THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA - A Validation of the U.S. Marines

At the Quebec conference in August of 1943, the Allied high command announced it's intention to launch an offensive in the Central Pacific, in the drive towards Japan. A prime objective of this drive, to be undertaken as a Navy-Marines operation, was to take the Marshall Islands. The Marshall Islands would serve as an air base from which further operations could be launched against the Marianas, and from there against the Japanese home islands. But 500 miles to the southeast of the Marshalls, an archipelago of atolls called the Gilberts stood between U.S. forward ground air bases and the Marshalls. The Gilberts had only one workable airstrip for refueling American aircraft and that was on the island of Betio in the western Gilbert Island atoll of Tarawa.

The Japanese commander in charge of the defense of Tarawa, Rear Admiral Keiji Shibasaki, said "A mission men cannot take Tarawa in a hundred years." He commanded 2,600 imperial marines, the best amphibious troops in the Japanese armed forces. With the importation of 1,000 Japanese workers and 1,200 Korean laborers the island airstrip of Betio had been transformed into one of the most formidable fortresses in the world, boasting 14 coastal defense guns(four of which were taken from the surrendered British garrison at Singapore), 40 strategically located artillery pieces, covering every approach to the island, a coconut-log sea wall four feet high lining the lagoon and over 100 machine gun emplacements behind the wall. All this was concentrated on an island only a mile long and a few hundred yards wide. Meanwhile an armada of 17 carriers, 12 battleships, eight heavy and four light cruisers, 66 destroyers and 36 transports carrying the 2nd Marine Division and a part of the 37th Infantry Division- some 35,000 soldiers and Marines headed for Betio in early November of 1943. In the moments before pre-invasion bombardment began, the task force naval commander, Rear Admiral Howard F. Kingman announced to the landing troops "Gentlemen, we will not neutralize Betio. We will not destroy it. We will obliterate it!" Neither Shibasaki nor Kingman knew what they were up against.

On November 20th at 2:15 A.M. the marine transports went to General Quarters. Last minute landing preparations were made and the marines received their last rites. At 5:05 A.M. the first battleship let loose a salvo on Betio's coastal batteries, followed shortly thereafter by the other battleships and destroyers in the task force. The shelling stopped only for enough time to let the dive bombers from the escort carriers pound the island. The first wave of amphtracks and Higgins boats moved in on the lagoon side of Betio. The formation was jolted to a stop 500 yards out by a reef which the amphtracks could climb over only with great difficulty. Simultaneously, a hail of fire opened up from the island, incinerating the lodged and incoming boats as well as mowing down the marines wading ashore. Few of the first wave survived. But a few got through, and with the help of four successive waves the marines established a beachhead up to a four foot sea wall.

By nightfall, the marines were pinned down on a stretch of beach 100 yards long and 20 feet inland. And rather than being obliterated, the Japanese marines had barely been scratched by the naval and air bombardment. While a brief respite between bombardment and the landings had occurred, the Japanese rushed to their gun posts and had delivered devastating fire. But because their communication lines had been cut, none of them knew what was going on. Therefore, according tot the Bushido Code, each isolated soldier or group of soldiers was obliged to either fight to the death or commit suicide unless ordered otherwise. Consequently, Japanese resistance was fanatical. Some Japanese swam out to disabled amphtracks that night and poured fire onto the marines from the rear- silenced only at great cost to the marines. And a lone Japanese seaplane-turned-bomber easily inflicted casualties on the concentrated beachhead. In all, the first day on Betio had been very costly for the 2nd Division- amphtracks and Higgins boats littered the lagoon, wounded marines everywhere, and dead bodies and parts of bodies everywhere: out of 5,000 men, 1,500 were dead or wounded.

At the beginning of the second day, three marine battalions held a small foothold on Betio's lagoon beach. They were ordered to attack at 6:00 A.M. while the 2nd Division reserves, the 1st and 3rd battalions of the Eighth Marines were brought up to the reef. As the Japanese defenders opened up on the wading-in marines, Colonel Shoup of Major Crowe's battalion at the far east side of the lagoon ordered a desperate attack to halt the slaughter of incoming marines. Only 450 of the 800 incoming men made it to the beach. But with this fresh reserve, the central battalion punched its way inland, across the airstrip, and seized a part of the island's sough shore. Meanwhile a high tide flooded the lagoon, allowing reinforcement boats to pass over the reef and come directly up to shore. The arrival of tanks in support of all three battalions on the beachheads proved critical that day. The tanks rolled up to the front lines, taking out Japanese pill boxes and other fortifications at close range.

