Which "exact moment" of the power failure are you looking at? The sequence of events spread out over more than an hour.
The following information represents a partial sequence of events based upon Reliability Coordinator information available to NERC. It is not clear if these events caused the event or were a consequence of other events. NERC is establishing teams to study the event and will coordinate with FERC, DOE, the industry and others.
Approximate times – Eastern Standard Time – MISO report only
14:06 Chamberlain – Harding 345 kV line tripped – cause not reported
14:32 Hanna – Juniper 345 kV line sagged and tripped
14:41 Star – S. Canton 345 kV line tripped
14:46 Tidd – Canton Ctrl 345 kV line tripped
15:06 Sammis – Star 345 kV line tripped and reclosed
(the preceding lines are located in the vicinity of Cleveland, Ohio)
15:08 Power swings noted in Canada and Eastern United States
15:10 Campbell # 3 tripped ??
15:10 Hampton – Thetford 345 kV line tripped
15:10 Oneida – Majestic 345 kV line tripped
15:11 Avon Unit 9 tripped
15:11 Beaver – Davis Besse
15:11 Midway – Lemoyne – Foster 138(?) kV line tripped
15:11 Perry Unit 1 tripped
15:15 Sammis – Star 345 kV line tripped and reclosed
15:17 Fermi Nuclear tripped
15:17–15:21 Numerous lines in Michigan tripped
The northeastern United States and Canada did not report significant outages prior to 15:11 EST.
http://www.nerc.com/pub_doc/PreliminaryDisturbanceReport.pdf NERC is a not-for-profit company formed as a result of the Northeast blackout in 1965 to promote the reliability of the bulk electric systems that serve North America. NERC works with all segments of the electric industry as well as customers to “keep the lights on” by developing and encouraging compliance with rules for the reliable operation of the electric grid. NERC membership comprises ten Regional Reliability Councils that account for virtually all the electricity supplied in the United States, Canada, and a portion of Baja California Norte, Mexico. For more information about NERC go to www.nerc.com.
Eaker, thanks for the pint
For those wishing for more information about the planning of the reliability of our electric power grids.
Reliability Assessment 2002–2011
The Reliability of Bulk Electric Systems in North America
Prepared by: North American Electric Reliability Council
October 2002
ftp://www.nerc.com/pub/sys/all_updl/docs/pubs/2002ras.pdf from the FORWARD
Since 1968, NERC has relied on voluntary efforts and “peer pressure” to ensure compliance with its standards. This voluntary arrangement is no longer adequate. The users and operators of the electric systems who used to cooperate voluntarily on reliability matters are now competitors without the same incentives to cooperate with each other or comply with voluntary reliability standards. Little or no effective recourse exists today under the current voluntary model to correct such behavior — not a single bulk electric system reliability standard can be enforced effectively today by NERC or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
from the EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Even though transmission systems are expected to operate reliably, some areas of the grid are not adequate to transmit the full output of all new generating units to their desired markets. Although some transmission constraints are recurring and well known, new constraints are appearing as electricity flow patterns change.
From the Regional Highlights:
Current projections indicate that New York State will not meet its 18% installed reserve margin requirement beyond 2004. However, currently about 4,200 MW of new capacity have approved applications under the New York State Article X process that have not been included in the projected reserve margins.
From the Transmission Adequacy and Security Assessment:
The transmission systems are being subjected to flows in magnitudes and directions that were not contemplated when they were designed and for which there is minimal operating experience. New flow patterns result in an increasing number of facilities being identified as limits to transfers, and transmission loading relief (TLR) procedures were required in areas not previously subject to overloads to maintain the transmission facilities within operating limits.