Replies

The problem with the "perspective of the guy on the ground" is that he has no concept of the overall picture to guide him, and no idea what planning has gone on behind the scenes. In Hackworth's case the problem is compounded by his being out of business for so long.

It's a different world than it was during VietNam. It would be a different war than the Korean War of the early 1950's. We were not ready then, having been massively demobilizing from WW II.

We have been preparing for war on the Korean peninsula since the cease-fire at Panmunjong, and would be ready now.
It's just that "the guy on the ground" has no way of knowing what the Rumsfeld DoD has been factoring into the equation.

My bet is there isn't anything said here, or by observors like Hackworth, that hasn't long since been taken into account by the Bush administration.

After all, it isn't as if North Korea just jumped up ugly in the last six weeks.

Korea always was ugly, and always will be the last place anyone would want to fight a war. It is true that Hackworth had a perspective from the guy on the ground, but that is not the only perspective that he has. You may recall that he commanded as high as a batallion in Vietnam. Abrams relieved him after his fourth purple heart in four months (#'s 5-8), because at that time the Army had big plans for him, if he would have just been able to contain the anger, and keep his mouth shut. One did not have to be a genius to see what needed to happen in Korea I. Fortunately Ridgway, and later Van Fleet did do the right thing. Korea II will be different, the ROC have also, like the PDRK had 50 years to prepare. Even the real estate has been placed with a DPRK invasion in mind. Those T-62s and T-72s aren't going anywhere except to hell when ROC A-10s get done with them, after they are halted by rubble from buildings all up and down the Uijjambu (spell?) corridor. My point hours before was then and is now that we should leave the defense of the ROC to the ROC, and come in only if needed.