Posted on 04/18/2005 2:16:49 PM PDT by Axhandle
Part of the profession of arms is to study past battles, so that we do not commit the same mistakes and so that hard lessons learned are not relearned with equal hardship. The parallels between Operation Iraqi Freedom and the successful counterinsurgency of the Philippines are numerous. The trick is to determine which are relevant and which are coincidental and how to learn from the relevant ones.
In the Spring issue of Parameters, Colonel Timothy K. Deady wrote a brilliant analysis of the US Counterinsurgency in the Philippines. The analysis by Colonel Deady illustrates the parallels between the two conflicts, so that we can make our own judgments of which are relevant and then apply them to Iraq. Clearly, the most important and relevant parallel between the two conflicts is the strategy of the insurgency.
“The Filipino insurgents accurately targeted the US strategic center of gravity – the national willpower as expressed by the Commander-in-Chief and supported by his superiors, the voting public. The American populace’s will to victory was the powerful key that brought the nation’s formidable elements of power to bear.”
There are sound strategic reasons for spreading freedom and democracy. The Filipino and Iraqi insurgencies have demonstrated why. By targeting our national willpower, the insurgencies each had a viable chance of success. The Filipino and Iraqi insurgencies understood this strategic significance and exploited it. The insurgencies would not have chosen to target the national willpower of their adversaries, if they had been opposed by an authoritarian government.
An authoritarian government is a grave threat to other nations. It will exert all means of coercion upon you, until the objectives of the head of state have been met. The head of state is less influenced by public opinion, because overthrow takes greater agitation than voting against an incumbent. Also, public opinion is effectively shaped by government-controlled media and censorship. When fighting an authoritarian nation, one must therefore strike physical targets that influence the capacity for the nation to wage war. The war is necessarily devastating and brutal.
A free and democratic nation is less of a threat to your nation. The strength of its military is irrelevant if the national willpower does not support the deployment of that military to achieve political ends. Now that we have entered the information age, the horrors of war can be broadcast in real time for all people to see and the collective tolerance for death and destruction gets lower as the images become more accessible. In any conflict, our enemies need to hold out for no longer than four years to test our national willpower – at the next Presidential election. In the case of Iraq, they needed to hold out for only 17 months. Fortunately, the Anti-Iraqi Forces did not crush our will, as evidenced by the support for the Commander-in-Chief, in the Presidential election.
A prominent and prudent feature of our National Security Strategy is the encouragement of the spread of freedom and democracy. The rationale behind this is that governments responsive to their people are less likely to wage wars of aggression. By definition, a democratic state is one where the government is responsive to the people. People do not support wars of aggression against nations that pose no threat. A free and democratic nation will therefore not favor wars against other nations, unless a threat is perceived. To avoid future military conflict, it is in our best interests to encourage the spread of free and democratic states.
This theory of international relations is a good model to predict the actions of the insurgency in Iraq. The insurgency is composed largely of Iraqi Sunnis and foreign fighters. Each has its own motivations, but both have the same goal: to prevent the formation of a democratic government in Iraq. After the removal of the Ba'ath regime and the de-Ba'athification process that followed, the insurgency targeted coalition forces. The purpose of fighting the coalition forces was to inflict sufficient losses against the coalition that the national willpower of the contributing nations would be defeated and the forces withdrawn. The coalition was targeted because it was the driving force behind the formation of the new Iraqi government.
As the new Iraqi government becomes viable, the insurgency will shift its focus away from the coalition and towards the Iraqi Security Forces and government leaders. We already see that this has occurred on a small scale. Whenever a new government official is appointed, he or she is immediately put in danger. Insurgents kill Iraqis who cooperate with coalition forces. As responsibility for law and order shifts from the coalition to the Iraqi Security Forces, the national will of the coalition members will be of less importance than the national will of the Iraqi people. If the Iraqi people's will is broken, then it will no longer be able to provide an adequate pool of recruits for its security forces, police forces, or government. This will not only achieve the ends of the insurgency, at least temporarily, but it will also effectively crush the national willpower of the coalition members. If the national will of the Iraqi people is crushed, then the mission of the coalition is no longer viable. The only reason that the insurgents have no focused their wrath upon the Iraqi people is because the coalition presence strengthens the national will of the Iraqis. Thus, the national will of the coalition must be the primary target of the insurgents.
The national will of the coalition members is already clear - we all want to get out of Iraq as soon as possible. "As soon as possible" is defined as the soonest that we can establish a viable Iraqi government to turn over police authority to. Until a viable Iraqi government stands up, the coalition will continue to be the target of continued attacks, in order to coerce the coalition members into leaving sooner. But as the government becomes more viable, and the exit of the coalition on its own terms appears inevitable, the focus of the insurgency will be increasingly upon Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi Police and civilian collaborators.
Some wish for us to cut our losses and come back home. This has parallels with all wars, not just insurgencies. But just like in all other wars, the best time for us to depart is not when the danger is greatest, but when the danger has passed.
Note how the Democrats and the Liberal media share a common strategic objective with the last century's Filipino insurgents and the current Iraqi terrorists.
They are part of the same international socialist movement.
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