Free Republic

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28, 2024

A limited segment of the Russian ultranationalist information space has resumed its standard public criticisms of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and warned that new Defense Minister Andrei Belousov may not solve certain systemic issues within the Russian MoD and military. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor warned that any “emerging progress” from Belousov’s appointment and the dismissals of several senior defense officials may “not be allowed” to go far enough to address systemic issues currently hindering the Russian war in Ukraine.[42] The former Storm-Z instructor particularly highlighted the poor, incomplete, and short training of new personnel as having a compounding effect on other systemic issues, including “excessive and unjustifiably” high casualties, no troop rotations, poor tactical and operational decision-making, degradation of combat-experienced units, inability to preserve combat knowledge, and lack of command-staff accountability.[43] The Storm-Z instructor claimed that these issues are all interconnected and cyclical and that Russia has accumulated significant reserves that are not undergoing training due to these systemic issues.[44]

Other Russian milbloggers, many of whom frequently complained about the Russian MoD prior to the mass MoD dismissals in late April-May 2024, agreed with the Storm-Z instructor and claimed that Russian “middle management” has been operating under the assumption that the current war in Ukraine is not actually a war, which is consistent with prior milblogger complaints that the Kremlin has failed to mobilize Russian society into a wartime mindset.[45] The Storm-Z instructor claimed that the fact that certain high-ranking officials, such as Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, have retained their positions further supports this complaint and that the appointments of new deputy defense ministers will indicate whether or not Belousov may be able to solve some of these systemic issues.[46]

The Russian ultranationalist information space has largely praised Belousov and the dismissals and arrests of senior Russian defense officials thus far. The milbloggers’ praise of Belousov and the dismissals comes with harsh criticisms of the corruption and ineptitude under former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, representing a significant break with the self-censorship largely enforced by the MoD following the Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023.[47] The condemnation of the MoD’s ineptitude prior to the dismissals and the resulting praise for Belousov’s appointment has largely benefited the MoD thus far as it helps rehabilitate the MoD’s image to Putin’s core ultranationalist constituency, secure their loyalty, and message to MoD officials that no one is safe from the consequences of falling from Putin’s favor.[48] The former Storm-Z instructor’s warning and resulting skepticism among like-minded milbloggers may represent the start of a return to prior complaints that undermined the MoD. The former Storm-Z instructor highlighted in his complaint that he was censoring himself throughout the conversation, suggesting that the MoD may not intend to lift censorship and self-censorship requirements on Russian milbloggers even if the bounds on what is acceptable criticism have shifted in the short term.[49]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024

Russia and China have moved to increase their stakes in Kazakh uranium production, impacting global energy security and highlighting allegations of corruption and covert deals within the industry.

China, which is on track to edge the U.S. as the top major nuclear power producer, has a huge appetite for the resource. The country plans to double its nuclear capacity by constructing 150 reactors by 2035. Chinese companies, including the state-backed China General Nuclear Power Corporation, have already acquired rights to 60 percent of future Kazakh uranium production, according to the mining industry specialist platform Minex Forum. Meanwhile, Russian entities control over 22 percent of yearly production and a quarter of Kazakhstan's uranium deposits.

Another headache for Washington is that “while Kazakhstan is already the world's biggest producer and can produce more, it has no processing capacity. All of its uranium is processed in Russia,” Weafer pointed out. This means that despite Washington's ban on Russian uranium imports, it remains heavily dependent on the country to fuel American nuclear power reactors.

Reports have surfaced of corruption and clandestine deals between local mining industry players and Russian and Chinese entities. Express cited sources claiming insider knowledge that one such company, Aurora Minerals Group, is reportedly under the control of Russian investors.

Founded by former civil servants Kaisar Kozhamuratov and Said Sultanov, the company says it is a “full-chain mineral exploration service provider.” Express's sources alleged that the company has been running a mining operation without a license and netted millions of dollars in uranium sales.

https://www.newsweek.com/russia-china-tighten-grip-global-nuclear-energy-supply-1904418

https://aurora.kz/en/pages/about

But while the world has been focused on Tehran’s nuclear programme, reports from inside Iran and statements from the US government point to a growing industry of pharmaceutical-based weapons. “Iran maintains a chemical weapons program that includes… incapacitating agents for offensive purposes,” Nicole Shampaine, the US ambassador to the OPCW in The Hague, told Tortoise. “This is an area that is a significant concern to us.”

