Posted on 03/09/2003 12:18:39 PM PST by Calpernia
Tubes of Mass Destruction
By Simon Henderson, adjunct scholar The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Weekly Standard, September 23, 2002
As the advance towards war against Iraq continues, the Bush administration has started lobbing missiles at hardline liberals ever unconvinced about the threat Saddam Hussein poses to his region and the world. The administration's game presumably is to make these diehards change their minds and to win over skeptical members of the public.
One of the latest missiles involves aluminum tubes. But the story here is complicated, and thus might confuse rather than clarify the danger of Saddam.
On September 8, the New York Times reported: "In the last 14 months, Iraq has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes which American officials believed were intended as components to enrich uranium. American officials said several efforts to arrange the shipment of aluminum tubes were blocked or intercepted but declined to say, citing the sensitivity of the intelligence, where they came from or how they were stopped."
Having leaked the story, the administration ran with it. September 8 was Sunday, and Vice President Cheney, speaking on NBC's "Meet the Press," referred to the aluminum tubes. "What we have seen recently is that [Saddam Hussein] is trying through his illicit procurement network to acquire the equipment he needs to be able to enrich uranium."
A September 10 analysis by the BBC's defense correspondent, Paul Adams, mentioned Cheney's comments but noted pointedly, "Experts say the shipment does not necessarily prove anything." The BBC quoted John Wolfstahl, deputy director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment, as saying: "It's disturbing but by no means a smoking gun." A further quotation came from David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington: "It's a weak indicator. A lot of people disagree with Cheney."
One hopes these experts did not do the public a disservice. After all, the New York Times story also said: "The diameter, thickness and other technical specifications of the aluminum tubes had persuaded American intelligence experts that they were meant for Iraq's nuclear program." It seems a strong indicator.
For the perplexed, a short science lesson is necessary. An atomic bomb can be made from either plutonium, obtained from reprocessed fuel rods in a nuclear reactor, or from highly enriched uranium. Normal uranium is no good, as it contains only 0.7 percent of the fissile isotope U-235. Centrifuges are one way of extracting the U-235 and bringing it up to the 90 percent strength needed for a bomb.
Building such a centrifuge is an engineering challenge. It works on the same principle as fairground rides in which the young and foolhardy are spun around and pinned against the wall by the centrifugal force. In an enrichment plant, a gaseous form of uranium is introduced into a centrifuge spinning about 1,000 times per second. Some separation is achieved from the more dominant U-238 isotope before the gas is passed to another centrifuge to repeat the process. After the uranium passes through a thousand or more centrifuges, known as a cascade, a dribble of highly enriched uranium emerges. Left operating for about a year, a cascade can produce the 25 kilograms or so required for a nuclear bomb.
Aluminum centrifuges are old-tech, even by Iraqi standards. When United Nations inspectors went in after the Gulf War they discovered that Iraq had been trying to build centrifuges made from a much stronger specialty steel, known as maraging steel, and even carbon fiber, which is lighter than steel and can be even stronger (explaining why many yachts now have carbon fiber masts). Because these materials are so strong, centrifuges made from them can spin faster, making separation of the U-235 isotope many times more efficient.
The weapons inspectors destroyed the centrifuges they found, along with the rest of Iraq's enrichment infrastructure, but apparently Saddam is trying again. And as in the 1980s, he seems prepared to use old technologies if they are available. Back then, using declassified U.S. data, Saddam's scientists were also building calutrons, a method considered by the Manhattan Project but rejected because enrichment by that route took too long.
By contrast, the technology for aluminum centrifuges -- developed in Europe to produce reactor fuel for power plants and submarines -- is still highly classified. Iraq obtained its plans for maraging steel centrifuges from a disaffected and greedy German scientist, since prosecuted. Pakistan, meanwhile, built its first centrifuge cascade using aluminum devices, with help from a Pakistani scientist formerly employed by the European enrichment consortium.
So the question is: Has Iraq obtained plans for aluminum centrifuges from a less-than-secure European industrial archive, or did Pakistan supply them? Back before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, according to intelligence officials, Pakistani nuclear scientists visited Iraq, and Iraqis visited Pakistan's unsafeguarded enrichment plant at Kahuta, outside Islamabad. It seemed surprising that U.N. weapons inspectors never discovered a Pakistan connection when searching Iraqi facilities.
If the plans did come from Pakistan, were they handed over before 1990 or more recently? And what was the quid pro quo? (Pakistan is believed to have swapped its centrifuge technology with Beijing in 1983 for a design of a nuclear weapon and enough highly enriched uranium for two bombs in order to jump-start its nuclear arsenal.)
One wonders what President Musharraf of Pakistan was thinking when he sat in the United Nations in New York on September 12 listening to President Bush lay out the case for action against Iraq and the responsibility of the international community. On message, the president again mentioned aluminum tubes.
When are we going to hear more about these Iraqi procurement efforts? Perhaps in the British dossier on Iraq, expected to be released by President Bush's closest (and so far only) ally, British prime minister Tony Blair, before Parliament meets for a special Iraq debate on September 24. The officials quoted by the New York Times cited the sensitivity of intelligence as the reason for withholding details of when or where illegal cargoes were detected. That's the normal formulation for intelligence material uncovered by a foreign country. Perhaps the Iraqi buying network has been operating in Britain, or at least Europe.
There are other concerns involving Pakistan, in whose lawless border region with Afghanistan al Qaeda operatives (and maybe bin Laden) are lurking. Before September 11, 2001, two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists with detailed knowledge of the other nuclear explosive, plutonium, were in contact with bin Laden. And a few weeks ago the London Sunday Times reported that Pakistan had been trying to buy more maraging steel from a British company. Officials had ordered the company to cancel the contract, but in a farcical confusion, the shipment was still sent. (Technical note: Aluminum centrifuges are built in sections, with maraging steel joints to provide flexibility. Otherwise they shatter at high speed.)
