IAEA on Threat of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorist Threat Warning From US State Department)

The head of the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says the ruthlessness of the September 11 attacks against the United States shows the potential for terrorist targetting of nuclear facilities, nuclear material and radioactive sources worldwide.

According to a November 1 press release, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said that the willingness of terrorists to sacrifice their lives to achieve their aims creates a new dimension in the fight against terrorism.

"We are not just dealing with the possibility of governments diverting nuclear materials into clandestine weapons programs," he said. "Now we have been alerted to the potential of terrorists targeting nuclear facilities or using radioactive sources to incite panic, contaminate property, and even cause injury or death among civilian populations."

ElBaradei released the statement as experts from around the world met at an international symposium on nuclear safeguards at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria.

Although terrorists have never used a nuclear weapon, ElBaradei said reports that some terrorist groups, particularly al-Qaeda, have attempted to acquire nuclear material is a cause of great concern.

The IAEA said that there have been about 375 cases of nuclear smuggling over the past decade, but none have involved anything close to enough fissionable material to construct a nuclear weapon. "However, any such materials being in illicit commerce and conceivably accessible to terrorist groups is deeply troubling," ElBaradei said.

He said that while the level of security at nuclear facilities is generally considered to be very high, security of medical and industrial radiation sources is disturbingly weak in some countries.

At the same time, IAEA experts evaluating the risks of nuclear terrorism point out that the potential damage of an intentional crash of a large, fully fuelled jetliner into a nuclear reactor or other nuclear facilities is still being analyzed.

To prevent a terrorist nuclear attack, IAEA is proposing a number of initiatives, including strengthening border monitoring and bolstering the capabilities of the IAEA Emergency Response Center to react to radiological emergencies following a terrorist attack. The agency estimates that at least $30-$50 million each year will be needed in the short term to strengthen and expand its programs to meet terrorist attacks.

ElBaradei also called on countries to actively reinforce nuclear safeguards, expand systems for combating smuggling of nuclear material and upgrade safety and security services.

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says that the ruthlessness of the 11 September attacks has alerted the world to the potential of nuclear terrorism - making it "far more likely" that terrorists could target nuclear facilities, nuclear material and radioactive sources worldwide.

Experts from around the world are meeting at the IAEA on 29 October to 2 November at an international symposium on nuclear safeguards, verification, and security. A special session on 2 November focuses on the issue of combating nuclear terrorism.

"The willingness of terrorists to sacrifice their lives to achieve their evil aims creates a new dimension in the fight against terrorism," says Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, whose Agency sets world standards for nuclear safety and security. "We are not just dealing with the possibility of governments diverting nuclear materials into clandestine weapons programs. Now we have been alerted to the potential of terrorists targeting nuclear facilities or using radioactive sources to incite panic, contaminate property, and even cause injury or death among civilian populations."

"An unconventional threat requires an unconventional response, and the whole world needs to join together and take responsibility for the security of nuclear material," says Mr. ElBaradei. "Because radiation knows no frontiers, States need to recognize that safety and security of nuclear material is a legitimate concern of all States. Countries must demonstrate, not only to their own populations, but to their neighbors and the world that strong security systems are in place. The willingness of terrorists to commit suicide to achieve their evil aims makes the nuclear terrorism threat far more likely than it was before September 11."

The IAEA, the UN nuclear watchdog agency based in Vienna, helps countries around the world to prevent, intercept and respond to terrorist acts and other nuclear safety and security incidents. It has the only international response system in place that would be in a position to immediately react to assist countries in case of a radiological emergency caused by a nuclear terrorist attack.

Although terrorists have never used a nuclear weapon, reports that some terrorist groups, particularly al-Qaeda, have attempted to acquire nuclear material is a cause of great concern.

According to the IAEA, since 1993, there have been 175 cases of trafficking in nuclear material and 201 cases of trafficking in other radioactive sources (medical, industrial). However, only 18 of these cases have actually involved small amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, the material needed to produce a nuclear bomb. IAEA experts judge the quantities involved to be insufficient to construct a nuclear explosive device. "However, any such materials being in illicit commerce and conceivably accessible to terrorist groups is deeply troubling," says Mr. ElBaradei.