Pharmaceutical-based chemical weapons are based on substances such as fentanyl, the synthetic opioid which has ravaged the US. They are aimed at rendering targets unconscious. Leaks from regime-backed universities in Iran appear to show that fentanyl and other central nervous system-acting substances are being developed into aerosolised forms for use on civilians in riot control situations.

Over several months in 2022 and 2023, thousands of school girls in Iran became sick and with symptoms including vomiting and streaming nose and eyes. Some have claimed this as evidence that the regime used pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) against its own citizens in an attempt to bring an end to the anti-hijab protests gathering momentum across the country.

https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2024/05/28/exclusive-iran-believed-to-be-developing-chemical-weapons-decades-after-publicly-giving-them-up/

Iran has increased its stockpile of uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels amid recent statements from Iranian officials about Iran's ability to procure a nuclear weapon.[1] The Associated Press reported on May 27 that Iran possesses 142.1 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, citing a confidential International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report.[2] This amount marks a 20.6 kilogram (16.95 percent) increase in Iran's stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since the IAEA published its last quarterly report in February 2024.[3] Weapons-grade uranium is uranium that is enriched to 90 percent purity.[4] The IAEA report follows repeated statements in April and May from senior Iranian officials, including a top foreign policy adviser to the Supreme Leader, that have begun to normalize discussions about Iran's ability to procure a nuclear weapon.[5] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi recently expressed concern about Iran's nuclear program after visiting Tehran from May 6 to May 8, stating that Iranian cooperation with the agency is “not at the level it should be.”[6]

The IAEA report added that Iran's overall stockpile of enriched uranium is currently 6,201.3 kilograms, a 675.8 kilogram (12.23 percent) increase since February 2024 when Iran's total stockpile was 5525.5 kilograms.[7] A US expert noted on May 28 that, based on the confidential IAEA report, Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for almost eight nuclear weapons in the first month after breakout.[8]

Iranian Members of Parliament re-elected hardline politician Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf as parliament speaker on May 28.[9] Ghalibaf has served as parliament speaker since May 2020.[10] Ghalibaf received 198 out of 287 votes, while his competitors, former Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Mojtaba Zonnour and former Foreign Affairs Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, won 60 and five votes, respectively.[11] Ghalibaf will serve a one-year term.

Iran's continued support for Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) and provision of lethal aid to Russia is bolstering Russia's technological output and military capabilities on the battlefield in Ukraine. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published a report on May 28 detailing Russian efforts to produce Shahed-136/131 drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan using Iranian-provided technologies and a labor force recruited largely from eastern Africa.[30] WSJ cited the international hacking group Prana Network, which reportedly hacked an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) email server in February 2024 and revealed that Russia intends to produce 6,000 Shahed drones at the Alabuga SEZ in 2024 alone. The Institute for Science and International Security (IISS) assessed that the Alabuga SEZ has already produced 4,500 Shaheds as of the end of April 2024, ahead of schedule, and could produce all 6,000 by mid-August 2024.[31] WSJ found that Russia is currently producing more advanced models of Iranian Shaheds domestically and intensively using them to strike Ukraine.[32] WSJ also noted that Russian authorities are recruiting from African countries, particularly Uganda, and especially enticing young women to participate in work-study programs at Alabuga to produce Shahed drones. Russia would not be able to operate the Alabuga SEZ without Iran's consistent support for the Russian war effort—Iranian production models for Shahed drones and Iranian drone technologies are at the center of the entire Alabuga enterprise.[33] German outlet BILD similarly reported on May 27 that Iran has also likely supplied Russia with Qaem-5 television-guided air-to-ground bombs, which Iran started producing as recently as 2019.[34] BILD noted that an Iranian-provided Mohajer-6 drone carrying the Qaem-5 bombs crashed in Kursk Oblast for an unknown reason but that Russian forces may have intended to strike Sumy Oblast. ISW has not yet observed confirmation that Russia has used these projectiles in Ukraine, but their use would be consistent with the pattern of continued and intensified Iranian military support to Russia.[35]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-28-2024

Shoigu urgently demanded that part of the ashes of commander Suvorov be brought to him.
source: https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4160

Call for Banning Niqāb Highlights Problems in Moscow’s Turn to the East and Stress on Traditional Values, ‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta’ Says. by Paul Goble

Staunton, May 23 – Only a few years ago, few Muslim women wore the niqāb, a form of dress that covers all of their bodies except for their eyes; but now that has become commonplace and it is no longer a rarity to see Muslim women in Russian cities wearing even chadors which conceal the eyes behind a screen.

