Neglect Of Disabled Person - Constitutionality The 4th DCA affirmed a defendant's conviction for neglect of a disabled person, rejecting constitutional challenges to the underlying statute.
The defendant's conviction for neglect arose from the death of her mother. On appeal, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of sections 782.07(2) and 825.102(3) on the grounds that the statutes lacked a specific intent requirement, are unconstitutionally vague and violated her mother's right to privacy in refusing medical treatment.
Affirming the defendant's conviction, the DCA found it within the Legislature's power to dispense with the intent element and said the statutes are not vague because the defendant's conduct fell squarely within the conduct proscribed by the statutes. As to the defendant's argument regarding her mother's right to refuse medical treatment, the DCA said "constitutional rights are personal in nature and generally may not be asserted vicariously."
msmagoo: If this woman's claim that she refused medical treatment for her mother under a right to privacy was rejected by the court, why is MS allowed to vicariously assert a privacy right in seeking to cause Terri's death?
[Sieniarecki vs. State, 724 So.2d 626 (4th DCA 1998)]
Section 825.102 defines neglect of an elderly person or disabled adult in a lengthy definition that basically applies a standard of reasonable care to the acts of a caregiver.