Posted on 12/05/2003 8:14:06 PM PST by First_Salute
This is only a part of the report; the section pertaining to the following U.S. Army division; it begins on the report's page 17:
A Visit to the 4th Infantry Division/Taskforce Ironhorse --- November 6, 2003
Part One: General Observations
As a preface to this report, I should note that flying into Tikrit on a Blackhawk is an experience in itself. The flight profile is a low altitude, high-speed dash, avoiding roads and populated areas, until the outskirts of Tikrit, when the helicopter must slow down and fly a more predictable path.
The helipad is near the 4th ID HQ, located near one of Saddam's grandiose places --- reportedly one where he stayed all of one night, with its own compound and large enough so a bridge is needed between the various sections.
The end result is both an insight to the scale of Saddam 's tyranny and ambitions --- like most palaces it was built after 1991 --- and a feeling on entering a combat zone. Unlike
Mosul and Babil, or even the airport at Baghdad, the helicopter flight gives a real impression of the risks being run by the troops and real war fighters --- a risk illustrated by the fact a similar helicopter was forced down the next day.
The visit to the 4th ID command post also came after visiting three other military headquarters, plus the CPA, and reinforced several impression that I should probably summarize at the outset:
1. The impression sometimes comes out of media reporting that the US and its allies are static in tactics, isolated from the Iraqis, and being limited to their compounds. Nothing is further from the truth. The 4th ID provided more unclassified statistics than other units, but it is clear that major outreach efforts go on in all units, that the Iraqi police and ICDC do provide useful new sources of HUMINT, that aggressive local contacts and civil
action programs are underway in all of the areas visited, and that new tactics and equipment are the rule and not the exception. They also vary by AOR and threat mix. This is an adaptive war where unit commanders have considerable flexibility and make
use of it.
2. Everyone agrees that intelligence is a critical problem. Steadily better organization is underway. A major shift from technical intelligence to working HUMINT has largely been accomplished, although supported by UAVs, SIGINT, helis, and fixed wing aircraft.
In each area, local networks have been established, sources are now computerized on history and reliability, there is a large and continuing amount of input, and most raids and actions are based on multiple sources and payoff &endash; although often after multiple attempts.
The strikes are focused, rather than general, and tailored to limit provocation with welldefined ROEs. No one is perfect, and there are always mistakes. Claims of 90% success rates in using validated multiple source HUMINT are too high, but 70-80% with really good data may be fair.
Yet, everyone agrees that there is a serious shortage of analysts and translators, and that the entire intelligence team has had to retrain, reorganize, and reequip in place to focus on HUMINT and low intensity combat, and not on technical intelligence and heavy weapons. As a rough rule of thumb, the US has only about half the translators and intelligence specialists it needs, but has no reserves of qualified personnel. They are being created in combat.
Everyone hopes that deploying Iraqis will help fix this situation. There may be too much optimism about the ICDC, police, and Iraqi Army in terms of loyalty, reliability, and capability, but it is clear that the US can't turn to foreign countries for what it needs most: local area experts who can reinforce the intelligence and operational effort.
At the same time, there is no world of illusions here. One only has to look closely at the faces of the intelligence experts when one asks the usual questions about exactly who the FRL, Iraqi Islamist, and foreign opposition are, how many there are, who is directing what, sources of money, and the hunt for Saddam.
The truth is that a lot of information is flowing but there are no certain answers &endash; except that every officer we talked to felt that any direction of the FRLs came from loose coordination of regional cadres, that Saddam and the ex-senior leadership were hiding and not in charge, and that the "foreign" and Islamist threat was so far minor compared to the FRLs, Iraqi volunteers, paid attackers, and criminals working for and with them.
I also have to say that working intelligence officers seem sick and tired of the facile generalizations being attributed to senior officials, and efforts to tie the threat to outside political agendas for dealing with Al Qaida, Iran, Syria, etc. They feel they are working on an evolving local threat with some outside presence, and one whose leadership and
direction can survive because it is dispersed, in many cells, diverse, and now uses others to take risks and carry out the attacks.