Not surprisingly, this trend has both frightened and outraged many Russians including Valery Fadeyev, the head of the Presidential Council on Human Rights, who says that Moscow should ban the niqab and even more extreme forms of dress not only because they are not traditional to Russia but are part of a dangerous radicalization of Muslims there.

In his appeal, Fadeyev points to the growing interest in guns by Russia’s Muslims and especially migrant workers from Muslim countries as a threat to Russia’s stability and territorial integrity, a call that has sparked opposition from both Muslim leaders as not only untrue by counterproductive.

Perhaps the most thoughtful response to this debate comes from the editors of Nezavsimaya Gazeta who place it in the context of larger trends in Russian public life and suggest that Moscow should see both the niqab and calls for its ban as warning signs about the consequences of the regime’s policies (ng.ru/editorial/2024-05-23/2_9014_red.html).

Two of the most often proclaimed Kremlin policies are its turn to the east and its commitment to traditional values, the editors write. But these are not unproblematic as the debate about the niqab shows. The situation with regard to the niqab is especially indicative in this regard.

Many now defending the niqab are relying on Moscow’s turn to the east and suggesting that any ban on this form of dress would undermine Russia’s relations with the east. But if Russia is to be sovereign, the editors continue, then it must be sovereign in both directions. And the regime needs to make that clear.

“The same goes for traditionalism,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta says. It is an open question whether the niqab is in fact a manifestation of a commitment to traditionalism. Many experts say that in fact it is “a reaction to the extremes of progressivism and represent a completely post-modern idea of zels in the faith rather than to any memory of the past.”

For that reason, the editors say, “the declaration of traditional values [by the Putin regime] should be clarified. Society needs to know exactly what the traditions of the peoples of Russi are and where the line is between health conservatism and religious fanaticism and between the memory of ancestors and radical obscurantism.”

https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/05/call-for-banning-niqab-highlights.html

Sahel live map

https://sahel.liveuamap.com/

SAF Assistant Commander-in-Chief Yasser Al-Atta stated on May 25 that a SAF delegation will travel to Russia in the near future to conclude an agreement exchanging “vital weapons and munitions” for a Russian logistics hub at Port Sudan.[31] Al-Atta described the planned Russian hub as “not exactly a military base.”[32] A prominent, Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger also claimed on May 27 that the SAF was able to recapture several areas of Khartoum due to supplies of Iranian drones.[33] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Representative for the Russian President in Africa and the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov met with SAF head Abdel Fattah al Burhan and several other Sudanese officials during a two-day visit to Sudan on April 28 and 29.[34] ISW previously assessed that Russia may be switching sides in the Sudanese civil war to support the SAF in pursuit of acquiring a Red Sea naval base and that Russian backing of the SAF would greatly benefit Iran by aligning Russian and Iranian policy and strategy in the region.[35]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2024

We wrote [https://freerepublic.com/focus/news/4042550/posts?page=6384#6384 ] that the remains of Alexander Suvorov were divided into two parts - one was being transported to the front, and the other to defense enterprises. Sergei Shoigu demanded that the second part be urgently brought to his home. “Sergei Kuzhugetovich spent several days for several hours near the ashes of Alexander Vasilyevich. And after that he somehow became calmer,” a close associate of Shoigu told us.

It is unknown what caused such actions by the Secretary of the Security Council. Some comrades believe that the reason is the purges among the generals that are being carried out now. And Shoigu fears that they will reach him. But these are just assumptions for now. By the way, some of our interlocutors are surprised. After all, until now no one has had any questions about the fact that Suvorov’s remains were not only taken out of the grave and exposed to danger at the front, but also divided into two parts. We have not yet been able to find out Andrei Belousov’s position on this matter.
´

earlier https://freerepublic.com/focus/news/4042550/posts?page=6416#6416

This information was given to us by two sources in the FSB. “There are bad signals that Prigozhin’s associates want to “celebrate” the anniversary of his rebellion. So that they don't do anything stupid, we will follow them,” said one of the interlocutors.

Another noted that “all sorts of unpleasant things could happen at the end of June, but we won't allow anything like that.” Also, according to his information, in the period from June 20 to 25, Vladimir Putin plans to leave Moscow “just in case” (as he did during the Wagner uprising last year).