By dusk, the 6th Marines, after having secured the nearby island of Makin, paddled over the reef in rubber boats and landed on the western beach. There, they met up with Major Ryan's ravaged western lagoon assault battalion. Reinforced, and having gained ground, the second day came to an end. Marine Colonel Shoup radioed the daily situation report back to the command ships: "Casualties: many. Percentage dead: unknown. Combat efficiency: we are winning." Meanwhile, Admiral Shibasaki was sending his last radio message to Tokyo: "Our weapons have been destroyed. From now on everyone is attempting a final charge. May Japan exist for ten thousand years!"

On the third day, all three battalions moved inland, with the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines sweeping up the southern shore of Betio. With infantry and flame thrower support, tanks blew apart the remaining fortifications in the central and western part of the island. Taking out pill boxes, machine gun nests and snipers took up much of this third day. But by nightfall, the marines held western and central Betio. At twilight, Shibasaki's troops made one final courageous 'Banzai' suicide charge. They rushed the 6th Marines, Company B in almost overpowering numbers. The marines began to break. Lieutenant Thomas phoned Major Jones, saying "We are killing them as fast as they come at us, but we can't hold much longer; we need reinforcements." Jones replied, "We haven't got them to send you; you've got to hold." In the face of heavy losses, the 6th Marines wavered, but didn't break. When dawn appeared, the marines still held their positions.

On the morning of November 23rd, the 6th Marines counted 300 Japanese bodies scattered around their positions. As it turned out, this group of Japanese had been the last large contingent on Betio with only small pockets of resistance remaining. And following a painstaking mop up of the eastern side of the island, Japanese resistance, with the exception of a few snipers who would continue to take pot shots at marines for the next several days, came to an end. For at 1:12 P.M., after 76 hours of fighting, Betio was declared 'secure'. Upon arriving at Betio that day, General Holland Smith ordered both the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack to be raised over Betio(for Betio was to revert to the British as a Pacific trust after the war). The general then toured the island west of the airport. He noted that only seventeen Japanese had surrendered while only 129 Korean laborers had survived out of a total of 4,700 troops and construction workers

THE VALUE OF TARAWA In the 76-hour fight for Betio, 1,056 marines and sailors were killed, died of wounds or were missing and presumed to be dead. Some 2,300 men were wounded, but recovered. Meanwhile, at home, Americans were appalled by the losses at Tarawa, flooding Admiral Nimitz's mail with angry letters. But Tarawa had taught the navy and the marines some vital lessons in amphibious warfare which in the near future, would save thousands of lives. More amphtracks were to be built with better armor, including side protection for marines. Higgins boats were removed from landing operations. Landing craft were converted into supporting gunboats, able to come in close on the beach. Underwater demolition teams were organized to destroy natural and artificial obstacles before future atoll landing would take place. Precision rocket and naval attacks had proven their worth against the near impregnable fortifications. And the role of the tank in turning the tide of battle proved critical. All these lessons would be applied to future campaigns with great success.

The price for Betio had been relatively high, but within days, Betio was converted into a forward base for the assault on the Marshalls, with bomber and fighter sorties flying out within hours of the marines victory. And within nine weeks of the battle, an invasion task force under Admiral Nimitz left Tarawa to take the Marshall Islands.

Marines who would not have their deeds recorded, or recognized by earning a medal went about the deadly business of survival and winning a battle. Here and there small groups of Marines, most led by brave privates, took tiny patches of ground. The extraordinary requirement to wade across 700 yards of coral reef, totally exposed to withering machine gun fire and accurately registered artillery salvos, was faced be almost every single Marine in the Division. That simple act required braver and fortitude to succeed. PFC. Bill Clear, 8th Marines, recalled the wade in, "Jeez, the fire was heavy as hell as we went in. I was scared to death." Lieutenant Commander Robert A. McPherson, a pilot flying over the atoll, described what he saw, "The water never seemed clear of tiny men, their rifles held over their heads, slowly wading beach wards. I wanted to cry." "Yet this reef was crossed by men wading the reef with the determination, courage and endurance to carry on to the end in order to secure the island of Betio," declared Lt. General Julian Smith. "In the chaos, the life of every Marine depended quite simply on his willingness to risk it." How or why did Marines in small groups or singularly, usually on their own or under the direction of a local leader, and all completely removed from the doctrine of amphibious warfare, move forward? Inside enough men, willing to risk their lives, were qualities not listed in the Tentative Man2walfor Landing Operations.

