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At 1450, fifteen Swordfish commanded by Lieutenant-Commander J. A. Stewart-Moore took off from the Ark Royal (Captain Loben E. Maund) to attack the Bismarck. At 1550, they obtained radar contact with a ship and dived to attack. The attack, however, turned out to be a failure since the ship sighted was actually the light cruiser Sheffield (Captain Charles A. Larcom) which had been detached from Force H to make contact with the Bismarck. Luckily for the British, the Sheffield was not hit by any of the 11 torpedoes launched because they had faulty magnetic pistols. Two torpedoes exploded upon hitting the water, three on crossing the cruiser wake, and the other six were successfully avoided.

Let's just call that a practice run.

But wait a minute - If the Swordfish pilots hadn't exerienced this incredible snafu would they not have had the same results when they really did attack Bismarck? Which would have left Bismarck steaming straight for France and safety as night fell?

How about this twist of fate?

http://www.bismarck-class.dk/bismarck/miscellaneous/special_bond/specialbond.html

On 26 May, when dispositons were being made to support the Bismarck in her increasingly critical situation, new instructions were sent to the U-boats in the Bay of Biscay. One of those boats was the U-556, whose commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander Herbert Wohlfahrt, was ordered to reconnoiter and operate in the area of the Bismarck’s most recently reported position. When Wohlfart received those orders, he was on his way home from a patrol that began on 1 May. Therefore, he was low on fuel and, on his way to the Bismarck, he would have to be extremely economical with what he had left. Furthermore, he had expended all his torpedoes against British convoys.

Wohlfahrt reached the immediate area around the Bismarck on the evening of 26 May. Around 1950 he saw the Renown and the Ark Royal coming out of the mist at high speed the big ships of Force H. Nothing for it but to submerge. “Enemy bows on, 10 degrees to starboard, without destroyers, without zigzagging,” as Wohlfahrt later described it. He would not even have had to run to launch torpedoes. All he would have had to do was position himself between the Renown and the Ark Royal and fire, at both allmost simultaneously. If only he had some torpedoes! He had seen activity on the carrier’s (Ark Royal’s) flight deck. Perhaps he could have helped the Bismarck. That is what he thought at the time. But what he saw was the activity after the launching of the second and decisive attack on the Bismarck. So, even if he had torpedoes, he would not have been able to save the Bismarck from the rudder hit. The Swordfish had long since banked over the Sheffield and were just about to attack the Bismarck.

Fifty minutes later, at 2039, Wohlfahrt surfaced and made a radio report: “Enemy in view, a battleship, an aircraft carrier, course 115°, enemy is proceeding at high speed. Position 48° 20’ north, 16° 20’ west.” Wohlfahrt intended his report to be picked up by any of his comrades who might be in the vicinity and able to maneuver to attack. Then he proceeded on the surface at full speed behind the Renown and the Ark Royal. Their course to the Bismarck coincided almost exactly with his own. Every now and again, he submerged and took sound bearings to both ships, but after 2200 he could no longer hear them. The race between his little boat and the two big ships was an unequal contest.