There has been a six-fold increase in nuclear material in peaceful programs worldwide since 1970. According to IAEA figures, there are: 438 nuclear power reactors; 651 research reactors (of these 284 are in operation) and 250 fuel cycle plants around the world, including uranium mills and plants that convert, enrich store and reprocess nuclear material. Additionally, tens of thousands of radiation sources are used in medicine, industry, agriculture and research.

While the level of security at nuclear facilities is generally considered to be very high, security of medical and industrial radiation sources is disturbingly weak in some countries. "The controls on nuclear material and radioactive sources are uneven," says Mr. ElBaradei, "Security is as good as its weakest link and loose nuclear material in any country is a potential threat to the entire world."

IAEA experts have evaluated the risks for nuclear terrorism in these three categories:

Nuclear facilities: IAEA experts believe the primary risks associated with nuclear facilities would involve the theft or diversion of nuclear material from the facility, or a physical attack or act of sabotage designed to cause an uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the surrounding environment.

From its inception, the nuclear industry has been keenly aware of the dangers of nuclear material falling into terrorist's hands. At all levels - operator, State and international - there is a complex infrastructure at work to ensure nuclear material is accounted for; safeguarded from diversion; and protected from theft and sabotage.

Billions of dollars per year are already being spent to protect and defend nuclear facilities. Indeed, no other industry in the world has such a sophisticated level of security. Nuclear facilities are protected by well-trained security forces and are extremely robust, designed to withstand, for example, earthquakes, tornado-force winds and accidental crashes of small aircraft. Although it is not automatic that any attack would result in a release of radioactivity, they are however industrial facilities and as such are not hardened to withstand acts of war.

The extent of damage that could be caused by the intentional crash of a large, fully fuelled jetliner into a nuclear reactor containment or other nuclear facilities is still a matter for analysis. Nuclear facility designs vary from country to country, so studies will have to take specific plant designs into account. "After September 11, we realized that nuclear facilities - like dams, refineries, chemical production facilities or skyscrapers - have their vulnerabilities," Mr. ElBaradei says. "There is no sanctuary anymore, no safety zone."

Countries around the world with nuclear facilities have heightened security since the 11 September attacks, and are conducting urgent analyses of their safety and security systems. The IAEA plans to strengthen and tailor its existing safety and security services to address the terrorism threat, by assisting countries in upgrading the security and safety of their nuclear facilities.

Nuclear Material: According to IAEA experts, terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons would be the most devastating scenario. "While we cannot exclude the possibility that terrorists could get hold of some nuclear material," says Mr. ElBaradei, "it is highly unlikely they could use it to manufacture and successfully detonate a nuclear bomb. Still, no scenario is impossible."

Beyond the difficulty for terrorists to obtain weapon usable material - scientists estimate that 25 kg of highly enriched uranium or 8 kg of plutonium would be needed make a bomb - actually producing a nuclear weapon is far from a trivial exercise. Scientific expertise and access to sophisticated equipment would be required. However, when the Cold War ended, thousands of highly knowledgeable scientists and engineers previously involved in the Soviet Union's weapons program were laid off or found their incomes drastically reduced. Another legacy of the Cold War is the disturbing reports, albeit unsubstantiated, of missing nuclear weapons.

Nuclear material has traditionally been subjected to extensive national protection measures. To prevent theft of nuclear material, nuclear facilities employ a range of protection measures, including site security forces, site access control, employee screening and co-ordination with local and national security authorities. In some States, national security forces provide back-up to facility security. The IAEA offers countries around the world assessments and advice on physical security. It also maintains a database on incidents of trafficking in nuclear material, although the IAEA considers the information States provide on incidents and on follow-up to be inadequate.

In non-nuclear weapon States, the IAEA carries out international safeguards to verify that nuclear material has not been diverted to non-peaceful uses. These safeguards, the verification tool entrusted to the IAEA in the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), also play an important role in reducing the risk that terrorists could acquire nuclear material without detection. But when the NPT was drafted, nuclear terrorism was not perceived as a significant threat.

