanic victory against the Barbary Pirates in the early 1800s[xlvi]

· Demonstration of American national strength in prosecuting war with Mexico over Texas and in pressing home the advantage afterwards in terms of advantageous territorial absorptions [xlviii]

· U.S. resolve in contravention of international law and custom during the civil war naval action against the CSS Florida in Brazilian territorial waters outside of Bahia[xlix]

· American initiative in leveraging the USS Maine incident to wage an inter-oceanic war with a weakened Spain, resulting in the acquisition of a major Pacific foothold in the Philippines, apart from Caribbean strongholds in Puerto Rico and Cuba[li]

The most notable characteristic of these demonstrations of America’s strength and its gift for independent action is the relative economy of effort in terms of personnel and materiel losses. In other words, the price paid by the American citizenry to support their national efforts to carve a place for themselves among the great powers of the day was well within acceptable bounds (the American Civil War was an entirely different matter in terms of losses, but that conflict was more about impressing one’s fellow countrymen).

The Indian nation state has also shown its own sense of purpose and resolve several times since its very infancy. These instances include

· Sardar Patel and V.P. Menon’s integration of the princely states[lii] into the Indian Union in the face of British obduracy during 1947-49

· The liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 despite the pressure of the Nixon-Kissinger nuclear threats[lv]

· The grant of full and proper statehood[lvi] to Sikkim in 1975 despite international opposition

· The forceful gate-crashing of the Nuclear Weapons Powers Club in 1998 through the testing of multiple designs of fully-weaponized nuclear devices at Pokhran[lvii]

Even so, India has thus far not shown the world that it is fully capable of truly breaking its geopolitical shackles once and for all. Though national resolve has been amply demonstrated, national strength and power have not yet been undeniably unsheathed.

Indian military prowess will impress the American-led International Community if India repeatedly does two things:

Avid observers of Indian military affairs will note that the Indian Armed Forces quite regularly demonstrate cutting-edge capabilities. Some examples include the Indian Army’s domination of the Siachen glacier[lviii]^,[lix]since the mid-1980s, the Indian Navy’s innovative towing of Osa class Missile Boats to attack Karachi in 1971[lx], and the Indian Air Force improvising mechanisms to attack ultra-high altitude surface positions during the Kargil conflict in 1999[lxi]. The hoodwinking of American intelligence agencies[lxii] to pull off undetected the Shakti-98 series of nuclear tests at Pokhran[lxiii] can also be regarded as a superb feat involving coordination between multiple Indian security agencies.

Indians need to aggressively highlight these capabilities to international audiences notwithstanding the near complete denial of free access to credible global media resources. Word-of-mouth and asymmetric information dispersal strategies should be used to create some space[lxiv] for highlighting Indian military prowess and competence.

The ultimate objective though should still be to receive official acknowledgement from mainstream opinion-leaders and media. That will occur only when demonstrations of Indian power and national will become so awesome that they cannot be effectively ignored any longer. Acceptance, albeit grudging [lxv], of India’s nuclear assets and capabilities is indicative of such a desirable progression.

It is almost axiomatic that in the post World War-II era, the U.S. never picks fights with nations bigger in size than the American state of Texas[lxvi]. Members of the “axis of evil”[lxvii], Taliban-led Afghanistan, the now-defunct Yugoslavia, Haiti, Somalia, Granada, Libya, Vietnam, and Cuba are all illustrative examples of this “rule”.

Unfortunately, present realities dictate that India cannot afford to pick such insignificant enemies. In the foreseeable future, India’s serious adversaries are all bound to be large states with burgeoning populations, nuclear capabilities and acknowledged fighting abilities. Further, these opponents will almost universally be charged by ideological zeal and other intangible but strong motivations.

Indian policy-makers have been forced to consistently pick the “lesser evil” between total war and an imperfect peace while keeping in view the greater national good. Those observers pre-disposed towards a weak Indian republic have chosen to interpret (at least in public) this deliberate choice as lack of will, ability or both.

