Posted on 10/17/2003 6:15:58 AM PDT by JohnHuang2
Pakistan is supposedly our ally in the War on Terror, but there continues to be a heavy Al Qaeda/Taliban presence in the Northwest Frontier Province/Baluchistan/Tribal areas. Why? And if the Pakistanis are our allies, why are they engaged in nuclear proliferation to Iran and North Korea? Is it because the Musharraf government simply isn’t in full control? Or is it because we are being double crossed, like we have been by the Saudis? What should the U.S. do about Pakistan?
To discuss these and other questions on Frontpage Symposium today, we have the pleasure and privilege of being joined by Timothy D. Hoyt, an Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy at the US Naval War College, and the author of "Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine and the Dangers of Strategic Myopia," "Politics, Proximity, and Paranoia: The Evolution of Kashmir as a Nuclear Flashpoint," and "The War on Terrorism in South Asia." He has also written extensively on nuclear issues and regional security in South Asia. The views he expresses are his own, and not those of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the US Navy; Walid Phares, Professor of Middle East Studies and Religious Conflict at Florida Atlantic University and a Senior Fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. He serves as an Analyst on Terrorism and Conflicts with MSNBC; Alex Alexiev, a former senior analyst at the RAND Corporation who is currently a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy in Wash. D.C.; and Esam Sohail, a columnist for the daily New Age, a Bangladeshi newspaper. His writings are regularly featured in newspapers in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Israel.
Interlocutor: Gentlemen, welcome to Frontpage Symposium. As we are all aware, there is a heavy Al Qaeda/Taliban presence in Pakistan. If the Pakistani government really wanted to eliminate this terrorist presence, surely it could do so -- or at least make a Herculean effort -- as opposed to the pathetic efforts it has made thus far. The bottom line is that Al Qaeda and the Taliban use Pakistan as a sanctuary, and they raid Afghanistan constantly from there. The evidence also suggests that these terrorists are re-developing a permanent presence in Pakistan, especially in the southern Pashtun regions. We naively believed that the Saudis were our allies, but they were harboring, financing and aiding our most deadly enemies. The same could now be said of the Pakistanis, right?
Sohail: Almost. The critical difference between the two is the make-up of their two respective governing elite. In Saudi Arabia the lackluster effort to combat terror is the cohesive policy of a monolithic Wahhabi regime that presides over an insulated and closed society the regime itself has helped perpetuate. In Pakistan, it is an extremely powerful pressure group, made up of the shadowy ISI within the government and the Saudi funded Sunni clergy on the outside, that has run the show so far. In the short term, there is little difference in the policy emanating from the two.
Unlike Saudi Arabia, however, Pakistan does have a small but increasingly vocal secular element that wants genuinely good relations with the United States. Such sentiments are often found in the local civil society movement and the third largest political party, the MQM. If such elements are nurtured from the outside, it is possible to avoid a full Saudi-ization of Pakistan in the long term.
Phares: One major strategic concern of the US in Pakistan today has to do with the presence of al-Qaida and the remnant of the Taliban, mostly in the Western areas of the country. These Jihadist forces are attempting to reverse the process of stabilization and Democratization in Afghanistan by waging guerrilla and Terrorist attacks across the borders. This Jihad zone is not covered by the Pakistani security forces under the pretext that it is tribal and therefore could erupt against the central Government. Let's compare Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in this regards. The Saudi state is Wahhabi, Pakistan is Muslim but has significant secular areas of Government. Saudi Arabia is an absolute Monarchy, Pakistan has had some Democratic practices.
The Saudi regime has for decades supported Jihadism as a state policy while Pakistan didn't. However, geopolitical realities clearly indicates that the safe haven the Jihadists have in Western Pakistan is a direct threat to the US presence in the region. Hence, while the Saudis have been in essence a part of the Jihadi movement worldwide, the Pakistani state establishment is being taken as hostage by the Jihadists. To refine, Terrorists -as an enclave- are self harboring themselves in Pakistan without Government serious plans to dismantle them. Islamabad and Riyadh arrest Terrorists but do not wage wars on Terror.
Hoyt: There is no simple answer to this question. Stating that Pakistan could "surely" eliminate this terrorist presence assumes that Pakistan is a coherent, unified entity - a nice theory, but nothing approaching reality. Pakistan is a deeply fractured political community, with relatively weak central authority. The Northwest Frontier Province and Tribal areas have never been under strong central rule from Islamabad, and Baluchistan has a history of actual rebellion (in the 1970s). Further, as part of the recent tepid effort at democratization, the provincial governments in these areas are now anti-Musharraf and pro-Taliban. It appears that there is significant support for the terrorists in these regions.