However, safeguards require that a state account for all its nuclear material and serve as a "burglar alarm" against a terrorist. A well-designed system will also help to pinpoint the origin of missing material, identify individuals who had access to it, and facilitate recovery of the material.

The nuclear weapon programs in the five Nuclear Weapon States - China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well any that may exist in India, Pakistan and Israel, the three non-NPT countries known to have nuclear programs - are not under the purview of IAEA safeguards. "Although I understand there is a high level of security for nuclear weapons," says Mr. ElBaradei, "I hope that all of these countries are urgently reviewing the safety and security of their nuclear weapons."

"There have been two nuclear shocks to the world already - the Chernobyl accident and the IAEA's discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program," says Mr. ElBaradei. "It will be vital we do all in our power to prevent a third."

The IAEA plans to significantly expand its advisory services and help States upgrade protection of their nuclear materials.

Radioactive Sources: IAEA experts are concerned that terrorists could develop a crude radiological dispersal device using radioactive sources commonly used in every day life. The number of radioactive sources around the world is vast: those used in radiotherapy alone are in the order of ten thousand. Many more are used in industry; for example, to check for welding errors or cracks in buildings, pipelines and structures. They are also used for the preservation of food. There is a large number of unwanted radioactive sources, many of them abandoned, others being simply "orphaned" of any regulatory control.

Such a weapon, sometimes referred to as a "dirty bomb", could be made by shrouding conventional explosives around a source containing radioactive material, although handling the nuclear material could well be deadly.

"Security of radioactive materials has traditionally been relatively light," says Abel Gonzalez, the IAEA's Director of Radiation and Waste Safety. "There are few security precautions on radiotherapy equipment and a large source could be removed quite easily, especially if those involved have no regard for their own health. Moreover, in many countries, the regulatory oversight of radiation sources is weak. As a result, an undetermined number of radioactive sources has become orphaned of regulatory control and their location is unknown."

"Certainly, the effects of a dirty bomb would not be devastating in terms of human life," says Mr. Gonzalez. "But contamination in even small quantities could have major psychological and economic effects."

The accidental contamination of Goiânia, a major city in Brazil, with a medical radiation source exemplifies the potential for a terrorist group to wreak havoc on an urban center. In September 1987, scrap scavengers broke into an abandoned radiological clinic and stole a highly radioactive caesium 137 source and moved it to a junkyard for sale as scrap. Workers broke open the encasement and cut up the 20-gram capsule of caesium 137 into pieces. The valuable-looking scrap was then distributed to friends and family of workers around the city. Fourteen people were overexposed, and 249 contaminated. Four subsequently died. More than 110,000 people had to be continuously monitored. To decontaminate the area, 125,000 drums and 1470 boxes were filled with contaminated clothing, furniture, dirt and other materials; 85 houses had to be destroyed.

"We are dealing with a totally new equation since September 11," Mr. Gonzalez said. "These terrorists demonstrated before our eyes their willingness to give up their lives. The deadliness of handling intensely radioactive material can no longer be seen as an effective deterrent."

The IAEA is proposing a number of new initiatives, including strengthening border monitoring, helping States search for and dispose of orphan sources and strengthening the capabilities of the IAEA Emergency Response Center to react to radiological emergencies following a terrorist attack.

"September 11 presented us with a clear and present danger and a global threat that requires global action," says Mohamed ElBaradei. "Many of our programs go to the heart of combating nuclear terrorism, but we now have to actively reinforce safeguards, expand our systems for combating smuggling in nuclear material and upgrade our safety and security services."

"At a minimum," Mr. ElBaradei says, "national assessments of security infrastructure for all types of nuclear and radioactive material should be required. Countries will have something to gain from allowing international assessments to demonstrate to the world that they are keeping their nuclear material secure."

