The Kosovo conundrum: By its own performance definitions, the U.N. effort has been a failure

Smoke rises from where a car bomb exploded outside a restaurant on "Bill Clinton Avenue" in Pristina, Kosovo, Dec. 13. The bombing highlighted the volatility of the province, which has been run by the U.N. since June 1999.

Dec. 20 — Three and a half years after the United States bombed its way with NATO into the then-Serbian province of Kosovo and imposed an international protectorate, how does it look in that recurrent trouble spot?

Under the new circumstances Kosovo is still deeply troubled, with both Serbs and Albanians resentful and international authorities frustrated.

AFTER ALL, Kosovo, the historic homeland of ethnic Albanians, Serbs, Roma (Gypsies), Turks and several other minorities, was unmistakably a festering sore for more than a century. Its Albanians and Serbs vied for and alternately won suzerainty, repeatedly chasing out thousands of their ethnic rivals.

Under the new circumstances Kosovo is still deeply troubled, with both Serbs and Albanians resentful and international authorities frustrated.

Now the nearly 2 million Albanian inhabitants vastly outweigh the barely 100,000 remaining Serbs and members of other minorities, having driven out 230,000 non-Albanians during the almost helpless governance of the United Nations and a NATO military contingent now numbering 30,000. The minorities live in 24 ghetto-like settlements.

Despite pious, almost weekly declarations by the United Nations that the protectorate will be “multiethnic,” Kosovo is essentially Albanian and will remain so in the distant foreseeable future. A mere 2,500 Serbs and other minority members have returned to their communities, and even those are only able to do so under heavy international guard.

Violent crimes occur almost weekly. The province is a hub of organized crime for the central Balkans.

Albanians continue to murder Serbs and sometimes other Albanians. On Nov. 16 two Serbian Orthodox churches in the Istok municipality were severely damaged by explosives, adding to 110 Serbian churches destroyed or desecrated since June 1999. The evening of Dec. 13 a car bomb detonated on crowded Bill Clinton Avenue in downtown Pristina, injuring 32.

On a typical day, Dec. 5, troops of the international Kosovo Force reported separate confiscations of a machine gun, two large mortar bombs, four grenades and one pistol. Bigger caches are routinely discovered.

Although Pristina, the Kosovo capital, boasts images of bustling activity such as many new Albanian houses, the U.N. Development Program has estimated that half the population of the province lives at or below the poverty line. Unemployment hovers around 50 percent.

Sadly, this is nothing new. During four decades of Yugoslav Communist rule, Kosovo persisted as an economic basket case despite billions poured in from richer parts of the federation as assistance to the “underdeveloped region.” The U.N. now appears to be haplessly replicating the Communists’ unsuccessful strivings to create a harmonious and prosperous province. It is “not a viable economic entity,” said Elez Biberaj, head of Voice of America’s Albanian service.

On the surface there are faint signs of normality. Kosovo has a president, a parliament and municipal authorities. But they have few powers. Real authority is vested only in Michael Steiner, who is in charge of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and who routinely undoes decisions taken by the many Albanian and the few Serbian institutions.

In the view of Susan Manuel, until recently the UNMIK spokeswoman, this has created a “culture of dependency,” where provincial officials tend to shirk making decisions because they know international authorities will have the final say.

As they have for two decades, Albanian leaders press constantly for an “independent” Kosovo and are regularly told by everyone from U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan on down that no change in the status (defined by U.N. resolution 1244, adopted in 1999) can be contemplated until “benchmarks” are achieved, starting with “a society based on the rule of law.”

After a 24-hour visit in Kosovo in November, Annan pronounced the international effort “a successful mission.” Rather, by its own performance definitions on communal security, interethnic dialogue and returns of minorities, the U.N. effort is a failure.

I ask you, as I ask any reasonable Serb or interested party, to consider the reality. Kosovo is not a joke. Serbs are in no position to set considitions for Kosovo and I submit that the worst case scenario at this point, in decreasing order, is (1) independence/annexation by Albania for entire Kosovo under NATO occupation, (2) re-integration of Kosovo into Serbia under conditions less favorable than those dictated by the 1974 Constitution and (3) partition. The last being the best of the worst.

These "solutions," no matter how grave will only be temporary. Anyone who knows the region also knows that the Serbs will eventually reclaim their land although the historical treasures now being wantonly destroyed by Albanians will never be recovered. If history is any guide, the degree of retaliation will, at best, be directly proportional to the damage and duration of occupation/annexation. Hopefully, this can be avoided with some prudent temporary patch work.

The current demographic makeup of Serbia is unacceptable because the Albanian minority has the highest natality rate in Europe and Serbia one of the lowest. Serbia is facing a similar, if not parallel, situation Israel is facing with its Arab minority. No degree of social engineering will fix this. In both countries it is a mathematical certainty that its growing minority, which is both hostile and separatist, will not assimilate and will continue to grow until the Jews and the Serbs become a minority in their own lands. When that happens, Israel will no longer be a Jewish state, and Serbs will no longer be a nation.