Neither of these conditions suggest that "Pakistan" (if by that one means the Musharraf regime) is "harbouring, financing and aiding our most deadly enemies." Pakistan has turned over more than 400 Al Qaeda members to the US, and has captured key members of the movement including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Binalshibh, and Abu Zubaida. These have been significant blows to Al Qaeda, depriving it of organizational and logistic capabilities and providing the US and allies with valuable insights and intelligence into Al Qaeda operations and doctrine.
However, the unmistakeable past support of the Pakistani government and (particularly) Army and Interservice Intelligence (ISI) for hard-line Islamic insurgents in both Afghanistan and Kashmir clouds the issue considerably. As Deputy Secretary of State Armitage recently remarked, factions within the Pakistani military and intelligence are not cooperating with Musharraf's efforts to cut off support to Al Qaeda and Taliban. Is Pakistan's official policy to support the Taliban and Al Qaeda? No - it is not. However, there is a strong possibility that some Pakistani officials are providing covert support. Bluntly, Pakistan's assistance to the US effort is greater than its harm to this point, and that is why they remain an ally in the war on terrorism.
Alexiev: In the aftermath of 9/11 Pakistan, under heavy U.S. pressure, made an abrupt about face from an avid supporter of the Taliban and assorted anti-Western jihadis to an ostensible ally of the U.S. in the war on terror. Today, two years later, it is clear beyond much doubt that Pakistan is hardly a genuine ally and has, in fact, become part of the problem with respect to both Afghanistan and the war on terror more broadly.
In fact, history seems to be repeating itself. In the early 1980s, the Unites States allowed Pakistan and, more specifically, the ISI, to run our support program for the Afghan mujahideen virtually uncontrolled. Yet the ISI was already in the hands of Islamic zealots like Hamid Gul and did everything possible to steer the majority of our aid to Islamist groups like Gulbaddin Hekmatiar's and Sayaf's Wahhabis to the detriment of the traditional Afghan resistance. This, in addition to the military's open support for the viciously anti-western Deobandi extremists who were rapidly taking over the Islamic establishment with government support. The result was the total destabilization of Afghanistan and ultimately Taliban/Al Qaeda rule, coupled with the establishment of a massive jihadi/terrorist network in Pakistan proper.
Today, we seem to have put all of our eggs in the Musharraf basket with rapidly diminishing returns. True, Islamabad has assisted us in arresting scores of Al Qaeda terrorists, but that's about the extent of the benefits we have received from our massive support for the regime. On every other front, the picture is cloudy and getting more so. Anti-American Islamists are in charge of the NWFP and Baluchistan governments and terrorist organizations operate more or less openly throughout Pakistan. Some of them, as the recent arrests of Lashkar-e-Tayba members in Virginia have documented, have a global reach including the U.S. Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants are again staging raids from Pakistan, as well as recruiting openly in Deobandi madrassas and maintaining a nearly official presence in Quetta. It has gotten so bad that President Karzai recently cast aside diplomatic niceties and almost openly accused Pakistan of exporting terrorism and fundamentalism to his country.
The key question that I hope we'll address in this forum is whether all of this is happening with the support of Musharraf and his government or because of their inability to prevent it. The answer to that question has profound implications for U.S. policy.
Interlocutor: Ok, so let’s look into this crucial question that Mr. Alexiev raises. How much power and control does the Musharraf government really have? Are the Taliban and Al Qaeda operating in and out of Pakistan with the support (perhaps even half-hearted support) of Musharraf and his government or because Musharraf cannot put a stop to it?
Hoyt: The short answer is that no one really knows. Some observers have noted that major actions against Al Qaeda occur at very convenient times for US-Pakistan relations - most recently this October, just before the visit of Deputy Secretary Armitage, when the Pakistani Army carried off the largest raid it has ever staged in the tribal areas. Recent reports suggest that the Taliban presence in and outside Quetta is extremely conspicuous. There are claims that Al Qaeda is operating in Kashmir, which would suggest a high probability of Pakistani support (as cover for infiltration, at a minimum).
