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To: montanajoe
Just wanted to thank you again for doing this. I'm not a morning guy but I find myself waking an hour earlier so I can go over each mornings installment its developed into a great habit.

You are welcome, and thank you for the report. I am usually eager to start the day with a new post myself. And I am gratified you consider this a great habit instead of a bad one.

11 posted on 08/08/2012 10:45:08 AM PDT by Homer_J_Simpson ("Every nation has the government that it deserves." - Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821))
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To: Homer_J_Simpson

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Savo_Island

Mikawa decided to take his fleet north of Buka Island and then down the east coast of Bougainville. The fleet would pause east of Kieta for six hours on the morning of August 8. (This would avoid daytime air attacks during their final approach to Guadalcanal.)[6]:126 Then they would proceed along the dangerous channel known as “The Slot”, hoping that no Allied plane would sight him in the fading light. However, the Japanese fleet was sighted in St George Channel, where their column almost ran into USS S-38, lying in ambush. She was too close to fire torpedoes, but her captain, Lieutenant Commander H.G. Munson, radioed: Two destroyers and three larger ships of unknown type heading one four zero true at high speed eight miles west of Cape St George”[14]:355

Once at Bougainville, Mikawa spread his ships out over a wide area to mask the composition of his force and launched four floatplanes from his cruisers to scout for Allied ships in the southern Solomons.

At 10:20 and 11:10, his ships were spotted by Australian Hudson reconnaissance aircraft based at Milne Bay in New Guinea.[1]:88[15] The first Hudson misidentified them as “three cruisers, three destroyers, and two seaplane tenders”. (Note: Some accounts state that the first Hudson’s crew identified the enemy ships correctly but, the composition of enemy forces was changed from the aircraft crews’ report by intelligence officers in Milne Bay.) The Hudson’s crew tried to report the sighting to the Allied radio station at Fall River, New Guinea. Receiving no acknowledgment, they returned to Milne Bay at 12:42 to ensure that the report was received as soon as possible. The second Hudson also failed to report its sighting by radio, but completed its patrol and landed at Milne Bay at 15:00. It reported sighting “two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and one unknown type”. For unknown reasons, these reports were not relayed to the Allied fleet off Guadalcanal until 18:45 and 21:30, respectively, on August 8.[6]:139–50[16]

Mikawa’s floatplanes returned by 12:00 and reported two groups of Allied ships, one off Guadalcanal and the other off Tulagi. He reassembled his warships and began his run towards Guadalcanal, entering the Slot near Choiseul by 16:00 on August 8. Mikawa communicated the following battle plan to his warships: “On the rush-in we will go from S. (south) of Savo Island and torpedo the enemy main force in front of Guadalcanal anchorage; after which we will turn toward the Tulagi forward area to shell and torpedo the enemy. We will then withdraw north of Savo Island.”[5]:20


13 posted on 08/08/2012 5:18:03 PM PDT by abb ("What ISN'T in the news is often more important than what IS." Ed Biersmith, 1942 -)
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