We were unable to confirm this information one hundred percent. Some sources in the FSO say that this is true, while others refuse to comment on such rumors. By the way, it is possible that on these dates Vladimir Vladimirovich will make a foreign visit - to the DPRK or another country.

Sources among Yevgeny Viktorovich's old associates are surprised that they are going to be under increased surveillance. “It is unpleasant. But since the FSB is afraid of something, they probably have reasons for it. True, these fears are unlikely to be connected with us. It would be better if they kept an eye on the Tajiks,” said one of the Wagnerites.

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4159

Tajiks = ISKP that was resonsible for the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow

The New York Times (NYT) reported on May 26 that Western intelligence officials stated that the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) are behind a series of low-level sabotage operations throughout Europe that aim to disrupt Western arms supplies to Ukraine and create the appearance of a European movement opposing support for Ukraine.[15] The NYT stated that the GRU often recruits locals to conduct arsons and noted that the concerted Russian effort has targeted a paint factory in Poland, homes in Latvia, an IKEA store in Lithuania, and a warehouse in the United Kingdom connected with arms supplies to Ukraine. Western officials have recently reported on widespread Russian sabotage efforts throughout Europe, and NATO reported on May 2 that Russia is intensifying its hybrid activities in Europe.[16] Russian investigative outlet The Insider reported on April 29 that GRU agents established a long-term presence in the Czech Republic and Greece and have been conducting operations, including attacks on ammunition depots and assassination attempts, since 2014.[17]

Russian officials are considering delisting the Taliban as a prohibited organization in Russia and will likely do so in the near term. Russian Special Representative to Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov stated on May 27 that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Justice reported to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Russia can remove the Taliban from its list of prohibited organizations.[24] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that the Taliban is the “real power” in Afghanistan and that the initiative to remove the Taliban from the prohibited organization list “reflects objective reality.”[25] Russian officials have yet to delist the Taliban as a prohibited organization, but Kabulov’s and Lavrov’s comments suggest that Russia will do so in the near term. Kabulov added that Taliban representatives will attend the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in early June 2024.[26]

Putin met with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Tashkent on May 27 and signed a statement on bilateral commitments, which included intentions to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan.[27] The Kremlin has maintained contacts with the Taliban since the Taliban deposed the Afghan government in 2021, although more outright Russian recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan will likely portend increased Russian-Taliban cooperation. Russia likely hopes to leverage its relationship with the Taliban to degrade the operations of Afghan-based Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), which organized and conducted the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow, among other things.[28] The Taliban continue efforts to repress anti-Taliban groups throughout Afghanistan, including ISKP, and Russia may hope to help the Taliban intensify its anti-ISKP activities.[29] Kazakhstan delisted the Taliban as a terrorist organization in December 2023, and Uzbekistan has expanded agreements with the Taliban in recent years.[30] Russia may view direct engagement with the Taliban as an increasingly normalized trend among Central Asian states.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 26, 2024

Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) will reportedly manufacture and refurbish three times as many artillery shells as the West will produce in 2024, although Russian shells reportedly suffer from quality-control issues and Ukrainian artillery is reportedly more precise than Russian artillery. Sky News, citing open-source research from US-based consulting firm Bain & Company, reported on May 26 that Russian DIB producers will likely be able to manufacture and refurbish 4.5 million artillery shells in 2024 compared to 1.3 million artillery shells that the US and European countries will collectively produce in 2024.[11] Sky News reported that it costs Western countries about $4,000 to produce one NATO-standard 155mm shell – although this price “significantly” varies depending on the country of production – while it costs Russia about $1,000 to produce one 152mm shell. The report does not make clear if the dollar value comparison between the price to produce one shell accounts for the difference in purchasing power parity between Western countries and Russia, however.

