ROSTOV AND VOROSHILOVGRAD RECAPTURED; R.A.F. BLASTS LORIENT BASE TWICE IN NIGHT (2/15/43)

Microfilm-New York Times archives, Monterey Public Library | 2/15/43 | James MacDonald, Hanson W. Baldwin, George Axelsson

[colorado tanker]

Thanks for your interesting response. Actually, I was speaking tongue in cheek.

Had Hitler not seized direct control in 1941 I think Allied problems would have been immeasurably worse and I'm sure the Prussians privately thought so too. Do you think Hitler really took notice of this article or was his ego just too big to actually give up control?

[henkster]

I recently read a biography of von Manstein and the article did cause a stir among the Nazi elite. It fed on Hitler’s paranoia, particularly about his “Prussian” generals. In the end, having assumed control as C-in-C after sacking von Brauchitsch in December 1941, there was no way he was going to relinquish it. It was only a question of to what extent he was going to exercise actual control over the conduct of operations. To the extent the article had impact on Germany’s conduct of the war, it helped to hasten a process already in motion.

[HenpeckedCon]

If Manstein had command of the Wehrmacht and freedom of action from Hitler at the beginning of Barborosa, the Germans might have been able to force the Bolsheviks to the peace table, but Hitler would never have accepted any terms other than unconditional surrender. Germany didn't have the resources to conquer the USSR.

[henkster]

In his memoirs, von Manstein clearly stated the biggest problem with Barbarossa was the idea that the USSR could be defeated in one campaign season. He knew that given the size and resources of the Soviet Union, it had to be planned as a two year war at the minimum, and Germany needed to be geared economically and militarily for a grind-it-out slugfest. They were not.