He not only never lost a battle in which he was in charge, but in those battles he completely annihilated the enemy.
Considering: (1) He lead in only 8 battles (2) His entire CW career was in the Western Theater (3) 90% of Confederate resources were in Eastern theatre.
You know, if the New York Yankees played my local high school team 8 times, they'd win 8 times. Calling a general better than Lee is laughable considering he never met the likes of Lee, Jackson, Longstreet etc.
This thread has become a revisionist love fest.
Actually it started out as a “revisionist love fest” - we’re just draggin it back to reality! ;’)
George Thomas never led bigger groups than what he did because the Ohio cabal of politicians and generals wanted their own State to get all the glory and Thomas was from Virginia, Thomas never wanted publicity or glory for himself, and he refused to allow himself to get promoted over someone senior to him. He was nicknamed "Slow Trot" because of his deliberate method. Others thought him "slow". However, once his plan was put into action he was fast as a Whippet.
Also, he pretty much saved the Western Theater at Chickamauga when his Corps staved off the Rebel advance...hence, "The Rock of Chickamauga".
The Confederate command advantage in the East vs. the Union command advantage in the West is one of the endlessly interesting facets of the war. It is easy to beat up on GB McClellan, but McClellan's errors in 1862 probably prolonged the war by two years, Lee notwithstanding. Political interference with Army of the Potomac operations is another great factor.
One of the keys is that Lee and Jefferson Davis formed an abiding partnership, based on trust, that was sorely lacking on the Union side. Davis, for all his faults, was a West Pointer with a distinguished service record, a former Secretary of War and chairman of the military affairs committee in the Senate, and a capable strategic thinker, although in the final analysis he was a westerner who probably was trapped by political pressures into overvaluing the east with regard to distribution of resources.
Lincoln was a great man and evolved as a war leader, but he was a military amateur. The Union suffered mightily early in the war in Lincoln's vs. Davis' management. In the west, where the Union armies had less political interference and no McClellan factor, they commenced to win early and often. The Union had its share of inadequate commanders and made its share of blunders in the West as well, but the Confederates made more. The East is another story.
Lee had the advantages of a narrow front that could only be outflanked by amphibious operations, numerous defensible river lines, Union hypersensitivity about the defense of Washington, and a chaotic Union command structure for the first two years of the war. He prolonged the war in northern Virginia by twice moving north, consuming two campaigning seasons. He tried this a third time, but by 1864, the Yanks had figured out the trick, Grant had reached James River, and there were no more miracles to be had. Lee was a brilliant soldier, on the wrong side, and a man of noble character. But had he gone west, as Davis at times suggested, there is little reason to think he could have reversed the inexorable collapse along a broad front threatened by multiple simultaneous Union advances.