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Iran’s Trump Card

By Azizuddin El-Kaissouni
Staff writer – IslamOnline
10/08/2003

Iran’s recent admission that it is holding members of al-Qaeda seems to have sparked a flurry of diplomatic activity.

The statement, made by the Islamic Republic’s Intelligence Minister Ali Yunesi on July 23 2003, announced that Iran was holding a “fair” number of al-Qaeda operatives that had entered Iran shortly after the fall of the Taliban regime in neighboring Afghanistan.

Mr. Yunesi added that a number of the detainees had since been expelled, while others were extradited to their countries of origin.

Speculation is rife in the media as to the identities of the militants in question, with some suggesting that no less a personage than Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s chief lieutenant, is in Iranian custody. Other possible names include Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, the organization’s spokesman, Saad Bin Laden, one of Osama’s sons, and Saif al-Adel, the Egyptian born military commander of al-Qaeda, presumed to have taken command of operations following the death of Egyptian Mohammed Atef in a US airstrike during the Afghan leg of the war on terror.

Some have noted, however, that the presence of a large number of high-level al-Qaeda members in Iran is unlikely, particularly in the case of Dr. al-Zawahiri. Interviewed by phone, Mr. Yasser al-Sirri, head of the London-based Islamic Observation Center, maintains that it is illogical to expect al-Zawhiri to turn up in Iran, given that he had previously been denied entry in 1996, following his departure from Sudan.

Additionally, ideological clashes are almost inevitable, owing to the enmity often exhibited between Iran’s dominant Shi’ism and the Salafi creed adhered to by al-Qaeda. Al-Sirri confirms that this has, in the past, been a source of tension between the regime and a few Egyptian militants whose presence had been somewhat tolerated.

Other members of al-Qaeda had indeed sought to settle in Iran with their families on a personal basis, following the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, with some packing up and leaving soon thereafter, after having had it made clear to them that their presence was unwelcome in Iran, according to al-Sirri.

Iran, meanwhile, has maintained a studious silence as to the names and nationalities of its prisoners, choosing merely to state that it has in its custody “important and less important” members of the al-Qaeda organization, and that, for “security reasons,” it could not yet announce their identities, and would wait until files have been completed on the prisoners to decide their fates.

The Iranian admission signaled a reversal of a policy of ambiguity on the presence of al-Qaeda in Iran, and surprised many analysts for breaking so definitively with the Islamic Republic’s earlier statements.

Some observers attributed the reversal to Iran’s internal upheavals, coupled with increasing pressures being piled on by the United States.

“Iran is undergoing a crisis,” said Monstasser al-Zayat, an Egyptian lawyer and activist and erstwhile acquaintance of Dr. al-Zawahiri, in a phone interview. “It is undergoing a violent internal struggle between the conservatives and the reformists.” As such, Iran did not hasten to reveal the diplomatically embarrassing presence of the al-Qaeda militants on its soil, which might have focused attention on Iran’s relative inaction in dealing with them, or at the very least, the inordinate delay in confirming their presence to the international community and taking steps to apprehend them.

Al-Zayat holds that the revelation was forced upon Iran by governments seeking to pressure and embarrass the regime politically – an apparent reference to the US, which has long maintained that Iran was harboring terrorists. Al-Zayat adds that the de facto situation imposed on Iran forced it to pause and calculate potential benefits to the scenario.

While the New York Times reported on August 2nd that Iran was allegedly seeking to exchange al-Qaeda militants for members of Mujahedi Khalq, or the People’s Mujahedeen, the outlawed militant Iranian organization that is waging a low intensity guerrilla war against the regime, Iran denied seeking such a trade – a claim that makes sense, according al-Zayat. “Mujahedi Khalq were broken in Iraq with the downfall of the Iraqi Baa’th regime.” This coupled with the recent crackdown on the organization in France means that it has ceased to be a significant threat to Iran.

While Iran has ruled out prospects of a trade-off with the US, some observers suspect that al-Qaeda members might be handed over to the US through a third country, a view held by al-Sirri.

The al-Qaeda detainees face expulsion, extradition to country of origin, or prosecution in Iran, depending on a variety of factors, including but not limited to the circumstances surrounding their presence in the Islamic Republic, and whether or not extradition treaties exist between Iran and their countries of origin.

