True Conservatism, False Conservatism

There are few things more unstable than political labels. Policies which in one decade are called "liberal" may find themselves called "conservative" in another, and men who in one age thought of themselves as "liberals" are in another age regarded as intransigent "conservatives." Yet for all the migratory propensities of labels, there is nonetheless at the bottom of labels a certain consistency or core meaning which transcends the semantic fluctuations of the moment. That men like Edmund Burke, David Hume, Alexander Hamilton, Alexis de Tocqueville, George Santayana, Joseph Schumpeter, Michael Oakeshott and James Burnham are all conservatives hardly anyone would doubt. Nor would very many more doubt the conservative credentials of Rush Limbaugh, Newt Gingrich, Milton Friedman, and Jack Kemp. Nonetheless, it should be clear to anyone who delves beneath the mere surface of things that the men in the former list are conservative in an appreciably different way than the men in the latter list. This is not to say that one group is better or worse than another, but simply to point out that there are differences that deserve to be noticed and appreciated. And what, may we ask, are these differences? To put it briefly, we could put it this way: the men in the former list, the Burkes, the Hamiltons, the Santayanas, are non-ideological conservatives. Their conservatism is not a precise creed; it is a method of interpreting experience. The other conservatives, the Limbaughs, the Gingriches, and the Kemps are ideologues. They believe in a precise creed which transcends experience. They are dogmatic and full of political zeal.

It is probably unfair to single out particular "conservatives" and accuse them of being ideologues, since it really is a matter of degrees, not of kind. There is a trace of non-ideological conservatism in nearly all conservative ideologues. The reason for this is that conservatism, traditionally, is not an ideological political movement. Conservatism is not, as Albert Jay Nock once put it, "a body of opinion" or "a set platform or creed." It is, rather, "a purely ad hoc affair; its findings vary with conditions, and are good for this day and train only." Conservatism "does not generalize beyond the facts of the case in point. It considers those facts carefully, makes sure that as far as possible it has them all in hand, and the course of action which the balance of fact in that case indicates as necessary will be the one it follows; and the course indicated as unnecessary it not only will not follow, but will oppose without compromise or concession."

Edmund Burke made much the same point when he wrote: "I cannot stand forward and give praise or blame to anything which relates to human actions, and human concerns, on a simple view of the object, as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction. Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing color and discriminating effect. The circumstances are what render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind."

Non-ideological conservatism, then, seeks a more complete view of political reality-one which captures all the nuances and subtleties of each particular situation. It is for this reason that conservatives in the Burkean tradition mistrust abstract political systems and "metaphysical" principles founded on "reason." Political reality, Burke would say, is far to complex to be summed up in a handful of bromides thought up by some pretentious academic or philosopher. "The science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori," Burke gravely warned his readers in his Reflections on the Revolution in France. "Nor is it a short experience that can instruct us in that practical science, because the real effects of moral causes are not always immediate; but that which in the first instance is prejudicial may be excellent in its remoter operation, and its excellence may arise even from the ill effects it produces in the beginning. The reverse also happens: and very plausible schemes, with very pleasing commencements, have often shameful and lamentable conclusions. In states there are often some obscure and almost latent causes, things which appear at first view of little moment, on which a very great part of its prosperity or adversity may most essentially depend. The science of government being therefore so practical in itself and intended for such practical purposes-a matter which requires experience, and even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be-it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again without having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes."

This, in a nutshell, is what non-ideological conservatism is all about. Particularly important is Burke's assertion that "the science of government" requires "even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be." Here we have the conservative defense of tradition. Tradition, for the conservative, is not good in itself. No, for the conservative, only the good is good in itself. The reason why conservatives favor tradition is because they see tradition as a sort of accumulation of many lives of wisdom. Tradition is something "confirmed by the solid test of long experience." Or, as the historians Will and Ariel Durant put it: "No one man, however brilliant or well-informed, can come in one lifetime to such fullness of understanding as to safely judge and dismiss the customs or institutions of his society, for these are the wisdom of generations after centuries of experiment in the laboratory of history."

