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The mass of the vehicle translates to greater heating loads on reentry.

I would agree that the total heat generated would be greater due to a required longer re-entry(more s-turns to scrub off the speed), however the craft would likely not experience substantialy more heat at any one time during the decent, just a longer time at high heat.

Am I close to correct? Or am I mis-understanding the process.

I can not ascertain the answer without more specific flight data. I am not privy to such information.

However, generally, the more massive payloads create higher heating loads. These heating loads can be dissipated across time by flying a trajectory with lower profiles. However, the profile OV-102 STS-107 was flying was apparently the lowest profile they could identify.

There was no other approach profile to fly.

The vehicle structure can experience maximum heat loads later than when it experiences maximum energy. The reason is that the TPS dissipates some thermal energy and other amounts slowly migrate into the structure by conduction.

In this case it appears from the Covault article posted in the last 24 hours that FR scooped the major media again.

FR consistent shows the superiority of having on-line expertise from various fields of experience. Although we are not involved with the space program, we have enough experience in various fields to identify the issues and apply standard analytical techniques.

I want to congratulate NASA on their successes and share in their loss. This is an international loss. Each crew reflects our hopes and dreams for a better planet.

Understanding how those dreams were lost in this accident can help us prevent similar incidents in the future.

At this point, I believe that the ET insulation had ice build up. That ice build up became substantial due to the changes in the ET insulation formula. ET contractors were probably aware of ice build up, but may not have been aware of the extent of the build up. Ice impact analysis is nothing new to Boeing. Ice impact analysis was done prior to the launch of STS-51 L per report in the Rogers Commission findings. That ice impact analysis was necessitated due to the realization that ice from the gantry could impact part of the orbiter.

The threat of ice impacting the orbiter has been known for many years. Changes to formulation in ET insulation made to support Clinton-Gore environmental goals were not consistent with flight safety. Dan Goldin is responsible for this disaster because he was the NASA Administrator who permitted NASA's flight safety to be compromised.

Dan Goldin needs to be put before a public hearing to discuss this matter and defend his decision. It is not Ron Dittemore who deserves this kind of treatment. The Shuttle Program Manager is following directives from Washington DC. His goal is safe flight. He clearly did not realize the safety factors involved with the ET insulation changes nor the ice build up.

The question is whether or not Dan Goldin ever requested NASA exception from the Clinton-Gore policy.

"Am I close to correct?"

That's it. The speeds would be the same. They would decrease their reentry angle to keep the temps the same. It would just take longer to slow down.