Iran at Watershed: Clerics Survival Depends on Taking the Offensive
Defense & Foreign Affairs
Analysis. By Gregory R . Copley, Editor, GIS.
The Iranian clerical Government is now at a strategic watershed, because of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) insistence on comprehensive inspections and disclosure. The clerics must either go fully public with their nuclear weapons programs and existing capability, or initiate a major diversion operation, taking the strategic offensive against their international opponents. Inaction would lead to further international isolation and a resurgence of the domestic opposition which could, as with the case of the Shah in 1978-79, reach the tipping point at which the clerics would be overthrown by popular action.
Their only option lies in taking aggressive action against international and domestic opponents, including strategic diversion operations and direct political and psychological operations. The two overwhelming realities facing the clerics are (i) the need to stave off the growing domestic opposition which threatens, with international support, to remove them, and (ii) the need to ensure security from international pressure by achieving the kind of strategic power which they believe will be available to them with demonstrable military nuclear capability and the means to deliver it.
There is no evidence to suggest that the clerical leadership around Supreme Leader Ali Hoseini-Khamenei, Pres. (Ali) Mohammad Khatami-Ardakani, and former Pres. Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani in any way understands that the changing global strategic reality has made the question of nuclear weapons ownership less viable than it was, say, during the Cold War. On the other hand, they have witnessed the fact that nuclear weapons ownership has given India, Pakistan and North Korea (DPRK) special status which both holds the US at bay while elevating their prestige elsewhere in the world.
In any event, the Iranian clerical leadership has only two strategic assets: nuclear weapons and control of terrorism. Equally, to support these capabilities, Irans clerics depend absolutely on the DPRK for strategic missile capabilities and to help distract the US from focusing on Iran; and on a web of alliances with a range of radical Islamist terrorist organizations and governments which fall outside the mainstream modern trading nations.
The clerics on July 9, 2003, successfully capped the growing momentum of opposition in the cities, and have demonstrated their capability to forcefully suppress future rebellion. However, they are equally aware that a failure to take the initiative internationally would result in their increasing isolation from the world community. This would lead, axiomatically, to a rise perhaps an uncontrollable rise in domestic opposition. Offensive operations abroad, therefore, are mandatory.
See also, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily reports:
October 31, 2002: Iran's Ballistic Missile and WMD Programs: The Links to the DPRK.
November 19, 2002: DPRK Acknowledges Possession of Nuclear Weapons, Confirming Consistent GIS/DFA Reporting. Possibility of Link to Saddams Surprise Weapon.
December 12, 2002: Special Reports: Iran's Military Nuclear Capability, Highlighted by Exclusive 1992 Report, Now Critical Part of Persian Gulf Strategic Planning.
January 9, 2003: Iraq, Iran, North Korea and WMD: Threat Activated.
February 11, 2003: Iran, as Predicted by GIS, Announces its Nuclear Poison Pill: Acknowledges Domestic Nuclear Self-Sufficiency.
April 28, 2003: DPRK Declaration of Nuclear Weapons Capability and Will to Use Highlight Deliberate Cover-Up by US Clinton Administration and Also Directly Impacts Current Iran Situation.
The Iranian clerics options include:
1. Declaring Military Nuclear Status: The Iranian leadership could well order a nuclear weapons test or demonstration, even using one of the seven or so externally-acquired, ex-Soviet nuclear weapons, but more likely as soon as a local device is ready using an indigenous device. The clerical leadership is aware that their possession of former Soviet nuclear weapons has been an increasingly open secret since the early 1990s, and that Iranian nuclear facilities have been working toward indigenous weaponization. The IAEA ultimatums now mean that the clerics could make a virtue of either acquiescing to the IAEA or demonstrating overt nuclear power. Acquiescing to the IAEA would, or could, lead to the same fate for the clerics as suffered by Iraqi Pres. Saddam Hussein. Saddam attempted to toy with the UN and IAEA and ended up dispersing his nuclear (and other WMD) programs outside Iraq, in most cases clearly disrupting his weapons programs. The Iranian clerics will wish to avoid this fate, of wasting decades of nuclear weapons research. At the same time, Iran will need to demonstrate an ability to deliver the nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Shahab-3 IRBM remains its best option, demonstrating a viable capability to deliver a nuclear (or other WMD) warhead to Israel and other targets which could be construed as holding the US hostage. There is strong evidence that Iran is actively working with the DPRK and Libya on continuing and expanding this program. [See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, September 4, 2003: Libya , Iran, DPRK Discuss New Strategic Missile Procurement .]
