Army Chief 'Adamantly Opposes' Added End Strength

The Army chief of staff "adamantly opposes" an end- strength increase to the size of his service.

Gen. Peter Schoomaker told the House Armed Services Committee today that an unfunded end-strength increase "puts readiness at risk, it puts training at risk, it puts modernization at risk, it puts transformation at risk – and that's why I'm resisting it."

Many in Congress believe the Army is stressed with worldwide operations. One proposal calls for adding two more combat divisions. Another calls for a 40,000-man increase in the Army, while other, more general proposals just call for end-strength increases.

Schoomaker agrees the Army is stressed, but believes it is a temporary spike and that any plus-up can be done with current resources. He said transforming the Army will result in manpower savings that can be plowed into the combat force. "What we are doing is to transform the Army simultaneous with meeting the security commitment of the nation," he noted.

He also disagreed that the service is facing a recruiting and retention crisis. He said that in 2003, the Army made all its retention goals except for one: Army Reserve mid-careerist missed by 6 percent. He explained that away by saying stop/loss prevented mid-career NCOs and officers – the primary pool for the Army Reserve – from leaving the service. "Indications this year is that we're on track to make 100 percent of goal across all components," he told the representatives.

But, he said, the Army must make "significant moves" to change the way it does business. He said he has permission from Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld "to grow the Army by 30,000 people." He said this will give the service the personnel needed to handle the stress on-going operations are placing on it.

"We're making very serious moves to modularize the Army, standardize the Army, developing an Army that's more lethal, more agile, more capable of meeting the current and future operating environment task," Schoomaker said.

The general emphasized that this is an evolutionary process. He said a permanent end-strength increase will drive the service back into the late- Vietnam era Army.

"In the early '70s, we had an Army with a lot of people that was hollow," Schoomaker said. "It couldn't train, couldn't move, couldn't fly, couldn't do the kind of things the Army was required to do."

Schoomaker, who came out of retirement to take the chief of staff job, said it costs about $1.2 billion a year for every 10,000 people added to the Army. Congress often gives the military an unfounded order – meaning that the service must take the money from other areas to fund the requirement.

Schoomaker said Army planners believe the service can get 10,000 spaces from military to civilian conversions. He said he believes stabilizing the force – giving soldiers longer tours – will increase retention. And, he said he believes there are significant efficiencies as the service examines the global footprint and restructures overseas overhead and headquarters.

He said if the Army is allowed to pursue the course now charted, the country will get "a better Army more capable of doing what it needs to do, within our current level of resourcing."

Schoomaker detailed some restructuring elements for the representatives. He said there are currently 10 active duty divisions. The service will retain the 10 division headquarters as battle command headquarters but move some enabling resources – such as air defense, signal and intelligence – to the brigade level. The Army would increase the number of brigades under those divisions. "Tentatively we think we can go from three brigades under a division to four," he said. That alone would take the service from 30 brigades under the division structure to 40.

The service has already decided to go forward with five Stryker brigades in the active structure. The service also has two airborne brigades and an armored cavalry regiment. "That moves us from 33 active brigades under 10 division headquarters to a force of 48 active brigades – more lethal, more capable, more agile, more modular – that will allow us to be much more strategically agile than we are today," he said.

The chief also wants to standardize the divisions. "Today we have six heavy divisions in the active force – all of them are different," he said. "Today we have two light divisions in the active force – each different. Then we have the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st and, of course, they are different. This we need to fix."

On the reserve side, the Army has eight division headquarters, which the service plans to retain. "But we want to go from 15 enhanced brigades today to 22," he said. He wants to increase these reserve brigades levels of readiness and equip them with the very best equipment available. This would increase those brigades' capability to become part of a broader rotation base to meet the future strategy, he said.

Overall, there are more than 100,000 structural changes to be made to the Army. "We're going to convert 36 field artillery battalions to 149 MP units, increase the number of transportation units, medical, aviation restructuring," he said. "This is the biggest internal restructuring we've done in 50 years, but it must be done to make us relevant and to allow us to meet the real threat to the United States."

Here is something I pulled off of Yahoo! with the use of "end strength." I know it's more along the line of how to build a watch when you only asked the time.
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End Strength

What is "End Strength"? In simplest terms, it is the total number of Sailors on Active Duty as of the LAST day of the fiscal year (FY). End Strength is a "Statutory" requirement - which means it is directed by public law rather than Navy or DoD policy. It is simply Congress directing all services how many personnel they can have on the active duty payroll.

