THE DEBATE OVER CHINA'S AIRCRAFT CARRIER PROGRAM

Elsewhere, Ian Storey and I have both argued that the PLA's aircraft carrier program is shelved but not canceled altogether. [1] Profound political and military factors are at work to delay construction, but the idea of China possessing carriers is not dead. In other words, the debate is continuing both within PLA leadership and among interested members of the public. That the aircraft carrier serves as an unfulfilled national ambition still inspires both the PLA and the population. However, Chinese pragmatism propels the Beijing government to concentrate on expedient security considerations, not by vane displays of power.

The carrier debate in China is deeply rooted in a larger debate among Chinese strategists: what weapon is best suited for the IT (information technology) age? This is related to the debate over what type of warfare the PLA could be involved in during the IT age. The dominant view of PLA commanders is that the first Gulf War of 1991 was America's last war of the industrial age aimed at destroying the enemy's military machine. Warfare in the IT age, however, is most likely to be in the form of non-engagement. Information warfare (IW) capabilities will be more crucial than conventional firepower. Paralyzing the enemy's capability through information systems leads to its rapid collapse. Aircraft carriers as a good platform for delivering fire power and anchoring IW measures are important but not indispensable over time. Hence, other more cost effective IW anchorages will emerge.

In 2002 the PLA put forward a new national defense strategy focusing on the IT transformation of the Chinese military. A major component of the strategy is the so-called generation leap (from the industrial age to the IT age). To PLA strategists, the characterization of force modernization in the industrial age is mechanization (platform-centric), while in the IT age, it is informatization defined in terms of systems integration (network centric). Apparently aircraft carriers are considered to belong to the former. Although warfare is conducted between platforms, aircraft carriers being the best of them, victory is decided by the IT systems. Under the guidance of this new strategy, the priority of weapons Research and Development has been set on enhancing the IT transformation of the PLA, with the network-centric capabilities attracting increased funding. Costly carriers do not enjoy significant leadership attention.

In 1999 the PLA top command issued an order to accelerate preparations for war following the events of the Chinese embassy bombing and Lee Teng-hui's move for Taiwan's independence (his two-state-thesis). IW dominated action in the Taiwan Strait with U.S. involvement has been identified as the inevitable scenario the PLA must confront. [2] This has three negative impacts on the Navy's carrier project. First, if the U.S. is seen as the potential object of engagement, no Chinese carrier could survive the first few days of war. Second, if the PLA's future war is to take place in the Strait, it will most likely be through actions of non-engagement in the form of counter-force through IT or missile warfare. After all, a Taiwan war is a war of politics, not one of invasion. The aim is to cripple Taiwan's key defense assets rather than to kill large numbers of Taiwanese soldiers and civilians. Within a geographic range of two hundred miles, the use of the aircraft carrier is in question. Third, as the focal point of China's security has shifted to the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea is no longer an area of major concern for the navy. The aircraft carrier won its day of attention exactly due to the Spratly focus in the late 1980s. The strategic urgency for it has since greatly diminished.

Although the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has a long-term blue war ambition, its current posture is basically defensive. Apart from the Taiwan scenario, which is offensively oriented, the naval missions in the near term can be described as achieving sea control and sea denial effect. Sea control refers to effective defense of China's three offshore narrows: the Bohai Sea Strait, the Taiwan Strait, and the Qiongzhou Strait. Of these, the Bohai is the top priority, as it protects Beijing. The Taiwan Strait is also vital, because it allows the PLAN access to the western Pacific. Sea control capability is crucial for deterring Taidu, or Taiwanese independence. It also leads to defensive campaigns against invading fleets in waters adjacent to major coastal cities, such as Shanghai (in the case of U.S. involvement).

