SYRIA AND TERRORISM - The Conceptual Basis

Intelligence.org ^ | 2003 | staff

[doug from upland]

		Syria and Terrorism
		The conceptual basis
1.	While the United States and the West continue to pursue the war against terrorism, Syria, under Bashar Assad, continues – with mounting intensity – to regard terrorism as an efficient and legitimate means of advancing its policy goals, particularly vis-à-vis Israel. This policy has a deeply rooted ideological aspect – anchored in the world view of Assad Sr. and the Ba’ath party (which has ruled Syria for about 40 years). Within this framework, terrorism is perceived by Syria as not only legitimate, but also as “compatible with international law”, as it implements the right to “oppose occupation” and “struggle for liberation”.
2.	Under the government of Assad Jr., this perception has been strengthened even further, both on the ideological level and in terms of its operational implications. In concrete terms, in Bashar's view – as in the view of his father – the probability of his achieving his primary aims against Israel and in the regional arena by purely “conventional” political or military means, is small, and accordingly a “third way” is required – partially military – between a total war (in which he is not interested, out of a profound appreciation of his military inferiority) and negotiations (which entail “painful” concessions and internal shock waves, which, at least at this stage, he is not willing to bear).
3.	At the same time, it is apparent that enduring in Bashar’s consciousness as “seminal experiences” are: “Hizbullah’s” success in cracking Israel’s image of might by “ejecting” the IDF from South Lebanon, as well as the “al- Aqsa Intifada”, which has undermined the sense of security of Israeli society. In our understanding, all these factors have led to the strengthening of Bashar’s perception (inherited from his father) of terrorism as a strategic asset, which assists him to: -
	A.	Reinforce the legitimacy of his regime (and as part of this, strengthen the special relationship with and backing of Iran), while bolstering his own image as a forceful Arab leader who is faithful to (and has successfully preserved!) the heritage of his father.
	B.	Take a leading role in the region as a whole and in the Israeli-Arab conflict in particular. This is particularly desired in the context of the Syrian fear that the failure of the political process, the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon and the death of Assad Sr. (June 2000) may seriously undermine Syria's weight in the regional and relegate its political power to its “natural dimensions”.
	C.	Provide him with an efficient and active instrument to counterbalance the military and technological advantages of Israel and afford him a legitimate negotiating card against Israel. These results are achieved by conducting prolonged hostilities by proxy – based on a system of asymmetrical attrition.
		Characteristics of Syrian support for terrorism
4.	Syria – which figures together with Iran and Libya on the American list of countries supporting terrorism – has for many years granted broad support to the political, organizational, propaganda and operational activities of a long line of terrorist organizations (headed by the Lebanese and Palestinian organizations)1: - 1 It should be pointed out that in the past, Syria used terrorism – also directly – against international who wished to intervene in the Middle East – the United States and France –
	A.	On the political level – it incites and encourages terrorism against Israel. Within this context, Damascus works to increase suicide attacks, boost violence inside Israel and preserve the “resistance to occupation” in South Lebanon. Syrian senior officials and the multifaceted propaganda services at their disposal, emphasize the “legitimacy” of these activities2 and their opposition to the US and Western perception of the nature of terrorism. In this framework, Damascus has on many occasions transmitted the message that Israel is an “army state” and accordingly that there is no need, when engaging in attacks, to distinguish between military personnel and civilians, between the “Territories” and the interior of Israel, etc. In this context, it should be noted that when addressing the attack on Kibbutz Metzer (10 November), in which a mother and her two little children were murdered in their sleep, Syrian propaganda described the terrorist as one who had infiltrated into a “settlement” after succeeding in overcoming the Kibbutz barricades, which were electrified, mined and filled with soldiers”3…
	B.	On the operational level – it grants its sponsorship to the Palestinian organizations (“Hamas”, “Palestinian Islamic Jihad”, “The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine”, “The PFLP/ Jibril, etc.). It enables them to maintain headquarters in Damascus, which are involved in the management and direct control of terrorist activities within the and against regional adversaries – Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and the Palestinians. The occasion on which Syria’s direct involvement in terrorism attracted the greatest attention around the world concerned the “Hindawi affair”. In April 1986, an attempt was foiled in London to blow up an EL AL plane with a bag of explosives taken onboard by an unwitting courier. The courier was dispatched by Nizar Hindawi (a Jordanian of Palestinian origin), who was directly controlled by the Air Force Security Directorate headed by Syrian Major-General Muhammad al-Khouli. Hindawi was convicted by a court in Britain, and in consequence Britain (for a short period) severed its relations with Syria and the United States withdrew its ambassador from Damascus. 2 For details of Syrian statements supporting terrorism, see Annex. 3 “Teshreen”, 20 November 2002. interior of Israel, and also allows them to establish an extensive training infrastructure on Syrian territory. It does so while falsely presenting the offices as press centers4 and repeatedly rejects demands (primarily issued by the United States) to close them; assists the organizations (the “Hizbullah”, in particular) to build up their strength, arms them and acts as a transit point for terrorist operatives. Concurrently, over the years, Damascus (the “landlord” in Lebanon) has enabled various terrorist organizations to establish an expansive and comprehensive infrastructure in Lebanon, and in practical terms, turn Lebanon into a “country of asylum” and a launching pad for hostile activities against Israel, the Arab world and abroad.
5.	Within the context of the “Syrian order” in Lebanon – and in particular since the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon (May 2000) – Damascus has transformed the “Hizbullah” into the principal non-governmental Lebanese organization to remain armed. Moreover, since the rise of Bashar to power (July 2000), a significant change has taken place in the nature of the relations between the Syrian regime and the “Hizbullah” organization. Essentially, this has taken the form of the upgrading of the status of the organization, in the eyes of Damascus, from a game piece and facilitative device in the management of its strategy towards Israel and Lebanon, to a strategic partner (“vanguard”) and a central player in the Syrian effort to further its goals in the region.