Other terrorist groups - focused on Kashmir - clearly are "operating in and out of Pakistan" with official support. Bluntly, terrorism has become a vital asset in Pakistan's Kashmir policy. However, these groups are heavily armed, do have sympathizers and supporters both inside and outside the Army, and have the backing of powerful religious groups and political parties in many cases - suggesting a strong element of autonomy or independence, particularly in the wilder western regions.
Official tolerance for groups associated with Al Qaeda but primarily engaged in Kashmir - the recently banned Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, and Harakut-ul-Mujaheddin - is probably fairly high, provided they do not engage in the assassination of Western citizens (Daniel Pearl, French engineers) or other "extra-curricular" activities. Similarly, tacit support (official or unofficial) for the Taliban - considered a vital Pakistani ally under the now-bankrupt policy of gaining "strategic depth" - would hardly be surprising. However, even tacit official support for Al Qaeda proper would be extraordinarily dangerous for Pakistan, and would risk a very serious US response. In short, half-hearted support for Taliban? Possible. For groups affiliated with Al Qaeda but targeted primarily on Kashmir? Likely. For Al Qaeda proper? Unlikely.
Sohail: Despite having an occasionally distracting parliament, President Musharraf banks on the old wisdom that the legitimacy and power of a Pakistani ruler is derived from the Three A’s: Army, America, and Allah. As the military chief and a new friend of President Bush, Musharraf is confident of the Army and America for now. It is deference to the ‘Allah’ part that makes Musharraf lukewarm in cracking down on terror links in the conservative tribal belt or within his own army’s jihadi elements.
Musharraf has the resources to go after the Taliban/al-Qaeda support system in Pakistan. His army has a record of vigorous local policing operations in the former East Pakistan(1971), Baluchistan(1973-74), and Karachi(1990-1997). If the Musharraf regime is not clamping down on the terror support network on Pakistan’s western borders, it indicates either a lack of will or a desire to hedge political bets evenly. In either case, Musharraf is not being a full-fledged participant in the War on Terror.
Phares: This is the central question which would and should determine if the Musharraf Government is a 1) reliable ally, 2) a weak ally, 3) a pseudo-ally, or 4) an enemy. Behaving like the Taliban with open support to al-Qaida would qualify for an enemy. Obviously, that is not the case of the Musharraf regime. Not only it declared itself on the side of the US in the war on Terror, but it made enough arrests and in some cases eliminated Terrorists, to qualify as an ally. The question is what kind of ally is Pakistan in the war on al-Qaida? The answer is complex because the geopolitical realities of the country and of its regime are complex.
Here is why: The Taliban movement hosts al-Qaida in its womb. Musharraf's regime wants to dismantle Bin Laden's core group but has always shown reluctance with regards terminating the Taliban. The latter were born in Pakistan, are allied to large Islamist movements inside the country and have actually been reliable allies to the Pakistani intelligence services for about a decade. Musharraf wants to offer al-Qaida to the United States but needs to rely on his own intelligence services, themselves not very warm to the idea of a total war against the Islamists of Pakistan and their Taliban proteges. Can the Pakistani army simply march on the tribal areas and comb them altogether? Technically it can, if the strategic choice of General Musharraf is to confront not just al-Qaida, but also their vast Wahabi supporters. Apparently, he hasn't made that decision yet.
Musharraf's strategic decision -which he hasn't made yet- takes the following factors into consideration. First and foremost, if he sends the troops to the north west and particularly to the Pashtun areas, will there be defections? He is not sure as to who within the intelligence, military security and even other arms would at some point declare himself an "Emir" and rebel against the command. In those tough moments, the Jihadi cells and networks would emerge and paralyze the advance. Practically speaking, in such a scenario, one can imagine (Musharraf as well) that few officers can create rebel enclaves, onto which the Taliban like forces would converge. We're talking about a risk of an Intifada. That is something that only Musharraf can really assess, and no one else overseas. The second factor is the internal situation. Remember that he has many political enemies, who could -despite the ideological divide- join the opposite camp in case of crisis. To his credit, Musharraf has made significant statements against the religious zealotery. But the real challenge remains his position towards India. For, if he decides to wage an internal war and be successful, he needs to lower tensions with India. And to do so, he needs a strategic Indian decision to do the same. Here comes the crucial role of the US. If Washington can insure a stabilization between the two Governments, this would give a window for Musharraf to de-Talibanize his country.