3. No one feels there can be any early end to attacks, casualties, and sabotage. They see the present LIC as likely to continue in some form until the US departs. They fully realize that as the US and its allies improve, so will the threat, and it can turn to larger car bombs, more use of SAMs, longer range mortars, better rockets, and use improvements in their intelligence to improve sabotage.
The effort is to contain and reduce the threat, not eliminate it, and the focus is as much on hearts and minds as fighting and HUMINT. The civic action program, local liaison, Iraqification of security, and above all the SERP aid program are also seen as absolutely critical.
There may be a problem with the CPA civilian aid effort. It is far from clear that it is as yet focus ed on what Iraqis want, what impacts most on Iraqi perceptions, and the needs in high threat areas or that the civilian aid program is seen in time urgent terms and that measuring its effectiveness day-to-day in terms of local Iraqi perceptions has a suitable priority. The US military tend to be over polite, wince, or laugh when asked about this aspect of the struggle. Admittedly they have their own biases, but it is clear that they see the SERP funds as a tool as good as any weapon, and working with local tribal, urban, and sectarian leaders as critical.
4. There is a general feeling that things are getting better, and that the US will "win" to the extent of containing and localizing the threat &endash; although never in eliminating attacks and casualties. There is no false optimism here, however, and all of those interviewed see risks and uncertainties. No one talks about early victory, or rotating out and leaving a peaceful area to their successor.
Victory is seen in relative terms: allowing the aid program and nation building to catch hold, allowing Iraqi ICDC and police to take over in most areas, allowing the CPA to work out a new government. There is a good understanding that hearts and minds means tolerance and not love, and is dependent on departure in 2004 and 2005. No officer felt the US could or should stay unless in a very limited form and at the invitation of a new government. Victory is also seen as something that will always have some new attacks hitting the press. This tracks well, incidentally, with the goals set by CPA. There is now civil-military split on goals and timing in the theater, although some may be much more ambitious in the US.
5. Only one officer interviewed privately called for more troops in Iraq. Every other officer either privately or during briefings talked about quality and the need for better training, better intelligence, more MPs, more translators, more rapid delivery of key equipment, and immediate available of SERP aid money.
Behind all of this, however, is the broader problem of morale. No one I talked to, officer or enlisted, objected to the risk or the mission, although the US could do a much better job of explaining its goals to the troops, and why their mission is needed. The problem is not fear, risk, or casualties. There are soldiers, not unformed bureaucrats, and the risk is accepted.
The key problem is rather overdeployment and a total inability to plan a life. Officers and soldiers alike feel they are overstretched, deployed too long and too often, and have no way to explain to their families when they are coming back or why so many delays occur.
This may ease with time under current deployment schedules, but the general impression one gets is that reenlistments are going to be a massive problem simply because US forces as a whole are too small to limit the strain on deployments.
The National Guard and reserves are particularly stressed on these lines, and there is a separate problem. Rightly or wrongly, they feel they don't get the same quarters, protection, and equipment.
The key point I would make, however, is that this is not a disheartened or unmotivated force for this mission, or a casualty or risk adverse one. It is a force that feels it is being overstretched, and treated badly in terms of rotations and career conditions.
6. Finally a point about winning or losing. On paper we are winning in spite of the successful attacks. The frequency and impact of attacks may be up but so are the US and allied raids, seizures, and impact on local areas. At present, serious combat remains limited to the Sunni triangle and Baghdad, although attacks do take place in other areas.
If the war remains limited largely to FRLs, we will probably win to the extent we can accomplish much of the aid and rebuilding effort, secure most areas most of the time, and allow a new Iraqi government to takeover.
The US and allied military, however, cannot control the other risks that could lead to defeat:
- A Shi'ite leader emerging that turned the Shi'ites largely hostile. This would be like losing the Buddhists in Vietnam. It would mean losing the war (Here far too much now rests on the support and survival of older clerics like Sistani and the US may be counting Sadr out too soon).