Knowledgeable Indians can come up with multiple scenarios that will enable India to accomplish both a) and b). But, the overriding consideration must be for Indians to undertake these endeavors fully independently, meaning India acting alone.

Even a minimum amount of overt co-operation with the International Community in pursuing these national projects will result in unsolicited and undesirable hogging of credit [lxviii], [lxix] for "tutelage" and “direction” by actors other than India. More significantly, such cooperation may seriously hamper future Indian efforts to re-shape the country’s geopolitical landscape to its own advantage, thus defeating the whole purpose.

References

[i] Stephen Kotkin, “Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000”, OUP, ISBN: 0192802453, pp-18-27

[ii] Ashutosh Mishra, “Talbott - Jaswant Talks: Vying for distant possibilities”, JNU, 6 August 1998, http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/128-usr-asutosh.htm

[iii] March 1942 Correspondence between Lord Halifax, British Ambassador to the US, 1941-46 and Sumner Welles, Acting U.S. Secretary of State, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box36/t327k02.html

[iv] President Truman’s State of the Union Speech to the U.S. Congress, 1954, http://www.intac.com/~rfrone/history/1953-sou.htm

[v] Inaugural address to the Indian Constituent Assembly by Dr. Sachchidananda Sinha, its Provisional Chairman, 9 December 1946, http://alfa.nic.in/debates/vol1p1.htm

[vi] M.K. Gandhi, My Experiments with Truth, Beacon Press Edition, ISBN0-8070-5909-9, pp 318-319

[vii] Jawaharlal Nehru, “Glimpses of World History”, Oxford University Press; ASIN: 0195623967, pp 214-215

[viii] Then General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Indian Army Western Command, later General and Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, still later Field Marshal

[ix] K Subrahmanyam, “Arms & the Mahatma - No place for pacifism in security”, the Times of India, 8 May 1997

[x] http://www.mkgandhi.org/biography/gndnonv.htm

[xi] Ashutosh Varshney, “US-China relations, not India-Pakistan, are the real cause for concern in south Asia”, the Financial Times, 6 August 1998

[xii] Amulya Ganguli, “Marxist Blunderbuss”, the Hindustan Times, 24 January 1997

[xiii] http://www.megastories.com/china/glossary/march.htm

[xiv] Stephen P. Cohen, Michael H. Armacost, “India: Emerging Power”, the Brookings Institution; ISBN: 0815700067, pp 230

[xv] Teresita C. Schaffer, “Building a New Partnership with India”, the Washington Quarterly, Spring 2002, http://www.twq.com/02spring/schaffer.pdf

[xvi] President Clinton’s address in Hyderabad, 23 March 2000, http://www.rediff.com/business/2000/mar/24usprez.htm

[xvii] The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/np/mtcr/mtcr.html

[xviii] U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner, 10 June 2002, http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/powell.html

[xix] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28823-2002Aug16.html

[xx] The elephant has often symbolized India, much like the Bald Eagle, America and the Lion, England. This is notwithstanding the Tiger being India’s national animal and the Ashokan Lions of Sarnath enjoying pride of place in the national seal.

[xxi]From the Bhagwad Gita. Kingly elephant rescued from a preying crocodile’s jaws by Lord Vishnu.

[xxii] From the Vishnu Purana. Four tusked elephant. Steed of Indra, King of the celestials. Invincible on the battlefield.

