Luther’s Doctrine of Imputated Righteousness: Nominalism vs. Aristotelian Realism

Broaden Journal of Undergraduate Reseach ^ | Joshua Price

[rzman21]

48 Broaden Journal of Undergraduate Reseach The theology of German reformer Martin Luther has had a profound impact on Christian history. His doctrine of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer is no different. This study examines the philosophic underpinnings that support and inform Luther’s doctrine and describes the extent to which Luther is influenced by medieval Nominalism.

This study then proposes two methods by which Luther’s doctrine of imputation might be reconciled with a philosophic commitment to metaphysical Realism.

Since the Reformation, scholars of Martin Luther have debated the extent to which his philosophy was influenced by Nominalism. Certain of his doctrines seem inherently nominalist—such as consubstantiation and the hidden God—and others are opposed to Nominalism, such as Luther’s doctrine of human will.

With some doctrines, it is more difficult to ascertain the extent to which Luther’s beliefs reflect a Nominalist influence. One such example is Luther’s doctrine of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer.

In this paper, I will explore the extent to which Luther’s doctrine of imputation was influenced by Nominalism. Next, I will explore the methods by which an Aristotelian Realist might reconcile the doctrine of imputation with Realism. I argue that Luther’s doctrine of imputation represents a break from the traditional Nominalist doctrine. I further argue that the best way to reconcile the doctrine of imputation with Aristotelian Realism is by understanding it as a forensic act that provides the grounds for the justification of the believer before God.

Before delving into the argument, it will be useful to define Nominalism and Aristotelian Realism and explain the significance of these positions for the doctrine of imputation. Aristotelian Realism refers to the metaphysical position that everything that exists is a composite of form and www.jbu.edu/academics/journal 49 matter.

Aristotle argued in Book VII Chapter 17 of his Metaphysics that the form or substance of a thing guides and forms the matter.1 Thus, universals such as redness exist in nature in individual red things, and these individual things are red because they possess the form of redness. This is significant for the debate concerning imputed righteousness because Realism holds that righteousness is a universal that can be recognized by the accidents that inhere in righteousness.

Nominalism is the philosophic position opposed to Realism. William of Ockham, a proponent of Nominalism, asserted in Epistemological Problems that universals do not actually exist in nature, but are merely concepts that the mind invents to describe individual objects.2 To give an example, the Nominalist sees a dog as a dog not because it has the characteristics of “dog-ness;” instead, he thinks a dog is merely an individual thing to which the human mind ascribes a name. This is significant for imputed righteousness because it means that, for the Nominalist, one could conceivably possess the accidents of sinfulness and yet, at the same time, be considered righteous.

So, a philosophic commitment to Realism or Nominalism has an important effect on one’s doctrine of imputation.

Luther was clearly influenced by Nominalism in some significant ways, and it affected his understanding of imputation.

One manifestation of this influence is found in his belief concerning the nature of the divine will. In Bondage of the Will, Luther defended a voluntaristic conception of God’s will, arguing that no cause or ground determines His will, but that His will is the self-determining rule for all things.3 Thomas Aquinas, an Aristotelian Realist, believed that God’s will proceeds directly from God’s nature, which is used to explain why God cannot sin. Luther, contra Aquinas, argued that the goodness of God’s actions is not determined by the inherent goodness of His nature, but out of His declaration that His actions are good.4 For Luther, goodness proceeds out of God’s will rather than His nature, so that the divine will is separated from the divine nature.

In other words, God’s will determines what the term “goodness” means rather than his nature being consistent with a particular conception of goodness. In Bondage of the Will, Luther wrote that because power is part of God’s nature, His will cannot be impeded.5

In this sense, God can do whatever he wants—even if it appears to be evil to humans—because His will is supreme. This voluntaristic conception of the divine will is seen clearly in the tradition of Nominalism, which is associated with William of Ockham. According to Heiko Oberman, an historian who specialized in the Reformation, Luther’s voluntaristic conception of God stems directly from this Nominalist tradition.6

In The Two Reformations, Oberman points out the medieval distinction between the potentia absoluta and the potentia ordinata as evidence of Luther’s connection to Nominalism.7 The potentia absoluta defines God’s ultimate nature, while the potentia ordinata describes God’s nature as it is revealed in Scripture.