A Ukrainian artillery battery commander operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast told Sky News that Russian forces operating in this area have a five-to-one artillery shell advantage but noted that Ukrainian forces can “completely destroy” a target using one to three shells. Ukrainian and Western officials and several Russian milbloggers previously stated that Ukrainian artillery is more precise than Russian artillery despite the fact that Russian artillery supplies greatly outnumber those of Ukrainian forces.[12] Russian milbloggers recently complained that the amount of gunpowder in Russian artillery shells widely varies, causing artillery systems to perform inconsistently.[13] The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported in March that Russia currently has about three million rounds of old artillery ammunition in its stockpiles, but that much of it is in poor condition.[14] RUSI and other Western analysts also assessed that Russia’s current domestic ammunition production is not sufficient for its war in Ukraine, so Russia will likely continue relying on supplies from partners.[15] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported in February that Russia had imported about 1.5 million rounds of ammunition from North Korea, but that about half of the munitions did not function and the other half required restoration or inspection before use.[16]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 25, 2024

Russia is likely helping North Korea develop its defense industrial base (DIB) in exchange for North Korean munitions supplies, and US officials reportedly assess that Russia may also be supplying North Korea with military equipment, weapons, or technology. NBC reported on May 24 citing six senior US officials that the Biden administration is concerned that the Russian-North Korean relationship could help North Korea expand its nuclear capabilities.[40] US officials reportedly stated that Russia may push North Korea to conduct its “most provocative military actions in a decade” close to the US presidential election in November 2024. NBC reported that a senior US official stated that US intelligence officials assess that Russia is providing North Korea with nuclear submarine and ballistic missile technology in return for North Korea’s provision of munitions to Russia. US officials reportedly assess that Russia may be helping North Korea develop a long-range ballistic missile that can re-enter the atmosphere with its payload intact — likely referring to the capability required to field an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

NBC noted, however, that US officials stated that they do not have an “entirely clear understanding” of what technology Russia is giving to North Korea as it is difficult to detect and track military technology exchanges. NBC reported that US officials also stated that North Korea may want Russian ballistic missile parts, aircraft, missiles, and armored vehicles and that Russia may help North Korea develop its own DIB. Known facts suggest that Russia is likely at least helping North Korea develop its DIB. Western officials previously stated that North Korea supplied Russia with more than one million artillery shells in 2023.[41] Although these shells are reportedly mostly old, North Korean authorities likely would have agreed to relinquish such a high quantity of munitions only if they thought they would be able to replenish their stockpiles in the near future.[42] North Korea’s ability to produce such a high quantity of shells rapidly would likely require some level of Russian funding and assistance.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 24, 2024

Russia is currently preparing for the possibility of a conventional war with NATO, and the Kremlin will likely view anything short of Ukrainian capitulation as an existential threat to Russia’s ability to fight such a war.[19] Russian military leaders planning a war against NATO will have to assume that Ukraine might enter such a war on NATO’s behalf regardless of Ukraine’s membership status.[20] A front with NATO along Russia’s entire western border with Europe presents the Russian military with serious challenges, as ISW has previously assessed, whereas a Ukrainian defeat would give Russia the ability to deploy its forces along Europe’s entire eastern flank from the Black Sea to Finland.[21] Russian victory in Ukraine would not only remove the threat of Ukraine as a potential adversary during a possible conventional war with NATO but would also provide Russia with further resources and people to commit to a large-scale confrontation with NATO. Regardless of how Russian victory would partition Ukraine between Russian annexation and the Kremlin-controlled puppet state that would follow Putin’s desired regime change, Russia would have access to millions more people it could impress into military service and the majority of Ukraine’s resources and industrial capacity. Putin and the Kremlin therefore likely view victory in Ukraine as a prerequisite to being able to fight a war with NATO and any ceasefire or negotiated settlement short of full Ukrainian capitulation as a temporary pause in their effort to destroy an independent Ukrainian state.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2024

Iran Update, May 27, 2024

Iranian journalists reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed his policy adviser, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, in March 2024 to lead nuclear negotiations with the United States.[1] The publication of this information could be meant to boost the political standing of Shamkhani ahead of the Iranian presidential election in June 2024. Shamkhani assumed responsibility of negotiations from the Foreign Affairs Ministry, which had led negotiations under the Ebrahim Raisi administration. Shamkhani is a trusted adviser to Khamenei and a seasoned diplomat, who served as secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council from 2013 to 2023.[2] Shamkhani in this capacity played a prominent role in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement.[3] Khamenei has previously delegated responsibility for international talks to his inner circle, making it unsurprising that Khamenei has involved Shamkhani in nuclear negotiations again. The publication of this news could be meant to position Shamkhani to run for president or receive a position in the next presidential administration by framing him as a capable and trusted diplomat.

