Rolling to war with too few troops

And, Mike...THANK YOU for YOUR SERVICE.....

Like Ceasearandaoist stated, active duty troop deployment is happening as it has been planned for months. I don't know about reserve units, but I truly believe that based on what I am seeing and hearing up close that everything is business as planned. Yes, there have been some "unexpected events" but that is war and this has been dealt with through flexibility...which is a great sign and a great accomplishment.

So far it seems our troop level has seized most of Iraq, except for scattered pockets of resistence. We have the Iraqi's trapped in and around Baghdad, what is our hurry? Hell we can starve them out over time. Let Saddam live in his underground bunker like a gopher for ever if necessary. We control the oil field, oil storage and port facilities. All we need to do is to start selling their oil, to pay for the "OCCUPATION" until they, the Iraqi's surrender.

We are in great shape as long as we don't let the media and other outside sources force us into urban warfare, where we would win, but at a cost of lives.

We should just declare victory over all of the country, except Baghdad, and go about selling oil. Tell Saddam if he wants his oil field back, he will have to fight for them.

. But it is difficult to understand the tactical or strategic philosophy behind the incredibly small number of troops employed so far in this campaign.

Hmmmm, let's put two and two together.

About 1 month ago, Turkey denied our use to use their land to initiate an attack from the north. We pleaded and got nowhere. Plan B, we send in paratroopers the other day, secure an airfield and then repair it. What equals 4? Could it be these 100,000+ troops about to be airlifted to our newly acquired airfield WITHIN Iraq?

Nope, too much logic here...

However, I'll bet our troops on the ground would love to have the 4th I.D. and the 1st Cav Div on the ground with them NOW.

No doubt.

The issue is not casualties, or whether we'll "win" - of course we will.

The issue is embracing psy-ops, airpower and righteous indignation over the proven effectiveness of men with guns in armored vehicles.

We'll never know for sure, but this may have already been overwith if we'd had another division or two on the ground.

As is, the longer Saddam stays upright, the more naysayers will come out of the woodwork.

Maybe we're tryin' to get the Iraqis to "bite" on the troops to the south? If ya look real close, ya may see a large hook hidden in the pretty stuff.

Your post like many of the other anti-arm chair general posts is quite right. Monday morning quarterbacking can be counterproductive to an extent and is always easier than coming up with the original plan. In addition, by any standard the war is going very well on all fronts. We will win this one shortly with a fairly low casualty rate (for both the US and for Iraqi civilians). Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and guardsman are the best in the world. Their equipment is second to none.

Nonetheless, its not completely inappropriate to offer some informed, constructive criticism while the war is in progress, which might spark debate that might improve things, if not for this war than perhaps for another in the future (and there will always be another). Here is my (admittedly poorly informed) take on what could have been done differently and what this might mean for future conflicts:

(1) While generals always want more of everything before they begin a battle (more troops, artillery, aircraft, etc.), there appears to be some merit to the idea of having more than the 3ID, 101st, 1MEF and Brit Div. comprising the main force of the campaign. Another heavy division and an arm. cav. reg. attacking from the south would have helped if things got hairy and even if the regime collapsed in a few days they would have been great to have on hand to mop up scattered resistance which would likely be around for a few months after Saddam is killed anyway. The 4ID is coming to Iraq not as emergency reinforcements but as a previously scheduled follow on force to occupy and mop up things after the main event. If we wait until the 4ID is up around Bahgdad for the move on Saddam then it would give credence to those who think we didn't plan appropriatly for the eventuality we find our selves in now, which is something that should have been planned for even if it seemed unlikely to occur. It might have been more prudent to wait for the 4ID to come to Kuwait or have had the 1st Arm. Div. in Kuwait when we crossed the line into Iraq.

(2) One thing I was surprised to see we didn't do was knock out Iraqi tv/radio and electricity from the get go. Having Saddam on tv daily (even if in reruns) might make some hesitate to believe the end is near for his regime. Allowing him to continue broadcasting serves to allow him to frighten his people when they should be in grave doubt about his future. The average Iraqi isn't watching CNN or the BBC and appreciating that the end is near for Saddam. Likewise, knocking out electricity really makes it seem like the government is not doing one of its most basic functions (in a 3rd world country anyway) and, hence, might be on the brink of collapse. The potential harm to the civil populace this might cause, I believe, is far outweighed by the doubt in the regime's future it would create. Basically, knocking tv/radio and electricity out on the first night would have helped further the shock and awe campaign.