Alexiev: I concur with Mr. Sohail's assertion that Musharraf does have the resources to go decisively after the Taliban and Al Qaeda support systems if he wished to do so. In fact, I'll go as far as arguing that if he did do that, he is unlikely to suffer serious political consequences, noisy threats by the Islamists notwithstanding . Just as he did not following his siding with America after 9/11, despite dire predictions of large-scale violence and political doom by the extremists and Western pundits alike. Yet he has not and it is evident that both the Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants are getting a second lease on life, something simply not possible without a degree of support from the Pakistani side of the border. Actions such as the recent Pakistani raid in South Waziristan are welcome exceptions but do not change the problematic overall picture.
Thus one would have to conclude that this is so because Musharraf wants it that way. And here Mr. Hoyt has put his finger on the problem by noting that terrorism has become a vital asset for Islamabad in its confrontation with India over Kashmir - a paranoid and hopeless obsession that, in my view, is the cause of many of Pakistan's failures - from excessive militarization and a series of incompetent military dictatorships to counterproductive "strategic depth" policies and the pervasive spread of extremism and a culture of violence at the expense of civil society.
What are the chances of change for the better? I'm not excessively optimistic. Musharaf has done none of the things he could and in fact promised to do to reverse this dismal situation both before and after 9/11. Instead he has performed an elaborate Kabuki dance designed to show action where there has been little. He outlawed a bunch of terrorist groups only to have them continue under different names and froze their accounts but not before they were given time to withdraw their money. And he has done nothing to curtail extremism in the madrassas, despite the fact that laws that allow him to do that already exist and last but not least he has continued to tolerate the organic relationship between the jihadist groups and the ISI. The implications of all of this for the U.S. war on terror are clear and they are not sanguine.
Interlocutor: gentlemen, let’s turn to the issue of how the Pakistanis are engaged in nuclear proliferation to Iran and North Korea, giving those Axis of Evil nations enriched uranium programs. Surely this behavior is not the mark of a U.S. ally? Please comment on why Pakistan is doing this, the dangers of this situation, and what the U.S. should be doing about it.
Sohail: The cardinal feature of Pakistan’s twenty-five year effort to go nuclear is that its willingness to cooperate with anyone to create a nuclear capability for the Islamic ummah. Hence, in the last quarter of a century Pakistan has collaborated, at various levels and at different times, with Libya, Iran, the defunct BCCI bank, Dutch smuggling rings, Florida-based drug cartels, and now North Korea to amass the money and the know-how to make actual weapons. The danger here is that such a weapon could finds its way to rogue jihadi elements, given the ISI-mullah influence on Pakistani policy discussed earlier.
With arch-enemy India having nuclear capability, frankly Pakistan’s program has wide public support. The United States should continue to pressure both countries to sign the NPT, re-impose the non-proliferation sanctions (sec. 503) on Islamabad, and explore the possibility of offering a nuclear shield to Pakistan if it agrees to sign the NPT without waiting for India to do the same.
Phares: The second most important concern the US has in Pakistan is obviously its nuclear arsenal. Terrorists leaders, including Bin Laden himself stated openly that they are planning on taking the control of this infrastructure. That alone is of grave consequences. Pakistan's decision to further develop its WMD is an international hazard. But its technological cooperation with other regimes such as Iran and North Korea puts that danger on the table of strategic emergencies. In return, Pakistan's military would obtain advanced delivery systems from the North Koreans. As for Iran, it is geopolitical. For as it faces India, Pakistan's proliferation to Tehran aims at establishing a "strategic depth" to its West, and hence links up to the Arab Muslim world. Pakistan's eastern borders are with India, China and north western borders are with the new Afghanistan. A minimum exchange with Iran could be seen as a breathing corridor, despite the deep Sunni-Shiite divide. But when it comes to choices, "we and our cousins against the others."
Hoyt: The danger of the situation is very serious indeed. It now appears that Pakistan has transferred nuclear enrichment technology to both North Korea and Iran. In the case of North Korea, according to press reports, the Pakistanis informed the US of the program shortly after joining us in the war on terrorism (no later than November 2001). In the case of Iran, however, Pakistan has not - again according to press reports - admitted any culpability in private or public.
