Ukraine: Presidential Politics and a Crossroads

STRATFOR ^ | November 22, 2004 2358 GMT

[Axion]

Summary

With pro-Moscow candidate Viktor Yanukovich emerging victorious in Ukraine's presidential runoff, and pro-U.S. challenger Viktor Yushchenko launching a popular revolt in response, Ukraine nears an historic crossroads: Stay with Russia or drift to the West. The stakes are high and the country is sharply divided -- a situation that likely will lead to violence in Ukraine's most significant internal conflict since independence.

Analysis

With 99.14 percent of the vote counted in Ukraine's presidential runoff election, the Ukrainian Central Election Commission has declared pro-Moscow candidate Viktor Yanukovich the winner, with 49.42 percent of the vote. His pro-Western contender, Viktor Yushchenko, received 46.69 percent. The results have been certified by election monitors from the Commonwealth of Independent States, a Russian-led organization of former Soviet republics. At the same time, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe -- as well as the United States and NATO -- has deemed the results fraudulent.

Even before the results were published, Yushchenko refused to submit and began calling for mass protests and resistance. So far, everything has gone as Stratfor forecast, even before the first round: Yanukovich will win but Yushchenko will attempt a revolution. If violence breaks out, many mainstream Ukrainians might be scared away from the Yushchenko revolution. However, feeling he is close to winning and emboldened by the West, Yushchenko likely will fight to the end.

Whether the pro-Western revolution succeeds depends upon answers to the following questions: How far will Yushchenko's camp push? Will it resort to violence to overthrow the government? Will the Ukrainian security establishment obey the government in countering opposition protests? Will Ukraine's government elite switch sides and support Yushchenko? Will the Ukrainian public give massive support to a pro-Western revolutionary?

While Yushchenko's first steps will be to try to make the Central Election Commission reverse the runoff results, Ukrainian law provides only for the president to initiate the necessary parliamentary hearings -- something current President Leonid Kuchma, who hand-picked Yanukovich to succeed him, will not do. Knowing this, the Yushchenko camp will send thousands of demonstrators to storm the parliament and other government buildings, betting that government security forces will not dare stop them. Yushchenko is already calling for the "total mobilization" of all the Ukrainian people, a civil disobedience campaign and an indefinite national strike until the government surrenders and agrees to revisit the election results and declare him the new president.

While he has stopped short of calling for an armed rebellion, some of his followers -- radical activists from the youth movement Pora and Western Ukrainian nationalist groups, some of which have militant wings -- do not hide their intention to confront security forces and take power by force if necessary. Some participants in the current rally in Independence Square, Kiev's city center, tell sources they have weapons they will use if called upon to do so. Furthermore, while Yushchenko has not issued a call to arms, his first deputy has. On Nov. 22, Yulia Timoshenko rallied supporters to "storm the presidential administration."

This means that violence is likely in Kiev. However, Yushchenko probably will lose his bet that security forces will allow his supporters to overthrow the government. Sources inside Ukrainian national security and law enforcement establishments say that, so far, there are only a few generals and senior officers willing to switch sides and support Yushchenko, despite his claims to the contrary. The only senior officer to speak out in support of Yushchenko at the Kiev rally has been a one-star admiral.

Ukraine's State Security Service, Interior Ministry and General Procurator's Office have issued a joint statement, warning the opposition that law enforcement and national security agencies are "prepared to quickly and firmly curb lawlessness in case there is a threat emerging to the constitutional order and security of our citizens."

The Ukrainian military and security establishment does not have a tradition of participating in armed uprisings, nor does it seem to have an appetite for it. From conversations with junior officers and enlisted personnel, it does not appear that the rank-and-file will support a pro-U.S. revolution. In addition to traditions of tolerance and loyalty, a significant majority of officers and enlisted personnel in the army and security forces traditionally come from eastern Ukraine, where U.S. opposition is high (it also is the most populous region in the country, as well as Ukraine's industrial heartland). Yushchenko will not be able to count on much support from the military or eastern Ukraine.

Much of the outcome of this conflict will depend on Kuchma. So far, his support of Yanukovich has been somewhat timid as he tries not to lose him as an ally and at the same time not to burn any bridges with Yushchenko and the West.

Putin is engaged in a balancing act between angering U.S. President George W. Bush and losing Ukraine. It is a difficult choice for Putin, who likely will opt to anger Bush, believing the loss of Ukraine would undermine his stature inside Russia and Russia's stature on the world stage. In addition, sources close to the Russian Security Council say the national security establishment, which still has some say in Russian geopolitics, is strongly urging Putin not to abandon Russian allies in Ukraine. Putin already has called Kuchma from Brazil and agreed to meet him in the "very near future."

As for the West, it has a long dossier on Kuchma. If he is left alone, with no support from Putin, the West will use this dossier with full force to bring pressure on Kuchma. In the end, it will be Putin who decides Kuchma's fate and how willing he will be to support Yanukovich. Both Putin and Kuchma will maneuver, trying to arrange a compromise between the two opposing sides, enticing the Yushchenko camp by offering important positions in the government. Kuchma may go so far as to offer to create a national accord government -- with Yanukovich at the head, since he was declared winner of the election.

If the situation turns violent, the most interested players -- Russia, the United States and European Union -- likely will intervene. Russia will support the Ukrainian government as it repulses attacks against government buildings, while the West will criticize the "government crackdown." However, these interventions will be political, not military. A 47-million-strong Ukraine with a large, well-trained army and Russia standing nearby is not something Washington is prepared to attack, at least not any time soon.

Later, if Yanukovich is indeed inaugurated president, economic sanctions by the European Union and United States might be threatened and, possibly, enforced. However, with much-needed energy supplies being transported through Ukraine to Europe, the EU is unlikely to introduce painful sanctions against Ukraine.

The struggle between Yanukovich and Yushchenko is likely to be difficult and violent. This is not to say that Yushchenko has no chance of success. In fact, his chances are rather good, given increasing U.S.-led Western support and the fact that some Ukrainian government officials are switching sides in his favor. In addition to the city councils of L'vov and Ivano-Frankovsk -- which are traditional Yushchenko strongholds in western Ukraine -- the Kiev city council also refuses to recognize the runoff results. Furthermore, 75 percent of all Kiev voters in the election were pro-Yushchenko, which should enable him to sustain his "chestnut" revolution, at least in the capital.

While Yushchenko might get close to victory, however, he is unlikely to achieve it without a fundamental change in circumstances.

[pierrem15]

The alternative is that the Ukraine is re-partitioned along its pre-Kruschev borders with the eastern Ukraine re-incorporated into Russia and the Western Ukraine remaining an independent Ukraine.

[Leo Carpathian]

The alternative is that the Ukraine is re-partitioned along its pre-Kruschev borders with the eastern Ukraine re-incorporated into Russia and the Western Ukraine remaining an independent Ukraine.

Yea, right. Just like US was partitioned along red - blue states after last election. Elections in Ukraine were heavily fudged by pro russian "forces". Georgian style of uprising is not out of the question.

[pierrem15]

I am not contesting that the elections were fudged. I just doubt that Yushchenko will be able to do much, and that rather than trying to keep two halves of the country together when they are diametrically opposed on political, ethnic, and religious lines, it might be better to partition.

[dr_who_2]

Sounds like Bush and Condi need to step in.