Of course, this does not mean that all traditional customs and institutions are good. The conservative is well aware that some customs and institutions are bad, either because they were always bad or they became bad over time. All that the conservative insists is that you have to have very good reasons before you decide to abolish or reform a custom or institution. You cannot get rid of a custom or institution merely because there are some inconveniences associated with it or it is short of perfect. Human instititutions, by the very fact that they are human, must always be imperfect. If their imperfections are severe, they can be reformed. But we should never abolish something merely because it doesn't conform to our "reason."

From this, it can be gathered that nonideological conservatism is intransigently anti-rationalistic. Knowledge, for the conservative, is based, not on words or ideas, but on practical experience. It contains a large intuitive component which defies precise articulation. The conservative believes that concepts and ideas never completely agree with the reality they represent. Articulate knowledge is symbolic, and as such, is flawed and inadequate. Reason is therefore regarded as limited. As Hume put it, reason "sees a full light, which illuminates certain places; but that light borders upon the most profound darkness. And between these reason is so dazzled and confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assurance concerning any one object." Thus speaks the non-ideological conservative. What about the conservative who is not non-ideological? How does the one species of conservatism differ from the other? To answer this question, we must needs examine this conceptual contrivance called ideology. What, precisely, is an ideology? James Burnham defined ideology as "a more or less systematic and self-contained set of ideas supposedly dealing with the nature of reality (usually social reality), or some segment of reality, and of man's relation (attitude, conduct) toward it; and calling for a commitment independent of specific experience or events." When Burnham describes ideology as a "self-contained set of ideas," what he is driving at is the dogmatic nature of the ideological creed. Ideologues are immune to experience. No fact or event will ever convince them that their ideology is bogus or flawed.

Since ideologues will never admit that they are wrong, it is easy to devise a test to determine whether a given set of beliefs is ideological. All one has to do is ask the suspected ideologue if there is any conceivable evidence that might prove him wrong. If he says "No, nothing can refute my beliefs" (or the equivalent thereof), then he is an ideologue. Ideologies, because they cannot be tested by experience, are irrefutable. The ideologue believes this is a good thing, that irrefutability is equivalent to certainty and truth. But here he is mistaken. An ideology is not irrefutable because it is true; it is irrefutable because it is not testable.

From this, it can be gathered that a conservative ideology is merely a form of conservative belief that has been dogmatized and transformed into a rigid set of principles. The ideological conservative follows the letter of conservatism but ignores its spirit. In his hands, conservatism becomes, not a method of grasping the complexity of social reality, but a dogma used to simplify reality to the point of serious distortion. In any conflict between the facts and his conservative dogmas, the ideological dogmatist always sides with his dogmas. Under this view, principles become more real than facts, ideas more real than experiential observations. In philosophy, this "damn the facts" attitude is called "idealism." The philosophical idealist holds that reality is primarily mental, that it is made up, not of matter and forces and facts, but of images, feelings, ideas, and propositions. To adopt this view obviously suggests that our conception of things must take precedence over the things themselves.

Idealism usually (though not always) goes hand in hand with rationalism. The rationalist seeks to discover matters of fact through logical reasoning, as if the nature of the world were to be found through mere speculation, rather than through observation, study, and respect for the wisdom inherent in tradition and accustomed usage. Rationalism, like idealism, is a species of conceit or egotism. The rationalist regards the conclusions of his mind as having more cognitive value than all the traditional notions and values which arise spontaneously from the accumulated experience of society. He places his own private judgment above that of experienced statesmen, eminent scholars, and the great men of history, saying, in effect, that he is smarter than everyone else and that, by thinking alone, he can reach valid conclusions about subjects which he knows little, if anything, about.