In the short term, the IAEA estimates that at least $30-$50 million annually will be needed to strengthen and expand its programs to meet this terrorist threat.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), based in Vienna, has 132 Member States. It has 2200 employees and an annual budget of about $330 Million. The IAEA, a UN agency, serves as the world's intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is also the international inspectorate for the application of nuclear verification measures to ensure that nuclear programs are peaceful.

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State.
Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

(Practicing for a biological, chemical or nuclear terrorist attack.)

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Terrorism drill planned

By Kim Craft

Gadsden Times Staff Writer (Alabama)

November 5, 2001

ATTALLA - A simulated mass casualty, hazardous material, terrorism incident Friday at Etowah High School will test military and local emergency interaction and response capabilities.

The Attalla Fire Department is the host agency for the drill that is being coordinated with the 326th U.S. Army Reserve Unit, commanded by Capt. Leslie Chapman and based in Huntsville.

"The Army Reserve unit approached us to host this because of our location between Huntsville and Anniston and our highway accessibility," Assistant Fire Chief Robert Dillard said, explaining that some members of the unit live in Etowah County. "They know of the interstate travel and how we access it."

He said the drill coincides with a 60-day activation of the 326th for homeland protection following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on America and subsequent detection of anthrax being used as a weapon.

Dillard said area residents should not be alarmed by the sounds of emergency vehicles responding to the drill planned for 12:30 p.m. and expected to continue for about three hours Friday. The reserve unit will be on the school grounds early that morning, stationing equipment. The public likely will notice increased traffic in the Camp Sibert area, though any disruptions are planned to be minimal, Dillard said.

"We want to let the public know that as this occurs this is merely a training exercise and there are bound to be possible inconveniences," he said. "They may hear traffic on scanners that would be horrific in that there may be alarming amounts of emergency vehicles in the Attalla area, especially when they see U.S. troops and their equipment in our city."

The drill specifically will depict a terrorist event during a basketball game at Etowah High.

"The drill will use as much of a realistic environment as we can gather, from decontamination to triaging of victims," Dillard stressed. "There will be hands-on approaches with leadership and decision making."

The incident commander will come from the first emergency vehicle responding. That person eventually will request Army Reserve unit response through the Gadsden-Etowah Emergency Management Agency.

Reserve unit members will conduct the decontamination measures, and as the incident drill progresses it will encompass the use of several area buildings.

"We can't say whether it will be international or domestic terrorism," Dillard said. "It will involve hazardous material and there will be all types of problems first responders will encounter, such as victims who have been contaminated attempting to leave the area, those who cannot walk and possibly those who one cannot help."

The drill focuses on testing the capabilities of the military to interact with civilian first responders. It provides a second test in gauging capabilities of a number of local emergency agencies to detect and identify the incident and establish possible evacuation to a secure area while establishing perimeters of the affected site.

"I'm sure there'll be mistakes, but that's what this is for - to help identify those areas," Dillard said, citing communication among various agencies probably will be the biggest problem, considering agencies utilize different communication systems.

Participating Agencies

The 326th U.S. Army Reserve Unit, Attalla Fire Department, Gadsden-Etowah Emergency Management Agency, Gadsden Fire Department, Blount County Haz-Mat, Rainbow City Fire Department, Ivalee Volunteer Fire Department, Reece City Volunteer Fire Department, Sand Valley Volunteer Fire Department, Steele Volunteer Fire Department, a number of EMS transporters, including Rural Metro Ambulance, Gadsden Etowah EMS, Etowah County Volunteer Rescue Squad, Attalla Rescue Squad, Union Rescue Squad, Union Rescue Squad of Marshall County and possibly others yet to be identified.

The CFR in 1998 in it's Foriegn Affairs Magazine in 1998 tells how an attack taking down the world trade center (by nuclear,etc) would transform America:

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CATASTROPHIC TERRORISM

by Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow

From Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998

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IMAGINING THE TRANSFORMING EVENT

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. But today's terrorists, be they international cults like Aum Shinrikyo or individual nihilists like the Unabomber, act on a greater variety of motives than ever before. More ominously, terrorists may gain access to weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices, germ dispensers, poison gas weapons, and even computer viruses. Also new is the world's dependence on a nearly invisible and fragile network for distributing energy and information. Long part of the Hollywood and Tom Clancy repertory of nightmarish scenarios, catastrophic terrorism has moved from far-fetched horror to a contingency that could happen next month. Although the United States still takes conventional terrorism seriously, as demonstrated by the response to the attacks on its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August, it is not yet prepared for the new threat of catastrophic terrorism.