It is ridiculous to believe that these efforts could have occurred without official approval. It is equally ridiculous to accept, at face value, Pakistan's pronouncements that it has never engaged in proliferation - it clearly has, for badly needed cash (pre-9/11), missile technology (the Pakistani Ghauri is virtually identical to the North Korean No Dong), or diplomatic influence. What is most important is to determine what technology (both hardware and "know-how") has been transferred, to whom, and where. This could be vital intelligence. Equally important is to ensure that Pakistan's transfer of nuclear technology stops now - or preferably yesterday.
Another disturbing syndrome in Pakistan, however, is the apparent willingness or ability of Pakistani nuclear scientists to discuss aspects of their work and otherwise cooperate with foreign nationals and terrorists without the approval of the government. At least two Pakistani nuclear scientists have been interrogated regarding their contacts with Al Qaeda front groups in 2000-2001. This suggests that technology leaks from the Pakistani nuclear complex at an alarming rate - both officially and unofficially - and that overall security is poor. One can only hope this is not the case with physical security for nuclear weapons components and fissile material.
Alexiev: It is beyond reasonable doubt, by now, that Pakistan has become a key proliferator as well as beneficiary of proliferation from China and North Korea. Its assistance to Iran is particularly disturbing because it indicates that the Islamabad government is unconcerned about helping a documented terrorism supporter to obtain WMD. Further proliferation in the direction of Egypt and Libya is entirely possible as well.
One additional factor of interest is the fact that the Pakistani nuclear program was heavily subsidized by Saudi Arabia through concessional prices for oil amounting to no less than $1 billion per year. What degree of influence Riyadh has is unknown but it must be very considerable. Pakistan, after all, is a state heavily dependent on remittances from the kingdom apart from the direct oil subsidies. This, of course, implies that the Saudis could secure a "take home" nuclear capability with relative ease at some point.
Finally, one cannot dismiss the possibility of Islamic zealots like A.Q.Khan and like-minded extremists in the ISI illegally supplying nuclear know-how to terrorist groups.
Interlocutor: It appears that Pakistan is undergoing a process of Talibanization. What is your reading of this precarious situation?
Sohail: For the first time in history, Islamist parties have made significant electoral gains to the point that they run the provincial governments in two provinces and are the second biggest opposition group in the federal assembly. Taleban-like social policy is being imposed in already conservative Bauchistan and the NWFP. Given the fact that parts of the Pakistani establishment, specially the ISI and much of the mid-level (major to brigadier general) officer corps, have been heavily influenced by jihadi mentality (from the Afghan war era), it is important to address the issue immediately and forcefully.
While redoubling efforts to assist anti-Islamist socio-political elements, the Administration ought to make clear to President Musharraf that the US will look unfavorably at any compromise with the Islamists on a provincial or federal level. Also, we should consider placing some of these Pakistani parties on the list of entities supporting terrorism because they do support terror.
Phares: Let's analyze the inner world of Pakistan. On the one hand the country has a solid secular elite, and was ruled by some -not always with transparency. Pakistan is a very large country of a hundred million people. It has its seculars, liberals, conservatives, nationalists, minorities and of course its Islamic Fundamentalists. The latter have three power bases: the border tribes in the West, the Islamists parties and some influence in the military and security services. The Jihadists have been successful in mobilizing on three fronts: 1) Counter attack the infidel-backed Karzai Government in Afghanistan, 2) an all out support to the Cashemire "Islamic" rebellion against India and 3) further implementation of the Sharia law inside the country. In that sense the so-called Talibanization is waged on three axis, one supporting the other. The secular forces in the country are divided deeply between regime and opposition. Only a national consensus among the seculars, moderates, feminists, democrats and reformists can stop that process. The Army as we know, without social mobilization cannot be a shield forever.
Hoyt: Pakistan is not undergoing a process of Talibanization at this time, but there is an alarming and very militant minority who favor extremist visions of Islam. The failure of the state education system in the 1980s and 1990s left a vacuum that was filled by extreme madrassas, many of which teach jihad and a virulent anti-Western version of Islam. "Jihadist" sentiments were accelerated by the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan - a struggle funded by Western and Saudi money and run from the currently pro-Taliban areas of Pakistan. Many of the most extreme elements of the Afghan resistance cooperated with Pakistani intelligence to inflame the conflict in Kashmir, and Pakistan used Afghanistan as a training base before funnelling "volunteers" into Kashmir. Taliban is a movement with Pakistani roots, which took over Afghanistan with Pakistani training, logistics support, and military advisors. It is hardly surprising that its extreme ideology resonates with some Pakistanis, particularly in the northern and western areas.