Coupled with this arrogance one often finds intellectual laziness. The rationalist simply does not want to put in the hard work it takes to gain understanding of any complex social problem. He would prefer to reach his conclusions by playing verbal games with words. Instead of humbly going out into the real world and developing the intellectual skills necessary to undertake research into social phenomena, he prefers to sit in his room and read newspapers and concoct opinions on the basis of vague generalizations found in editorials and books of political propaganda. But nothing of any worth can be discovered in this way.

But the very fact that rationalism can never understand the complexity of social reality makes it eminently suitable for the purposes of ideology. Since the ideologue is more concerned with dogma than with fact, he will find rationalism a most useful tool for defending his beliefs. Rationalism and rationalization are not merely similar etymologically, they represent more or less the same thing in reality. The rationalist is nearly always a rationalizer; and the rationalizer is always a rationalist. Ideology, then, leads to (or at least entails) idealism and rationalism. This is true even when the ideologue officially adheres to an anti-idealist or anti-rationalist philosophy. Since ideology, by its very nature, gives ideas the priority to reality and reason the priority to experience, the ideologue cannot avoid idealism and rationalism in the practice of supporting his beliefs.

Now since conservatism has always given facts precedence over ideas and experience precedence over rational thought, it would seem that conservatism would also have to oppose ideology. And so it is: conservatism, by its very nature, is anti-ideological. The conservative wants to see social reality as it really is, not as he might wish it is. Conservatism always strives towards realism. That is why the conservative vision of social reality tends to be, as Thomas Sowell has pointed out, essentially tragic. Reality is not a playpen for our wishes. If you want to understand the way things really are, you have to be prepared to accept many things that go against the grain of human desire. Unpleasant things exist in reality, and conservatism accepts this fact bravely, without resorting to cowardly evasion or rationalistic make-believe.

Reality is also immensely complicated. It is entirely out of scale with the human mind and can only be represented symbolically, in terms of metaphors, myths, and vague ideas. No rationalist conception of reality can ever be fully adequate. This is why humility in knowledge is required by the sincere truth-seeker. And it is also why conservatives oppose rationalism in all its forms. Reason, by itself, can never grasp the complexities of life. It will almost always distort and misinterpret them. A rationalist view of society must inevitably be a subversive view. Anything in society that the rationalist is unable to understand he seeks to overthrow. All uncritically accepted traditions, such as those found in religion or traditional morality or chilvaric sentiments, the rationalist mercilessly attacks, arguing that, since they are irrational, they need to be replaced by constructs devised by "reason." Never mind whether society requires these non-rational supports in order to cohere and survive. The rationalist would rather see all of society implode into a universal chaos than flourish on the basis of traditions he regards as "irrational."

Keeping all this mind, it should be clear that the very notion of an ideological conservative is virtually a contradiction in terms, and that to the extent that a conservative is ideological, to that precise extent is he not a conservative (or at least not a true conservative). He is merely a spouter of conservative slogans. This false, ideological brand of conservatism is prominent among two camps within the broad "conservative" movement: first, among the so-called "economic" conservatives and, second, among right-wing conspiracy theorists. Both of these groups tend to be very dogmatic in their thinking. They are ideologues who make their principles their gods.

Being ideologues, they are prone to those two fatal diseases of ideology: idealism and rationalism. For those who do not regard this as a serious matter, perhaps an empirical illustration will persuade them to reconsider their position.

Although Ayn Rand was unceremoniously booted out of the conservative movement by Whitaker Chambers nearly 45 years ago, she has nevertheless exercised a profound influence on "economic" conservatism. Even more to the point, this influence has always been purely ideological. Rand, despite all the noise she made about being an uncompromising realist who accepted facts as they are, was, if the truth be told, an ideologue of the purest variety, immovable in her dogmatism and fiercely rationalistic. Rand's "Objectivist" vision of the ideal society represents a kind of reductio ad absurdum of secular economic conservatism. Here, in the words of Rand scholar Chris Sciabarra, is a description of Rand's ideal social order: "In an Objectivist society, the socialization process would aid, rather than hinder, the development of maturity, rationality, and self-responsibility. Parents and teachers would treat children with respect, encouraging them to think, rather than to evade. They would not deliver moral ultimatums or religious injunctions, but present the child with reasons and explanations within the context of his knowledge, for every rule....People would not act on the basis of an uncritical acceptance of traditions and/or of tacit rules of behavior. They would understand the nature of their actions and the implications of their beliefs.Accepting their own uniqueness and potential, such people would have a benevolent attitude toward one another. Human communications, sexual relations, spiritual commitments, and material exchanges would not be masked by strategic lying and deceit, but by mutual trust and respect."