Israel has taken steps to offset this, in part by immigration of Russian Jews, many of whom may not even be considered Jewish, to augment the population numbers. Unfortunately, Jewish diaspora -- several million of them world-wide -- are unwilling to "meet next year in Jerusalem," and istead prefer the commodities of the Western world while providing material and political, but also a lot of lips service to their ancestoral homeland.

Serbs are not so lucky or skilled. They are facing extinction as a nation, death by numbers. Right now, Yugoslavia has a population breakup that puts Serbs at jusy over 62% of the population of the official 10.5 million. These figures are not reliable, of course, because the last census was done ante bellum in 1991, and since there there has been a tremendous demographic upheaval, but nonetheless these are the oficial figures, and they show a trend.

The numbers show that nearly 17% of the Yugoslav population are Albanians. Serbs make up about just over 62% (6.5 million; note that the official number of registered Serbian citizens for voting purposes is 6.6 million!). According to these figures, Serbia has just over 8 million people. Without Albanians, Serbs make up about 80%, with no other minority growing out of proportion with the rest.

Serbia can avoid the drastic measures Israel is proposing of actually expelling its Arab citizens out of Israel because they are, by definition, "enemy within," in order to preserve its ethnic state. Serbs can do thi by simply partitioning Kosovo and Metohia (for now -- that's a given) with demographic restructuring that would leave Serbia's portion of Kosovo with those Albanians who wish to stay only. This would bring Serbia in line with other European states and avert a national tragedy.

I do hope sensible people in Serbia set aside their pride and anger, and think what's best for the Serbs as a nation in this case, which is partitioning of Kosovo.

I don't think a population census in Kosovo is possible at this point. Half of the Albanians in Kosovo at the onset of US bombing in 1999 were illegal aliens to begin with.

In the early 1980's Kosovo's member of the rotating Yugoslav presidency was a citizen of Albania! This was discovered just as he was about to take over as the nominal head of state of Yugoslavia! That's equivalent to a Mexican citizen becoming a US president!

Its Albanians and Serbs vied for and alternately won suzerainty, repeatedly chasing out thousands of their ethnic rivals

Binder -- or NBC censors -- make it sound like a tug-of-war. In reality, for centuries following the Ottoman takeover, the ethnic cleansing was a one-way street, with Albanians chasing the Serbs and noth the other way around.

Kosovo's ethnic makeup is a political product of encouraging Serb exodus and Albanian influx. In all fairness, Voyvodina, Serbia's northern province, was settled by refugees from Kosovo in the 18th century. Until then, it was a Hungarian province.

Such demograophic changes were bound to happen in the Balkans and must be accepted. Hungarians may not have been any happier about Serb takeover of Voybodina than the Serbs are about Albanian takeover of Kosovo.

The problem with the Balkans is that no one adheres to principles. What is good for the goose, must be good for the gander. If multi-ethnic Yugoslavia could break apart, so must multiethnic Bosnia. Serbs will have to negotiate Kosovo and hope to get some of it back. Thinking in terms of retaking and reclaiming the entire province is unrelistic in the present political setup and power arrangement, which also prevents the 1.3 million or so Serbs in the artificially held together Bosnia from joining Serbia.

That Serbs are united in their desire to live in one state -- as much as possible -- is both their right (self-determination) and their sencere desire that transcends political differences. Voyislav Koshtunitsa called the Bosnian Serbs arrangement "temporary," and Zoran Djindjich, commonly described as "pro-Western" pragmatist, is [inning the reslution of Kosovo on the resolution of the Serb republic currently held captive in Bosnia.

Half of the Albanians in Kosovo at the onset of US bombing in 1999 were illegal aliens to begin with.

Exactly. So how can an illegal alien be stripped of his rights and be discriminated, as the NATO-propagandists claimed was the the case in Kosovo? Illegal aliens have only one right, and that is to be transfered to their country of origin if discovered. According to western standards, by force if necessary. Common practice here in Germany. Personaly, I know people who's visa's expired or other circumstances under which the german authorities regarded them as illegal alliens. Police forced them on a plane 'back home'.

A strory that deserves a thread on FR. Shows how evil the serbs were, not to allow an illegal immigrant to become head of state. Barbarians! By the way, what was the name of that guy and where is he living today?

What is good for the goose, must be good for the gander.

What about the 'croatian goose' and the 'Krajina gander'?

While I agree with your analysis of the situation in the Balkans and the need for a general solution for the probelms created in the 1990's, I see little hope unless some polticians in the 'west' admit to their own mistakes concerning the former Yugoslavia.

As to Vojvodina, I think the serbs have to be carefull not to loose this province as well.