- The failure of the Governing Council and Iraqis to take effective control over their own destiny.
- Serious ethnic divisions and beneath the surface, there are rural problems with Kurdish expulsion of Arabs and serious Sunni and Shi'ite tensions over the shift of power and wealth to the Shi'ites.
- A major religious crisis in which the US made a major mistake in a Shrine area or somehow gave the Islamists ammunition in charging it was anti-Islamic.
Here one point is clear. US information operations remain crude and inadequate. Radio and TV coverage are better, but it is unclear who in Iraq really cares. The US backed paper gets read from intelligence on the CPA and contracts, but its credibility is uncertain. So far, most information comes from hostile Arab sources.
Moreover, the problem no one really seems to want to address is the Iraqi perception that the US uncritically backs Israel and has strong anti-Islamic elements, and that Iraqis see constant images of Israelis attacking Palestinians on Arab satellite TV.
These images are compounded by the CPA, which has no observable charisma, and is divided and slow to react in pushing forward with the constitutional effort, elections, and a clear picture of Iraq' s future. Like the problems in the way the CPA seems to focus aid and communicate locally, the information battle is a weak link.
Part Two: Fighting and Nation Building in the Sunni Triangle
I write this memo with some sadness, knowing other Americans died in a helicopter flight a day after my visit. At the same time, the 4th ID has a powerful story to tell, and most of it is positive.
Task Force Ironhorse, with the 4th ID at its core, bears the brunt of the present war fighting, along with the 1st Armored Division.
It covers the Sunni triangle and the area from Kirkuk to the north of Baghdad. It has to cover part of the Iranian and Syrian border, but the main threat areas are the Sunni portion of Mosul (1/3 of the population) and the Sunni towns of Huwayiat, Bayji, Tikrit,
Ar Dawa, Samarra, Balad south to Baghad, and Mansur (Not really much of a triangle on a map.)
It has been engaged in combat almost since the defeat of Saddam's conventional forces.
The intensity of combat is indicated by the chronology of major operations:
--Operation Peninsula Strike - 8-15 June
--Opertion Desert Scorpion - 15-29 June: 56 initial raids rising to total of 87
--Operation Sidewinder: 29 June-5 July: 33 initial raids followed by attacks on 29 major targets
--Operation Ivy Serpent - 12-17 July: 89 raids
--Operation Ivy Needle - 11 Aug- 9 Sept: 182 raids, 11,590 coalition only patrols, 2,285 joint patrols with Iraqis. 373 flash checkpoints, 905 static checkpoints. Hit 109 targets, capture 965 detainees, and find 5 IRD bomb makers and 6 financiers. Weapons seizures include 4 howitzers, 84 mortars, 199 rockets, 115 RPGs, 5 IEDs and 3 kits.
--Operation Ivy Focus - underway since 10 September - Reflects both intensive operations and a shift to tactics suited to a prolonged LIC effort:
- Focused raids to eliminate mid-level organizers, financiers, and other non-compliant forces.
- IPB driven counter mortar and IED ambushes.
- Focused recce and counter-recce along Corps/Division/BDE<SRS.
- Continuous engagement with key civic, religious, and tribal leaders.
- Continue investment to improve basic infrastructure and basic life services and create jobs.
- Train, employ, and equip Iraqi national police, ICVDC, and Border Guards to protect key infrastructure (oil, power) and urban areas and the Iranian border.
- Identify, seize and destroy enemy munitions.
The division feels that Ivy Focus describes the way ahead. It stresses that far more is involved than military operations, and there have been 857 engagement meetings with local and tribal leaders and a constant process of contact. Civil-military action is seen as just as critical as military operations, and the division has steadily strengthened its civil military operations effort, created an operations center, a project coordination cell, a division plans cell, and an "Effects Coordination Cell." The latter is of major importance because projects are chosen to have the maximum political and military impact, and are constantly monitored to see they are carried out and determine their local political effect.