Iranian politicians are continuing to maneuver and prepare for the Iranian presidential election in June 2024. Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi announced the official start of Iranian presidential campaign season on May 26.[4] Registration for presidential candidates will open on May 30 and close on June 3. Iran will hold elections on June 28.[5]

Prominent hardliner Saeed Jalili has since announced his candidacy.[6] The Guardian Council—a regime body responsible for reviewing presidential candidates before candidates are permitted to run—previously approved Jalili’s candidacy in the 2013 and 2021 presidential elections, which suggests that the council will likely approve his candidacy in this election. Jalili withdrew from the 2021 race to back Ebrahim Raisi.[7] Jalili’s candidacy is particularly noteworthy following reports from an anti-regime outlet that some Iranian officials warned Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei against allowing Jalili to run. These officials included moderates like Ali Larijani and several hardliners such as Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and adviser to the supreme leader Rear Adm. Ali Shamkhani.[8]

Jalili currently serves as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to the SNSC and previously served as the SNSC secretary from 2007 to 2013.[9] Jalili also holds roles within Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council (EDC)—a board that advises Khamenei on policy decisions and mediates conflicts between Parliament and the Guardian Council—and a foreign relations council that advises Khamenei.[10] Jalili’s prominence within the regime suggests that he continues to hold Khamenei’s trust. Jalili has criticized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for abandoning “a hundred (of Iran’s) inalienable rights.” He has made similar remarks about subsequent nuclear negotiations, making such negotiations less likely under a potential Jalili administration.[11]

Other rumored presidential candidates include:

Mehrdad Barzpash:[12] Roads and Urban Development Minister in the hardline Raisi administration. Barzpash previously served as a parliamentarian from 2012 to 2016 and was the CEO of well-known Iranian automakers SAIPA and Pars Khodrow.[13]

Parviz Fattah:[14] Head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO), a parastatal organization directly controlled by the supreme leader. Fattah’s role within the EIKO underscores his loyalty to Khamenei. Loyalty to Khamenei is a critical metric of whether a presidential candidate is permitted to run.[15]

Ali Larijani:[16] Prominent moderate politician and current EDC member. Larijani formerly served as parliament speaker from 2008 to 2020 and was SNSC Secretary from 2005 to 2007.[17] Khamenei has increasingly marginalized Larijani since 2019 and the Guardian Council notably denied his presidential candidacy in 2021.[18] A freelance journalist claimed on May 26 that Khamenei greenlit Larijani’s candidacy in the upcoming elections and that Larijani‘s team is “assessing the situation.”[19]Approval of Larijani would be noteworthy and may indicate that Khamenei is attempting to make Iranian presidential elections appear politically diverse.

Mohammad Mokhber:[20] Interim President and hardline member of Raisi’s cabinet. Mokhber formerly served as the EIKO and Mostazafan Foundation head, a separate regime business conglomerate that contributes to regime self-enrichment.
Ali Reza Zakani:[21] Tehran Mayor and hardline politician. Zakani previously ran in the 2021 presidential elections before withdrawing to support Ebrahim Raisi.[22] The Guardian Council denied Zakani’s candidacy in the 2013 and 2017 election cycles.[23]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-27-2024

According to sources close to Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, the military leader did not receive a response to his previous appeals to Andrei Belousov ( you can read one of them here ). And I decided to publicly address the Minister of Defense again using our channel.

Firstly , Teplinsky notes that his call to improve the situation in the Kherson region has not been heard. “We are stuck in the Kharkov region, when we could have strengthened the Dnepr group of troops. We inflict huge losses on the enemy, but despite this, the Ukrainian Nazis achieved certain tactical successes. And we, too, unfortunately, suffer losses,” says the military man. “Sometimes it seems that no one is going to liberate Kherson at all. And this needs to be done,” he said indignantly.

Secondly , according to Teplinsky, “the authorities have not yet heard” the call to strengthen the front with new commanders. “We won't say more, and everything is clear ,” said a source close to the general.

Thirdly , Teplinsky turned to Belousov: “I've already said it, but I'll repeat it. I do not aspire to high positions, but I am ready to take responsibility. At the same time, it is difficult to accept the fact that the Minister of Defense does not respond to my requests. I ask Andrei Removich to take the time and discuss current issues together. I know how important Russia's victory is for him.”

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4158

It can be assumed that Teplinski speaks for a majority of the military on the ground, but the politicians in the Kremlin don't know what to do. If they act against Teplinski, they risk a Prigozhin march again.