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Posted on 11/18/2001 2:50:59 PM PST by ATOMIC_PUNK

What does the legislation call for?

What will the UNRDF do?

• The UNRDF will be a rapidly deployable force consisting of up to 6,000 international volunteers employed directly by the U.N. No U.S. troops or forces from other U.N. Member States will be part of this force, however U.S. citizens may apply. The UNRDF will be trained and equipped as a single unit specifically for peacekeeping, and will be able to serve both in a traditional peacekeeping and as civilian police roles.
• The UNRDF will be able to deploy within 15 days in situations where a conflict is in danger of escalating but has not escalated yet, when gross human rights violations are being committed, or when peace has been restored to a conflicted region but law and order has not AND when the Security Council believes there is a situation where peacekeepers from Member Nations can not be deployed quickly enough.
• When the UNRDF staff are not otherwise engaged they will serve as trainers of Member Nation peacekeepers and civilian police so that they can serve more effectively.

What will the UNRDF not do?

• The UNRDF is not a standing army. Its primary purpose is to fill the three to six month average gap between when the Security Council authorizes a peacekeeping operation and when the international community is ready to deploy national forces. It can only be deployed with a Security Council resolution, over which the U.S. has veto power.
• The UNRDF will not serve in any specific area for more than 6 months. It will only be a temporary force until a more permanent peacekeeping mission can be established.
• This force will not be used in "Chapter VII interventions" (i.e. Kuwait or other large scale military operations). It will not be expected to fight its way into ongoing conflicts.

• The UNRDF reduces the "political will" gap.
      A common problem with peacekeeping is that there is often a lack of political will within troop-contributing Member States due to fear of negative public response to casualties. UNRDF casualties, although unfortunate, would not be viewed by the public in the same way as regular armed forces casualties would be, because they were individual volunteers for an international force. A UNRDF deployment by the Security Council could give Member State leaders time to make the case for troop contributions to their legislators and constituents.
      Actual or threatened Member State casualties have caused nations to withdraw peacekeepers, allowing massacres and genocide. The Security Council could order the UNRDF to hold fast in precarious situations until the international community could relieve them.
  

  ® Guinean peacekeepers in Sierra Leone in January 2000 surrendered their weapons to a smaller force because they were under orders from their government to avoid combat. In May, 2000 RUF rebels in Sierra Leone seized about 500 U.N. peacekeepers along with their weapons and equipment. The UN force had been deployed too slowly, was undertrained, and understaffed. It consisted of only 8,700 of the 11,100 peacekeepers requested by the U.N. Security Council.

  ® In 1995 in Srebrenica, Bosnian Serb troops forced the retreat of Dutch United Nations peacekeepers who were part of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from a "safe haven," resulting in the massacre of 7,000 Bosnian civilians and expulsion of 40,000 Bosnian civilians.

  ® When 10 Belgian peacekeepers were killed in Rwanda in 1994, Belgium decided to pull out their forces, effectively ending the U.N. presence in Rwanda. The subsequent failure of the Security Council to deploy 5,500 peacekeepers at a 6-month estimated cost of $115,000,000 allowed for the genocide which consumed 800,000 lives and $2,000,000,000 in humanitarian aid.

American citizens would support the UNRDF

A rapidly deployable force is in line with what the American people want. According to a 1999 Harris poll, 64% of Americans support the development of a "truly international army, with troops from many countries that can be used in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Rwanda").

An October 1999 PIPA poll reports that 1) 77% agree that if a government commits atrocities against its people "the countries of the world, including the US" should intervene with force to stop the killing; 2) 73% view themselves as "a citizen of the world as well as a citizen of the United States"; and 3) 53% favor "a standing UN peacekeeping force made up of individuals who were not part of a national army but had volunteered to be part of the UN force." A March 2000 Zogby poll show 52% supported a "100,000 man U.N. peacekeeping force."

HR 4453 IH

106th CONGRESS

2d Session

H. R. 4453

To encourage the establishment of a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

May 15, 2000

Mr. MCGOVERN (for himself, Mr. PORTER, and Mrs. MORELLA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

A BILL

To encourage the establishment of a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force Act of 2000'.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds the following:

(1) United States Presidential Decision Directive 71 calls for a stronger United States response to maintaining order in societies recovering from conflict. It aims to improve coordination of United States efforts and to enhance the ability of other countries, the United Nations, and regional organizations to plan, mount, and sustain operations in support of the rule of law.

(2) In a press briefing on February 24, 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated the following: `The recent slowness in deploying desperately needed civilian police to Kosovo provides only the latest evidence that present international capabilities are not adequate. And the ongoing deployment of CIVPOL teams to East Timor and Sierra Leone show that the need will not soon diminish. In response, we must recognize that old models of peacekeeping don't always meet current challenges. Peace operations today often require skills that are neither strictly military nor strictly police but, rather, a combination of the two. The international community needs to identify and train units that are able to control crowds, deter vigilante actions, prevent looting and disarm civilian agitators while, at the same time, winning the trust of the communities in which they are deployed.'.