Here we find about as pure an example of social rationalism as we are likely ever to find. Everything in society would be placed under the dominion of "reason." All uncritically accepted traditions, including "moral ultimatums" and "religious injunctions" would be unceremoniously thrown in the trash. Everyone would be expected to "understand the nature of their actions and the implications of their beliefs" so that they would never act on the basis of "tacit rules of behavior."

This is a view of society that only an intractable ideologue could hold. It not only oversteps important social realities-it mangles and crushes them beyond recognition. If it were even possible to attempt to regulate the social order with such principles, the consequences would be disastrous. If you took away all uncritically accepted traditions and subverted through rationalist criticism all tacit rules of behavior you would create a positively inhuman society. For it is precisely these uncritically accepted traditions and tacit rules of behavior that provide the moral glue responsible for holding society together and rendering social relations civilized and humane.

We see this all too clearly in the social behavior of Rand's most scrupulous followers. Those who are familiar with Rand's own life will immediately understand what I am talking about. But it goes well beyond the dysfunctional relations that existed between Rand and her most immediate disciples. Within the broad movement itself one finds a high degree of social displacement, alienation, and anomie. As is well known, Rand preached one of the most extreme forms of individualism ever inflicted upon the human race. Randian individualism is revolutionary and subversive in scope. It is incompatible with the sort of "social bond individualism" favored by conservative thinkers like Richard Weaver. Anarchic (i.e., Randian) individualism, as Weaver wisely notes, "is charged with a lofty disdain for the human condition....It is not Christian to accept such a view; or, if that is too narrow, it is just not possible. Such a view ends in the extremism of nihilism."

A good example of this nihilism is seen in Ellen Plasil's account of her experiences within the Objectivist. Plasil, on the recommendation of one of Rand's closest disciples, Dr. Allan Blumenthal, began therapy with Dr. Lonnie Leonard, a leading "Objectivist" therapist. Leonard, however, had his own agenda that went well beyond Rand's philosophy. By taking advantage of the psychological vulnerabilities of his female patients, he sought to manipulate them into giving him sexual favors. He exploited Plasil for nearly five years before she realized the harm it was causing her. When she learned that Leonard had also sexually exploited other female patients besides herself, she terminated her therapy. This move set off a storm of controversy within the Objectivist community.

Since her teens, all of Plasil's friends and acquaintances had been Objectivists-that is, diehard followers of the Randian ideology. These were the people that Plasil would turn to in times of need. They constituted, as Plasil herself put it, her "entire support system." If they abandoned her, she would have nobody. So what happened? In keeping with the heartless rationalism which is at the center of Rand's ideological philosophy, Plasil's Objectivist friends betrayed her. They all sided with Dr. Leonard. "I received innumerable phone calls, from men and women alike," she later recalled, "who condemned me for terminating my own therapy and for the reason they had learned was behind my doing so. In one call, I was accused of 'destroying the closest thing Man has ever had to a god.' In another, I was threatened with retaliation for causing the closing of Dr. Leonard's practice."

Here we have an eloquent example of the subversive effects of rationalist ideology. Rand's morality of "enlightened selfishness" and excessive individualism had, like a corrosive acid, eaten away the tradition-based social bonds that are suppose to hold a community of friends and acquaintances together. In the absence of these social bonds, the individual must rely entirely on his own private judgment in dealing with the immense complexities of social reality. Because this is not in fact possible, what happens instead is that the individual attaches himself to any charismatic figure who is willing to fill the void left by the absence of all those uncritically accepted traditions that give people the sense of community they need.

