In this case under discussion, I don't buy the comments about divulging secrets. The papers written in Arabic were released by the government a good while ago and now are being translated and analyzed by our good freeper, JVeritas. For crying out loud what's going on here and why?
To me, the Administration is secretive even when it doesn't have to be. Can't it ever play hardball, EVER? Can't it ever point out triumphantly to public records (such as the papers Veritas is working on) which, properly explained, can put it in a good light for a change?
It makes me sick that the White House has a consistent record of fading away and almost forcing conservative TV pundits, radio talk show hosts and private citizens like Veritas and freepers to do the heavy lifting in both offense and defense.
I don't get it at all.
(......actually, I DO get it, and I don't like the answer one bit).
Leni
These are commercially available devices, most commonly used to measure rock porosity. One of their common applications is in prospecting for oil fields. They have essentially zero military significance.
And I agree with a previous poster: the "tantalum coated graphite" is much more problematic.
Good work !
Great article
Iraqi Document: Highly Radioactive Atomic Neutron Device (Translation)
Release/Translation of Classified PreWar Docs ping. If you want to be added or removed to the ping list, please Freepmail me.
Please add the keyword prewardocs to any articles pertaining to this subject.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Documents
http://www.iraqwatch.org/controlled/annex3text.htm
ANNEX 3
LIST OF ITEMS TO BE REPORTED TO IAEA
Items marked * and shaded are prohibited to Iraq under Resolution 687.
The notation (SC II) or (SC IV) indicates that items of the same type/category are also listed in one of the Annexes (2 or 4, respectively) of the UN Special Commission Plan.
(snip)
12. Tantalum (SC IV)
Tantalum sheets with a thickness of 2.5 mm or greater from which a circle of 200 mm diameter can be obtained.
(snip)
EXPLANATORY NOTE:
Many of the items listed in this section come into direct contact with uranium metal vapor or liquid or with process gas consisting of UF6 or a mixture of UF6 and other gases. All surfaces that come into contact with the uranium or UF6 are wholly made of, or protected by, corrosion-resistant materials. For the purposes of the section relating to laser-based enrichment items, the materials resistant to corrosion by vapor or liquid uranium metal or uranium alloys include yttria-coated graphite and tantalum; and the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include copper, stainless steel, aluminum, , aluminum alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.
(snip)
EXPLANATORY NOTE:
Components for these assemblies are made of, or protected by, materials resistant to the heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapor or liquid (such as yttria-coated graphite or tantalum) and may include pipes, valves, fittings, 'gutters', feed-throughs, heat exchangers and collector plates for magnetic, electrostatic (or other) separation methods.
(snip)
EXPLANATORY NOTE:
The crucibles and other parts of this system that come into contact with molten uranium or uranium alloys are made of, or protected by, materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance. Suitable materials include tantalum, yttria-coated graphite, graphite coated with other rare earth oxides or mixtures thereof.
29.5. *Uranium metal 'product' and 'tails' collector assemblies
Specially designed or prepared product and 'tails' collector assemblies for uranium metal in solid form. These collector assemblies are made of, or protected by, materials resistant to the heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapor, such as yttria-coated graphite or tantalum.
(snip)
Joseph,
Great job. Nice translation.
What's this "God" stuff? Doesn't that say "Allah" in the original?
http://www.iraqwatch.org/suppliers/update.htm
Iraq's Bomb — an Update
By Diana Edensword and Gary Milhollin
New York Times
April 26, 1993, p. A17
Soon, possibly this week, the U.N. will report that its inspectors in Iraq have found yet another cache of strategic equipment for making nuclear weapons. Their chief inspector at the International Atomic Energy Agency, Maurizio Zifferero, should be embarrassed. He announced in September that President Saddam Hussein's atomic weapons program was "neutralized" and "at zero." He even said that Iraq had "decided at the higher political level to stop these activities."
Saddam Hussein never told the I.A.E.A. about the newly discovered equipment, as required by UN resolutions. And he continues to rain down threats and intimidation on the inspectors, indicating that he has more to hide. In March 1992, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, told inspectors that Iraq had not relinquished the right to build weapons of mass destruction.
Before his army marched into Kuwait in August 1990, Saddam Hussein had a workable bomb design, many key components, a multi-billion dollar nuclear manufacturing base and a global supply network able to exploit lax Western export controls, especially those in Germany. His Western-trained scientists had produced small amounts of plutonium and enriched uranium: the fuels in the bombs that destroyed Nagasaki and Hiroshima. They even did clandestine research in laboratories the I.A.E.A. inspected regularly.
If Saddam Hussein had left Kuwait alone, he might have had his first bomb by now. He still has his scientists on the payroll and has protected the identities of many of his global suppliers. He has even started to get European and American inquiries on future oil sales: petro-dollars for a renewed bomb effort.
Here is a summary of nuclear-related equipment in Iraq today. It draws on export records and reports by inspection teams. The names of manufacturers, who may not have supplied their products directly to Iraq, are given where known. Iraq claimed the equipment was for civilian use The U.S. Government wants most of the material destroyed; the IAEA may let Iraq use it under the agency's monitoring. It was just such "monitoring," however, that failed to detect Iraq's bomb program in the first place.