That said, urban and eastern Pakistan remains more secular and pro-Western than many alarmists give it credit for. President Musharraf is clearly secular, as is much of the Army leadership (which remains the most powerful political force in the country). Democratization - admittedly a tepid effort - carries with it the inevitable danger of members of the opposition being elected, which has complicated the political process and led to the election of pro-Taliban regional governments in the west.
Pakistan is not about to "Talibanize" in the short term. However, it is a de-stabilized political community. Jihadism evolved from the Afghan struggle, was deliberately and cynically manipulated to support the ongoing conflict in Kashmir, and as a result has taken root in Pakistani society. "Rolling it back" will take firm commitment, economic assistance, and many years. That is an issue the US can help with, but that only the Pakistanis can actually accomplish. It is conceivable that poor domestic decisions can make the threat greater in the near term, but my own feeling is that Talibanization is a distant, worst-case prospect of relatively low likelihood in the next 5-10 years. Engaging closely with President Musharraf - the post 9-11 policy - appears to be a hedge against Talibanization by the US, and may be one of the best options to prevent a future Pakistani collapse.
Alexiev: The problem with the Talibanization of the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan is a very serious one and it directly and negatively affects the prospects of Afghanistan. The first thing to understand about it is that it did not start with the coming to power of the MMA, but long before that with Zia ul-Haq conscious policy of Islamization and favoring the extremist Deobandi creed at the expense of the syncretic Barelvis and the Shiites. Over time this led to a clear dominance of the Deobandis and their Wahhabi sponsors in religious politics and the madrassa system and the emergence of a vast network of militant jihadi organizations under ISI tutelage. This network, quite apart from its involvement in terrorism, has led to debilitating sectarian strife that threatens to rent asunder what little is left of civil society in the country. The jeanie is out of the bottle now and not easily put back in.
The key question here is whether anybody does in fact want to put it back in the bottle. Many believe that Musharraf will do that if he could. I don't see any evidence of that. His dealings with the jihadis and the madrassa issue to date do not indicate any serious desire to crack down on the extremists.
Some in Pakistan, in fact, believe that the surpising electoral victory of the MMA in the 2002 is better explained by Musharraf's vehement dislike for the civilian parties than the inherent strength of the Islamists. After all, he had amply demonstrated his ability to rig elections during the presidential referendum in 2002. It is also noteworthy that before taking over, his two closest friends and confidants in the military were Gens Mehmood and Usmani, both zealous Islamists.
This does not mean that he is a Muslim extremist in disguise himself, but it may mean that on a scale from Ataturk to Zia ul-Haq he is closer to the latter than the former. Yet, looking at Pakistan today, it is difficult for me to believe that anything short of an Ataturk could reverse the inexorable slide of the country into dysfunction.
Interlocutor: Ok gentlemen, let us suppose that President Bush phones you and says he doesn’t feel that he is getting the best advice on Pakistan. He has heard, through certain channels, that he can count on you personally. “What do I do about Pakistan?” he asks you. What do you tell him?
Sohail: Mr. President, remind General Musharraf of your defining line ‘Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.’ Let him know in no uncertain terms that he is not doing enough to fight terror, which means he is not being a good frontline ally. You have given him the carrot: loan guarantees, debt re-scheduling with IMF, outright grants-in-aid through Congress. Now show him the stick: the possibility of downgrading of US-Pakistan ties all the way down to a listing on the terror sponsor list. He can avoid it by cracking down on the operational, financial, intellectual, and ‘moral’ support for terrorism within his army, his intelligence agencies, his tribal belt, and his mosques and seminaries. And he has to put a stop to Pakistanis being recycled through every jihad from Kashmir to Iraq to Chechnya. Musharraf is a military man, he will understand the direct approach. Then, it is his call to choose between domestic Islamist dissent and global pariah status.
Hoyt: Sadly, the option of downgrading Pakistan to the terror sponsor list is simply not credible. If it wasn't done in the early 1990s, when US-Pakistani relations were at a nadir, it is hardly possible now, when Pakistan's cooperation against Al Qaeda has been critical, if sporadic. Right now, the US needs Pakistan enough that it cannot afford to make it an enemy. So my approach would be to emphasize the carrot, and the long-term dangers to Pakistan as a state. US aid is contingent on cooperation in the war on terrorism, but is only temporary.