So producing more details on aluminum tubes would help the Bush administration convince doubters, but could open a Pakistani can of worms. It could confuse the message about the unique threat posed by Saddam Hussein -- or prove it. Unfortunately, there appears to be little time to play with.
Same Question...also, what are so-called 'Unipolar Magnets???
I've seen them advertised in scientific supply catalogs but it sounds like 'perpetual motion'!
REPORT ON THE NINTH IAEA ON-SITE INSPECTION IN IRAQ UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991) 11 - 14 January 1992 SALIENT POINTS - The main objective of the ninth IAEA on-site inspection was to verify recent information obtained from Governments of Member States, and in particular from the Government of Germany, about the procurement of large quantities of stock materials and components needed in the manufacturing of gas centrifuge machines for the production of enriched uranium. The materials and components in question included purpose-designed aluminium alloy extrusions used in the production of centrifuge vacuum housings and molecular pumps, and ferrite magnets used in the stators of the centrifuge motors. The quantities involved, which would have been sufficient for the manufacture of the basic static parts of several thousand centrifuges, had not been included in any previous Iraqi declaration. - This information was discussed with the Iraqi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the presence of technical experts from both sides. Subsequent to the discussion, the Iraqi authorities acknowledged the procurement of these materials and components, but stated that all had been destroyed or "rendered harmless" by melting and crushing before the beginning of nuclear inspections in Iraq under resolution 687. - Further, they acknowledged the procurement of 100 tons of the special high-tensile-strength steel (maraging steel) needed for producing several thousand centrifuge rotors and rotor internal fittings and the procurement of a few thousand aluminium forgings for the vacuum housing top and bottom flanges. The Iraqi authorities explained that in this case also the stockpile of maraging steel and aluminium forgings had been "rendered harmless" by melting before the start of the nuclear inspections and offered to present to the team all the materials which they had procured at the location where they were currently stored after being rendered harmless. - The inspection team verified and sampled the melted maraging steel stockpile and the powder resulting from the crushing of the ferrite magnets, leaving for the next inspection the remaining verifications. A rough estimate of the quantities made on-site appears consistent with the quantities procured. Full verification must await the results of sample analyses and a more accurate assessment of mass. - The results of this inspection have resolved a number of inconsistencies regarding the Iraqi centrifuge programme remaining from previous inspections. In the opinion of the experts who took part in the nuclear inspection, Iraq had not reached the point where it could start centrifuge production on a sizeable scale, but given time, it would have been successful. - However, the centrifuge enrichment programme had reached the point where the materials necessary for certain key centrifuge components had been identified, and these materials were being procured as opportunities presented themselves even though the final design had not been completely fixed nor the manufacturing process fully implemented. The operation of any production-oriented centrifuge cascade would have required the procurement of large numbers of finished components, but the nuclear inspection teams have found no evidence of this. - Initiatives taken by the German Government have greatly assisted the ongoing inspection effort as it relates to the Iraqi centrifuge enrichment programme. Looking for more recent on magnets. THESE reports I just pulled are dated from the last inspection HOWEVER, are marked updated as of 2003. So it is throwing my search off.
Germany Company/Individual: Inwako - Nuclear Also Known As: Program: Nuclear Date Occurred: 1989 Activity Memo: Supplied U.K.-made ring magnets that stabilize rotors used in centrifuge uranium enrichment, including 125 aluminium nickel cobalt magnets made by several U.K. firms, and 20-50 samarium cobalt magnets procured via U.K. firm Endshire Export Marketing and Iraqi firm TDG; found by German Economics ministry to have arranged circuitous delivery.
United Kingdom Company/Individual: Matrix Churchill Ltd. - Nuclear & Military Also Known As: Formerly known as TI Machine Tools Program: Nuclear, military Date Occurred: 1987 to 1990 Activity Memo: Greatest single supplier of sensitive computer-controlled machine tools found by U.N. inspectors at nuclear weapon sites; supplied three percent of British exports to Iraq during 1980s, including £8.5 million of machinery in 1988 alone; supplied $36 million worth of high-tech lathes, useful for cutting high-quality steel used in centrifuges, manufactured and supplied at least 34 centrifuge components to Badr General Establishment (joint venture with SEHEE to establish the Al Furat centrifuge factory) for Project K-1000; exports allegedly approved to gather intelligence on Iraqi weapons programs, even though the British government knew the exports were for military purposes, including possible use to produce components of a nuclear weapon; supplied on-site training for Iraqi technicians to use and program the machine tools; manufactured 52 turning machines found in Iraq, of which 33 were capable of being used to produce nuclear weapons; manufactured 94 machine tools found at Hatteen, (the high-explosive test facility at the Al Atheer complex, Iraq's main nuclear weapon development site) of which 50 appear to be capable of being used to produce nuclear weapons; received orders for 141 lathes worth £19 million; received letters of credit from Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) in Atlanta, Georgia, including two for £8,950,000 worth of precision machines and lathes, and £3,430,480 worth of product machine kits, for the State Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipment (SEHEE, established the Al Furat centrifuge factory a joint venture with Badr; produced magnets, vacuum chambers, ion sources and collector components for calutrons to enrich uranium; part of MIMI); main Iraqi client was Nassr State Establishment (procured equipment for the SCUD enhancement program and for Taji [a chemical weapon and industrial arms complex which also produced components for uranium enrichment]; ran artillery plants, and linked to the Condor II intermediate-range missile project); identified by U.S. Treasury Department as an Iraqi front company; 89% Iraqi-owned in 1990.
I need better keywords than just magnets. I don't understand what I'm looking up.
Now all I need are the blueprints!
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