[xxiii] http://www.oecd.org/EN/home/0,,EN-home-0-nodirectorate-no-no-no-0,FF.html

[xxiv] http://www.g7.utoronto.ca

[xxv] http://www.un.org/Docs/scinfo.htm

[xxvi] Indian Civilization’s foremost geopolitical thinker. See http://www.top-biography.com/9046-Chanakya/

[xxvii]Natural formation representing Lord Shiva and consequently, a deity deemed worthy of veneration. See http:// www.srividya.org/Articles/Shivalingam.pdf

[xxviii] The worship of Lord Shiva. See http://www.shaivism.com

[xxix]Prussian infantry officer, imparted professional training to the Continental Army as a member of Gen. Washington’s staff. See http://www.steubensociety.org/

[xxx] http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/01/

[xxxi] http://www.russojapanesewar.com/index.html

[xxxii] Chen, Jian. China's Road to the Korean War : the Making of the Sino-American Confrontation. New York : Columbia University Press, 1994, ISBN: 0231100256 , pp 121

[xxxiii] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/vietnam.htm

[xxxiv] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/prc-vietnam.htm

[xxxv] A.B. Vajpayee, “Musings from Kumarakom”, New Year’s Eve 2001, http://www.meadev.nic.in/speeches/pm-musings.htm

[xxxvi] Alexis de Tocqueville, “Democracy in America”, 1835, Volume I, Chapter 3, http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/1_ch03.htm

[xxxvii] Nicholas Phillips, “Sanatana Dharma”, the Concord Review of Books, Winter 1999, pp 5,6

[xxxviii] Those who attain salvation through noble actions. See http://www.susankramer.com/KarmaYoga.html

[xxxix]Those who know themselves, nature and divinity. See http://www.geocities.com/neovedanta/a60.html

[xl] Dale Carnegie et al, “How to Win Friends and Influence People”, Pocket Books; ISBN: 0671723650, pp 32-37

[xli]Social stratification traditionally based on occupations. Later ossified across generations. See http:// www.hindubooks.org/sudheer_birodkar/ hindu_history/caste2classes.html

[xlii] Ibid

[xliii] Unsigned Editorial, “The Daily Illini”, 23 October 2000, http://www.dailyillini.com/oct00/oct23/opinions/

[xliv] Congressman Rush Holt, D-NJ, Comments at Friendship Summit, 5 January 2002, Bangalore, http://www.rushholt.com/newspapers/indiatimes.html

[xlv] Patrick J. Buchanan, “Death of the West”, Dunne Books; ISBN: 0312285485; pp 8, 14

[xlvi] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/barbary.htm

[xlvii] http://www.orbat.com/site/data/historical/usa/usn1812.html

[xlviii] http://www.dmwv.org/mexwar/concise.htm

[xlix] http://www.csnavy.org/cssfla.htm

[l] http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/org12-6f.htm

[li] http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/

[lii] "Story of Integration of Indian States", V.P. Menon, Advent Books; ASIN: 0861314654, pp 24,25

[liii] http://goatourism.nic.in/fjipgoa.htm

[liv] American-led military alliance in Europe. See http://www.nato.int

[lv] C. Raja Mohan, “India, U.S. bury the ghosts of 1971”, the Hindu, 7 December 2001

[lvi] http://sikkim.nic.in/sws/sikk_his.htm

[lvii] The 1974 test was officially not termed a weapons test, but as a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE).

See C.V. Sundaram, “Atomic Energy in India – 50 Years”, NIAS News

[lviii] http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Images-1984.html

[lix] http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1970s/Siachen.html

[lx] http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-4/harry.html

[lxi] http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/Kargil/Shenag.html

[lxii] U.S. Senate Hearing on "Crisis in South Asia: India's Nuclear Tests", 13 May 1998, http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/helm0513.htm

[lxiii] http://newsarchives.indiainfo.com/spotlight/nuclear/

[lxiv] http://www.fas.org/irp/wwwinfo.html

[lxv] Ashley J. Tellis, “India's Emerging Nuclear Posture”, RAND Corp., ISBN: 0-8330-2774-3 MR-1127-AF, 2001, pp 7-14

[lxvi] http://encarta.msn.com/find/concise.asp?mod=1&ti=761568357&page=2#s37

[lxvii] President Bush’s State of the Union Speech to the U.S. Congress, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html

[lxviii] http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/07/17/leone.peacekeepers.02/

[lxix] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/919992.stm