[U S Army EOD]

I commanded an EOD detachment in 1972 and went through the Easter Offensive. I was also in Military Intel Unit toward the end of the year. You name a communist country and I saw weapons and munitions from it. When Vietnam fell in 1974 not only did we quit supplying them, we didn't even make up their ammunition expenditures and equipment lost during 1972. What equipment we did give them was third rate when the NVA was receiving modern equipment right up to the end.

I had two friends who were advisors who both spent over 5 years in country. They had a high regard for the South Vietnamese.

When our conventional forces fought, we fought the war like it was OUR war and not theirs. We really blew this one. In my opinion the lost of the war was partly due to our conduct of the war and due to both the lack of support to our troops in this country. These mistakes could have been retified given time. How ever the MAIN cause for the lost of the war was due to the support of the VC and PAVN basically HAD IN THIS COUNTRY.

[DuncanWaring]

How ever the MAIN cause for the lost of the war was due to the support of the VC and PAVN basically HAD IN THIS COUNTRY.

From the Wall Street Journal, 3 Aug 1995:

Excerpted here:

Q: Was the American antiwar movement important to Hanoi's victory?
A: It was essential to our strategy. Support of the war from our rear was completely secure while the American rear was vulnerable. Every day our leadership would listen to world news over the radio at 9 a.m. to follow the growth of the American antiwar movement. Visits to Hanoi by people like Jane Fonda, and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and ministers gave us confidence that we should hold on in the face of battlefield reverses. We were elated when Jane Fonda, wearing a red Vietnamese dress, said at a press conference that she was ashamed of American actions in the war and that she would struggle along with us.

And (regarding Tet '68):

Q: What about the results?
A: Our losses were staggering and a complete surprise;. Giap later told me that Tet had been a military defeat, though we had gained the planned political advantages when Johnson agreed to negotiate and did not run for re-election. The second and third waves in May and September were, in retrospect, mistakes. Our forces in the South were nearly wiped out by all the fighting in 1968. It took us until 1971 to re-establish our presence, but we had to use North Vietnamese troops as local guerrillas. If the American forces had not begun to withdraw under Nixon in 1969, they could have punished us severely. We suffered badly in 1969 and 1970 as it was.