Posted on 12/01/2002 4:58:10 AM PST by SJackson
Towards furthering its own interests, the Arab world would do well to learn more about the US, argues Abdel-Moneim Said* in this installment of his ongoing series on Arab reactions to 9/11
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The events of 11 September threw many things into bold relief. Among these was the fact that the Arabs are somewhat out of touch with the world in general, which was clear from their inability to fathom the ramifications of the events or handle their consequences. However, the most crucial revelation in the aftermath of that fateful day was the Arabs' utter inability to interact rationally with the US, primarily because of a general ignorance about the country both before and after the explosions that struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
The US, as it is said, is too important and powerful to ignore. One would think that this fact alone would motivate extensive study of the history, institutions and political administration of that country. Yet, such a process has been virtually nonexistent in the Arab world. It is astonishing that, in spite of the intensity of Arab-US relations at the security, political and economic levels, the number of Arab specialists in the US can be counted on one hand. Only this year, at the initiative of Cairo University, the first centre for American studies in the Arab world was founded. This fact is not only dumbfounding, it is catastrophic. When asked who they believed was behind the attacks on New York and Washington, the vast majority of the Arab public refused to accept that it was Osama Bin Laden. This opinion, alone, is indicative of a vast gap between the peoples of North America and the Arab world and their respective leaders.
Many factors account for this gap. Some of these I have discussed in previous articles. Others pertain directly to our knowledge -- or, rather, lack thereof -- of US history, society and political institutions. Some observers attribute this gap to the composition and attitudes of the current administration. Related to these is a fourth set of factors that can be subsumed under the heading of the 'interference' that always blurs our evaluation of the US, with the Arab-Israeli conflict foremost in the 'din' that clouds our thinking in this respect. Certainly, each of these sets of factors merits separate analysis in the hope that the Arab world would consider them afresh. This article, however, will focus on the sense of bewilderment and foreboding the Arabs feel towards the current US administration.
The prevalent opinion in Arab decision-making quarters during the latter half of 1999 was that the election of George Bush junior would bode well for the Arab cause. Indeed, there are indications that Yasser Arafat was reluctant to accept the Clinton plan and to participate actively in the Taba talks in the last week of January 2000 because he felt that the president-elect would serve the Palestinian cause better.
The reason for that opinion is well-known: even if Clinton's proposals appeared reasonable, there were too many Jews in his administration (and the same would have applied to the next Democratic administration had Gore succeeded) for it to be trusted. Such blinkers, which the Arabs are determined to wear, have long hampered an objective assessment of situations in terms of Arab goals and interests and in terms of what is or is not feasible.
In a like manner, Arab leaders thought they knew Bush junior. After all, they had dealt with his father as head of the CIA, head of the US mission to the UN, vice-president for eight years, then president and, later, after leaving the White House, as a frequent visitor to this part of the world. The Arabs also felt that the Republican administration under Bush had opened important channels of communication through such figures as Richard Cheney, Colin Powell and James Baker who had worked during the Gulf War to establish military, political and intelligence ties. Nor had they forgotten that it was Bush senior who had been the driving force behind the Madrid Peace Conference, after having used loan guarantees to Israel to pressure Shamir into halting the construction of settlements -- the only time this has occurred in US-Israeli relations. Finally, the Bush family has strong ties with Texas, which is physically and culturally remote from America's east coast establishment and shares with the Arab world a desert climate, oil and minimal Jewish influence.
But this skewed perspective on the way US government and politics work was not without its critics. They warned that by making our causes the sole criteria for assessment, we obscure the reality that countries are dynamic entities, in which diverse social forces come into play and which are driven by a multiplicity of interests and motives. Further clouding our vision, the critics said, was the tendency to project the dominant role kinship bonds play in Arab societies and politics on to modern democracies in which the ethos of the political 'tribe' prevails over the traditional values associated with blood ties.
Simultaneously, the Arab perspective was mired in a notion of immutability. While the decade since the Gulf War brought little new to the way politics are conducted in the Arab world, that same period saw nothing short of a revolution spearheaded by Clinton which could only be reversed through a counter-revolution launched by Bush junior. When dealing with a social entity with the history, size and power of the US, adhering to such a blinkered view represents nothing if not gross remiss.
During the US electoral campaign in the autumn of 1999, James Zoghbi, director of the Institute of Arab-American Relations in Washington, published numerous articles in the Arab press, cautioning Arab leaders against their assessment of Bush junior, but to little avail. Arab leaders and, to a certain extent, Arab public opinion, clung to their belief that the Clinton administration had been the worst administration to come out of Washington and that an administration headed by Al Gore would be worse yet. To be fair, this impression prevailed not only in the Arab world, but also among Arab and Muslim Americans who sided with Bush, or, more accurately, cast their vote for the Arab-American independent candidate Ralph Nader. This vote may have been instrumental in handing Bush his victory.