2. Initiating Strategic Diversion Operations, Including Terrorism: The clerical leadership in Iran must keep Iraq destabilized if it is to keep the US from focusing on Iran from a stable position inside the Iraqi borders. As well, it must undertake strategic diversion operations elsewhere in the world, including initially-deniable terrorist operations using its asset base in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere, and supporting DPRK actions to preoccupy the US in Asia. Close to home for the clerics, the US must be denied credibility and support within Iraq, and as well, the US must not be allowed to build the credibility of a neutral or anti-Iranian Shia leadership and shrines in Iraq. [See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, September 2, 2003: The Najaf Bombing: Iran's Clerics Prosper; Threat of Iraqi Civil War Becomes Real.] Iranian activities inside Iraq are extremely cost-effective for the Iranian clerics: they tie down and distract US forces and strategic thinking, while at the same time undermining the credibility of US Pres. George W. Bush at home and US ability to build coalitions internationally. Iranian sources had, just after the end of formal hostilities in the Coalition war against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, indicated that they would put an initial fund of US$50-million in cash into destabilizing Iraq, along with considerable Iranian intelligence and special forces manpower, backed by Iranian radio propaganda. [See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, May 28, 2003: Coalition-sponsored Media Face Major Challenges in Post-War Influence Operations in Iraq, and May 30, 2003: Iranian Clerics Meet With Iraqi Baathists to Form New Terrorist Operation; Bin Laden/Islamists Team With Baathists.]
The move to re-ignite terrorism from the Balkans bases is well underway, as recent GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs intelligence material has demonstrated. It remains to be seen to what extent the death of Bosnian Islamist leader Alija Izetbegovic in September 2003 might have on the cohesiveness and leadership of the Bosnia-based Islamists, although the Iranian and al-Qaida linked terrorist cause was substantially assisted and legitimized on September 20, 2002, when former US Pres. Bill Clinton unveiled the new Islamist shrine in Srebrenica. Significantly, Mr Clinton and US Democratic Party presidential aspirant Gen. (rtd.) Wesley Clark, who was also in the region, used the opportunity to rebuild alliances with Islamist and Albanian supporters, and sought funds from them to help Gen. Clark's election bid. Much of this funding would funnel through from Albanian terrorist and narco-trafficking bases, which work in concert with al-Qaida and the Iranians. [See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, June 12, 2003: Terrorism in the Balkans and the Wider Ramifications for the Global War on Terror.]
3. Moving Politically to Contain the US Bush Administration: In the short-term, the Iranian clerics, according to reliable sources in Tehran, see their most urgent task as being the distraction of the US Bush Administration in its war on terror, the stabilization of Iraq, and in undermining support for the US in the UN and such agencies as the IAEA. However, in the medium-term, over the coming months, the clerics have committed themselves, according to very reliable sources, to supporting any political or strategic action which would see US Pres. Bush defeated at the November 2004 presidential elections. To this end, as GIS reported earlier, the clerics had reportedly in April 2003 earmarked some $200-million for political operations in the US. Given the linkages between the Albanian/Bosnian movements and former US Pres. Clinton and Democratic presidential aspirant Clark, it seems logical that much of that funding would go through a variety of Albanian expatriates in the US (as was the pattern in earlier elections) to the clerics favored candidate. At present, given Clark's potential strength in the US polls, his earlier support (with Clinton) for the Albanians who were directly linked to al-Qaida and the Iranians, and Clark's opposition to the US rtle in Iraq, there is little question but that they will do all in their power to support Clark. Removing Bush from the White House, and putting in a Clinton-style leadership is the most significant undertaking the Iranian clerics could attempt in order to remove the threat to their own political survival and to end their international political isolation.
It is readily apparent that all of the clerics options are interrelated and will almost certainly be considered together, not as an either/or situation. But within all of this, the option of a credible Iranian nuclear military deterrent is paramount, with terrorist operations emerging in a grey mode. That is to say, US and Western officials must be aware that Iran can, with its bin Ladenist allies, instigate terrorist unrest at will while being sufficiently deniable in this to avoid a direct and powerful US military response against the clerics themselves.
Adding pressure and urgency to the clerics situation was the fact that, in an unexpected development, a strong US-backed ultimatum was tabled and carried by the International Atomic Energy Agency board in Vienna on September 12, 2003. Iran was given until October 31, 2003, to reveal full details of its nuclear activities program and prove it was not engaged in nuclear weapons production. If this deadline was not met, the IAEA would declare Iran in violation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), opening the door to a UN Security Council debate in December 2003 or January 2004 and economic sanctions, one of which would prohibit UN members from purchasing oil and energy products from Iran, a measure which would severely damage Iran's already failing economy.