Sea denial means maritime defense in depth, a strategy resembling Japan's 1,000 nautical miles (nm) ocean security guidance. This defense perimeter is just outside the strategic Bohai channel and the Taiwan Strait, and is extended towards the first island chain in the west Pacific, about 200 to 250 nm from home. The denial takes the form of disrupting the enemy's sea lines of communication (SLOCs), or at protecting China's key traffic lines. It constitutes the outer shield of maritime defense for the PLAN, in addition to the first layer of coastal line defense needed for sea control. Sea denial is designed to break any blockade against China within the first island-chain in the next decade or so. [3] It is important to note that in the PLA war plan, sea control or denial is to be achieved not across a large horizontal geographic area but in a few vertically distributed lanes. It need not be comprehensive but is based on partial superiority of a limited time vis-à-vis the opponent. Obviously the aircraft carrier could not be of significant practical value to these combat models for the Chinese navy.

Last but not least, there are technological and budgetary constraints, and the idea that the aircraft carrier is at odds with China's current foreign policy priority. First, the carrier as a long range power project weapon could provide an excuse for global alarmist voices against China's peaceful rise. Worse still, it may serve as proof for the U.S. to regard Beijing as a strategic competitor. In fact, the best state of Sino-American relations is conditioned upon China not challenging U.S. global leadership, stated many times by China's new leaders. Overtly rigorous military reach-out may be interpreted otherwise. Secondly, Chinese aircraft carriers would cause concern in East Asia, especially among the Spratly claimants. This could be counter-productive to Beijing's concentration on the Taiwan situation, as it needs strong regional support to deter Taipei's move towards de jure independence.

Against all odds mentioned above, the feelings for aircraft carriers are still strong among Chinese sailors and ordinary citizens who long to see carriers of their own. Even the leadership has not scrapped the project altogether. Only has the reality of the changed times been temporarily accepted. The reason being, aircraft carriers possess many fighting capabilities that remain attractive to the Navy. The PLA will not stay within the first island chain forever. Control of air is now the precondition for sea control and denial. A carrier can be a great platform from which to mount IT warfare measures, too. Very importantly, research on aircraft carriers can be useful in studying the weaknesses of carriers, useful for dealing with carrier battle groups. This practical consideration has been behind the continued research effort.

In addition to these factors, reality does change over time: the Taiwan situation can be eased and Sino-US relations can be stabilized. The relevance of aircraft carrier capability to PLA modernization has not disappeared completely. Beijing may focus its attention on the South China Sea dispute again, and use a different method to come to a solution in the future. Aircraft carriers are perceived as potent symbols of national power around the world, and China is no different. It could make its peaceful rise more powerful. Therefore, the Chinese leaders may change their minds on carriers in the future.

Dr. You Ji is Senior Lecturer in Politics & International Relations at the University of New South Wales.

Notes: 1. "China's Aircraft Carrier Ambition: Seeking Truth from Rumors", Naval War College Review, Vol. 41, no. 4, Fall, 2004. 2. Yang Jinshan, Zhao Jinsong and Zhu Liang, "Lianhe zhanyi zhai weilai zhanzhengzhong de biaoxian xintai" (The form of joint campaigns in the future warfare), The Journal of PLA National Defence University, No. 1, 2004, p. 31 3. Li Jie and Liu Weixing, "Lun daoyu suolian de zhanlie diwei jiqi yingxiang" (The strategic status of the island chains and their impact), Journal of the PLA National Defence University, no. 12, 2000.

An article about Gwadar,the joint Sino-Pakistani port near Pakistan's frontier with Iran-

GWADAR: CHINA'S NAVAL OUTPOST ON THE INDIAN OCEAN

By Tarique Niazi

Four months after the U.S. ordered its troops into Afghanistan to remove the Taliban regime, China and Pakistan joined hands to break ground in building a Deep Sea Port on the Arabian Sea. The project was sited in an obscure fishing village of Gwadar in Pakistan's western province of Baluchistan, bordering Afghanistan to the northwest and Iran to the southwest. Gwadar is nautically bounded by the Persian Gulf in the west and the Gulf of Oman in the southwest.

Although the Gwadar Port project has been under study since May 2001, the U.S. entrée into Kabul provided an added impetus for its speedy execution. Having set up its bases in Central, South, and West Asian countries, the U.S. virtually brought its military forces at the doorstep of China. Beijing was already wary of the strong U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, which supplies 60% of its energy needs. It was now alarmed to see the U.S. extend its reach into Asian nations that ring western China. Having no blue water navy to speak of, China feels defenseless in the Persian Gulf against any hostile action to choke off its energy supplies. This vulnerability set Beijing scrambling for alternative safe supply routes for its energy shipments. The planned Gwadar Deep Sea Port was one such alternative for which China had flown its Vice Premier, Wu Bangguo, to Gwadar to lay its foundation on March 22, 2002.