Only significant changes in Pakistani policy and behavior can cement a long-term relationship with the US, and with international donors. Pakistan's support for jihad, and its obsession with Kashmir, run the risk of destroying the state in the future - either through internal collapse or through regional war. The threat of extreme Islam to the institutions he values the most - the Army and the state - is rising. If there is not significant internal reform - starting, I believe, with the education system, and the power of the madrassas - Pakistan will become a failed state, and perhaps an enemy of the United States (not a healthy proposition). We can help Musharraf with some of these problems - funding education, facilitating some diplomatic solution to Kashmir, supporting democratization - but that aid comes at a price. We must see more movement against jihadist elements in Pakistan - Al Qaeda, Taliban, and the Al Qaeda affiliates fighting in Kashmir. Without that, the US-Pakistani relationship will remain purely tactical, the US will (again) discard Pakistan when it is no longer needed, and Pakistan will become a failed state.
Alexiev: What I'd do is very much along the lines suggested by Mr. Sohail, perhaps in even stronger terms. I will call Musharraf in and tell him that the United States has three non-negotiable objectives in the region: guarantee a stable and independent Afghanistan, stop the spread of Pakistani -originated terrorism and prevent nuclear proliferation. And I'd further inform him that as an ostensible ally, Islamabad has failed to make much of a contribution on all three issues, which, sooner or later, puts it on a collision course with the United States. It may be helpful to specify what this could mean: curtailment or termination of economic and military assistance, public identification of Pakistan as a nuclear proliferator, a de jure alliance with India and ultimately declaring Pakistan a terrorist state with all that this implies.
Short of that kind of a wake up call, I'm afraid I don't see much reason for optimism for either our policy objectives or Pakistan's future. The latter is something that is not often discussed in the context of U.S.-Pakistani relations but it should. The fact is that not only NWFP and Baluchistan, but all of Pakistan has become Talibanized to a frightening degree. Hudood Ordinances and Blasphemy Laws have undermined the rule of law across the board and medieval obscurantism and Islamist zealotry are increasingly the dominant idiom in a society ridden with sectarian violence worse this year than ever before. Is this the kind of ally we want to count on to help us achieve our goals in the region? And is it the kind of ally that is likely to deliver?
Interlocutor: Ok Prof. Phares, what do you tell the President?
Phares: Mr. President, there are things that the US should do itself, and other things we should ask our ally to do:
1. First and foremost, you should ask your national security team to develop an emergency plan focusing on preventing the takeover by the Jihadists of the most important nuclear capabilities of Pakistan. Such a plan must be applied, possibly with including other international powers, in the single case of a Jihadist advance towards these dangerous weapons.
2. You should hold a summit with President Musharref and with national security teams of both countries and devise a strategic plan to end the threat of Terrorism in Pakistan. The US will reaffirm its assistance in aid and will work on providing the regional endorsement to this plan. Pakistan will commit to remove the threat of international Terrorism coming out of its territories.
3. You should hold another summit with the Prime Minister of India and explain that the US-Pakistani plan is not directed against India's interest. Just the opposite. One major dividend is to remove the Jihadist factor from the Cashemir equation and bring this matter to the table of diplomatic discussions between the two countries.
4. When you'll insure Indian understanding of the plan, you would provide the regional component to Musharraf and therefore ask him to move on the Terrorists. Such a move should be backed by Washington, endorsed by a number of other powers, including by some Muslim Governments. The psychological factor is very important. Musharraf, the moderates and the seculars in Pakistan must not feel they are isolated in the Muslim world.
5. In this context, a phased plan must be devised. One, Musharraf -who is a shrude officer- must take the control of his own intelligence service. Second stage, and with the help of the renewed intelligence service, he should remove Jihadist influence from the Army. Third stage, he would then lead an offensive against the Terror networks. And as he is making significant successes on that front, a Muslim summit must be held in Pakistan to dicuss the cooperation against Terror. Such an event would preempt the campaign to discredit the Pakistani Government among Muslims worldwide.
If the Musharraf Government fails in moving along the 4 above points, then you have no real choice but to start a slow downgrading of the relationship while keeping option one to yourself and to your allies. Interlocutor: Alex Alexiev, Walid Phares, Timothy Hoyt and Esam Sohail, thank you for joining Frontpage Symposium. It was an honor. Take care for now. I welcome all of our readers to get in touch with me if they have a good idea for a symposium. Email me at jglazov@rogers.com.
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