Mar 14, 2003
Introduction
Unlike Iraq, whose political war aims are elegant -- regime survival -- the United States has a much longer and more diverse list of war aims:
1. Replace Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's regime with one compatible with American interests.
2. Maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq so that it remains a counterweight to Iran, and so the nationalist ambitions of ethnic Kurds in northern Iraq do not disrupt U.S.-Turkish relations.
3. Eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction by having total, direct access to all of Iraq.
4. Change the perception of American effectiveness in the Islamic world.
5. Destroy any potential for collaboration between Iraq and al Qaeda.
6. Minimize U.S. casualties.
7. Create bases inside Iraq for the purpose of follow-on campaigns.
Adding to this the political requirement to minimize civilian casualties, we can see that a fundamental tension is built into American war planning. In order to achieve its ends, the United States must devise a military strategy that simultaneously shatters Iraq's military capability in the shortest period of time and avoids high-intensity ground combat with elevated rates of attrition, particularly in populated areas. The United States needs a short, intense war with low casualties and minimal collateral damage, ending in the complete subjugation of Iraq.
The United States wants to defeat Iraq for political, psychological and strategic reasons. It wants to do this as quickly as possible and with as few cashualties as possible. It is difficult to align these three goals: Thoroughness, speed and minimal cost are obviously in tension with each other. At various points, it is possible to have two out of three. For example, it might be possible to have speed and low cost, but not thoroughness. It might be possible to have thoroughness and speed, but not at a low cost. Or, it might be possible to have thoroughness and low cost, but not speed. Aligning these three variables is the primary challenge to U.S. strategy.
Nevertheless, the United States has two foundations for its belief that the goal of a rapid and complete victory, with minimal U.S. or civilian casualties, can be achieved.
The first is technological. The United States has revolutionized warfare through the introduction of a class of non-ballistic weapons -- precision-guided munitions (PGM). Traditional, ballistic weapons -- weapons which maintain their trajectory once fired or released -- are highly inaccurate. To compensate for the inaccuracy of gun fire and aerial bombardment, one compensates by increasing the number of projectiles fired or dropped. Quantity is used to compensate for inaccuracy. This makes war extremely costly on all levels: The number of projectiles required is enormous, and their inaccuracy results in calamitous casualties for non-combatants.
PGM are fundamentally different. They can be guided, or guide themselves, to the target, correcting their paths as required. Thus, the probability of hitting the target soars not to certainty, but to a probability orders of magnitude greater than with ballistic weapons. PGM have the virtue of requiring fewer projectiles for effectiveness and reducing collateral damage. That means that a smaller force is needed, and that that force can speed up the tempo of the war because accuracy speeds up the destruction of targets. It also reduces the number of unintended civilian casualties. This is one of the foundations of U.S. war fighting -- the one that makes the complex political goals of the United States attainable, by American calculations.
There are, of course, limits to the effectiveness of PGM. The primary limitation is intelligence. There is a high probability that any target that can be seen can be destroyed, but it is not as easy to see a target as one might imagine. Intentional deception aside, there are certain terrains and environments that do not lend themselves to easy reconnaissance and therefore are less vulnerable to PGM. The most unfriendly environments for PGM are cities in which infantry forces are widely dispersed inside of buildings. Seeing into a building is hard, and therefore the value of PGM is limited.
The greatest challenge to U.S. war fighting is urban warfare, which reduces the advantage of military technologies to their minimal level. Urban warfare is still built around machine guns, rifles, grenades and knives. This is particularly the case if inducing massive civilian casualties is politically unacceptable. The alternative to house-to-house fighting is encirclement, accompanied by artillery and air bombardment. If that cannot be done for political reasons, then the penetration of cities depends on the capability of defenders, who have the advantage in urban combat.
This brings us to the second assumption of U.S. war planners, which is that the Iraqi army is inherently incompetent and unable to mount an effective defense, regardless of environment. Just as Iraq's assumption is that the U.S. Army is incapable of absorbing casualties, so the U.S. Army assumes that the training, equipment and morale of the Iraqi army is such that it will rapidly collapse when attacked.
To be somewhat more precise, the United States assumes that the Iraqi army, once it is assaulted by massed PGM followed by encirclement by highly mobile U.S. forces, will rapidly lose its coherence. U.S. leaders assume that if the ability of Iraq's high command to command and control its forces is broken, and those forces come under sustained bombardment from U.S. aircraft and mobile ground operations, the Iraqis will succumb to "shock and awe" and cease to be an effective fighting force.
U.S. Warfighting Doctrine and the Case of Iraq
The United States will be introducing a new type of warfare to the battlefield, quite different from that seen in 1991. During the Gulf War, the United States engaged in a rigidly scripted war plan:
1. An air campaign against Iraqi command, control and communications facilities in parallel with a suppression of enemy air defenses, which paralyzed Iraq's command and control system and gave the United States complete command of the air.