Pakistan was interested in the project to seek strategic depth further to the southwest from its major naval base in Karachi that has long been vulnerable to the dominant Indian Navy. In the past, it endured prolonged economic and naval blockades imposed by the Indian Navy. To diversify the site of its naval and commercial assets, Pakistan has already built a naval base at Ormara, the Jinnah Naval Base, which has been in operation since June 2000. It can berth about a dozen ships, submarines and similar harbor craft. The Gwadar port project, however, is billed to crown the Pakistan Navy into a force that can rival regional navies. The government of Pakistan has designated the port area as a "sensitive defense zone." Once completed, the Gwadar port will rank among the world's largest deep-sea ports.

The convergence of Sino-Pakistani strategic interests has put the port project onto a fast track to its early completion. In three years since its inauguration, the first phase of the project is already complete with three functioning berths. The Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao will be on hand to mark the completion of this phase in March this year. Although the total cost of the project is estimated at $1.16 billion USD, China pitched in $198 million and Pakistan $50 million to finance the first phase. China also has invested another $200 million into building a coastal highway that will connect the Gwadar port with Karachi. The second phase, which will cost $526 million, will feature the construction of 9 more berths and terminals and will also be financed by China. To connect western China with Central Asia by land routes, Pakistan is working on building road links to Afghanistan from its border town of Chaman in Baluchistan to Qandahar in Afghanistan. In the northwest, it is building similar road links between Torkham in Pakhtunkhaw (officially known as the Northwest Frontier Province) and Jalalabad in Afghanistan. Eventually, the Gwadar port will be accessible for Chinese imports and exports through overland links that will stretch to and from Karakoram Highway in Pakistan's Northern Areas that border China's Muslim-majority Autonomous Region of Xinjiang. In addition, the port will be complemented with a modern air defense unit, a garrison, and a first-rate international airport capable of handling airbus service.

Pakistan already gives China most favored nation (MFN) status and is now establishing a bilateral Free Trade Area (FTA), which will bring tariffs between the two countries to zero. Over the past two years, the trade volume between the two countries has jumped to $2.5 billion a year, accounting for 20% of China's total trade with South Asia. Informal trade, a euphemism for smuggling, however, is several times the formal trade. The proposed FTA is an implicit acceptance of the unstoppable "informal" trade as a "formal" one. More importantly, Chinese investment in Pakistan has increased to $4 billion, registering a 30% increase just over the past two years since 2003. Chinese companies make up 12% (60) of the foreign firms (500) operating in Pakistan, which employ over 3,000 Chinese nationals.

The growing economic cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad is also solidifying their strategic partnership. Before leaving for his visit to Beijing this past December, Pakistani Prime Minister Aziz told reporters in Islamabad: "Pakistan and China are strategic partners and our relations span many areas." The rhetoric of strategic alignment is duly matched by reality. Last year, China and Pakistan conducted their first-ever joint naval exercises near the Shanghai coast. These exercises, among others, included simulation of an emergency rescue operation. Last December, Pakistan opened a consulate in Shanghai. The Gwadar Port project is the summit of such partnership that will bring the two countries closer in maritime defense as well.

Initially, China was reluctant to finance the Gwadar port project because Pakistan offered the U.S. exclusive access to two of its critical airbases in Jacobabad (Sind) and Pasni (Baluchisntan) during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. According to a Times of India report on February 19, 2002, Gen. Musharraf had to do a lot of explaining for leasing these bases to America. China, the Times of India reported, was also upset with Pakistan for allowing the U.S. to establish listening posts in Pakistan's Northern Areas, which border Xinjiang and Tibet. When China finally agreed to offer financial and technical assistance for the project, it asked for "sovereign guarantees" to use the Port facilities to which Pakistan agreed, despite U.S. unease over it.

