Carter's Maps: Worse Than Plagiarism

The truth is a little more complicated than mere plagiarism, and takes a while to explain. Carter not only appears to have copied maps from Ross but -- more importantly -- to have re-titled them to make them appear to be something they are not. Moreover, his maps omit the descriptive notes that Ross included on his maps, which would have contradicted the point Carter was trying to make. Finally, the point he was trying to make with the borrowed and altered maps is central to his entire book.

Watched a bit of a program on the Carter presidency on CSPIN this morning.

The panel was hosted by Chris Matthews. Commenting was Judy Woofwoof (looking like something the cat dragged in) a guy from Newsweak, the former head of CNN (Johnson or Johnston?)

The CNN flak said that Jimmy Carter was the best President this country ever had. They all praised his presidency (guess they had private energy supplies)

The Newsweak flak complained that Reagan used to stage his rallies by placing American flags and cameras at strategic spots. He referred to Michael Deaver as Don Corleone. At one point Matthews referred to a Reagan photographer as (he named Hitler's photographer).......

Without a doubt, someone must call this scum on their scurrilous comments.

Guess they thought slick willie never staged his rallies and that jon carry's staged reunion with his swift boat vet (with all the media in on it) didn't happen either!

The Clinton Parameters were formally offered to the Israelis and Palestinians at a meeting with Clinton in the White House on December 23, 2000 -- presented as a final proposal to be accepted or rejected by December 27, so that negotiations based on them could be completed before Clinton left office. Ross appends to his book the actual text of what Clinton read to the parties on December 23.

Clinton did not submit a written text of his parameters, so perhaps disagreement can therefore arise. I don't know if the Palestinian team disagrees with the Israeli team as to the content of the Clinton Parameters.

Perhaps their objections stemmed from fears of agreeing to a "final settlement" that left loopholes for Israel. Robert Malley, of the Clinton team, wrote:

Many of those inclined to blame Arafat alone for the collapse of the negotiations point to his inability to accept the ideas for a settlement put forward by Clinton on December 23, five months after the Camp David talks ended. During these months additional talks had taken place between Israelis and Palestinians, and furious violence had broken out between the two sides. The President's proposal showed that the distance traveled since Camp David was indeed considerable, and almost all in the Palestinians' direction. Under the settlement outlined by the President, Palestine would have sovereignty over 94 to 96 percent of the West Bank and it would as well have land belonging to pre-1967 Israel equivalent to another 1 to 3 percent of West Bank territory. Palestinian refugees would have the right to return to their homeland in historic Palestine, a right that would guarantee their unrestricted ability to live in Palestine while subjecting their absorption into Israel to Israel's sovereign decision. In Jerusalem, all that is Arab would be Palestinian, all that is Jewish would be Israeli. Palestine would exercise sovereignty over the Haram and Israel over the Western Wall, through which it would preserve a connection to the location of the ancient Jewish Temple.

Unlike at Camp David, and as shown both by the time it took him to react and by the ambiguity of his reactions, Arafat thought hard before providing his response. But in the end, many of the features that troubled him in July came back to haunt him in December. As at Camp David, Clinton was not presenting the terms of a final deal, but rather "parameters" within which accelerated, final negotiations were to take place. As at Camp David, Arafat felt under pressure, with both Clinton and Barak announcing that the ideas would be off the table—would "depart with the President"—unless they were accepted by both sides. With only thirty days left in Clinton's presidency and hardly more in Barak's premiership, the likelihood of reaching a deal was remote at best; if no deal could be made, the Palestinians feared they would be left with principles that were detailed enough to supersede international resolutions yet too fuzzy to constitute an agreement.

Besides, and given the history of the negotiations, they were unable to escape the conclusion that these were warmed-over Israeli positions and that a better proposal may still have been forthcoming. In this instance, in fact, the United States had resisted last-minute Israeli attempts to water down the proposals on two key items—Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and the extent of the territory of the Palestinian state. All told, Arafat preferred to continue negotiating under the comforting umbrella of international resolutions rather than within the confines of America's uncertain proposals. In January, a final effort between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in the Egyptian town of Taba (without the Americans) produced more progress and some hope. But it was, by then, at least to some of the negotiators, too late. On January 20, Clinton had packed his bags and was on his way out. In Israel, meanwhile, Sharon was on his way in.

Had there been, in hindsight, a generous Israeli offer? Ask a member of the American team, and an honest answer might be that there was a moving target of ideas, fluctuating impressions of the deal the US could sell to the two sides, a work in progress that reacted (and therefore was vulnerable) to the pressures and persuasion of both. Ask Barak, and he might volunteer that there was no Israeli offer and, besides, Arafat rejected it. Ask Arafat, and the response you might hear is that there was no offer; besides, it was unacceptable; that said, it had better remain on the table.

Offer or no offer, the negotiations that took place between July 2000 and February 2001 make up an indelible chapter in the history of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. This may be hard to discern today, amid the continuing violence and accumulated mistrust. But taboos were shattered, the unspoken got spoken, and, during that period, Israelis and Palestinians reached an unprecedented level of understanding of what it will take to end their struggle. When the two sides resume their path toward a permanent agreement—and eventually, they will—they will come to it with the memory of those remarkable eight months, the experience of how far they had come and how far they had yet to go, and with the sobering wisdom of an opportunity that was missed by all, less by design than by mistake, more through miscalculation than through mischief.

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14380

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