The question, here, is not whether the Bush administration is better or worse than Clinton's, even with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian cause or Arab interests as a whole, which have little impact on the direction the US electorate casts its vote. Rather, our concern is how to promote Arab interests through our dealings with any administration that comes to power in Washington, regardless of whether that administration is Republican or Democrat or whether its leader hails from Texas or Arkansas. Within a four or eight-year time span we must determine how best to approach a specific team empowered to steer US policy during a period that has its own set of conjunctural determinants.
In so doing, we must bear in mind that we are dealing with human beings who have their own motives, ambitions and approaches to promoting US interests. We must also remember that we are dealing with institutions that are far more permanent, but that do not operate in isolation from human beings.
Who are the people currently in the White House? Some had made their mark in Bush senior's administration during the Gulf War only to find themselves booted out of the White House for eight years by Clinton, the first Democratic president to serve two full terms since Franklin D Roosevelt. Others were conservative Republicans who had not served under Bush senior and who, throughout his term, had reproached their White House colleagues for their continued faith in the pragmatist school of the east coast establishment, which they said would neither make the country strong nor win elections. This latter camp took as its inspiration the "golden age" of the Republicans under Ronald Reagan, when the US led the world to victory over communism and when the country regained its economic prowess.
The age of Reagan, then, rather than Bush senior, was their point of departure. After Clinton was voted into his second term of office in 1996, the Republicans, setting their sights on victory in the forthcoming elections, began to rally around what they called "the new American century". If in the 20th century the US triumphed over fascism and communism and established global economic and military hegemony, the US of the 21st century would be no less glorious. This is the project that united the elite who had hitched itself to Bush junior's coat-tails, which includes such figures as Elliot Abrams, Dick Cheney, Elliot Cohen, Paula Dobriansky, Steve Forbes, Francis Fukuyama, Frank Gaffney and Dan Quail.
Many of these names are now part of the current Bush administration. And while National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was not among them, her beliefs vary little from theirs. Perhaps the sole exception is Colin Powell who has little in common with other members of the administration in terms of identity or ideology. In any event, this is the group that shaped the ideological framework of the current administration. It is impossible to understand the changes in the attitudes and policies of the US Defence Department towards the Arab world without taking a closer look at Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Peter Rodman who occupy, respectively, the positions of secretary of defence, his under-secretary and his assistant. It is impossible to understand many of the statements and beliefs expressed by the current administration, before and after 11 September, without taking note of the ideological influence of Fukuyama and his notion of "the end of history" and Elliot Abrams and his world view.
Perhaps our failure to take such factors into consideration accounts for why this administration has so often taken us by surprise. Perhaps it is not too late to take an entirely fresh look at who and what we are dealing with.
* The writer is the director of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
Written in a blameless passive voice to avoid Islam's lust for mass murder of innocents ignoring the widespread dancing in the streets celebrating the murders.
Allah aakkkkk barf.
Lots to think about in this article.
This article does not mention Islam, but it is Islam that is the source and cause of the unrealistic views of those Arabs that are Muslims. How could one hope to analyze the unrealistic views of people without mentioning the repressive religion that promotes that ignorance.
The failure to make a clear distinction between Arabs and Muslim Arabs, and to treat Arab-American relations as thought there were no disctinction, can only be an intentional obfuscation of the facts, and can only add confusion to any attempt to understand what is really going on in the world.
The other fact that Islam is no longer primarily an Arab religion, with more adherents who are black or Asain than Arab is neatly glossed over, obscuring the fact that it is the entire Muslim world that is confused and ignorant about the nature of the United States, and that it is not primarily an Arab issue at all.
The intended impression that this article speaks for all Arabs does a great disservice to those rational Arabs who woke up and rejected the stupid Muslim religion.
Hank
The reason for that opinion is well-known: even if Clinton's proposals appeared reasonable, there were too many Jews in his administration (and the same would have applied to the next Democratic administration had Gore succeeded) for it to be trusted.
...snip
Finally, the Bush family has strong ties with Texas, which is physically and culturally remote from America's east coast establishment and shares with the Arab world a desert climate, oil and minimal Jewish influence.
Well, them Ay-rabs got one thing right...
Pre-9/11 America was heading towards isolationism, and well on its way to telling Israel to piss off. Post 9/11 the shock and grief of America was turned to undying hatred at the sight of Muslims around the world celebrating our tragedy.
They will get their Jihad, but on American terms. Americans don't conquer; they make cultures extinct. The Wahhabism will find itself in the history books alongside Die Kultur, Samurais, and Sovetskiy Soyuz.
Their children will study English, chew Wrigley's, drink Diet Pepsi, eat Big Macs, listen to Britney Spears, read Mickey Spillane, and vote.
More so than they do already.
Well put.
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