"The Western Way of War": Review of CARNAGE AND CULTURE

Victor Davis Hanson. Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battle in the Rise of Western Power. New York. Doubleday. 2001. $29.95. Index, maps, 492 pp. Reviewed by Larry Schweikart

Written prior to September 11, this book has shocking insights into the wars we have fought, and are fighting. It could easily be subtitled, "The Western Way of War." Victor Hanson examines nine battles (including three sea engagements, and one land defeat) that pitted western military power against non-western forces. A couple of conclusions are obvious: Size doesn't matter, and neither do arms, at least, to some degree.

When it comes to combat, western armies are without equal in killing ability, and the worst combats in history take place when one western power is pitted against another. Otherwise, with a few exceptions, it is no contest.

Hanson concludes that there are reasons why western forces are successful. From Greeks at Salamis and Hellenes at Gaugemela, to the Romans, to Charles Martel's knights at Potiers and Cortes' conquistadores in Mexico City, all the way to the British at Roarke's Drift and the Americans at Midway, they all shared certain basic views of individual liberties, private property, and free expression. Whereas Yamamoto brooked no dissent, Cortes' commanders argued amongst themselves in Tenochtitlan. The Jannissaries and rowers of Xerxes' fleet were slaves, but the men who defeated them were free landholders. All the soldiers killed at Isandlwana were eligible voters, and they were quickly replaced by a new army of free soldiers who slaughtered their killers.

Free expression, private property, capitalism, religious tolerance, civic militarism are all components that made up the successful western armies. Some were "more free" than others. Hanson concedes that many of the rowers at Lepanto (1571) were slaves---yet the Christians went on to free some 20,000 Ottoman slave rowers after the battle. The footmen who fought for Charles Martel only dreamed of being knights with their aristocratic privileges. But every footman was more free than the highest ranking general in the Sultan's army that they defeated.

The West had another advantage forged by its freedom, namely that free men were more willing to maintain discipline, especially in rank when attacking or retreating, and that that fact had massive implications. Most of the time, the armies that westerners encountered abroad were not free, but mercenaries (Hannibal at Cannae, 216 B.C.), outright slaves (Darius's Persians and Cetswayo's Zulus at Gaugemela (331 B. C.) and Roarke's Drift (1879), or people who had surrendered their individuality to a mass system, such as the Japanese at Midway or the North Vietnamese at Khe Sanh. The best example of this phenomena of free vs. slaves is seen with Cortes at Tenochtitlan in 1521, where 600-1,000 Spanish soldiers were surrounded by nearly 200,000 Aztecs, were thousands of miles from home, and yet still closed ranks, delivered volley after volley of massed fire, used tight discipline to allow pikemen and crossbowmen to keep the enemy at bay, and used western engineering to build 13 brigantines with cannons that the Spaniards hauled overland to capture the water side of the city. Hanson points out that these brigantines, built on the spot, were better vessels than any Aztec or Indian canoe ever constructed. Indeed, the whole "Aztec way of war," designed to enslave enemies for their idiotic sacrifice system, led them to develop weapons that became useless after two or three blows, while Spanish steel still punctured lungs and eyes after hundreds of strokes. Throw in cannons, horses, and dogs, and it was a rout.

And routing is what non-western armies tend to do best, especially when met by shock combat. That is why they have always preferred stealth, maneuver, and "sneak attacks" (Tet, Pearl Harbor) to head-on confrontations. The Muslims ran wild in Spain until an army pinned them down in a terrain where they had to fight.

Another feature that makes this book so compelling is that Hanson is not afraid to analyze defeats, such as Cannae or Isandlwana or Tet (technically, he notes, a massive military victory but a journalistic/political loss). At Cannae, a poorly led Roman legion was crushed by the great Hannibal and his mercenary Spanish/French/African troops. Yet instead of negotiating, the Romans drafted every available man; threw up new defenses; stalled Hannibal until they had trained more troops (two new legions a year!); and smashed the Carthaginian army in Africa. Meanwhile, Hannibal delayed precisely BECAUSE his army did not use the "western way of war." They pillaged and looted instead of following up on their victory. He doesn't mention it, but the image of Sioux warriors stripping bodies and dancing after Little Big Horn came to mind. They danced, and Gen. Terry and Crook continued their march to annihilate them---or stuff them onto reservations.

Even "westernized" armies, such as Japan's, don't "get it" if their fundamental political/economic and social processes do not treasure human rights, free expression, and private property. Thus, Yamamoto dallied while Henry Kaiser started building ships---16 to every one for Japan.

Why don't non-western forces know how to "close the deal?" One reason is that free men, fighting for freedom, fight wars of annihilation to ensure that they can go back home. But the mercenary or slave or religious zealot LIVES for war. Hanson does not deal with the Mongols, but admits that they may be an exception. Yet even then, they fought a war of maneuver---literally Zulus on horseback, and never encountered a truly cohesive westernized army. One wonders how they would have fared against the British at Roarke's drift or Cortes' musketeers.

