Plus a special guest map from Michael Kordas, With Wings Like Eagles, showing the air defenses of England and Wales, August 1940.
FDR = lying scumbag
Date: 24 July 1940
Enemy action by day
The main activity was centred in the Channel. A combat involving approximately 90 aircraft took place at midday off Deal and North Foreland. Convoys and shipping were the main objectives. A few raids penetrated inland and dropped bombs without inflicting any serious damage except near Glasgow where a printing works was practically demolished.
North and North-East
At 0630 hours, hostile aircraft appeared over Glasgow and bombed the Hillingdon district where a printing works was seriously damaged. Some windows of the Rolls Royce factory were broken and a few minor casualties are reported. This aircraft was intercepted and it is reported that the rear gunner was killed and one engine put out of action. The enemy aircraft dived into clouds and was lost but it is doubtful if it will reach home. In the afternoon, several reconnaissances were plotted in the Aberdeen area.
East and South-East
Numerous hostile reconnaissances were carried out off the East and South-East coasts and in four cases were followed by attacks on shipping. One Do215 was shot down.
Just before midday, a large force of enemy aircraft assembled behind Calais and then approached two convoys off the North Foreland and the Downs. Three squadrons were up ready to intercept. A battle ensued in which approximately fifty enemy aircraft were involved with thirty-six of our fighters. The enemy aircraft were driven off after - it is reported - having sunk two trawlers and damaged two more. Enemy losses reported in this combat are reported as 10 confirmed (including one by AA) and sixteen unconfirmed against the loss of two of our Spitfires.
At 1503 hours, an enemy aircraft crossed the coast west of Shoreham and dropped bombs on the Vickers landing ground at Weybridge and on the gas works at Walton on Thames and at Byfleet. Little damage is reported and production has not been affected. There was no interception by our fighters.
At 1727 hours, three enemy aircraft bombed ships off Dover. No 74 Squadron report that one Do215 was shot down (unconfirmed) off Manston.
At 1950 hours, a hostile track appeared 20 miles south of Hastings and is reported to have machine-gunned inshore patrols. Weather conditions were too bad for fighter action to be taken.
At 2050 hours, one Spitfire of No 66 Squadron whilst on patrol, came down in the sea 30 miles north-east of Cromer but the pilot was rescued.
South and West
At 0730 hours, a Ju88 which approached Portcawl and bombed shipping was shot down by No 92 Squadron. Several raids approached Bournemouth and Portland but faded without and attack being made. Considerable enemy reconnaissance activity was plotted in the Channel.
By night
No enemy activity is reported with the exception of one track which was possibly minelaying off Bamburgh.
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Statistics
Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 24 July 1940
Casualties:
Patrols:
Balloons:
Aerodromes:
Organisation:
Air Intelligence Reports
Home Security Reports
320 men and two pursuit squadrons is a pretty token reinforcement for the Philippines. When you are fielding a defensive force of only 11,000 men you clearly are not maned to defend a place as large and dispersed as those islands.
At this point there still is not any confidence that the Philippines can be defended at all. The current version of War Plan Orange is the Embick-Richardson version which even both authors agree is impossible. In the October 8th meeting between Richardson and Roosevelt a question was posed as to whether a group of cruisers should be sent to the Philippines to bolster the Asiatic Fleet which, while it was a possibility, neither the Admiral or the President seemed enthusiastic about the proposition.
In an October 9th memo that Richardson wrote after this meeting he mentions this conversation in the numbered list of things discussed which states:
7. The President indicated that he might approve sending a Division of old Light Cruisers to visit Mindinao as a gesture. He did not appear favorably disposed toward sending a stronger force.
In the end this does not happen because neither department were too enthusiastic about sending these units to a potentially dangerous and untenable position.
Have you heard of these people?
http://pro5.com/mia/missions/past5.pdf
http://pro5.com/mia/