The aid efforts to date include joint work with the Iraqis, which now include 2,596 ICDC, 8,461 new police, and 1,203 border police plus new units of the Army. They include interim government activity, including some elections and multi-ethnic participation in provincial and local councils plus the selection of provincial governments. The figures for Iraqis required, recruited and hired, in training and training are:
- Border Police: 1372, 1203, --, 1,203
- Iraqi police: 15,601, 8461, 217, 1502
- ICDC: 8,834, 3,933, 797, 2812.
The Iraqi CDCan police now have begun to respond to threats on their own, the Border Patrol is intercepting illegal crossers, courts are trying and jailing criminals.
The first Iraqi Army battalion with 41 offices and 649 other ranks is coming on line with four rifle companies with 6/112 men each, and 17/201 headquarters and service personnel. It will begin joint field training with US forces at the platoon level in December and move to the battalion level, with scheduled completion of operational experience in early May.
Leaders and sheiks are constantly engaged as well, courts are refurbished, and the Iraqis now review provincial budgets. (It was pointed out to me that outside expertise proved useless in determining who was really a local leader or tribal leader in many cases. As a result, the 4th ID held local and provincial meetings, and saw who was respected and took charge. One key indicator was who stayed in the front row. "You can't get intelligence or area expertise at this level. You have to develop it in the field.")
New styles of government are being created. Kirkuk has an Interim Government which splits all senior jobs along ethnic lines and an interim council with a Turkoman Chairman (the governor is a Kurd) and members along such lines: 6 Kurds, 6 Turks, 6 Assyrians, 6 Arabs, and 6 independents appointed by their commander of Task Force Ironhorse (4th ID.)
The military has provided aid to 480 schools, and created a model school program with 40 schools as candidates. They are creating youth centers, sports programs and computer training centers. Delegates selected the Interim Council which chose the governor, deputy governor, and three assistant governors so that all ethnic groups were represented.
The military is also working to create social service initiatives like Women's Rights Councils, Religious site engagement initiatives, employment centers with a goal of 30,000 jobs, and an NGO recruit and housing imitative.
Civil-military infrastructure goals and progress include major increases in radio stations and repeaters and TV, newspapers, Internet cafes, etc. There is now radio and TV coverage of virtually all of the populated AOR.
Power generation is up 300%, 25 water projects have been started, and 8 sewage projects. Medical refurbishment is complete for 96% of the hospitals and 95% of the clinics and a nation immunization day has been held. In addition, targeted initiatives have been held in a largely unscathed Kirkuk for a rail/airport initiative, business symposiums, and creation of a comprehensive local economic plan.
At the same time, the ops tempo is now way up: 361 raids, 21,877 coalition only patrols, 3504 joint patrols, 2653 static checkpoints, 1919 flash check points, 843 ambushes.
There have been 231 targets and 1634 detainees, finding 46 IED bombmakers, 6 financiers, and 201 IEDs *(91 disarmed.) Massive seizures of ammunition continue.
The 4th ID does, however, face risks anywhere in its AOR south of the "ethnic dividing line" along the first major ridge/mountain line south of Kirkuk where the population is largely Sunni and virtually every town in this area has had enough incidents to qualify as some kind of hot spot.
To put the aid effort in perspective, as of November 3, there were 2012 aid projects underway in the AOR, 1,063 completions. The aid effort, however, is just beginning to take hold. Only $18.4 million of $139.8 million worth of projects begun has been spent.
This is a key point, since most of the hearts and minds impact of aid is only beginning to have an effect. The major projects were national aid ($91 million). CPA had started $5.1 million worth, OHD/CPA $1.1 million, Bechtel $5.2 million (3 projects with 0 completions), and NGOs $4.2 million.
The civil military CERP programs have, however, had a major impact already and all of the money goes directly to Iraqis. A total of 70 projects have been started at the central command level, with a total value of $8.1 million and 43 completions and $4.9 million spent. The brigade level projects total 1740 out of 2012,with a value of $24.8 million; 947 have been completed and $11.2 million spent out of a total spent for all aid of $18.4 million.