American military superiority on the conventional battlefield pushes its adversaries toward unconventional alternatives. The United States has already destroyed one facility in Sudan in its attempt to target chemical weapons. Russia, storehouse of tens of thousands of weapons and material to make tens of thousands more, may be descending into turmoil. Meanwhile, the combination of new technology and lethal force has made biological weapons at least as deadly as chemical and nuclear alternatives. Technology is more accessible, and society is more vulnerable. Elaborate international networks have developed among organized criminals, drug traffickers, arms dealers, and money launderers, creating an infrastructure for catastrophic terrorism around the world.

The bombings in East Africa killed hundreds. A successful attack with weapons of mass destruction could certainly take thousands, or tens of thousands, of lives. If the device that exploded in 1993 under the World Trade Center had been nuclear, or had effectively dispersed a deadly pathogen, the resulting horror and chaos would have exceeded our ability to describe it. Such an act of catastrophic terrorism would be a watershed event in American history. It could involve loss of life and property unprecedented in peacetime and undermine America's fundamental sense of security, as did the Soviet atomic bomb test in 1949. Like Pearl Harbor, this event would divide our past and future into a before and after. The United States might respond with draconian measures, scaling back civil liberties, allowing wider surveillance of citizens, detention of suspects, and use of deadly force. More violence could follow, either further terrorist attacks or U.S. counterattacks. Belatedly, Americans would judge their leaders negligent for not addressing terrorism more urgently.

The danger of weapons of mass destruction being used against America and its allies is greater now than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. It is a national security problem that deserves the kind of attention the Defense Department devotes to threats of military nuclear attack or regional aggression. The first obstacle to imagination is resignation. The prospects may seem so dreadful that some officials despair of doing anything useful. Some are fatalistic, as if contemplating the possibility of a supernova. Many thinkers reacted the same way at the dawn of the nuclear age, expecting doom to strike at any hour and disavowing any further interest in deterrence as a hopeless venture. But as with nuclear deterrence, the good news is that more can be done.1

ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESS

The threat of catastrophic terrorism spans the globe, defying ready classification as solely foreign or domestic. As the 1993 World Trade Center incident demonstrated, a terrorist group can include U.S. citizens and foreign nationals, operating and moving materials in and out of American territory over long periods of time. The greatest danger may arise if the threat falls into one of the crevasses in the government's overlapping jurisdictions, such as the divide between "foreign" and "domestic" terrorism or "law enforcement" versus "national security."

The law enforcement/national security divide is especially significant, carved deeply into the topography of American government. The national security paradigm fosters aggressive, active intelligence gathering. It anticipates the threat before it arises and plans preventive action against suspected targets. In contrast, the law enforcement paradigm fosters reactions to information provided voluntarily, uses ex post facto arrests and trials governed by rules of evidence, and protects the rights of citizens.

President Bill Clinton appointed a national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism in May 1998 to "bring the full force of all our resources to bear swiftly and effectively." There is no harm in the designation of a White House aide, but one should not place faith in czars. Real power still resides in the executive departments that have people, equipment, money, and the capacity to get things done.

Because most of the government functions addressing the danger of catastrophic terrorism apply to other purposes as well, the people making decisions about these capabilities against terrorists should be the same people who consider the other missions and can reconcile competing demands. The U.S. government must create unglamorous but effective systems for accountable decision-making that combine civil, military, and intelligence expertise throughout the chain of command; integrate planning and operational activity; build up institutional capacities; and highlight defensive needs before an incident happens. This strategy has four elements: intelligence and warning; prevention and deterrence; crisis and consequence management; and coordinated acquisition of equipment and technology.

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