It is only the mind-set of westerners that allows essentially free men to stand shoulder to shoulder and deliver shock blows despite heavy casualties, because they fight for an ideal, not a potentate. But it is the same individualism that led two essentially equal commanders at Roarke's Drift not only to work together, but to invite a third officer---a cook!---into the war room for his advice. That individualism accounted for the actions of pilots at Midway, who on their own located the Japanese fleet. That security of identity allowed the American commander to hand over his command to another officer willingly, rather than execute those around him for fear of a coup, as Montezuma and the Zulus did.

Even in defeat in Vietnam, western armies reevaluated their techniques, fixed the problems, and kicked butt in Kuwait. One has never seen self-criticism of the type the Frech engaged in after the Franco-Prussian War, or the U.S. after Vietnam, in, say, the Persian or the Muslim armies. One certainly never saw it in the Ottoman Empire---they lacked the printing press until long after the Venetians had it, nor those "advanced" Aztecs, who didn't even have the wheel.

This book becomes all the more timely because, written before September 11, it pegs Osama's methods dead on. Stealth, sneak attacks, use zealot/slave/mercenaries to hit and run, and, above all, avoid open combat. Hanson points out that ultimately, in the past, other non-western societies have NEVER succeeded in the "western way of war" merely by acquiring western weapons: that the true strength of even the "all-volunteer" army is not is rifles or tanks or lasers, but the individuality and discipline that keep men at their post manning a machine gun after every one else has run; or the guts of a Jimmy Doolittle to fly to his objective in formation knowing he would not have enough gas to get back. But here is a difference: Doolittle and his men WANTED to get back, and they fought so that they, and their children, would not have to fight again. Other cultures fight because their cultures invite constant turmoil and combat, and because they want, as Rush Limbaugh says, "the issue and not the solution."

It is a very interesting book, one which I poked around in Border's. I have not bought it as I found his previous work, The Soul of Battle, all but unreadable. Hanson does have some good ideas which he shared in, I believe, National Review, recently.

One thing from Carnage. In his conclusion of the section on Midway he pays homage to John Waldron, Lem Massey, Wade McCluskey and the other pilots who flew into history that June day. He questions whether this generation's suburban Ashleys and Jordans will have the soul to emulate them should the need arise. I would say those, mostly suburban, Gen X'ers who pounded up those stairs, held to their posts or brought down plane # 4 have proved Hanson incorrect.

Reminds me of a few things I've read before in a book of cavalry. First, discipline and organization are the keys to Western successes. In small groups, indigenous cavalry could beat small groups of western cavalry, ie, 10 indians could bear 20 US cavalry but 100 US cavalry could whip 200 Indians. Second, there is no record of indigenous cavalry ever standing before the charge of massed lancers, ie, shock tactics. The author went so far as to claim that it is possible that Custer would have won at Little Big Horn had the 7th Cav been equipted with lances. I found that claim a bit outlandish but interesting.

Yah, I don't believe that, and I even would dispute the "indigenous vs. European cavalry" claim. Here is the difference: cavalry, by its nature, is disorganized and difficult to control---the exact opposite of the "western way of war." BUT, when western units dismounted, they then again gained superiority. Look at the Wagon Box Fight, where a group of cavalry wood cutters were attacked by a huge party of Indians and, using Winchester repeaters, slaughtered them after drawing up in a circle.

Custer is a bad example. Not only was he outnumbered about 4,000 to 276, but his command was spread out all over the hill. Had he goaded the Indians into attacking HIM on, say, "Reno Hill" and kept his whole force of about 800 men together, I dare say we would be talking about a totally different "Custer massacre" today.

But Hanson's bigger point is still valid: note that the Indians did NOT press on to attack Terry when the U.S. Army was reeling, but instead withdrew. (They would have been destroyed if they attacked Terry's massed infantry with cannons). Hanson would say this is the ESSENCE of the "Western Way of War"---fight the battle to a climactic conclusion.

"I even would dispute the "indigenous vs. European cavalry" claim."

Oh, that part I found compelling since all he was saying is that in small unit actions individual skills make the difference but in large scale actions say, squadron and above, the discipline and organization of European cavarly made it possible for squadrons of European cavalry to defeat regiments or even brigades of indigenous cavarly. This isn't really all that differnt from what you said about Custer breaking into small groups rather than remaining concentrated.

No, I think we have a different argument here. The mass, "screaming body" of troops (Persians, Zulus, Mahdis) is a non-western concept. You see SOME "squad-level" operations by the North American Indians, but not many (and mostly due to small sizes of their armies, anyway).

Squad operations really only started with the Prussians circa 1810, and made their way into U.S. doctrine only after the Civil War. The eastern armies may have "cells," but don't operate as well without that rigid top-down command. That is the point of Hanson's book, that the individuality of the West wins even SMALLER-sized engagements.

If you took 20 of Custer's troops and pitted them against 50 Indians, I would bet on the 7th cavalry. The problem at Little Big Horn was that you had 4,000 vs. 264, just like at the Alamo, with 125 vs. about 2,000.

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