This too is a critical point and lesson for the future. The civilian aid program at best is far too slow and cumbersome for hearts and minds and unfocused in terms of security and local objectives. If the military had not have major CERP funds, and spent them quickly, it seems almost certain than Iraqi hostility would today be far greater and the civil aid program and nation building effort would never have had time to take hold. The military may not like armed nation building, but it seems clear that it is the most vital aspect of the aid effort in asymmetric wars and it seems unlikely that civil or contractor efforts can ever be a substitute.
Part Three: Combat and Intelligence Details
The previous parts of this three part memo have summarized the overall military situation in Iraq, and the formal data on the operations of Task Force Ironhorse and the 4th
Infantry Division. This memo highlights the points raised by US officers during briefings and discussions to the area.
The reader should be aware that as with all trip reports, no verbatim record exists. All mistakes and politically insensitive comments are the result of the author's mistakes and inadequacies and not of what was actually said during the briefing.
1. The Ethnic Politics of the Region
There is a sharp ethic fault line between the Kurds and mixed areas in the north and the largely Sunni areas in to the south of the ridge line that slants to the southeast south of Kirkuk.
So far the Kurds have avoided overt ethnic clashes but there is severe tension over the "return" of Kurdish property. The largely Sunni areas can see the risk of a major shift in power to the Kurds and Shi'ites, but the political impact may be exaggerated. So far, they have other issues, both local and in terms of nationalist concerns over the occupation.
One example of a local issue is Tikrit. Samarra was the traditional power center. With Saddam gone, it is far from clear what role Tikrit has or how it will ever get anything like its past funding, although it might become a university town.
No problems with Assyrians and Christians. Have learned to keep low profile, avoid provocation.
2. The Military Situation
There are some 10 raids a day.
Made 23 raids in the last 4 days (end 5 November) and sought 44 individuals and caught 33.
IEDs represent the greatest threat although can now find 33-50% before detonated.
Random mortars are a problem but rarely hit anything. Can see, however, the same shift to standoff attacks as in other areas, and rocket/mortar threat to come.
3. The 4th ID Heavy and Technology
The 4th ID would like more uparmored HUMVEEs and looks forward to deployment of the Stryker. Tanks are too heavy in many areas, and the Bradley has its limits. However, the heavy division has unique self-protection and the digital networks and displays in its vehicles and command centers are invaluable. Can precisely map locations towns and cities, know location of every unit, and show location of hostiles and sensitive areas. The all digital force allows far more secure and focused raids and quicker response, as well as better fusion of threat and friendly data and combined arms/joint operations.
Knowing exact locations in towns like Tikrit, Baqubas, and Samarra is of great value and works well with HUMINT to allow quick and precise reactions.
The 4th ID is also the only unit with UAVs integrated at the brigade level and on call to the brigade commander in real time. This has been vital and the data can be interpreted along with the digital location data.
The real time tasking of the UAVs has "flown the wings off" and they are used very night.
The training to use heavy weapons in urban areas before the war also has proved to be vital. Tanks and APCs are not the answer to every urban problem but they can be of immense use if they have digital netting and situational awareness.
The UAVs also work well with mortar locating radars and helicopters. Fusion provided tools for day and night warfare.
The only real problem has been integrating a non-digital 173rd Airborne unit into a digital force.
"We're a bit sick and tired of the claim you need light forces for LIC. How many of our capabilities can LIC units perform and how many casualties are you willing to accept.
What you need is the right partnership and force mix. "
Do need more UAVs, uparmored HUMVEES, assistance in intelligence training, and computer support of HUMINT records and analysis. Look forward to Stryker brigade's arrival next month, M-1 is too big for cities. Bradley has some of similar limits. HUMVEEs too light on armor and firepower even if uparmored and gunned.
4. The AOR Threat
Almost all of the threat is local FRLs. All claim, however, that the threat is foreign. Getting a lot of misinformation about foreign attackers. Al Ansar, Al Qaida, etc., trying to shift our focus. Some of the latter threat is real, but HUMINT is always a mixed bag. Some 70-80% of those captured to date are paid attackers, many criminals freed by Saddam before the collapse. Prices vary sharply but now some $150 to $500. Criminal element and private gain are key motives for FRLs.
