Posted on 02/10/2003 2:28:47 PM PST by Tailgunner Joe
1. The “Zero Hunger” program’s total discredit
Among these mishaps are reverses suffered by the so-called “Zero Hunger” program, one of President Lula da Silva’s main battle flags and most important contribution to social welfare. While President Lula has failed to create a national consensus for this welfare initiative, it has at least helped him gain considerable international support. “Zero Hunger” is quickly becoming totally discredited. The problems started with the confusion surrounding its official launching. The media reported that President Lula da Silva and his entire Cabinet would fly to Guaribas, in the state of Piauí. The town is listed as Brazil’s poorest by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and was to serve as the official launching site to kick off this important government program.
However, the trip was cancelled at the last moment, and the official launching of “Zero Hunger” has been postponed indefinitely. Guaribas is famous now in Brazil as the city President Lula could not reach. Adding to the confusion are the statements of town officials that while Guaribas has material needs, none of its residents suffers from actual hunger.
At the same time, specialists and political observers attacked the program, which no longer enjoys the unanimous support of the Workers’ Party (PT) members, and their closer allies, serving in the Lula administration. The main arguments hurled against “Zero Hunger” are its demagogic character, its inconsistent scientific basis and its lack of clear goals to resolve a problem whose true scope is ignored by absolutely everyone.
2. The Lula administration sheds its pragmatism, even in the economic field
The Lula administration’s political stumbles can partly be attributed to its lack of experience. They are also due, however, to the new President’s doublespeak, and what has been dubbed the “rash contradictions” underpinning his Cabinet.
As a presidential candidate, Lula da Silva portrayed himself as pragmatic, conciliatory, and desirous of good relations with every sector of Brazilian society. More importantly, he seemed to have jettisoned his leftist ideology and declared he would respect the market. Investors began to think he could be trusted.
The choice of his economic team was heralded as a sign of President Lula’s pragmatism. It immediately implemented measures that calmed down the markets. That tranquility is fast fading and uneasiness is setting in as events show ever more clearly that the State apparatus is being used to promote the PT’s leftist ideals.
This is happening even in the economic field where top posts in important state enterprises and banks are now being assigned to PT members or allies. The lack of proper professional credentials is no bar to these ideological appointments.
Consequently, after a few days of stability, the economic indexes began registering the general uneasiness again. The Central Bank increased interest rates and the dollar continued to climb against the Brazilian real, shaking both the government’s credibility as well as President Lula’s own. President Lula called for patience in one of his speeches, but analysts suggest that the increase in interest rates caused significant disillusionment.
Antônio Ermírio de Moraes, a leading businessman, affirmed in an interview with the Folha de São Paulo that the new government’s honeymoon with the public will soon be over.
Pre-election fears that a Lula administration would simply abandon its much-peddled pragmatism and become markedly leftist appear to be increasingly justified.
3. Party rule
The Lula administration is placing party interests over those of the State. Former President José Sarney, now a Senator, writes: “For the first time in our history, we are experiencing party rule, where a political party’s leadership wants to be the hegemonic center of decision-making.” [“Políticos no Governo” (Politicians in Government), Folha de São Paulo, Jan. 24, 2003.]
It is important to remember that the PT’s overwhelming presence in the administration does not reflect election results. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva received three times more votes than the PT, his political party. President Lula’s election victory was the outcome of the alliance of several political forces and ideological currents. In voting for President Lula, Brazilian voters did not endorse the PT’s leftist agenda.
4. Authoritarianism in negotiating for Congressional top posts
Press reports claim that José Dirceu, the President’s Chief of Staff, is being authoritarian in his negotiations with Congress on the selection of the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate.
The Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), the largest party in the Senate, hoped to win the Presidency there. The PMDB caucus, however, is split between supporters and opponents of the Lula administration and each faction presented its own candidate. The PMDB senators had to choose one of them. The Lula administration decided to interfere in this party struggle in favor of the pro-Lula candidate. It used threats of an income tax audit to convince one indebted senator not to participate in a planning meeting in support of the anti-Lula candidate. In the wake of such strong-arm tactics, political analyst Dora Kramer wrote: “The police-like use of the State apparatus to secure political advantage brooks no compromise. Today the target is a wing of the PMDB. Tomorrow it can be anyone who dares to disagree.” [“Cacoete absolutista” (Absolutist itch), O Estado de São Paulo, Jan. 17, 2003].
In light of this interference in the PMDB’s internal affairs, the Governor of Pernambuco called on the PT to “respect democracy.”
5. Foci of political instability
In its shift to the left and pursuit of ideological reform, the Lula administration has created foci of considerable political instability. The most characteristic example was its announced social security reform. Since Brazilian social security currently operates at a great deficit, the whole system needs restructuring and its budget balanced. Ricardo Berzoini, the Minister for Social Security announced reform plans that would implement egalitarian changes to retirement benefits. If the changes go through, the more favorable benefits traditionally paid to members of the Armed Forces and the Judiciary would be made to match other type of payees.
