No. You might want to read the opinion first.
The ruling:
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-7822_he4l.pdf
The situation:
Police officers observed a suspect in a violent robbery run into an apartment building, and heard screams coming from one of the apartments. They knocked on the apartment door, which was answered by Roxanne Rojas, who appeared to be battered and bleeding.
When the officers asked her to step out of the apartment so that they could conduct a protective sweep, petitioner came to the door and objected. Suspecting that he had assaulted Rojas, the officers removed petitioner from the apartment and placed him under arrest. He was then identified as the perpetrator in the earlier robbery and taken to the police station. An officer later returned to the apartment and, after obtaining Rojas oral and written consent, searched the premises, where he found several items linking petitioner to the robbery.
The trial court denied petitioner motion to suppress that evidence, and he was convicted.
Also:
Our cases firmly establish that police officers may search jointly occupied premises if one of the occupants consents. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164 (1974). In Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U. S. 103 (2006), we recognized a narrow exception to this rule, holding that the consent of one occupant is insufficient when another occupant is present and objects to the search. In this case, we consider whether Randolph applies if the objecting occupant is absent when another occupant consents.
....and Alito took the ruling beyond “we need to catch a violent suspect.”
“We therefore hold that an occupant who is absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is absent for any other reason,” Alito said.
....and Alito took the ruling beyond “we need to catch a violent suspect.”
“We therefore hold that an occupant who is absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is absent for any other reason,” Alito said.
But is this case consent to search was denied.
How long does the denial last, One second after he is removed?
- Bad ruling on rights. I would rather the guilty go free sometimes than have fundamental rights eroded.
if the guy didn’t livethere he’s not an occupant or resident.
More from the ruling:
"We first consider the argument that the presence of the objecting occupant is not necessary when the police are responsible for his absence. In Randolph, the Court suggested in dictum that consent by one occupant might not be sufficient if "there is evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection." 547
U. S., at 121. We do not believe the statement should be read to suggest that improper motive may invalidate objectively justified removal. Hence, it does not govern here.
The Randolph dictum is best understood not to require an inquiry into the subjective intent of officers who detain or arrest a potential objector but instead to refer to situations in which the removal of the potential objector is not objectively reasonable. As petitioner acknowledges, see Brief for Petitioner 25, our Fourth Amendment cases "have repeatedly rejected" a subjective approach. Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 404 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). "Indeed, we have never held, outside limited contexts such as an inventory search or administrative inspection . . . , that an officers motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment." King, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10).
Petitioner does not claim that the Randolph Court meant to break from this consistent practice, and we do not think that it did. And once it is recognized that the test is one of objective reasonableness, petitioners argument collapses. He does not contest the fact that the police had reasonable grounds for removing him from the apartment so that they could speak with Rojas, an apparent victim of domestic violence, outside of petitioners potentially intimidating presence. In fact, he does not even contest the existence of probable cause to place him under arrest. We therefore hold that an occupant who is absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is absent for any other reason."