(3) In his April 2000 report, `We the Peoples, The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century', United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan states that only member nations of the United Nations can fix the `structural weakness of United Nations peace operations . . . Our system for launching operations has sometimes been compared to a volunteer fire department, but that description is too generous. Every time there is a fire, we must first find fire engines and the funds to run them before we can start dousing any flames. The present system relies almost entirely on last minute, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to the provision of civilian personnel even more so than military. Although we have understandings for military standby arrangements with Member States, the availability of the designated forces is unpredictable and very few are in a state of high readiness. Resource constraints preclude us even from being able to deploy a mission headquarters rapidly.'.

(4) The December 1999 United Nations `Report on the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda' indicates that in April 1994, the United Nations Security Council failed to deploy 5,500 United Nations peacekeepers to Rwanda within two weeks of the initial violence, thereby allowing the conflict to escalate. The 6-month estimated cost of the deployment would have been $115,000,000. Instead, the genocide consumed 800,000 lives along with $2,000,000,000 in humanitarian aid.

(5) In Srebrenica, Bosnia, on July 11, 1995, Bosnian Serb troops forced the retreat of Dutch United Nations peacekeepers who were part of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) from a `safe haven', resulting in the massacre of 7,000 Bosnian civilians and expulsion of 40,000 Bosnian civilians.

(6) The United Nations peacekeeping budget estimate for the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from July 1, 1997, to June 30, 1998, was $165,600,000, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-sponsored intervention in the Serbian province of Kosovo cost $37,000,000 per day.

(7) In July 1999, 4,700 civilian police officers were requested to be deployed to the Serbian province of Kosovo but, as of April 17, 2000, the United Nations has deployed only 2,901 of the requested police officers, resulting in the breakdown of law and order and the escalation of unrest in Kosovo.

(8) In May 2000, Revolutionary United Front rebels in Sierra Leone, in violation of the ceasefire and peace accords, captured and held prisoner approximately 500 United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacekeepers. The weapons, equipment, and vehicles of the peacekeepers were also seized. The UNAMSIL force had been deployed too slowly and was undertrained and understaffed, consisting of only 8,700 peacekeepers of the 11,000 peacekeepers requested by the United Nations Security Council.

(9) On February 24, 2000, the United Nations Security Council approved a United States-sponsored proposal to send 5,537 troops on an observer mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (to be known as the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)), a Republic 1/3 the size of the United States, to monitor the implementation of the Lusaka accords. However, it will take at least three months to deploy the required forces. On April 25, 2000,

South African Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma urged rapid deployment of the troops and stated `[i]f deployment is very slow [the accords] can fall apart . . . The troops should have been deployed a long time ago.'.

(10) The United States has the power in the United Nations Security Council to veto decisions that are not within the national interests of the United States.

SEC. 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS RAPID DEPLOYMENT POLICE AND SECURITY FORCE.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT- The President shall direct the United States representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to urge the United Nations--

(1) to establish a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force that is rapidly deployable, under the authority of the United Nations Security Council, and trained to standardized objectives;

(2) to recruit personnel to serve in this Force; and

(3) to provide equitable and reliable funding for the United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force.

(b) MISSION STATEMENT- The United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force should have a mission statement that provides for the following:

(1) The United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force will engage in operations when--

(A) the United Nations Security Council determines that an imminent threat to the peace requires a preventive deployment of forces and the Security Council deems it as an appropriate response;

(B) the United Nations Security Council determines ongoing gross violations of human rights or breaches of the peace require rapid intervention by the international community and the Security Council deems it as an appropriate response;

(C) peace has been restored to a region but the rule of law has not yet been reestablished and when national civilian police or United Nations member nations personnel are not available and the Security Council deems it as an appropriate response; or

(D) the United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force can utilize its personnel to help train the military and civilian police of member nations of the United Nations to better participate in international peace operations.

(2) The United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force will consist of not more than 6000 personnel who are--

(A) placed under the authority of the United Nations Security Council;

(B) under the direction of the Secretary General of the United Nations;

(C) deployed only by United Nations Security Council resolution;

(D) volunteers from United Nations member nations employed directly by the United Nations;

(E) trained as a single unit, appropriately equipped, expressly for international peace operations including civilian policing; and

(F) rapidly deployable.

(3) The United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force will be organized as a sub-department within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations or under the control of the United Nations's Military Staff Committee and will contain personnel trained as military staff officers and civilian police officers to be deployed immediately to a potential conflict area.

(4) The deployment of the United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force will be limited to a maximum of 6 months, at which time the Police and Security Force would be replaced by personnel supplied by United Nations member nations.

(5) The basing and infrastructure service of the United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force will be leased from existing member nations' institutions.

SEC. 5. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS RAPID DEPLOYMENT POLICE AND SECURITY FORCE.

Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall prepare and transmit to the Congress a report on the progress of negotiations with the United Nations and its member nations regarding the creation of a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force described in section 3.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) The term `international peace operations' means--

(A) any such operation carried out under chapter VI or chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; and

(B) any such United Nations operation that includes civilian policing.

(2) The term `rapidly deployable' refers to the capacity to deploy military or civilian personnel to a region undergoing conflict within 15 days of the enactment of a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing a deployment.

END

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