The Minister’s affirmations rocked the Stock and Currency Exchanges and provoked a national debate. The technical considerations of the issue were not discussed. Rather, populist and demagogic rhetoric demanding the end of “privilege” in these two sectors of public service monopolized the debate.
The government’s proposal created great turmoil. Marco Aurélio de Melo, Chief Justice of Brazil’s Supreme Court, stated that changing acquired and expected rights was more typical of an armed revolution than a democratic State governed by the rule of law. Accordingly, Justice de Melo did not believe the proposal would pass constitutional muster.
The Chief Justices of the Superior Tribunal of Labor and the Federal Appeals Court also urged caution in the reform of the social security system.
Minister Berzoini’s proposal also generated unrest in the Armed Forces. The President of the Military Club, General Luiz Gonzaga Lessa (retired), a prestigious figure among the military, warned that the social security changes proposed by the administration would bring military instability.
The government had to step back. The debate was called “disastrous” even in PT circles, for having disparaged consensus and stirred up a contentious issue.
6. Politico-ideological “pay ups”
With each passing day, an important factor is beginning to shape Brazilian politics. While still in its initial stages, it may give rise to serious conflicts.
During the presidential campaign, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his closest aides presented an image and rhetoric different from the PT’s ideology and from the political platform discussed and voted on within the party. President Lula’s new politico-ideological orientation was not even submitted to prior debate within the PT’s ranks. Consequently, the party’s platform was never altered to accommodate the new formulas presented by Lula da Silva’s talented campaign managers.
Accordingly, with the massive presence of Workers’ Party members now installed at every echelon of government, the demands are multiplying for President Lula to “pay up,” and to deliver consistency between the administration’s policies and the PT’s ideological goals, as discussed and approved in its assemblies and enshrined in its political platforms.
The demands to “pay up” ideologically do not come from just one or another radical element in the PT. The party’s Executive Council is now showing its displeasure.
The demands for radical change include economic issues.
PT senators and representatives believe the government is off to a bad start. They have called for a meeting between the PT Congressional Caucus and government ministers on January 31. In presenting their demands, the Congressmen affirmed that their main target is the government’s economic policy. Regarding the latter, they demand a quick change in course by the Lula administration.
In addition, radical PT Congressman João Batista Oliveira de Araújo formally request that Henrique Meirelles, the new President of Brazil’s Central Bank, be removed from this post. This official request was sent to PT party leadership and the PT leader in the House of Representatives.
7. An isolated minister
Leftist currents widely represented in the Lula administration are trying to scuttle the government’s announced economic policy. A good example is the case of Luís Fernando Furlan, the new Minister of Development and Foreign Trade.
This minister was paraded by the PT as proof that the Lula administration is complying with market rules. However, he was not even allowed to choose his own executive secretary in the Ministry. The appointment of economist Carlos Lessa as President of the National Bank for Development (BNDES) – a key position within the Ministry – was considered a blow to Minister Furlan. Lessa’s appointment was imposed by the left. Lessa disagrees publicly with Minister Furlan’s development policy. Minister Furlan’s impotence was further demonstrated by his inability to select a single Bank director.
8. A possible change of course in the economic and monetary fields
Economist Reinaldo Gonçalves outlined the drastic change of course in economic policy that many PT leaders and militants demand in an interview published in the Dec. 2002-Feb. 2003 issue of Teoria e Debate (a quarterly published by the Perseu Abramo Foundation of the Workers’ Party).
Reinaldo Gonçalves is a professor of International Economy at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and member of the committee that has drafted the PT’s economic program since 1989. He affirms that Brazil must reverse its policy of liberalization in trade, manufacturing, technology, currency, and finance. Mr. Gonçalves adds that Brazil needs a governmental agency to regulate foreign capital. He argues that this agency should reintroduce State control over finance and currency exchange, and introduce State control over the international flow of capital.
From the tax perspective, Mr. Gonçalves believes Brazil needs new taxes. He states that the country needs a tax shock with the creation of a “solidarity tax.” This new tax would consist of a tax on all wealth accumulated by the more affluent sectors of society; an annual tax on all great fortunes; as well as a tax on capital and the revenue it engenders.
Lastly, Mr. Gonçalves declares that Brazil must reject entirely and without negotiations membership in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
9. First signs of a possible radicalization of the Lula da Silva government
Signs of a possible radicalization in the course chartered by the Lula administration are beginning to appear. This is the opinion of Edmilson Rodrigues, the radical PT mayor of Belém do Pará, capital of the state of Pará. Mr. Rodrigues believes that being in power may become a dilemma for a leftist government that chooses to fit its polices into the existing order and remain subject to formal political and legal constraints.