The clerics were surprised when both Russia and India supported the US at the IAEA board meeting. Russia, in particular, has been the major beneficiary from the construction of Iran's nuclear reactor at Bushehr and other defense and infrastructural sales to Iran. India's trade with Iran has been worth some $2.5-billion a year. It is not insignificant that this is roughly the amount of the India-Israel trade, and the Indo-Israeli strategic alliance is strengthening to become a pivotal aspect of Indian security. This does not mean that either India or Russia can ignore and neglect Iran, but the move demonstrated that both India and Russia had now begun to hedge their bets, perhaps indicating their unstated belief that the clerics might now be facing an inevitable collapse.
The clerics, however, have consistently demonstrated that they have learned from the Shah's mistakes. They will not readily relinquish power, and would (as has already been demonstrated) suppress their population to ensure absolute compliance at home. The question remains, however, whether they would in the near term risk an obvious link with their terrorist assets in the Balkans. Any such link, if demonstrable, would encourage the US to escalate the US-Iranian confrontation and would legitimize US Pres. Bush, something which the clerics would be most reluctant to do. As a result, there would likely be an attempt to allow the al-Qaida Islamists to be blamed for any terrorism emanating from the Balkans in the near future, and would perhaps even prefer to have a renewal of the Bosnian civil war and the Kosovo and Sanzack separatist wars against Serbia appear to be merely a domestic (Bosnian, Serbian or Kosovo) Muslim reaction against Serbs. A revived war in the Balkans, then, with no initial or overt links to Iran, would be very much in Tehran's interest, significantly tying down US peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Serbia.
As a result, the visit by former US Pres. Clinton to Srebrenica on September 20, 2003, was very much in support of the Iranian clerics requirements, while at the same time helping Clark's presidential bid.
A variety of sources, including the web information service, DEBKAfile, which has strong links to Israeli intelligence sources, have said that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon played an decisive rtle in swinging the Russian and Indian votes at the IAEA. Mr Sharon reportedly called Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin about the subject, and certainly talked about it with Indian Prime Minister Atali Bihar Vajpayee when they met in New Delhi on September 9, 2003.
Iran had carefully delayed any IAEA pressures over the nuclear weapons program, and had, to an extent, counted on the fact that the IAEA leadership had been at odds with the US over questions relating to the Iraqi nuclear weapons programs. The clerics clearly felt that they could win enough time for the weapons program to produce at least an initial one or more indigenous nuclear weapons.
Supreme Leader Khamenei reportedly recently asked the 37 top nuclear experts heading the different projects at Natanz, Arak, Esfahan and Kashan, together with Iran's atomic energy commission director, Gholam-reza Aghazadeh when they could deliver the matiriel to produce the first weapons. He was reportedly told, according to DEBKAfile, that the testing of the centrifuges in Natanz could be completed within months and uranium enrichment could begin as soon as December 2003. An enrichment level of 70 percent or more would then be only months away, enabling Iran to build its first basic weapons by, say, mid-2004.
This timetable would mean, then, that while working as rapidly as possible toward a demonstration detonation of a nuclear weapon the clerics would need to (a) demonstrate that they had a delivery system in place and discreetly advise Washington that they did, in fact, have the seven or so ex-Soviet weapons, in order to forestall any possible direct US military action, and (b) initiate diversionary political and terrorist actions as soon as possible while simultaneously working to pin down US Pres. Bush politically until the November 2004 elections. The fact that the US supported by Israel and India cut across the Iranian plans and forced an IAEA confrontation means that the US Bush Administration has become aware of the Iranian nuclear gameplan.
However, there was no immediate recognition in Washington that the Bush Administration had made the connection with the Iranian-backed diversionary plans in the US political arena and presidential elections, nor in the matter of the proposed escalation plans in the Balkans.
On May 13, 2003, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily carried a report, Iran, Libya Embarked on Massive Political Influence Campaigns in US, Elsewhere, which noted:
The clerics were ... believed to have allocated as much as $200-million to be spent on psychological or influence operations within the United States itself to achieve indirect access to, and influence over, US policy officials.
Bearing in mind that a US Presidential campaign in 2004 was expected to cost each candidate some $250-million, the Iranian budget would be of a decisive size.