No evidence of any Al Qaida action. Cannot confirm Al Ansaar activity. No signs of problems with Iranians, but foreigners are coming in through Mosul and across Iranian border.
Mohammad's Army is present but seems to be an FRL cover and not truly Islamists. FRLs keep using new names to make selves look different, create false flags, image of being Islamic or Arab.
Threat tactics have evolved:
- June: Were direct fire, but they found could not compete against our night and thermal sights, protection and firepower.
- July: Moved back in distance. Used RPGs. We attacked into them and rush them. They couldn't survive.
- August: Shifted to IEDs and used everything in sight. Mixes of C-4 and with good triggers and crude efforts with 6,155mm rounds badly linked together.
- Since then: Have added mortars and rockets but IEDs are key. Found 55 IEDs in the last week, but found 19 before set off, many with Iraqi help. Detonated 26.
- See 43 mortar and rocket attacks in the last week. So far crude and poorly aimed. Lost one HUMVEE but no casualties.
- ICDCs and Border Patrol of great help.
Do estimate threat will improve in tactics, skill, and intelligence over time. Feel will conduct fewer but better planned attacks, make more use of foreign fighters and experienced cadres.
See future threat will use MANPADs, artillery, heavier mortars, more sophisticated and larger IEDs and vehicle bombs, multiple and single rocket launchers can aim, possibly mines and ATGMs can all expand the range of threat attacks and will learn to make more accurate. Cannot ever stop their intelligence from improving as well, although our intelligence networks are getting steadily better.
Mortar locating radars and UAVs will get steadily more important with time.
Do not know where talk of Saddam, Ibrahim and/or Al Douri being in charge came from.
Feel Saddam is moving constantly, relying on tribal contacts, and constant change of houses and cars. Are doing random checks.
5. More Troops.
No. This is not the issue. Do need quality in some areas, but ICDC, Iraqi police, Army and Border Guards will give manpower strength as well as language skills and HUMINT, area expertise.
More Americans are not the answer and neither are new foreign contingents. The Iraqi police will be the key to urban security, and making good use of 1,20 Iraqi border police.
6. Intelligence
Technology helps but everything boils down to HUMINT. Have had to reorganize around 3-4 man Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs). These have 1-2 intelligence specialists and translator. Do have a shortage of analysts. Can only field half of the THTs would like.
Do, however, have threat analysis now on every link, and going down to battalion level. Multisource where possible and computerized down to individual. Can call up at battalion level in real time.
A-10 and AC-130 provide imagery and fire powers support. Have two battalions of AH- 64s per brigade. Often pick up air support in real time. Are fighting joint operation, and LIC is scarcely ground only.
Sheer volume of HUMINT is not a problem. Get flood of data from Iraqis. Have also learned to sort out the intertribal efforts to use us to attack others, and similar problems.
Have also learned to keep source through end of raid. Have been attempts to set up for false raids, provocative or ambushes, and holding on to source helps.
Need to remember here that every raid cannot be a winner. Targets move, etc. But if information is correct, coming back pays off or produces leads that help in the future.
Much also is now done at night. Reduces impact on innocent, targets less prepared.
Gradually have developed solid networks of proven informers and ability to use them to get multiple sources. Now really on [proven sources, multiple data, and can judge plausibility much better. Success rate near 80%, although often have to repeat raids until target actually present.
Have set a goal of two hours from information to attack. There or close.
Police HQs very helpful. Do have US intelligence liaison at most.
Also getting far more walk-ins since May: volunteer, seek payment, or want influence.
Believe would go way up if Saddam taken as well as sons.
Must note, however, translators are as important as analysts. Have never had enough high quality US translators and cannot acquire enough vetted locals or use in some roles. Still have only one Category 4 translator per battalion.
Simply cannot handle all material gathering. Tend to be slower in dealing with new or
unproven sources because do not have enough of both translators and linguists to deal
with full flow of information.
