Yep. As long as you're within about 24km of your artillery. (30-something with ERFB). Usually, in practical terms, far less... which means you have to bring it with you, or you have to convince your enemy to revert to the operational art of the First World War (see Korea).
This article shows the kind of weak imagination that our branched officers have. The artillery guy quoted thinks the US is in a bad way because other nations have longer range artillery: "they can outrange us." Maybe they can... can they do any good with it? They outranged us badly in Vietnam (The Soviet 130mm gun was the longest-range gun in the world, then). Saddam outranged us enormously in both Gulf Wars, but you can see what good it did him. (Well, it left a lot of unfired 155 HE lying around, with which to make infernal machines). For every allied soldier killed by the Iraqi's cannon fire, dozens (hundreds?) have been killed by the abandoned cannon shells. And Iraqis who stood by their guns in the combat phase were not rewarded for at -- at least not on this side of the Styx.
So this genius quoted in the article gets into an appendage-measuring thing with all the nations rushing to buy bigger guns. Why bother? Increasing the size of guns, you quickly run into diminishing returns... going to the 52 calibre 155 from the 39 buys you what, maybe another 6,000 metres? And you wind up more roadbound, and bridge-restricted, than presently. And if you are within 30 or 40 K of the enemy, you are not only in easy range of his air, you are liable to be suddenly introduced to his armour (in both cases, "if any.")
Artillery will remain necessary where we're looking at large forces along fairly static lines having to defeat massive human wave attacks. We know where that is, and might be. And for that we need to retain artillery -- not out of concern for the two nights a year that even the birds are walking. For counterinsurgency war, it's not helpful until the war has reached Mao's Third Mobile stage (it's easier to explain stuff using Mao's three stages than our doctrinal seven. Mao was a monster, but a clever one). Otherwise even a firebase (a very artful doctrinal innovation from Vietnam) is more of a target and a drain on the counterinsurgents... as is a mobile column of an arty unit, as is the same unit in a garrison type compound.
I'd rather put the research into improving registration and fire control in mortars. If we could somehow apply computers and get the artillerist's art accessible at the section and platoon size patrol level, we might have something revolutionary. Compared to artillery fire direction and control, mortar operations are crude.
d.o.l.
Criminal Number 18F