[Theyknow]

"Consider the following design: votes are stored on a bipolar 32Kx8 PROM encased in a clear tamper-evident package with serialized seals provided by both/all parties. Initially, the PROM is blank except for a header identifying it. Past the header (assume it's 768 bytes), the PROM is divided into one thousand 32-byte blocks (which, as noted above, are initially all blank). "

"Every time someone casts a ballot, the contents of their ballot are converted to a 192-bit blob organized as 32 6-bit bytes. These are run through a lookup table to convert them into 8-bit bytes which have exactly four "1" and four "0" bits. These 32 bytes are then stored in a randomly-selected vacant block in the PROM."

"Tell me how anyone could delete any votes from such a system without the alteration being obvious."

Whatever you said makes no sence to me. Or to the overwhelming number of people who must maintain confidence in the accuracy of the outcome of the election results. Mark my words, if the integrety of the voting system is in doubt the legitmacy of the Government itself comes into question.

Optical scanners are understandable to everyone, they have the bonus of paper back up and where ballot boxes can be stuffed scanners can be punched.

[supercat]

BTW, here's my mechanical voting system design; tell me how you like this one.

Votes for this machine would be recorded on 1/2" paper tapes which would be factory-punched with sprocket holes every 1/4" down one side. Each tape would be marked with a unique design (preferably identifying the race, candidate, district, ward, and machine) which repeated every 1/4" or 1/2" (lined up with the sprocket holes). There would be one tape for each candidate, plus one for each race for a write-in candidate, and one for each race for "no candidate selected". An additional tape would be used in any "vote for two" race to indicate that only one candidate was selected [two extras in vote-for-three or vote-for-four races].

Initially, the tapes would have no punches in them other than the sprocket holes. Before the election, each tape would be marked at the end to indicate the race, precinct, ward, and machine for which the tape would be used as well as the candidate the tape represents. It would be further signed and sealed by representatives of all interested parties. [One set of seals could be applied by a surely-trusted representative of each party who need not be present on-site and another set applied by on-site representatives].

To the extent possible, everything in the machine would be transparent except the enclosures holding the tape spools. Each tape would come out of an opaque enclosure, through a visible mechanism, and proceed into another opaque enclosure. After the voter selects candidates using pull-levers and pulls the "finish voting" lever, the visible mechanism would, in clear view of the voter, punch the appropriate tape for every selected office (or two tapes for vote-for-two offices) and advance the appropriate tapes by 1/4" (or 1/2", depending upon the design size).

If there are four inches of tape between the punching mechanism and the opaque takeup-spool enclosure, it would be necessary to prep the machine by punching each tape ten times after loading, to ensure that every voter saw punched tape from the puncher to the takeup spool; these ten punches would be figured in the tally below.

Once voting is complete, the tail end of each tape would be marked and sealed by appropriate party representatives and the tapes submitted for counting. Counting could be accomplished very quickly and easily, since each tape would simply have a uniform bunch of holes on it. Subtract ten from the number of holes to get the number of votes for the candidate represented by the tape.

The use of a "no candidate selected" tape would protect other tapes from alteration; if 2,500 people voted and there were six presidential candidates (plus "write-in" and "no-candidate-selected") then there should be exactly 2,580 non-sprocket holes in all the presidential tapes. Assuming the tape is designed so that patching holes is impossible, and assuming that the number of voters is logged immediately upon the close of the election, it would be difficult for anyone to perform fraud upon the tapes without detection.

Anyone like that as an approach? The mechanics might be a little bit complicated, but hopefully not too bad. I think it would give voters a unique ability to actually see their vote permanently and indelibly recorded, something which is lacking in other voting systems.