Was VVAW Involved In Plans To Murder 7 US Senators In 1971? What Did Kerry Know?
"Winter Soldiers"/ "Home To War" | March 11, 2004 | Various
Posted on 03/10/2004 10:29:58 PM EST by Hon
The following is from Gerald Nicosia's book, "Home To War," pp 221-223:
[Scott] Camil proposed VVAW return in force to Washington, D.C., and there apply pressure in every conceivable way to the legislators who were still voting to fund the war. After the assembly of coordinators defeated the plan, he was told it was “a closed issue at this point." Camil replied that such a tactic was "never a closed issue." He then made known an even more radical proposal, which he intended to submit to the coordinators for their approval. If undertaken, he claimed, it would guarantee the end of congressional support for the war. It was this proposal that nearly blew the Kansas City convention wide open, and which branded Camil as both dangerous and crazy for the remainder of his time in the organization.What Camil sketched was so explosive that the coordinators feared lest government agents even hear of it. So they decamped to a church on the outskirts of town with the intention of debating the plan in complete privacy. When they got the church, however, they found that the government was already on to them; their "debugging expert" uncovered microphones hidden all over the place. An instantaneous decision was made to move again - to Common Ground, a Mennonite hall used by homeless vets as a "crash pad," on 77th Terrace. This time a vote was taken to exclude anyone but regional coordinators and members the national office. The rest of the members, even trusted leaders such as Randy Barnes and John Upton (who had earned their credibility in the mud and tears of Dewey Canvon III), were forced to wait outside on the grass, where messengers brought frequent word of what was going on inside. According to Barnes, everybody knew that the discussion in that hall "was grounds for criminal indictment of conspiracy."
Discussion was not exactly the word for it. John Upton recalls it being "a knock-down-drag-out [fight] at times." Randy Barnes remembers "people standing up on the tables yelling and screaming at one another." The proposal that fired so much anger was called the "Phoenix plan," in mockery of the U.S. government's similar program in Vietnam. There was, in fact, good evidence that the United States Studies and Observation Group (SOG) - known to those inside it as the Special Operations Group - had used its own Special Forces, those of South Vietnam, and even South Vietnamese mercenaries to murder various Communist and Communist-sympathizing village chiefs, political leaders, and other influential citizens in South Vietnam. Some say as many as 10,000 were assassinated, in order (theoretically) to rebuild a more democratic infrastructure in the south. Hence the name "Phoenix": a better, stronger Vietnam was supposed to rise from the ashes of the Communist-tainted one. Similarly, Camil now proposed the assassination of the most hard-core conservative members of Congress, as well as any other powerful, intractable opponents of the antiwar movement - the ones who would rather die than see America suffer a military defeat in Vietnam. Fine, let them die, suggested Camil - in fact, help them along in that direction and once they were cleared out of the way, a truly democratic America could arise, one that would choose to be at peace with the rest of the world.
When the Phoenix plan first came before the steering committee meeting, John Upton had been standing almost next to Camil, and he recalls that "at first it was laughed off. Then he [Camil] became really irate, and some other people that were supporting that got really irate, and it got down to a really hard discussion about it. There was a time, I'm not kidding you, I was almost one of them. Especially when we moved over to 77th Terrace, a lot of people were convinced that this was the way to do it. I thought it was a novel idea, but it was not something I would support. I looked on it as doing just what we were fighting against. It was killing people for no [good] reason. I remember saying this, and somebodv stood up and called me a 'moderate'! If I went an inch more crazier than I was, I could have endorsed it one hundred percent. Scott was pissed off just like I was. He was one of those people I really identified with with the anger I saw there. My whole instinct here was, `Let's demonstrate and do these things against the fucking war, to get the word out. Let's talk in high schools. But let's do things legal. Let's get the right permits.' The Phoenix plan was like, that's what needs to be done, but, God, we can't really do that."
The Phoenix plan, like the rest of Camil's proposals, was voted down in Kansas City, but its specter had only begun to haunt the organization; and, ironically enough, among those whose imaginations it enflamed were those very agents who had been charged with finding a way to destroy VVAW.
Nicosia is unlcear as to whether Kerry was still involved with the VVAW at this time. At one point he says that Kerry left the VVAW leadership, after a public showdown with Al Hubbard in July 1971. But then at other times Nicosia seems to suggest that Kerry was not removed from the leadership until after the Kansas City meeting.
Even if Kerry was no longer involved in the VVAW's leadership at the time of this discussion, it still likely that he had heard about this discussion, since it was such a pivotal moment in his group's direction according to Nicosia--or more precisely, the VVAW members he quotes.
So if Kerry heard about this discussion did he report it to the proper authorities at the time? If not, why not?
And when did he know it?!