István Mészáros, one of the world’s most important leftist intellectuals, made similar comments in an interview with Folha de São Paulo. Mr. Mészáros affirms that Brazil’s development depends on a radical break with present theories and methods. Moreover, this leftist intellectual argues that the true meaning of Lula da Silva’s victory will become manifest when President Lula da Silva scuttles the hopes of the conservatives who helped him win the presidential election.
10. Diplomacy at the service of a leftist project
It is in the diplomatic realm, however, that President Lula da Silva’s administration is showing most clearly its intent to subject Brazil’s interests to an ideological program.
Brazil’s new President appointed Mr. Marco Aurélio Garcia, an important PT figure, as Special Assistant for International Relations. Mr. Garcia speaks unequivocally of a “national plan” that must inform Brazil’s foreign policy.
Mr. Garcia is not just the President’s advisor. In fact, President Lula da Silva has asked him to intervene directly in foreign affairs, strengthening Brazil’s ties with Castro’s Cuba and Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. Mr. Garcia’s actions were considered an unprecedented foreign policy turnaround in the press.
President Lula’s diplomatic plan became clearer in Ecuador during the inauguration of President Lúcio Gutierrez. President Lula da Silva affirmed that the Brazilian government is beginning to build a “new South America” and in a hegemonic outburst expressed his desire that Brazil will command this continental integration.
This “new South America” envisioned by President Lula da Silva aims to unite all of the leftist political forces – and thus expand Cuban influence – as a counterweight to American influence in the region.
11. Venezuelan crisis – a poorly disguised pro-Chavez position
The Venezuelan crisis is the first great diplomatic backdrop clarifying the course being chartered by President Lula da Silva’s government. At President Hugo Chavez’s request, President Lula da Silva proffered his services for the creation of a “Friends of Venezuela” group – a group of countries whose sole purpose would be to support President Chavez.
The Lula administration’s clear pro-Chavez stance (coordinated by Mr. Marcos Aurélio Garcia) gave rise to much criticism in the Brazilian press. Several articles pointed out that President Lula had broken with Brazil’s time-honored diplomatic tradition by interfering in another country’s political affairs and in aligning himself with an authoritarian, populist head of state. This pro-Chavez stance of the Lula administration also gave rise to an internal crisis in the country’s diplomatic circles, upsetting Itamaraty, Brazil’s Foreign Ministry.
Brazil’s diplomatic service tried to correct these mistakes and proposed that Brazil, together with the “Friends of Venezuela” group, arbitrate Venezuela’s internal crisis. However, the press challenged the authenticity of the Lula government’s arbitrating ability, since it had already displayed clearly its pro-Chavez position.
Subsequent events only confirmed this suspicion since the Lula administration declared itself contrary to early elections in Venezuela. Likewise, President Lula da Silva criticized American policy on Venezuela, while still in Ecuador. President Lula da Silva’s statements do not hide his desire to maintain his ideological ally in power. Lastly, President Lula da Silva refused to listen to the Venezuelan opposition. Venezuelan businessman Carlos Fernández, President of Fedecámaras, insisted in an interview with the Folha de São Paulo, that President Lula da Silva listen to the Venezuelan trade unions and business associations in order to become acquainted with their country’s plight.
The Brazilian press also reported on the complaints against President Lula made by Cesar Gaviria, Secretary General of the Organization of American States. Allegedly, President Lula instilled in President Chavez the conviction that instead of negotiating with the Venezuelan opposition he should confront it.
President Lula da Silva’s spurring of President Chavez to confrontation appears to have been repeated during the lightning visit of the latter to Brazil to urge President Lula to enlarge the “Friends of Venezuela” group. Upon returning to Venezuela, President Chavez hardened his position and threatened to quit the negotiating table definitively.
Equally noteworthy, was Chavez’s declaration to reporters immediately after his meeting with President Lula da Silva (and while still in the gardens of the Presidential residence) that revolution is the only way out for South American countries.
One last detail meriting attention in Brazil’s diplomatic initiatives is that, in spite of having formally denied President Chavez’s request for the enlargement of the “Friends of Venezuela” group, President Lula da Silva nevertheless seems committed to reinforcing his – and therefore President Chavez’s – stance in the Venezuelan crisis, by enlisting the support of Germany and France. In exchange for this support, President Lula da Silva would reinforce the anti-American position of these two countries regarding the war on Iraq.
Lula and Left hate the middle-class and are determined to destroy them, just like all Marxists are.
A choice between Neo-liberalism and Marxist Socialism is a classic case of PRESSURE FROM ABOVE... AND PRESSURE FROM BELOW
Axis of Southern Weasels.
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