2. Using Iraqi paralysis and command of the air, the United States attacked ground formations, systematically reducing the quantitative aspects of the Iraqi force and shattering them qualitatively.
3. When this phase was completed, the U.S. military launched a ground assault that was complex, preplanned and designed to pin Iraqi forces in Kuwait and envelop them in an armored thrust.
The U.S. campaign was based on battle damage assessment at each stage. When the enemy capability targeted in that phase was reduced by the requisite amount, the next phase began. There was a time variable -- how long it took to reach the desired degradation -- but relatively few operational variables. What would happen at each point was fairly scripted.
The conflict of 2003 will be based on a very different assumption: agility. Instead of sequenced operations, the intention is to have parallel operations. Thus, instead of beginning with the air campaign and then moving to the ground campaign, something much less predictable is planned.
The United States sees intelligence and information management as its great advantage. This enables PGM; it also makes it possible to reduce the fog of war. As knowledge of battlefield reality increases at higher echelons, it becomes possible to create frameworks for campaigns, but to allow operations to evolve depending on circumstances. In its most traditional sense, this allows for combined arms operations on a level not previously conceived. In the most advanced sense, this is supposed to allow battlefield realities to write the strategy. It allows forces to advance on multiple fronts and then, based on real-time intelligence from air strikes, choose the primary axis of attack after the initial deployment, shifting forces as opportunities present themselves.
That, at least, is the theory. A smaller force theoretically could carry out the mission not only because of technological force multipliers in combat, but because the efficiency with which deployment is carried out is increased to such an extent that redundancy required by limited intelligence can be reduced. Therefore, the U.S. force invading Iraq will be about 60 percent the size of the force used to occupy Kuwait, a much smaller country, in 1991. It is not simply because U.S. commanders view the Iraqi army with contempt; it is also because they believe a great deal of inefficiency has been squeezed out of warfare.
Now, U.S. operations have great vulnerabilities. They depend heavily upon intelligence gathered by aerial- and space-based platforms. They depend heavily on a space-based communications system and its integration with a highly sophisticated information management system that links combat units with all echelons of command, and between services. Knock out the reconnaissance, communications or computing systems, and U.S. force capabilities are reduced extraordinarily.
The core U.S. assumption is that Iraq cannot strike at U.S. space-based systems, cannot jam or spoof U.S. communications and cannot fry U.S. computing systems. That assumption is probably true, but it will be untested until war begins.
Given domestic and international political requirements, the United States requires a war-fighting strategy that will lead to Iraqi capitulation at the earliest possible moment. Therefore the war is to be fought in a manner intimately connected to political considerations in Baghdad, and at the level at which command and control has devolved due to U.S. air attacks and Iraqi doctrine.
Given this, politico-military factors will govern war fighting:
1. War fighting will be designed to maximize the psychological impact as well as operational impact of the war.
2. Political conditions will be constantly examined in terms of their impact on the military operations.
3. Operations will be shifted if political events can be influenced, war termination speeded up and casualties reduced.
This also creates a potential tension. There is a military path to war termination, and there is a political path. It is possible that sub-optimal military choices will be made in order to take advantage of political opportunities. An air assault on Tikrit, the hometown of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, might make little military sense, but politically, it might be a means to Iraqi capitulation. Choosing an assault on Tikrit over other potential operations makes a great deal of sense if the political analysis is correct, but intelligence assessments are not hard science. Predicting the political consequences of a military action can rapidly become murky.
Agility is necessary, therefore, so that the military recover from political miscalculations, which are highly likely in this environment. The new U.S. war-fighting doctrine, if it works, supports a war in which the desired outcome is a politically driven capitulation rather than a militarily imposed reality. This is the only way to align the goals of comprehensive, rapid, low-casualty warfare.
That said, at the end of the day, a war is fought by planes in the air, ships at sea and soldiers and marines on the ground -- a ground that is geographically defined.
General Strategic Considerations
Two principles have always competed in U.S. strategic planning for Iraq: One was the doctrine of concentrating one's own force; the other was the principle of dividing the enemy's force.
On the surface, the Iraqis have the major advantage of interior lines. In order to split the Iraqi force effectively, the United States would have to operating at extreme exterior lines. What this means is that the Iraqis should have a great advantage of being able to shift forces from front to front rapidly in a multi-front war, as the Israelis have done. It also means that the burden of placing forces in totally unconnected theaters, such as Kuwait and Turkey, would put a terrific strain on U.S. logistics without genuinely splitting Iraqi forces.