Once this is understood, we can begin to understand why all of Plasil's Objectivist friends abandoned her and sided with Dr. Leonard. They sided with Dr. Leonard because he gave them the emotional support they desperately needed and could not get in any other way. Bereft of any sort of religious or communitarian support system, they had no choice but to become abject followers of a common charlatan and sexual malefactor. This is always what happens when some ideologue or philosopher attempts to replace the common sense morality of traditional ethics with a "rational" morality of intellectualist speculation or "reason." Instead of liberty and independence, we find blind loyalty to some sort of self-appointed messiah.

Ideology, if carried out consistently, leads to social or political totalitarianism. That is why even ideologies which, like Rand's Objectivist philosophy, advocate liberty and independent thinking must lead, if they lead to anything at all, to a loss of personal autonomy and a degradation of liberty. Most human beings cannot tolerate living without some sort of community-based support system. If that support system is subverted through rationalist criticism or an excessive reliance on personal judgment, the individual will turn to some cult or to the state for support. The end result will either be the flourishing of cults or government interventionism on a massive and intrusive scale.

Now while it is true that the Randian ideology is so extreme that even ideological conservatives cannot accept it in toto, this does not mean that her influence on the right can be regarded as of minor importance. Even those only slightly influenced by an ideology as potent and as intensely rationalistic as Rand's are going to be influenced for the worse. Most of the so-called "secular" or "economic" conservatives influenced by Rand are deeply enmeshed within the mire of ideology. Too many of them, under the influence of Rand and other "laissez-faire" ideologies, are guilty of placing too much emphasis on the market and the laws of supply and demand. But merely because the market leads to an efficient allocation of goods and services doesn't mean it can be made into the leading principle of society. The truth of this was recognized by Wilhelm Roepke, the important German economist. "Society as a whole cannot be ruled by the laws of supply and demand," Roepke warned, "and the state is more than a sort of business company, as has been the conviction of the best conservative opinion since the time of Burke. Individuals who compete on the on the market and there pursue their own advantage stand all the more in need of the social and moral bonds of community, without which competition degenerates most grievously. As we have said before, the market economy is not everything. It must find its place in a higher order of things which is not ruled by supply and demand, free prices, and competition. It must be firmly contained within an all-embracing order of society in which the imperfections and harshness of economic freedom are corrected by law and in which man is not denied conditions of life appropriate to his nature. Man can wholly fulfill his nature only by freely becoming part of a community and having a sense of solidarity with it. Otherwise he leads a miserable existence and he knows it."

It would appear from all that has been advanced here that anyone sympathetic with the broad tenets of conservatism really ought to take a close look at what he really believes and make certain that he isn't slipping here or there into ideological thinking; because to the extent that he does so, he is betraying the better part of his conservative sentiments. An ideological conservatism must always be, to the extent that is ideological, a false conservatism. The rationalism and dogmatism implicit in most ideologies are contrary to conservatism's essentially anti-rationalist and practical point of view. Those who want to mature and deepen in their conservatism need to oppose ideology in all its manifestations, even in its putatively "conservative" ones.

Suggested Reading: Branden, Barbara, The Passion of Ayn Rand. Branden, Nathaniel, Judgment Day: My Years with Ayn Rand. Burke, Edmund, Reflections on the French Revolution. Burnham, James, The Suicide of the West: An Essay on the Meaning and Destiny of Liberalism. Burnham, James, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom. Hayek, Friedrich, The Constitution of Liberty. Hume, David, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Mosca, Gaetano, The Ruling Class Nock, Albert J, The State of the Union: Essays in Social Criticism Oakeshott, Michael, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays. Plasil, Ellen, Therapist: The Shocking Autobiography of a Woman Sexually Exploited by her Therapist. Popper, Karl, The Open Society and its Enemies. Roepke, Wilhelm, A Humane Society: The Social Framework of the Free Market Roepke, Wilhelm, The Moral Foundations of Civil Society Roepke, Wilhelm, The Social Crisis of Our Time Santayana, George, Scepticism and Animal Faith. Santayana, George, Dominations and Powers: Reflections on Liberty, Society, and Government. Sciabarra, Chris, Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical. Sowell, Thomas, The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulations as a Basis for Social Policy. Weaver, Richard, The Southern Essays of Richard M. Weaver. Weaver, Richard, Ideas Have Consequences