The qualities can best be identified by men who lead the marines into battle. Colonel T. A. Culhane, Jr., Operations Officer, 2nd Marines identified the intangible qualities, "More important than all the techniques [of amphibious assault], was the high state of training and discipline of the individual Marine, his morale, and his confidence and determination to continue the attack even though those about him became casualties." Lt. Colonel Howard J. Rice, Exec., 2/2 focused in on the morale factor, "Before we hit the beach we knew it would be grim business. But we intended and expected to win, even when we held only a narrow naked beach. But, I must admit this confidence was based on nothing more tangible than a faith, a faith shared by all Marines, that Marines always finished a job assigned." Lt. Colonel William T. Bray, C.O., Company All/2, was even more succinct, "The value of sound training and the spirit of comradeship, which comprises a fundamental pillar of Marine Corps life, still stand foremost in my mind as the primary reason for victory at Tarawa." Joseph Alexander believes that an important factor from training permitted the marines to sustain morale and operations longer than the Japanese in the intense battle. Alexander writes, "The Marines' intensive, preliminary field training and strenuous conditioning prior to combat gave them an edge as the battle entered into the third day." Edwin Hoyt saw the training in a different beneficial light, "here the hard training of the marines showed itself; men, from the remnants of several different companies, adjusted to complete change of command and operating procedure under heavy fire without a whimper, and moved on to fight as though it had all been planned this way." These were officers and leaders viewing from the topside of command down to the ranks. The men in the ranks may have reacted that way from training but self -motivation may have been more personal and human related.

The espirt de corps of the Marines was operating in the inferno of the battle. The esprit de corps was extremely high in the Second Marine Division. But how did that play out on a individual basis? Richard Wheeler, a marine veteran who fought on Iwo, explained, in his book, A Special Valor, how the esprit emerged on Tarawa, "They were all Marines, and they were in this thing together, and they would do the best they could to uphold the Corps' reputation and sustain one another. Few men talked in terms of 'death before dishonor," but the ancient code applied." Robert Sherrod who witnessed it up close and personal described it this way, "It was inconceivable to most Marines that they should let another Marine down, or that they could be responsible for dimming the bright reputation of their corps." This was demonstrated by the feeling among the Marines who held the tiny strip of beach on the first night. "There was no sense of panic in the lines as the Marines set up for night defenses." No one dared to let the Corps down or to let down the Marine lying next to him. It even extended to unknown Marines. Marines fought and died for other Marines, unknown and even unseen. "In those first desperate hours there had been only one way to get at the Japanese, and that was to get in and kill them, which usually meant getting killed oneself in the process. But enough marines had given their lives to let the beachhead live." Even fifty years later marines recall why they carried on. Norman Moisie, an amtrak driver in Company A, 2nd Amtrac Battalion, wrote on the fiftieth anniversary, "Still, not a day passes without memories of Tarawa, the spirit of the Marine Corps, and of all the good men with whom I served.

Tarawa did turn out to be a "productive proving ground" for the amphibious doctrine. In fact every subsequent move in the drive across the central pacific was to be made with the mistakes of Tarawa in mind. The lessons learned and adjustments made to the doctrine helped take the Marshalls twice as fast with half the casualties. The practical lessons of amphibious warfare [at Tarawa] provided for adjustments and improvements in all six parts of the doctrine. But what must be recognized and remembered about Tarawa was that it was the individual marine, his courage, bravery and training which bought the victory and time for adjustment which sold the doctrine. The doctrine may have been sound, and the correct method to seize an enemy base, island or hostile shore, but it was in disarray and failing on Tarawa. It took the Marines to catch and save it from failure; Marines who relied on traditional bedrock foundations of the Corps. Edwin Hoyt put it best, "without the heroism of the Marines at Tarawa, the entire course of the Central Pacific might have changed." Tarawa should not stand as the proof of amphibious doctrine, but as the symbol of raw courage and Marine tradition.

Professor Dirk A. Ballendorf

Thank you for posting this thread. I was thinking about Tarawa yesterday and today also. The second day at Tarawa was worse than the first.

What strikes me about the black and white pictures you chose (and this is nothing on you), is how faceless and hopeless those huddled figures all look.

The "Old Corps" was known for its characters -- Old Gimlet Eye, Hikin' Hiram, Hard Hearted Hannikin, Diamond Lou, Chesty Puller, even Rupe the Stupe, and a slew of others. I think the Corps is best explemplified by brashness and even arrogance. And I bet the Marines that fought the Japs on Tarawa had it all in spades. That artwork doesn't show that. I love the line from the 1974 "Three Musketeers" -- "The King says fight and we fight. Is life worth so many questions?"

And what Pat Cleburne told Govan before the Battle of Franklin: "If we are to be killed, let us die like men."

I don't see anything of that in the artwork you chose (which I bet is official Marine Corps art); that is interesting, but also sad.

The thing to remember about Tarawa and the whole black bloody business of war is what General Patton said (paraphrasing): "Don't cry that such men died; rejoice that such men lived."

Semper Fidelis

Walt

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.