(3) As the 4ID wasn't coming through Turkey, an airborne move into the Kurdish area should have occurred from the first (or second) day. There is nothing like a big airborne drop in your rear to shock an opponent. With such a drop occurring on the first (or second) day a more sizable force would be in place today and for when the final push is made on Baghdad. Of course, at the same time it must be said an airhead simply cannot sustain a large heavy force for very long so this is not to say we'd have a big armored force driving on Baghdad from the north. Still, 5-10,000 troops above Baghdad by this date would be rather helpful.

(4) While imperitive that we be careful in avoiding civilian casualties, perhaps our rules of engagement are a bit too conservative in this respect. If we kill 1,000 or more Iraqi civilians to liberate Baghdad I think most sane people (including Iraqis) will understand it as an unfortunate but necessary byproduct of war to end a horribly oppressive dictatorsgip. In future conflicts, we might want to loosen up on these sort of rules of engagement a bit.

(5) The war as a general matter illustrates to me that the US Army needs more then 10 divisions for worldwide deployment. We have (a) one division tied down in Korea permanently, (b) the equivalent of one division tied up in peace keeping around the world (including Afghanistan but not including post war Iraq), (c) the equivalent of another division resting from or preparing to go to peacekeeping operations, (d) an Airborne division which (while great to have) isn't something to deploy for many conflict scenarios, and (e) 5 other divisions left to fight one or more major regional conflicts. The occupation of Iraq will porbably tie up at least 2 divisions for some time to come after Saddam falls. Even adding the USMC's 2.5 divisions this is not a number that provides the US with much flexibility or the ability to confront 2 major regional conflicts simultaneously. We simply need more divisions.

(6) The reported death of the tank and heavy units is premature. Recall how the M1 Abrams is supposed to be the last major tank the US fields and how heavy armored units should be phased out in favor of more nimble units that can get to far off battles within 72 hours. Well, it looks like the tank and heavy armor units are going to be around for quite some time and the idea of having 2 divisions of highly mobile but lightly armored troops might not be going anywhere. A brigade or two of stryker like AFVs that can go anywhere on a moment's notice is a good idea. Pure airborce units have always been recognized as being too light to put up much of a fight against a foe with some armor and heavy artillery for very long (the 101st at Bastogne being a rare exception few want to repeat) and with the phasing out of the Sheridan tank (remember that) the US hasn't had much in the way of immediatly available airmobile armor. Still, the stryker brigades aren't going to be heavy enough to deal with stiff resistance from a medium ranked military like Syria which still has a lot of Soviet armor that, while no match for an M1 Abrams, might prove much more difficult for a stryker AFV.

(7) Air Force artillery is not a long term substitute for a unit's organic artillery. In a pinch in certain circumstances (like the Marines landing in Afghanistan) ground pounders can leave their long guns behind and rely upon the Air Force to be their airborce artillery, but it seems that we'll need heavy guns (MLRS or something like that cancelled Crusader SP howitz) for quite some time to come. The idea of leaving behind some MLRS units to be replaced in a sense by airborne artillery needs to be rethought going forward.

(8) The rolling start concept might be acceptable in certain situations, but where one has the time and ability to prepare an invasion force, it would seem preferable to have an overwhelming force at or near the point of contact then to have other significant follow-on forces enter the theatre after the main attack has begun.

With that said, don't panic. We're going to win this one in a short time. No matter what happens our guys will do their lessons learned analysis after the war and apply what works and subtract what doesn't to the next one.

May GOD bless our brave troops and those of our allies and may GOD bless America.

Amen.

Bunch of has been armchair generals putting in their worless 2 cents. This isn't the same force they commanded and the generals are doing a much better job than they could have ever done. The only way to win with no casualties is to go NUCLEAR.

I wouldn't blame the military. The prelude to this war was so long we tend to forget all the elements. The civilian leadership and political ideologues were saying we could take Iraq with a small force - I seem to recall some saying as little as 40,000 even. The military politely disagreed claiming they thought a force at least the size of Gulf War 1 and they were told to shut up and follow orders. Seems the professionals knew a bit more than the politicos once again.

By waiting at the gates of Baghdad we give the Iraqi forces the idea they can hold us off. That will serve to strengthen them in their resolve.

More later.

If we weren't so worried about civilian collateral damage, we could just bomb the hell out of them, flatten the whole country and start over without putting more coalition boots on the ground!

McCaffrey--once Clinton's drug czar

He was once the chief of the secret police.