In Bondage of the Will, Luther wrote of the importance of distinguishing between the revealed God and the hidden God, as though the two have different chacteristics.8 Luther’s distinction between the potentia absoluta and the potentia ordinata is essential for understanding the influence medieval Nominalism had on his conception of God.

However, Luther employed the terms differently than did medieval Nominalists. Gordon Rupp, a Luther scholar, points out that Nominalists like Ockham appealed to potentia absoluta to speculate on and explain supernatural occurrences, whereas Luther used the distinction to cut off speculation and focus on God as He has revealed himself in Scripture.9

Rupp argues that Luther rejected the Aristotelian tendency to explain God’s nature with reference to a hierarchy of being.10 Luther viewed the Aristotelian view as a Pelagian fallacy, because he thought it gave too much credit to human reason.11

Instead, as Rupp aptly states, Luther understood God as an entirely unpredictable being.12 Rupp interprets Luther’s attempt to place God beyond human understanding as a reflection of his theocentric approach to theology.13 Despite the semantic distinction, both Luther and the medieval Nominalists used the potential absoluta and potentia ordinata distinction to support their voluntaristic understanding of God’s will, namely, that His will is distinct from His nature.

So, Nominalism’s influence on Luther is apparent in his attempt to insulate God from any rational attempt to comprehend His being. As with Ockham, this resulted in a voluntaristic understanding of God. Despite the influence Nominalism had on Luther’s doctrine of the divine will, he rejected Ockham’s view of the human will in favor of an Augustinian view.

As Oberman points out, Ockham—and the Nominalist tradition in the via moderna—asserted the priority of the will over the priority of the intellect.14 In contrast, Augustine argued in Confessions that men are corrupt from birth, and this corruption taints their ability to make decisions.15 In Bondage of the Will.

[rzman21]

This is an excerpt of a longer article that can be accessed through the link.

[D-fendr]

Excellent article, thanks.

>>>”In this sense, God can do whatever he wants—even if it appears to be evil to humans—because His will is supreme.”

This explains how Calvinism can say God’s justice is not the same as our view of justice. I.e., God’s actions can be what we would call an injustice.

It also reminds me of Islam’s view that God can be irrational, cruel, etc.

[rzman21]

This explains how Calvinism can say God’s justice is not the same as our view of justice. I.e., God’s actions can be what we would call an injustice.

>>You should read Robert Reilly’s book about Islam. It makes the similarities between the Calvinist God and the Muslim God plain as day.
http://books.google.com/books?id=6p1kewAACAAJ&dq=robert+reilly&hl=en&sa=X&ei=qs77ToOHJYjq0gHkyNSOAg&ved=0CGYQ6AEwBg

[7MMmag]

This explains how Calvinism can say God’s justice is not the same as our view of justice. I.e., God’s actions can be what we would call an injustice.

It appears you both possibly misunderstand, and misrepresent Calvin, or at the least, a great many others.

It was written in the Mosaic Law that a son was not to be punished for the sins of his father, and the father not be punished for the sins of a son.

If a father sins, should we kill a child of his for it? The Lord has done so (or ordained it to be, which is much as doing so, as the one who directs or hires an assassin is as culpable for the killing, as the one who commits the act). Yet it was needful & just, when He did so with King David's illegitimate son.

He even sent His own Son to die, and for a brief time He separated Himself the Father, and removed His Holy Spirit too, taking that also from the Son, leaving him alone and despised to suffer for injustices and wrongs others had done, and would do.

No fair! That was not fair at all. The Son had done nothing to earn such darkness, that the sun itself was darkened. He didn't do anything wrong.

It wasn't for justice, save that there must be a penalty for sin.

And why was this miscarriage of justice, this crime not only allowed to be committed, but this time an actual legitimate heir to the royal line was ordained to be slain, but for love?

Where was "justice" when He stood in our place? Please, don't take this for granted, or you will entirely miss understanding those whom you here so frequently malign.

It must be written upon your heart. Who can make such a writing?

John 3:5