This would be a reasonable analysis, but it is complicated by reality:
1. The Iraqi advantage of interior lines is dramatically reduced by U.S. airpower. Major strategic deployments would result in the decimation of Iraqi forces as they moved along highways. The geographical advantage for Iraq therefore is negated by U.S. weapons systems.
2. The Turkish option has always existed more on paper than in reality. While some forces certainly could operate out of Turkey, terrain and road considerations would make it difficult to create a force in Turkey that is equivalent to U.S. deployments in Kuwait.
The fact is that doctrinal dilemmas (concentration of force vs. splitting the enemy; interior lines vs. exterior lines) don't really come into play. The Iraqis' interior lines yield little advantage because strategic movement will not be an option once the war begins. The United States must concentrate its forces in Kuwait -- and if possible, in Saudi Arabia -- for a primarily southern thrust.
The shape of the campaign is fairly obvious in the first instance. It will consist of air and cruise missile attacks on Iraqi air defenses and command control and communications facilities. Targeting will be assisted by Special Operations and covert forces on the ground in Iraq. The Iraqi national command authority should be paralyzed within 48 hours. Once paralysis sets in and penetrates sufficiently deeply in the Iraqi command system, ground operations can begin.
The United States has deployed the bulk of its aviation assets to the region. The U.S. Navy has deployed five carrier battle groups to the theater -- the Constellation, Abraham Lincoln, Kitty Hawk, Harry S Truman and Theodore Roosevelt. Britain has deployed the Ark Royal.
The precise numbers of strike aircraft in and near the theater are extremely difficult to pin down. Air Force security in particular has made a count difficult. But ultimately, the precise number is irrelevant. Between available aircraft and the cruise missiles that will be fired from B-52s, submarines and a variety of surface ships, the probability of success will be extremely high. Indeed, should Iraqi air defenses remain a threat 72 hours into the war, should it become apparent that command and control is functioning at all or most levels, or should it be clear that the Iraqis are moving large numbers of forces around with successful interdiction, this would be the signal that something has gone very seriously wrong with the U.S. battle plan. The probability of that happening is relatively low. The SEAD, decapitation and counter-command and control operations will likely enjoy a high degree of success.
At this point, the land battle becomes the key. At the highest level, the United States and Britain have deployed roughly seven divisions in Kuwait, in three groups:
1. In the west, the Third Infantry Division is now forward-deployed along the northern Kuwait-Iraq border. Deployed behind them is the 101st Airborne Division, which can function in an infantry and airmobile mode.
2. East of this, along the northern Kuwaiti border with Iraq, are two U.S. Marine divisions, a British armored division, an armored brigade and a British airborne brigade. These forces are deployed along Highway 80, a main road in Iraq.
3. Further to the south, there is one brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division.
There are also air bases and logistics facilities scattered throughout the country.
Two separate operations apparently are planned. One, involving the slightly heavier forces, seems committed to advancing northward, into the oil fields and against two Republican Guard Armored Divisions. The lighter, western force seems to be preparing a combined ground/airmobile thrust into the Western Desert, to the Euphrates bridges. In other words, the coalition really appears to be dividing its forces. That is probably not the case. Rather, the deployment appears to be inherently opportunistic, taking advantage of the principle of agility.
As we have discussed, the fundamental unknown is the capability of the Iraqi forces. That must be tested early in the battle. One way to do that will be to engage the Hammurabi and al Neda divisions early with British armor. This will be a defining moment in the war. If the Iraqis show little or no resistance, a very aggressive war plan can be put into place. If they show heavy resistance, a more conventional and systematic war plan will emerge.
The area directly north of Kuwait is a difficult area from a military point of view. It is marshy terrain and contains critical oil fields. From a purely military point of view, torching the oil fields makes sense for the Iraqis. This would create a smoke and heat screen against U.S. sensors and would complicate movement through the area. However, if the fields are not blown and the Republican Guards collapse, a movement through the area directly north -- bypassing Basra to the east and moving toward Baghdad along the Euphrates -- can become the main line of attack. This attack would be supplemented by the 3rd Infantry Division moving out through the Western Desert to support the southern flank of the main thrust. The 101st would leapfrog ahead to take control of water crossings in the Euphrates-Tigris basin in order to facilitate the main line of attack.
If there is resistance, destroyed oil fields, roads clogged with civilians and difficulty in mounting air attacks because of intermingling between Iraqi military forces and civilians, then another line of attack must occur. The western thrust, now spearheaded by the 3rd Infantry with follow-on support from the two Marine divisions, would execute an envelopment far to the west of the oil fields. Their goal would be to take the bridges across the Euphrates or, if they were destroyed, to execute bridging operations for the armor. The role of the 101st, coupled with special operations troops, would be take bridges between An Nasiryah and As Samawa. The attack would develop on both sides of the Euphrates, using airmobile formations to leapfrog what limited Iraqi forces are in the region. In other words, the forces currently deployed are capable of multiple axes of attack, depending on experience and follow-on intelligence.