I am on the deck plates...why is "End Strength" important to me? Virtually every plan or policy in personnel (recruiting, advancements, retention, SRB amounts, High Year Tenure gates and waivers, Fleet Reserve approvals/cancellations, training quotas, etc), all is tied to making "End Strength” in some fashion. The number of Sailors on the deck plates in your ship is there because of an End Strength authorization; the reason your PO1's HYT waiver was not able to be approved was in order to make End Strength on 30 Sept; your being promoted to Master Chief was in keeping with End Strength.

How much "End Strength is allowed? For FY04, Navy is seeking an authorized End Strength number of about 374,000 Sailors (enlisted and officer combined). The actual number will be written into the FY04 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

What are some means of controlling "End Strength"? The most obvious one is recruiting numbers - if it appeared we were going to be over End Strength by 2,000 Sailors, some would say, "just cut recruiting by that many Sailors". But, there are serious implications to under-recruiting that many Sailors in any one year - the worst of which is not having enough Sailors in that particular Length of Service Cell or year group to move through a projected career of 20-30 years. Other ways to control End Strength are to adjust HYT gates, allow early separations, provide Time In Grade waivers for Sailors to retire early, etc. There is no simple answer...personnel planners must continually adjust a variety of throttles, brakes and leers to make it all work.

Are there upper and lower limits to End Strength? The End Strength number, as approved in the NDAA, is the absolute "floor" - you cannot go below whatever that number is. Congress gives the services the ability to go 2% above that number (an additional 7K Sailors or so) with Service Secretary okay. You can go an additional 1% beyond that (for a total of 3% above End Strength) with SECDEF permission.

If we can have up to 3% extra Sailors (10,000 people), wouldn't it be smart to have them around? No. Along with the End Strength number authorized in the NDAA, Congress only provides us sufficient $$$ in the Military Pay-Navy (MPN) account to pay that number of Sailors (374,000 X whatever the dollar factor is = MPN). So, for each Sailor above End Strength, Navy has to take $ out of some other account to pay them, move their dependents, etc. That's why it is important to stay as close as possible to End Strength number, without going below it.

If we are at End Strength, and my request doesn't cross FY's, can I have an HYT waiver to stay on active duty till Sept 30th? As mentioned above, End Strength must be reached by the end of the FY. So it would be easy to assume there is no problem approving short-term HYT waivers that don't cross FY's. That is simply not the case. When you stay beyond where we calculate you as a loss to the Navy, that much extra MPN $$$ must be paid out of the account. A CPO staying an additional 5 months costs the MPN account and the American taxpayer about $22,000 in pay and allowances...money that could be directed toward other purposes (such as compensation to personnel serving on the ground in Iraq). If you multiply that $22,000 by all the number of CPO's retiring, that equates to million of $. Hard as it seems, we in the Community Management business must be frugal stewards of the taxpayers' dollars.

Who tracks End Strength? Within the Enlisted Plans and Policies Branch of the OPNAV Staff. There is a Strength Planning code (N132C), staffed by 4 Officers, 1 MCPO and 1 civilian, whose sole job is to formulate End Strength strategies. They have every form of abacus, Cray supercomputer, quiji board, Magic 8-Ball, and chicken bones known to man, in order to keep track of End Strength numbers.

What can I do to assist the Navy in End Strength issues? First and foremost, understand what End Strength is. Then, spread the word around via POD notes, GMT/PMT, etc. Also (CRITICAL REQUEST COMING UP), have your PSD, CSD, Ship's Office, Personnel Office, or Admin Office, expedite processing of gains and (especially) losses of personnel to the Navy. The more rapidly and accurately we record gain/loss transactions, the more accurate and timely our End Strength number will be. That, in turn, allows us to make critical policy decisions, based on the most accurate of information.

I appreciate you taking the time to read this. I hope it provides information that you can use. I am proud to serve as the Navy's Enlisted Community Manager and welcome your thoughts, comments, recommendations, and e-mails and phone calls. All the best from THE BIG HOUSE....R/CDR Wisniewksi

CDR Matthew Wisniewski
Head Enlisted Community Manager
N132D (703)695-3935 [DSN 225]
"The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil, is for good men to do nothing!"...Edmund Burke

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