Meanwhile, before the IAEA issue came to a head, Iranian sources were quoted by the London-based Arabic newspaper, Al-Hayat, on September 11, 2003, that Iran had bought nuclear equipment, installations and technology from British companies. The sources did not reveal the names of these companies but pointed out that the purchase took place with the knowledge of British Government. According to the information received by Al-Hayat, the nuclear cooperation between Iran and British companies consisted of building the Natanz and Arak plants which specialize in uranium after Iran recently acquired this technology. The Al-Hayat report came at a time when the escalation between Iran and the United States had expanded to include Iranian relations with members of the European Union. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi strongly criticized Western countries and accused them of extremism and impudence and trying to wreck the course of cooperation between Iran and the IAEA.
At that time, enriching ith the extent and meaning of the IAEA confrontation becoming apparent, Foreign Minister Kharrazi threatened to rethink Iranian cooperation with the IAEA after it specified a time limit for Iran to reveal all aspects of its nuclear program and sign a protocol to allow stricter international inspection of Iranian [nuclear] plants. This accompanied Tehran's decision to suspend talks with Europe regarding human rights which were scheduled for the end of September 2003.
Significantly, the headlong rush by the Iranian clerics to force the completion of the nuclear weapons development program has caused increasing concern in Saudi Arabia. There has been growing evidence of a revived Saudi attempt to push Pakistan into providing nuclear weapons to the Kingdom, largely as a defensive measure against Iran.
On September 16, 2003, Iranian Pres. Hojjat ol-Eslam (Ali) Mohammad Khatami-Ardakani, faced with the fait accompli of the IAEA-US confrontation, reiterated to a group of Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC: Pasdaran) his Government's determination to acquire nuclear technology for military purposes, saying: It is integral part of the fundamental duties of the Islamic Republic, and one of its most basic principles, to become more and more equipped with science and technology, including nuclear technology. Having made that comment, he then hedged, saying: We don't want nuclear arms, no, no, no, this is against our policy and our faith, but we want to be strong and being strong means to have technology and nuclear technology is the most advanced, one that we would master thanks to the intelligence and the will of our children.
The comments highlighted the uncertainty as to which way the Islamist leadership should move, tactically, in handling the situation, although it has been clear from all ongoing intelligence that the commitment to building nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible was now an absolute priority for the Government. Pres. Khatami did not make any direct comment concerning the resolution adopted on September 12, 2003, by the Board of Governors of the IAEA in Vienna, which called on the Islamic Republic to adhere immediately and unconditionally to the additional Protocols of the Non Proliferation Treaty. The resolution had been formulated by Canada, Japan and Australia and adopted without vote.
One report noted that Hoseyn Shariatmadari, a high-ranking officer of Iranian intelligence services who had been appointed as Chief Editor of the evening daily Keyhan by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, warned the clerical leadership that if they failed to expel Canadian, Australian and Japanese ambassadors from Iran as a result of the IAEA vote, then the Muslim people of Iran would do it themselves. The daily Jomhoori Eslami (Islamic Republic) newspaper, which belongs to Khamenei, noted: [O]ne must accept that North Korean dealing with IAEA and NPT is the correct one.
The DPRK expelled all IAEA experts and left the NPT altogether in December 2002.
Meanwhile, on September 11, 2003, in an action which has not yet been completely explained, four armed men attacked the house of an Iranian nuclear physicist and took all the information stored on his computer. The four men, who wore masks, forcibly entered the home of Dr Ramin, the ex-assistant of the late Dr Mahmoud Hesabi, a noted US- and French-educated physicist. They downloaded the information from his computer, stole the hard-disk and fled. Following Dr Ramin's complaint, the police started an investigation as to the reasons behind the theft of this information and the hard drive. The timing and significance of this incident may, or may not, be relevant.
In summary, however, it is now clear that the Iranian clerical leadership is under considerable time pressure to act on the nuclear question. It remains highly unlikely that the clerics would at this stage abandon what they perceive to be their only strategic umbrella. They have seen what the lack of this capability achieved for Iraqi Pres. Saddam; he was removed quickly and efficiently. The adoption of the DPRK's approach to the nuclear question seems most likely, especially given the close strategic alliance between the two leaderships.
At the same time, the necessity for strategic diversionary action becomes urgent in (a) Iraq, (b) the Balkans, (c) East Asia, with the DPRKs continued cooperation, and (c) in the US political arena. In this regard, the Iranian clerics, along with their al-Qaida-linked allies (particularly those assets in Bosnia) must work strenuously to contain and discredit the US Bush Administration. This will entail a variety of international actions, and support for domestic US political leaders who will attack Pres. Bush. The Clinton and Clark actions during September 2003 in Bosnia and Serbia were, therefore, extremely supportive of the Iranian strategic objectives.
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