The next phase of the war -- approaching and taking Baghdad -- would depend in part on lessons learned in the early engagements about the Republican Guard in the south. If the RG divisions collapsed and further weakness was identified by engagements of the 101st Airborne Division, a very aggressive plan would be implemented. If the early news was troubling, a more cautious plan would evolve.
The aggressive attack would close very quickly on Baghdad and engage in a direct assault, which might well include several battalions of the 82nd Airborne dropping in or near the city -- particularly at the airport. With the airport secured, additional forces could be flown in to the city while the 101st also inserts itself, with the 3rd Infantry rapidly closing in.
If, on the other hand, experience is showing Iraqi resistance to be more substantial, the more cautious path would include:
1. Using strategic bombing against Iraqi RG and other formations.
2. Closing with the city but not entering it.
3. Using airborne forces to seize airfields in northern Iraq and building up a major force there via an air bridge, while coalition air power hammered at the Iraqi forces.
4. Liquidating Iraqi troop concentrations in the Mosul-Kirkuk area.
5. Approaching Baghdad more cautiously and systematically.
The sequence then would be:
1. Air attacks for 48-96 hours.
2. Probing attacks to take the measure of Iraqi forces
3. Two options:
a. If the two divisions collapse, a very aggressive, combined arms operations designed to seize Baghdad.
b. If resistance is heavy
(1) Return to strategic bombardment for an extended period of time.
(2) A systematic north westward evolution through the Euphrates river
(3) Take advantage of time to build up forces in northern Iraq, using airborne troops and air transport -- regardless of Turkish support.
In the rapid collapse scenario, taking Baghdad would take priority over liquidating Iraqi forces in the north. Having taken Baghdad, the combination of air strikes and ground forces would deal with a force likely even more demoralized than those who collapsed in the south. Taking Baghdad would be a political priority.
If there is heavy resistance, U.S. forces would be loath to enter Baghdad directly. Strategy instead would shift to a buildup of U.S. forces in the north, and at that point Washington might insist both that Turkey allow the passage of the 4th Infantry Division through its territory and provide additional forces to deal with the force around Kirkuk. Under this scenario, the 30,000 troops that are apparently in northwestern Saudi Arabia also would become a factor, moving along the Amman-Baghdad highway to provide additional capabilities in Baghdad.
The assumption here would be that with its forces in the south encircled and those in the north battered and destroyed, Baghdad would be unable to resist. We should remember, however, that one of the U.S. priorities is minimal civilian casualties. In any isolation of Baghdad, however benign, deterioration of conditions inside the city would rapidly generate disease, hunger, thirst and death. Speed remains essential.
This obviously would be a much more complex battle than presented, as the decision tree will be much more complex and dynamic. For example, it might turn out that the southern divisions are not indicative of forces elsewhere. The operation will change depending on what is experienced.
There is a built-in danger in this system. The dynamic battle management that is envisioned has never been implemented on a multi-divisional basis in real combat. Should decision support systems, communications channels or intelligence-gathering platforms fail through technical malfunction or enemy action, the opportunities for chaos are substantial. Shifting forces and plans in response to real-time intelligence sounds good, and it has been practiced both in the war games at Leavenworth and at the National Training Center. But that is not the same as war.
Nevertheless, given the conditions of Iraq and the political requirements, no traditional war plan would suffice. From the American point of view, the war must be over quickly. If one plan doesn't work, then another one must be undertaken.
Conclusion
The fundamental questions the United States is confronting are:
1. Are the Iraqis capable of offering significant resistance?
2. Can the United States react as quickly to changes on the battlefield as it would like to believe?
These questions can be answered only empirically at this point. However, even if the Iraqis do resist effectively and there are significant problems with the U.S. battle management system, the United States still can win the war. Even if there is resistance in the first battle, the U.S. military can isolate the southern group of Iraqi forces. It can use strategic airpower to decimate the northern group. It can isolate and overcome Baghdad without heavy casualties. The combination of mobility and air power makes this extremely likely.
What the United States cannot guarantee is either the time frame or the range of civilian casualties. If the campaign must step back to an intense aerial bombardment, that can take up to two months to be effective. Only then would a full ground assault be launched -- in the heat of the summer. Moreover, civilian casualties would be heavy throughout the country, including in Baghdad.
In short, under the worse case scenarios -- including the use of chemical weapons by Iraq -- the United States theoretically would be able to win the war. The issue would be whether an extended war-fighting scenario would be politically tenable. This will be discussed in the next installment.