Found but Not Destroyed or Removed
These items have been tagged for possible destruction, monitoring by the I.A.E.A. or unconditional release to Iraq.
• 580 tons of natural uranium (Brazil, Niger and Portugal).
• 1.7 tons of enriched uranium (Italy).
• 255 tons of HMX, a high explosive for detonating atomic bombs.
• 60 machines that shape metal into centrifuge parts, by Dorries, H&H Metalform, Kieserling & Albrecht, Leifeld and Magdeburg (Germany), Matrix Churchill (Britain) and Schaublin (Switzerland).
• Mass spectrometers to monitor bomb-fuel production, by Finnegan-MAT (US, Germany).
• Two electric frequency converters to power atomic bomb fuel production, by Acomel (Switzerland).
• More than 700 valves that can process atomic bomb fuel, by Balzers, VAT (Switzerland) and Nupro (US).
• Two coordinate-measuring machines to monitor centrifuge production, by DEA (Italy).
• 70 mixer-settler units to extract plutonium, some by Metallextraktion AB (Sweden).
• Machines for milling metal, by Maho, Schiess, SHW and Wotan (Germany), Innocenti (Italy) and Zayer (Spain).
• Two assembly presses and two balancing machines to make centrifuges.
• One resin-mixing and discharge machine to support electromagnetic uranium enrichment, by Millitorr (Britain).
• One jet-molding machine to make centrifuge motors, by Arburg (Germany).
• One 63-ton hydraulic press to shape explosive atomic bomb parts.
• One mainframe computer used to process nuclear atomic bomb codes, by NEC (Japan).
• Two oxidation furnaces for making centrifuge parts, by Degussa (Germany).
• One electron-beam welder to assemble centrifuges, by Sciaky (France).
• Tantalum metal sheets for making crucibles to cast atomic bomb cores.
Still Missing
These items are suspected or known to be in Iraq, but have not been found or accounted for:
• More than $1 million worth of computers, electronic testing machines, computer graphics equipment and frequency synthesizers licensed for shipping to atomic bomb builders, by Hewlett Packard (US).
• More than $7 million worth of computers, licensed for shipping to atomic bomb builders, by International Computer Systems (US).
• Nuclear reactor control panels, instruments and computers salvaged from a damaged reactor, by the consortium Cerbag (France).
• Computers and instruments capable of analyzing metals and powders for atomic bomb manufacture, licensed for shipping to an atomic bomb builder by Siemens (Germany, US).
• $43,000 worth of computers for a nuclear weapon testing site, licensed for shipping by EZ Logic Data (US).
• $30,000 worth of electronic and computing equipment lo measure neutrons and gamma rays, licensed for shipping by Canberra Industries and Canberra Elektronik (US, Germany).
• Five frequency converters capable of powering centrifuges, by Acomel (Switzerland).
• Parts that collected enriched uranium in electromagnetic enrichment machines.
• One jet-molding machine to make centrifuge motors, by Arburg (Germany).
• One powder press suitable for compacting nuclear fuels, by XYZ Options (US).
• $15 million worth of cylindrical presses, by Leifeld (Germany).
• $2.2 million worth of computers, licensed to be shipped to an atomic bomb builder by Unisys (US).
• $280,000 worth of computers and electronic and photographic equipment for nuclear weapons laboratories, licensed to be shipped by Perkin Elmer (US).
• $367,000 worth of computers licensed for shipping to an atomic bomb builder to run its machine tools, by Gerber Systems (US).
• Design plans for a $5.6 million plant to process uranium, by Natron (Brazil).
• More than 100 mixer-settler units to extract plutonium, by Metallextraktion AB (Sweden).
• Centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium.
• Underground reactor and heavy water to produce plutonium.
• Records of Iraq's foreign sources of expertise on uranium enrichment, foreign equipment suppliers and explosive tests of atomic bomb components.
• Records containing identities and current activities of Iraqi nuclear personnel, including those trained by H&H Metalform, Interatom, Leybold, Lurgi and ZSI (Germany), Balzers (Switzerland), Chemadex (Poland), CNEN (Brazil) and Matrix Churchill (Britain).
• Computer database showing status and extent of the entire nuclear weapon program.
where's Hanz Blix?
Wow, you sure can miss a lot when you don't FReep for a couple of days. This is a VERY interesting find. The media and usual suspects both here and overseas will ignore this, claiming it's not a smoking gun, just the way South Korea claims North Korea's ICBM isn't necessary to be used as a weapon so it's OK.
And we found a container labelled as cesium at one base. It was in an isolated bunker-like container and on a base in Al Anbar that hosted Iraqi biochem warfare training.
Thanks.
Yead, but they don't have anything with the letters "WMD" on it. /sarc
ping!
Just found the link to this in the comments at Captain's Quarters. I haven't slept all night and NOW I find this? (Arrghhh!) Will return after some sleep to read everything/see if anyone's picked up on this.
(I did just add this to my Saddam/WMD post at my site, but I'm no Captain Ed.) ;-)
Apparently Iran and Venezuela and Bolivia have been working on procuring some of these materials too