6.	Behind this shift is the special and close relationship which has developed between Bashar and the leader of the “Hizbullah”, Hassan Nasrallah, which is 4 The nature of this propaganda may be discerned from a telephone interview given by Ramadan Shalah from damascus, in which he justified the attack in Kenya and refused to condemn it. particularly prominent against the backdrop of the estrangement and suspicion felt by Assad Sr. towards the organization. Together with the personal factors – two central developments (which occurred later) contributed to the process in which the two parties drew together and to the shaping of the present pattern of relations: -
	A.	The profound meeting of interests – as a result of the failure of negotiations in the Syrian channel (March 2000), the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon (May 2000), and the desire on the part of Syria to preserve a controlled tension on the Israeli-Lebanese border as a means of exerting pressure upon Israel.
	B.	A change in the balance of power between Syria and the organization – which was manifest at the time of the rise to power and establishment of Bashar (a new leader), when “Hizbullah” was at the height of its power and glory as a result of its “success” in causing the IDF to withdraw from South Lebanon.
7.	Against this background, Syria –
	A.	Encourages “Hizbullah” to preserve its “Jihad” nature and demonstrates its satisfaction with the balance of deterrence which it has created vis-à-vis Israel and with its growing ability to make Israel pay. Thus, (since July 2001) Damascus has granted significant military assistance to the organization – for the first time since the 1980s and contrary to the policy of Assad Sr. This assistance includes, inter alia, Syrian manufactured long range rockets.
	B.	Reinforces the perception of the organization as a “front line force” which “compensates” for the military inferiority of Syria versus Israel.
	C.	Grants the organization broad room to maneuver in its continued operational preparations and hostile activities from South Lebanon - – even if within defined borders: sporadic attacks in the “Shebaa Farms”, return fire by anti-aircraft batteries along the entire length of the border and attacks under Palestinian cover within Israeli territory (as occurred in Metzuba, 12 March). At the same time, Syria rejects American demands to act against the organization, to freeze its assets, to extradite senior wanted members of its ranks, and restrain its activities against Israel. Against this background – and in blatant opposition to the wishes of Lebanon – Damascus in effect prevents the disposition of the Lebanese Army along the Israeli-Lebanese border, and thereby in practice breaches Security Council Resolution 425 and facilitates the continued operations of the organization in South Lebanon.
	D.	Attempts to create an “international defensive umbrella” for the organization, for the purpose of “positioning” it in the international consciousness as a (legitimate) “resistance” organization and not as a terrorist organization.
8.	It should be emphasized that under the sponsorship of Syria and with the latter’s complete backing, the “Hizbullah” has carried out close to 30 attacks since the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon up to the present (of these 13 were attacks carried out during “Operation Defensive Shield”, 30 March – 13 April): most of them by way of targeted fire – anti-tank and artillery – towards IDF posts in Har Dov, during which 9 Israelis were killed, including civilians. In the attacks on Har Dov, 3 Israelis were killed and 26 were injured (the last incident took place on 29 August); 3 bomb attacks; one infiltration into Israeli territory (Metzuba, 12 March, in which 6 people were killed); 2 sniper attacks; more than 70 anti-aircraft attacks directed at IAF planes; an attempted assault on an outpost; and the kidnapping of three IDF soldiers (7 October 2000). It should be emphasized that by virtue of the conditions supplied to the “Hizbullah” by Syria, the organization can carry out a murderous terrorist attack within a short time frame and bring about an escalation of tension on the northern border.
9	Ultimately, it was Damascus in cooperation with its strategic ally Iran, which were the ones who created the conditions for the transformation of the “Hizbullah” from an “irksome” terrorist organization into a strategic threat to Israel and to the stability of the regional structure as a whole – and into an entity which occupies the position of “potential regional destabilizer”. Accordingly, (and not for nothing…) American Deputy Foreign Secretary Armitage described the “Hizbullah” as the “A Team” whereas “al-Qaida” is “only” the “B Team”.
	The Palestinian terrorist organizations
10.	The Palestinian organizations – both the “Islamic” organizations (among them the “Hamas” and the “Palestinian Islamic Jihad”) and the left-wing organizations (among them the “PFLP” / Jibril and “Fatah” / Abu Musa) – have for many years maintained extensive activities in Syria, and in practice control and lead a large portion of the terrorist activities carried out in Israel. (See in this context Annex A – the headquarters of the Palestinian organizations in Damascus). These activities are supported by Iran, a second state sponsoring terrorism which is a member of the “axis of evil”.
11.	In recent years, and in particular during the “al-Aqsa Intifada”, it was the “Hamas”, “Islamic Jihad” and the “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine” which ignited and fanned the flames of the struggle in Palestinian society against Israel, while engaging in bomb attacks against Israeli citizens. In this context one should recall the murder of the Israeli Minister of Tourism Rehavam Ze’evi (17 October 2001), the attack on the “Park Hotel” in Netanya on the eve of Passover 2002 (30 killed), the attack on the Megiddo Junction (5 June 2002 – 18 killed), the attack in Hebron (15 November 2002 – 12 killed) and the like (for details see Annex F – attacks carried out by Palestinian organizations having their seat in Damascus since Syria joined the Security Council).
12.	In the face of these, Damascus rejected the express demands made to it (primarily by the United States) to stop these activities and close the offices of the organizations – demands made, inter alia, in the light of the fact that senior officials have permitted themselves to accept responsibility for these attacks, from Damascus . In Syria’s view, these bodies are merely engaged in propaganda. In reality, the leadership of the terrorist organizations in Damascus have clear-cut operational functions which include the initiation,encouragement, guidance and support for the execution of attacks within the territory of the State of Israel. This fact has been well testified to in documents which have fallen into the hands of the IDF and from the interrogation of detained terrorists.
