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Because they had a short-term conscript Army with few professional NCOs or junior officers, they had little ability to conduct effective movement or fire & maneuver with small units---which is exactly what is necessary against an enemy holed up in towns or fighting guerilla style. So the Macedonians resorted to firepower-intensive solutions; tanks, attack helos, arty.

Sounds an awful lot like the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force. I don't recall seeing a lot of fire and maneuver exercises during Gulf War II.

The Powell Doctine pertains to strategy, not the tactics used to execute that strategy. Overwhelming force in that context refers to the totality of the combat power brought to bear against a particular adversary. And combat power is a function of many things, first of which is the leadership & training of the forces involved.

The problem with the Macedonian tactics was that their inability to maneuver or conduct semi-independent ops with small units in order to close with and fix or destroy the extremists caused them to essentially stand-off at a distance and blast away at both known and suspected enemy locations. The Albanians figured that out in a hurry, would fire a few shots & then quickly move away to watch the Macedonian over-reaction (along with the reporters and TV cameras). In the glare of the Information Age, the relatively indiscriminate use of firepower by the Macedonians brought them not victory, but more recruits for the Albanians, widespread international condemnation and resultant pressure to negotiate.

I suspect that General Powell would strongly disagree with your characterization of Macedonian tactics as emblematic of the Powell Doctrine. Think Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama as an example of the Powell Doctrine executed while Powell was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. And in regard to Gulf War II, it was a masterpiece of movement, not firepower. Most Iraqi forces were rendered irrelevant by the tempo of US ops & speed of the advance.