Iran has in the past extradited detainees to Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Iran’s sudden desire to cooperate with the Arab states is also understood to be an effort to seek an improvement in its relations with the neighboring Arab bloc – crucial in the current situation Iran finds itself in, under mounting pressure from the US and under the international spotlight for its alleged nuclear weapons program. Improved relations with the Arab regimes would give Iran a badly needed new strategic depth, thereby complicating US policy geared towards containing the Islamic Republic.

Both al-Zayat and al-Sirri also suggest a more obscure ideological motivation for Iran’s cooperation, in the sense that conservative religious elements within the Iranian regime are pushing for better access to Egypt in particular, in efforts to gain a better foothold for the Jaa’fari School of jurisprudence, for which Egypt is historically significant.

Egypt has been specifically identified by diplomatic sources as one state actively engaged in negotiations with Iran for the extradition of its nationals, along with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Egypt had earlier responded to allegations that it was conducting talks with Iran for the possible extradition of Egyptian detainees with – predictably - strenuous denial. Reuters had in early July quoted an official Egyptian source as categorically denying that any form of discussions pertaining to the extradition of Egyptian nationals in Iran were taking place.

However, London-based Egyptian lawyer and activist Dr. Hani al-Sebai reported to AFP Tuesday August 5 that a delegation from Egypt’s Interior Ministry had been dispatched to Iran to identify the prisoners, as a necessary step preceding negotiations for their return.

Such cooperation is to Iran’s benefit, in that al-Qaeda members are notoriously difficult to identify, owing, among other factors, to their being trained in counter-interrogation techniques. As such, al-Zayat says, Iran needs some sort of access to Arab security apparatuses to allow it to identify the detainees - and consequently assess their relative worth as bargaining chips, no doubt.

In addition, such a step would not be unprecedented in Egyptian-Iranian relations, as “Iran has already extradited eight Egyptians back to Egypt in 2002,” according to al-Sirri.

Egypt’s history in this respect is a mixed bag. While it generally seeks the extradition of its nationals complicit in terror, it was generally unsuccessful in the past – until 1998. The US embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya spurred the US into backing Egypt’s extradition requests, according to al-Sirri. Subsequent to those bombings, Egypt was able to secure the extradition of its nationals from a number of countries, perhaps most notably Albania and Azerbaijan. Al-Sirri stresses that the extraditions were not so much diplomatic successes for Egypt as they were a reflection of a new, more aggressive US policy in combating terrorism, as US intelligence services realized they stood to benefit from the interrogations of militants conducted by the Egyptian government.

Indeed, the extradition of the Iranian detainees to their countries of origin may prove to be the most practical solution as far as the US is concerned; a December 26 2002 report published in the Washington Post detailed a US policy of legally questionable “extraordinary renditions,” through which al-Qaeda suspects are handed over to states with a record of brutality to facilitate the interrogation process, free from judicial or other constraints that might hamper questioning in the US. Egypt is one particularly favored state in this regard, having even interrogated Saudi suspects when the US feared the Saudi government might not be forthcoming with potentially embarrassing confessions.

In contrast, Egypt has not sought the extradition of Dr. Omar Abdul Rahman, the spiritual mentor of Egypt’s outlawed Al Jama’a Al Islamiyah, from the US, where he is currently serving a life sentence in Rochester, Colorado’s infamous Supermax facility after being convicted under Civil War-era sedition laws in relation to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. This is because the Egyptian government realizes that were Dr. Omar to be returned to Egypt he would most likely face a mere seven-year sentence, subject to appeal. Additionally, it was feared that an attempt to extradite the Sheikh would spur his followers into launching a fresh wave of violence against the state, says al-Sirri.

Any extradition to Egypt will doubtless raise a host of ethical and legal issues, given Egypt’s less-than-spotless human rights record in dealing with suspected militant Islamists – a record already in the spotlight due to the ongoing trial of several British and Egyptian suspected members of the banned Hizbut-Tahrir in Cairo, who have allegedly been severely tortured during interrogation, and who are the subject of several human rights organization reports.

At the time of writing, the Iranian Consulate in Cairo had failed to respond to requests for an interview or a statement.

Azizuddin El-Kaissouni is staff writer for IslamOnline. A graduate of the American University in Cairo, he holds a BA in Political Science with a specialization in International Law. He frequently writes about Muslim affairs around the world. You can reach him at azizuddin@islam-online.net.

http://www.islam-online.net/English/Views/2003/08/article02.shtml