13.	In concrete terms, Syria grants sponsorship and shelter in its territory to theheadquarters, training camps and diverse activities carried out by these organizations and their leaders who are seated in Damascus, including the planning, initiation, and operational guidance of attacks; smuggling of military equipment and operatives into the interior of Israel; the conduct of training and instruction; transfer of monies to fund terrorist operatives (it even contributes monies5 directly to the “Territories” to encourage the Israeli- Palestinian conflict); the convening of conferences within the framework of organizational and inter-organizational political conventions. In addition, 5 Since the beginning of “al-Aqsa Intifada”, Syria has collected about 22.5 million dollars and has transferred at least about 17 million dollars from this sum to the “Territories”. Damascus permits the various organizations to maintain diverse infrastructure in Lebanon (primarily, in the area of the Bekaa, which is subject to complete Syrian domination).
	Extreme Islamic organizations
14.	In Syria (as in the refugee camps in Lebanon, which are subject to its control) extreme Islamic entities are operating, including ones which are linked to the organization of Bin Laden, however, we do not possess details regarding the characteristics of their activities. It seems that Syria is not providing direct or indirect assistance to these organizations; however, its assistance to extreme Islamic organizations creates an environment which enables them to act.
15.	In practice, the Syrian regime has taken steps against “al-Qaida” activists. Apparently, it does so primarily in order to make use of this fact to score “favorable points” with the United States. This reflects the Syrian perception that supplying this restricted aid will provide it with an “insurance policy” which will enable it to ward off American pressure on issues which are more fundamental to Syria, such as its relations with the “Hizbullah”. In this context, the gratitude of Washington for the aid given to it by Damascus over the last year is indeed evident. It seems that this has led significant focal points of power in Washington to favor continuing the “soft” approach towards Bashar.
	The “price” of terrorism and ways to “offset” it
16.	Last year Damascus was forced to engage in a closer examination of the cost/benefit balance ensuing from its support for terrorism, in view of the challenges facing it: -
	A.	“The overall situation” – the American war against terrorism following the September 11 murderous attacks) – led to a certain hardening of the American position towards the terrorist organizations supported by Syria, and to a limited and inconsistent extent, even towards Syria itself. Beyond this, there is a mounting fear in Damascus that down the road in the war it may find itself “the next in line” (after Iraq!).
	B.	The Israeli policy of deterrence which has the purpose of creating an equation of deterrence whereby Syria pays a direct price for its support for hostile operations from South Lebanon – payment may be found in the Israeli attacks against Syrian radar positions in Lebanon (April, July 2001), as well as in Operation “Defensive Shield” (March- April 2002) – during the course of which “Hizbullah” attempted to “ignite” the northern front, something which it was prevented from doing as a result of the intensification of the constrictions and restrictions operating on the “Hizbullah” and on Syria (and in particular in view of the fact that Israel refrained from responding to the stepped up hostile activities on the northern border).
		Conclusion
17.	The progress of the American war against terrorism and the developing war against Iraq, as well as the express demands to restrict the activities of the terrorist organizations sponsored by Syria, have created increased fear in Damascus concerning the ramifications of the “day after” and have strengthened the dilemma regarding Syrian use of the tool of terror. To the outside world, Damascus continues to try to portray itself as still “sitting on the fence”: on one hand – it cooperates on the issue of “al-Qaida” while on the other hand, it continues to regard the “Hizbullah” as a strategic partner and refuses to close the offices of the Palestinian organizations in its territory.
18.	Beyond this, in our assessment, Syria continues to perceive Palestinian terrorism, and terrorism of the type promoted by the “Hizbullah”, as a legitimate and efficient means of promoting its strategy, as well as a central and fundamental component of the strategy of the regime. Syria takes this view because of its evaluation that the balance of cost/effectiveness in this context is still tilted in its favor – as the “hostile operations card” – so long as it is managed in a cautious and considered manner – is, in its view: -
	A.	An asset – as in the absence of a political settlement which will satisfy its claims, it still serves Syrian interests well vis-à-vis Israel in the regional arena and even in the international arena (if only by emphasizing Syria’s importance and its centrality in preserving regional stability).
	B.	It does not comprise (in Bashar’s view) a significant or concrete threat to the regime, as: -
		1.        The American attack on Iraq may perhaps comprise an opportunity for forceful action against Syria and Lebanon, yet, at the same time, it ties the hands of the US and may restrict the maneuvering room available to it. 2.       Israel aspires not to be dragged into conflict in the northern front, inter alia because of the deterrent aspect of the “Hizbullah” and the hostilities in the “Territories”, and it also suffers from limited “endurance”. In any event, Bashar assumes, in our assessment, that even if Israel will react, it is very likely that its response will be restricted – at least in the first stage – to the “Lebanese playing field”. 3.       The United States – indeed still cites Syria on the list of states sponsoring terrorism, however, it still has not shown, in Bashar’s view, “sufficient” determination and consistency – in the form of a willingness to take practical punitive steps against Syria (stick), or to offer an attractive alternative (carrot) to the weapon of terror. According to our impression, Bashar has concluded that the totality of the relationship between the two countries still provides him with relatively broad room to maneuver vis-à-vis the United States, particularly in view of the “safety net” which the cooperation on the issue of “al- Qaida” affords him.
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Truly, Syria is a Terrorist State!