I think most people are pretty simple, and like me, a little lazy. We all share something in common, even with liberals, such as most of us enjoy a good joke. Personally, I think that is why there isn't many people posting about this article....because the majority didn't have the time to devote to reading the entire thing. Plus I think most people have their own opinion on whether they are an a true conservative or a false one. I think that is why you see a lot of posts on humorous threads. Everyone enjoys a laugh.

Why is there no justice for the 58,000 + names on the Viet Nam Wall?

Why is there no justice for to the millions,
who served with honor in Viet Nam?

When will the Right Wing Main Stream Media demand
that Hanoi Kerry apologize to the names on the Wall
And to Viet Nam Vets who served with honor?
Why are we still "war criminals" and Hanoi Kerry is a "hero"?
When will the GOP controlled Senate set the record straight?

US GOP controlled Senate

AND

Main Stream Right Wing Media

Hang your heads in shame!

When you wake up in the morning,
and look in the mirror,
before you go to the US Senate,
or to the TV or Radio studios,
know that you did nothing to remove this traitor.

Well REAL Americans know what you did NOT do!

U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or elector of President and Vice President,
or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States,
or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress,
or as an officer of the United States,
or as a member of any state legislature,
or as an executive or judicial officer of any state,
to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same,
or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.
But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Good read.

However, I find the author's description of an Ideologue much more applicable to the current mindset of the Democratic Party than anything near Rush Limbaugh, et al. The Liberal attitude is the very embodiment of strident, inflexible dogmatism. Just try to rationally discuss the Bush administration's war policy with the average anti-war protester, and it will become clear.

I think the author would like modern conservatives to be unthinking, immovable blocks of rationalist dogma, but it just ain't so.

Good article. In the 1950s or 1960s conservatives needed more ideological rigor. A widespread attitude in those days was to go along with the prevailing liberalism of the day, and the National Review conservatives were right in pointing out more of the dangers and fallacies of liberal assumptions than the Eisenhower or Rockefeller Republicans of that day did. But now we have a far more ideological politics, and it's wise to step back every now and then from the fray and examine the slogans and prepackaged ideologies of the day in a more dispassionate and disinterested light.

Forty years ago people were more willing to accept a consensus handed down from political, media, and intellectual leaders, and needed to question it more, to ask whether our goals were the right ones and our means appropriate to achieve them. Today, what's handed down to us already quite partisan and polarized, so if we want to think independently and deeply, we have to call intellectual party lines into question.

Where I might take issue is on just whether "ideological" is quite the right word in every case. Some people are passionately ideological today, but on the whole the political scene is less dominated by ideologies and political religions than it once was. Truly deep gulfs like those between fascism and democracy or communism and liberalism aren't a factor on the political scene now. It maybe that in some of the cases where he uses the word "ideological" one might better use "partisan," or "factional," or "polarized," or "tribalist, or "militant." A lot of the venom in our political life has to do with overcoming the old passionate conflicts between socialism and capitalism but retaining the polarizing rhetoric that developed in previous decades. So we bring to ordinary partisan conflicts the passions of cold war.

The struggle between the West and militant Islamicism may be the exception. In this we see a return to Cold War attitudes: a militant position with respect to foreign affairs and a liberal-conservative consensus on things like budget deficits. Convinced that what really matters is the big ideological conflict with the foreign foe, the adminstration is less concerned with spending and the size of government, but this agreement doesn't affect the strong political passions and dissention expressed in the media and on the Internet.

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