[al44]

Get a hold of “And I Was There” by Admiral Layton. He was the intelligence officer to Kimmel (and later Nimitz), and offers a great perspective of the state of codebreaking and intelligence before and after Dec. 7.

I don't believe we had broken the Naval operational code by then, only the diplomatic code. We could read the “East Wind Rain” message, but couldn't put a location of where the attack would be.

[BatGuano]

My Uncle was an anti-aircraft gunner, stationed at Schofield Barracks. In late November they received orders from San Francisco to store all ammunition underground. When the field was attacked, he was in Honolulu on a weekend pass. He made it back to the base but had nothing to return fire with. I don't recall if the airfield was attacked during both waves or not.

To the day he died, he maintained that someone at the top knew something bad was about to happen in Hawaii. He was transferred to the ETO in 1944.

I'll try to find the book, thanks.

Diplomatic code and Purple (operational)code were not the same. Also, as in Germany, our intel was always reluctant to indicate to the enemy that we did have their code, ie. “Enigma” machine, we had to appear lucky.