Rotation may be a problem but will be overlap, clear records, all computerized. Hope can
avoid short tour and rotation problems of Vietnam.
7. MPs
Have proven invaluable for operations and training Iraqis. Need far more. Key element of asymmetric warfare.
8. Changes in US Tactics:
(See summary in part two)
Keys are more focused raids based on better HUMINT and reaction times and emphasis on local engagement: See 857 such meetings with local officials and dignitaries between September 10 and November 1.
Ramadan did lead to step up in attacks on US during first two days, but then slack off.
One key tactic is educating troops in sensitivity to Ramadan, local customs, altering profile of action to suit local customs and concerns.
9. Aid: Dollars are Bullets
The CERP program is absolutely critical, as is civil military action. Cannot fight in asymmetric wars without aid and money as tools.
Another key is the Effects Coordination Cell. Aid must be targeted to local military and political efforts, given in ways that really help with hearts and minds and influence, and effects must be validated to make sure are lasting and meet local needs.
Seriously doubt, however, can really rebuild country before leave. Dealing with 15-20 years of cannibalization, lack of maintenance, and lack of training. Can make a start but should not assume can fixed a nation. See far too many Iraqis passive or not communicate. Find regional power distribution company not talk to local. Caused serious
power problems while one waited for equipment other already had.
Ultimately up to Iraqis.
Lack of CERP funds is an issue. Local CPA rep good, but in general civilian aid is poorly coordinated with local security needs, lacks analysis of effectiveness.
10. Role of Iraqi Force
Very careful to recruit and use intertribal council as key source. If a local leader vets a volunteer then some chain of history as well as responsibility.
All eight tribes in AOR involved and represented in proportion to size. Serves a number of other purposes and clear understanding that if create a problem, other tribe gets the money and influence. Have found knowledge of tribes and clans to be critical to HUMINT and focus of aid efforts.
- Worked well in Afghanistan and are transferring techniques. Have special forces experts from Afghanistan helping. Using local Sheiks to help guard pipelines.
Hiring their poorer young men gives them influence and helps make support us.
- Tikrit tribal leaders do, however, remain hostile as do young men. No way to convince them and other towns/men that got maximum benefit from Saddam that new regime will ever offer same privileges.
Have found very valuable and that working jointly with US forces in field makes up for lack of formal training time. ICDC, for example, training 10-14 days but then works with US in field before put on own.
Police problem is cultural. Lack of patrols, investigative skills, concern for civil rights.
Shortened training is a problem, but again see working with US counterparts is key. Here really do need more MPs.
New Army will help overtime, and trying to field 27 BNs by September 2004, with first coming on line. On holiday for Ramadan but first unit will start field deployments and working with US units once over. Hope first BN operational on by June 2004.
Do have outreach to former generals and colonels. Try to bring into local government, consult. No old Iraqi Army to use or rebuild but not want to isolate part leaders and have them feel no option but opposition.
11. Outreach Efforts
Major problem but physical radio, TV, and press facilities much better, and beginning to have clear themes, concerted effort to explain aid and plans for new government.
Fyi, important. Please read the whole report.
I'm surprised the author says technology is being stressed as the solution to our problems on the ground. Inside the Pentagon, perhaps ~ not by the DoD ~ to the public. We get far more reports on 'winning hearts and minds' from CPA and CENTCOM.
Also, every Commanding officer on the ground in Iraq says he doesn't need more troops. Gen. Sanchez, supposedly L. Paul Bremer's more capable 'co-worker' ~ has not asked for more troops and says they aren't necessary. The Pres. and the SOD have both repeatedly stated that whatever Gen. Abizaid and Sanchez need ~ they will get.
Unless, of course, the troops are needed but those in positions of authority have decided that it's far more dangerous to re-institute the draft while the enemy has control of the press, Universities and international, heavily funded, anti-American activist groups ~ in which case our troops would be placed in far greater danger, as the homefront would probably erupt in a civil war this time ~ post 911, and the left sowing hate daily. The war in Iraq would end ~ and so would freedom for Iraq, the enemy would win....we ~ America, freedom, civilization, the world ~ would lose, imho.