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[Taldeine]

Save us a trip back over there and do it now. The enviormentalest should agree since we are saving gas and there would be less greenhouse gases released if we save the trip.

[doug from upland]

IRAQI SCIENTISTS FLED TO SYRIA

[backhoe]

-All Terror, All the Time-- FR's links to NBC Warfare, Terror, and More...--

-Jihad! Across the World....--

-IRAQ- some links to terror--

-The Web of Terror--

[gonzo]

Interesting missive, Doug. Syria should have gotten the object lesson visited upon Iraq.

Frankly, the 'gotterdammerung' on Iraq must scare-the-crap out of all the petty dictatorships in the entire Middle East, and dem-dare 'Merican troops are still there, locked-and-loaded!

I actually thought that Iraq and its' neighbours would put-up more of a fight when they realized that Democracy was going to be visited upon them. But, true-to-form, they dropped their guns, uniforms, and boots, and went home.(personal experience here - trying to train those wogs is like trying to herd kittens)

Stay well, buds - I finally get a weekend without a Freeper event. We're going to a 'Make-a-Wish' fundraiser Saturday, but it's all Classic-Cars! I get to show-off the Gonzomobile AND the Imperial! Life is good...............FRegards

[doug from upland]

All right Gonzomobile! Put up a pict.

[doug from upland]

SYRIA ALSO MISBEHAVED

[doug from upland]

bumping this important article

[gonzo]

Another bimp...........FRegards

[doug from upland]

GIVE UP WMDs

[doug from upland]

Bush administration finally says it --- WMDs moved to Syria before the war.