By the way, what was the name of that guy and where is he living today?

Fadil Hoxha, of course. He was eventually stripped of his partisan general rank and decorations for saying publicly that Serb women should be available to satisfy Albaninas who wish to rape them.

I know Branicap has an elephant memory and maybe he can add to this.

The one Kosovo Albanian who served as the nominal Yugoslav head of state (1986-1987) was Sinan Hasani. He was accused of being a Miloshevich "loyalist."

As to Vojvodina, I think the serbs have to be carefull not to loose this province as well

Serbs can lose Voyvodina only if they want to. About 2/3 of the population of Voyvodina is Serbian. Overall, Hungarians represent just under 4% of the overall population of Serbia.

What about the 'croatian goose' and the 'Krajina gander'?

Serbs will deal with Croatians when they no longer enjoy the protection of the Big Brother, whoever that may be (God knows they always look for one to hang on to). Every now and then, they are "orphaned," as was the case in 1918, and 1945. In both instances the Serbs helped them get out of punishment they deserved. Next time, I seriously doubt that will happen. Next time, Serbs will come to collect.

David Binder


Copyright 1981 The New York Times Company   
                                      The New York Times 

                             April 19, 1981, Sunday, Late City Final Edition 

SECTION: Section 4; Page 4, Column 1; Week in Review Desk 

LENGTH: 1134 words 

HEADLINE: ONE STORM HAS PASSED BUT OTHERS ARE GATHERING IN YUGOSLAVIA 

BYLINE: By DAVID BINDER 

DATELINE: WASHINGTON 

BODY:

Josip Broz Tito has not been dead a year, but the Yugoslav ''brotherhood and unity'' he nurtured for 35 years has already developed fissures on a sensitive flank, the mostly Albanian province of Kosovo.

What started March 11 as an isolated, seemingly insignificant protest - a student at the University of Pristina dumped his tray of cafeteria food on the floor - escalated by April 2 into riots involving 20,000 people in six cities. Nine people died and more than 50 were injured. Only last week did authorities relax a state of emergency in the province, lifting a curfew and reopening schools.

There are other multi-ethnic countries with sizable minorities. But none equals Yugoslavia for ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity and is so vulnerable to centrifugal forces. Hence the concern of Marshal Tito's successors over the explosion of resentment among Yugoslavia's predominantly Moslem Albanian minority of 1.4 million, most of whom live in Kosovo. After the riots, Stane Dolanc, a member of the Communist Party Presidium, warned of ''the danger of the growth of other kinds of nationalisms'' in Yugoslavia - a thinly veiled allusion to the traditional and still virulent rivalry between the dominant Serbs and Croats.

The Kosovo rebellion was bad enough news for the Belgrade leadership; it coincided with setbacks that have put Yugoslavia's economy in its worst straits in decades. Industrial production dropped 0.6 percent from February 1980 to February 1981 (Kosovo's dropped 2 percent), while the cost of living rose 40.5 percent, according to official figures. Exports now constitute only 10 percent of the gross national product - the lowest proportion in Europe - and are sinking. The Yugoslavs also spent $1.2 billion more in 1980 for oil imports, despite such conservation measures as gasoline rationing. The foreign debt stands at $17 billion.

''Evidently our economy does not function well,'' acknowledged Milos Minic, a member of the collective party leadership, in a speech to party activists in Zagreb last month. ''Stop the uncontrolled rise of prices!'' demanded

Cvijetin Mijatovic, the current President in the revolving succession to Tito, in another grim assessment of the economy before a gathering in Nis.

The Government, having just authorized sharp price increases for alcohol and tobacco products, declared that price rises would have to be held this year to 30 percent at the producer level and 32 percent at the retail level. Belgrade is also looking to revitalize Tito's vaunted system of factory self-management, which has ''deteriorated'' under the pressure of inflation, according to Mr. Mijatovic. He and other leaders have described cases of economic anarchy arising when worker councils have raised prices for their products without considering the common good.

The collective leadership, created by Tito partly because he did not want to be succeeded by one prominent figure, has functioned adequately despite its Rube Goldberg construction. Yet its very dispersal of authority has deprived it of the charisma required to persuade a nation of independent spirits that it is really leading Yugoslavia.

Of course, Tito is a hard act to follow. According to Belgrade officials, the leadership took pains after his death last May to maintain a low profile, but this soon may change. One official said he expected the next Prime Minister, to be elected next year, to play a more prominent role. He also noted that all but one of the eight members of the collective presidency will be replaced in 1983 and he suggested that this might encourage the current leaders to ''become more inspirational because they have nothing to lose.''

Serbs, Turks and Albanians

Outsiders sometimes forget that socialist Yugoslavia was born not only of the war against Hitler, but also of a raging civil war that pitted nationality against nationality and church against church, at a cost of 1.7 million lives.