Still, great report.
Myself, I long ago wished that we had some support system set up to provide the technology by which Iraqi's could quickly establish their own free press, and thus exercise their sovereignty and its place under God (a.k.a. in most parts "under Allah") while also asserting their sovereignty above their Constitution, above their goverment, above their governors, and above their government agents.
So I was glad to see Tony's notes on the need for better and much more sources of news and information.
I think, not just ultimately, but actually right now, the real gains are to be made as small groups of Iraqi's associate for the purpose of ensuring and enduring freedom. Their meetings require protection, and also their thoughts require confirmation, in that, in the free press, they also see where others are with them, and so that foundation for their liberty grows.
Thanks for reading all the stuff.
I'm now having to take a long break from FR and wish you, and all fighters for our liberty, well and a Merry Christmas.
My apologies. I was referring to the most recent comments made by Gen Sanchez (following months of similar comments from made by military leaders). Am unable to find the quote. Will keep searching and link back if I do.
Here's a recent, typical exchange from 'the top':
Rumsfeld: Just so we get a fix on the number of U.S. troops, the number of U.S. troops is a portion of the total troops in the country, the other elements being coalition forces and Iraqis. And the number --
Q: (Off mike.) -- my question --
Rumsfeld: Shh-shh! The total number of troops, security forces in the country, is going up steadily. It has been for four months.
Second, I don't know that there are "many" members of Congress -- I hear a few. There's 535 members of the House and Senate. And I have not seen anything approximating a large number of them doing what you've said they're doing.
Senator McCain is a senior member of the Armed Services Committee and has a distinguished military record. And needless to say, when he makes recommendations, people think about them and consider them and discuss them. We had discussions this morning on that very subject. (Aside.) Just a minute. We talked to General Sanchez, and he and General Abizaid have been meeting with all of the commanders. And I do not -- I have not been told of a single military commander in CENTCOM, in Iraq, who is recommending additional U.S. military forces; not one.
Now if General Sanchez and General Abizaid came to General Myers and said, "We believe we need additional U.S. forces," and General Myers came to me, we would go to the president and we would recommend additional U.S. forces. No one has recommended that. And there are a lot of good reasons why they don't. They believe that it is important to have Iraqis take increasing responsibility. The Iraqis admittedly don't have the training our forces do. They tend not to have the equipment our forces do. They tend not to have the experience our forces do.
On the other hand, they do speak the language, they do live in the neighborhood, they do have situational awareness, which is different from someone who's in from another country. And the progress that's been made with joint patrols has been impressive.
Myers: The only thing I would add is that as you think about the security situation in this very complex environment, that it -- as the secretary said earlier, that numbers do not equate to capabilities.
For instance, the Stryker Brigade that is on its way, as we speak, to Iraq will be a very effective unit because of the way it's structured. It's a very modern structure that the Army has devised for that brigade and the ones that follow it, up to six, I think, eventually, perhaps, if the secretary approves all those. And that's going to help.
And the way we're structuring these forces that are going in is different than the way we structured the forces that are in there now. For instance, we're going to have a lot more infantry. Even though we'll have armored divisions going in, they're not going to go in with all their armor, because that's not what the need is right now. So their capabilities will not equate the capabilities -- in fact, we think they'll be superior. And that's part of the answer.
The other part of the answer is that you just can't carve out the security piece and say more forces are going to help -- in my view, more forces are going to help us with the problem of making progress in Iraq like we want to make. There are several other things that have to come along simultaneously. The governance piece has to come along very well. The economy, the infrastructure and, probably just as importantly, how you communicate where we're headed to the Iraqi people, to the region, to the world -- those are all pieces of it. And so it doesn't come down to -- it's just impossible to boil it down to numbers. ~ http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20031106-secdef0862.html
Thanks for the lessons, First_Salute.
Merry Christmas to you and yours.
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