In particular, the port project set off alarm bells in India which already feels encircled by China from three sides: Myanmar, Tibet, and Pakistan. To counter Sino-Pak collaboration, India has brought Afghanistan and Iran into an economic and strategic alliance. Iranians are already working on Chabahar port in Sistan-Baluchistan, which will be accessible for Indian imports and exports with road links to Afghanistan and Central Asia. India is helping build a 200-kilometer road that will connect Chabahar with Afghanistan. Once completed, Indians will use this access road to the port for their imports and exports to and from Central Asia. Presently, India is in urgent need of a shorter transit route to quickly get its trade goods to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

These external concerns are stoking internal challenges to the port project. Baluchistan, where the project is located, is once again up in arms against the federal government. The most important reason for armed resistance against the Gwadar port is that Baluch nationalists see it as an attempt to colonize them and their natural resources. Several insurgent groups have sprung up to nip the project in the bud. The three most popular are: the Baluchistan Liberation Army, Baluchistan Liberation Front, and People's Liberation Army. On May 3, 2004, the BLA killed three Chinese engineers working on the port project that employs close to 500 Chinese nationals. On October 9, 2004, two Chinese engineers were kidnapped in South Waziristan in the northwest of Pakistan, one of whom was killed later on October 14 in a botched rescue operation. Pakistan blamed India and Iran for fanning insurgency in Baluchistan.

Moreover, the Chinese in Pakistan are vulnerable because of their tense relationship with the Uighur Muslim majority of Xinjiang. Stretched over an area of 635,833 square miles, Xinjiang is more than twice the size of Pakistan, and one-sixth of China's landmass. However, it dwarfs in demographic size with a population of 19 million people. Beijing is investing 730 billion yuan (roughly $88 billion USD) in western China, including Xinjiang, which opens it up to the six Muslim countries of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. Despite this massive investment, displacement of Uighers from Urumqi, Xinjiang's capital, is drawing fire, where the population of mainland Chinese of Han descent has grown from 10% in 1949 to 41% in 2004. In direct proportion, the population of native Uighurs has declined from 90% in 1949 to 47% in 2004. Tens of thousands of displaced Uighurs have found refuge in Pakistan where the majority of them live in its two most populous cities: Lahore and Karachi.

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is fighting against Chinese attempts at so-called "Hanification" of Xinjiang. Pakistan, which along with China and the U.S. lists the ETIM as a terrorist organization, killed the ETIM's head, Hasan Mahsum, in South Waziristan on October 2, 2004. Seven days after, two Chinese were kidnapped from the area, one of whom was killed in a rescue operation. The thousands of Chinese working in Pakistan make tempting targets for violent reprisals by the ETIM or Baluch nationalists.

The realization of economic and strategic objectives of the Gwadar port is largely dependent upon the reduction of separatist violence in Baluchistan and Xinjiang. Chinese response to secessionism is aggressive economic development, which is driving the Gwadar port project also. The port is intended to serve China's threefold economic objective:

First, to integrate Pakistan into the Chinese economy by outsourcing low-tech, labor-absorbing, resource-intensive industrial production to Islamabad, which will transform Pakistan into a giant factory floor for China; Second, to seek access to Central Asian markets for energy imports and Chinese exports by developing road networks and rail links through Afghanistan and Pakistan into Central Asia; Third, to appease restive parts of western China, especially the Muslim-majority autonomous region of Xinjiang, through a massive infusion of development funds and increased economic links with the Central Asian Islamic nations of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

The port, by design or by default, also provides China a strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, although to the alarm of India and the unease of the U.S. sitting opposite the Strait of Hurmoz, through which 80% of the world's energy exports flow, the Gwadar port will enable China to monitor its energy shipments from the Persian Gulf, and offer it, in the case of any hostile interruption in such shipments, a safer alternative passage for its energy imports from Central Asia. Its presence on the Indian Ocean will further increase its strategic influence with major South Asian nations, particularly Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, which would prompt the Indians in turn to re-strengthen their Navy.

Tarique Niazi teaches Environmental Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire. He specializes in Resource-based Conflicts. He may be reached via email: niazit@uwec.edu

http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=408&issue_id=3232&article_id=2369262

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.