The nationality problems of the Kosovo region, desperately poor despite considerable mineral wealth, are centuries old and were exacerbated in both world wars. Originally the home of Serbia's founding dynasty in the 12th century, Kosovo lost most of its remaining Serbian population in the 17th century when the Serbs, Orthodox Christians, fled northward to distance themselves from the Ottoman Turks. Albanian tribesmen filled the vacuum; they now constitute more than four-fifths of the province's population.

When the great powers agreed in 1913 to make Albania independent more or less within its present borders, they ceded Kosovo to the Serbian monarchy. It was a blow the Albanians have never forgotten, the more so because their own independence movement had begun in the Kosovo town of Prizren in 1878. World War II brought more upheavals when Kosovo was handed to Mussolini's Italy by Germany and some Albanians enlisted out of gratitude on the Italian side. Retribution came when Tito's partisans entered the area, massacring suspected collaborators before the horrified eyes of their own Albanian Communist comrades in arms.

Tito Partisans Once Ruled Albania

For a time, Tito's dominant forces ruled Albania and a permanent Yugoslav-Albanian federation was even contemplated. One holdout was Enver Hoxha, who had earlier called for a plebiscite in Kosovo. In 1948, the reversals caused by Tito's ouster from the Cominform lofted Mr. Hoxha into the Albanian leadership he still holds today.

For two succeeding decades, Tito's Yugoslavia held down the Albanians of Kosovo, denying them proper schooling and arresting or killing outspoken Albanian teachers. The repression ended in 1966 with the fall of the Serb leader who was Tito's number two, Aleksandr Rankovic. Since then, federal money has poured into Kosovo at a higher rate than into any other part of the country. Pristina University has grown to become one of the country's largest with 48,000 students. Most of the region's administrators, and its police, are ethnic Albanians. The Kosovars are even allowed to fly the Albanian flag, a black eagle on a red field.

Yet this ''tremendous dynamic of development,'' as Mr. Dolanc described it, ironically has fed unrest. There were riots in 1968 and again in 1975. This time the youths of Kosovo shouted ''We want a republic'' (their semi-autonomous province has almost all rights of a Yugoslav republic except the right to secede) and some even demanded annexation by Mr. Hoxha's Albanian fatherland.

David Binder did a world a huge favor during the 1980's by showing the "other side of Kosovo," the side where the term "ethnic cleansing" was coined to define what the Albanians were doing to the Serbs and not the other way around.

But, memories are short, and political realities change drastically in a matter of a few decades. Binder is no longer welcome at the New York Times, and the daily itself has engaged in a relentless anti-Serb propaganda during the brakeup of Yugoslavia and the ensuing civil wars.

That being said, let me just put some things in perspective that is almost never mentioned because most reporters are copycat plagiarists and depend of the whims and prejudices of their guides and translateors. Very few are actually experts in the region their cover, althought some are much better than others. Others yet, like Christiana Amanpour, have made their journalistic careers serving as propaganda mouthpieces for one of the embattled sides.

Binder is dead wrong when he says the Serbs left Kosovo in the 18th century (the Great Exodus led by Bishop Charnoyevich), who settled in what is now Voyvodina, in order to "distance" themselves form the Turks. That's putting it rather mildly!

Serbs joined Austro-Trkish war, after being promised help from the Austrians. When Austria started losing, it reneged on any promises, and the somewhat naive Serbs, having taken the side of the loser, were targeted by the Ottomans for some bloodletting. The reprisals for the Serbian trechery were swift and bloody. Sderbian Orthodoc Patriarchy in Pech was given to the Greek Patriarchate for administration.

Vast numbers of Serbs fled from Kosovo in order to save their lives, not merely to "istance"themselevs from the Turks.

A second very important point is the so-called Buyan (aka Bujan)conference in Dec 1943-Jan 1944. At that conference, the delegates of Tito'c communist partisan movement promised (illegally) Kosovo and Metohiya (aka Kosmet) to Albaninans if they agreed to fight on the side of Tito's forces.

I said, this promis was illegal because Tito's partisans were neither the legitimate government of Yugoslavia, nor was there any legal basis for them to "donate" a part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the Albanian thugs took the Yugoslav thugs' word as something carved in stone.

After the war, Tito has a change of heart. Albania was a strong supporter of Stalin and Tito was trying to save his skin by breaking away with him and cozying up to Americans. It was Tito who reneged on an illegitimate promise made by his goons as the war was windign down. But the Serbs got the blame. The Albanians never forgot this.

At the time they rioted shortly after Tito's detah, the Albanians were the most pampered minority in Yugoslavia, the only "constitutent" minority, and living off of every other Republic. That was apparently not good enough. They only masked their hatrted for Serbs and Yugoslavia with economic and other issues, but their goal was the same all along -- separation.

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