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Great job!

Here is another group that was fooled. The UK Parliament felt that there were WMD's in Iraq in 1999.

Parliament's concern re WMDs and Saddam in 1999

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/407/40704.htm#a4

IRAQ

19. In the aftermath of the 1990-91 Gulf War, UN Security Council Resolution 687 obliged Iraq to destroy its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and its ballistic missiles with a range over 150km, and to undertake not to develop these weapons in future. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were charged with ensuring Iraq's compliance. In December 1998, however, Iraq's refusal to co-operate with UNSCOM and the IAEA resulted in the withdrawal of weapons inspectors and the launch by the USA and the UK of Operation Desert Fox.[41]

20. In December 1999, the Security Council adopted a UK-drafted resolution (1284) that "makes clear that Iraq must give up its aspirations to have WMD" and also creates the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM as the body responsible for disarming Iraq of its nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile capabilities.[42] If Baghdad fully co-operates with UNMOVIC and the IAEA, Resolution 1284 provides for the suspension of sanctions on Iraq, but controls would remain in place on prohibited items.[43] The resolution did not have the unanimous backing of the fifteen member Security Council: there were eleven votes in favour and four abstentions from France, Russia, China and Malaysia, which had a non-permanent seat on the Council at that time. Reports have suggested that the resolution was weaker than it might have been due to Russian and Chinese opposition to sanctions and France's unwillingness to jeopardise its commercial and diplomatic relations with Iraq. The resolution did not contain an earlier provision which had called for the inclusion of UNSCOM inspectors in the new monitoring organisation. There was concern that without institutional memory to augment the archives that UNMOVIC will inherit, the new Commission will be unnecessarily disadvantaged in terms of fulfilling its disarmament mandate.[44]

21. Dr Hans Blix, whom we visited in New York in March, took up his appointment as the first Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC on 1 March 2000. Under the terms of SCR 1284, he had forty-five days in which to produce an organisational plan for UNMOVIC. This plan was presented to, and unanimously endorsed by, the Security Council on 13 April 2000. The FCO informed us that "a successful first meeting of the new UNMOVIC Commissioners was held on 23-24 May, during which Dr Blix described progress on setting up the organisation ... and said that UNMOVIC will be ready to start work in Iraq by the end of August 2000."[45]

22. Prior to December 1998, UNSCOM and the IAEA succeeded in destroying large quantities of chemical and biological weapons materials and facilities as well as Scud-type missiles. A nuclear weapons programme was also uncovered. However, the Iraqi regime's systematic concealment of proscribed items and obstruction of weapons inspectors means that not everything has been uncovered. It is more than likely, therefore, that Iraq has taken advantage of the absence of inspectors to rebuild its WMD and missile programmes and capabilities.[46] There have been reports claiming that Iraq has conducted tests of the Al Samoud missile since the withdrawal of the inspectors.[47] The FCO advised us that the Al Samoud has a declared design range of less than 150 kilometres which means that it does not contravene SCR 687. However, the absence of inspectors in Iraq means that the international community has not been able to ensure that the tests were compliant with SCR 687.[48]

23. We support the Government in its diplomatic efforts within the UN Security Council to ensure that UNMOVIC and the IAEA are given the maximum opportunity to complete the process of disarmament in Iraq in line with relevant UN resolutions. We wish to see UNMOVIC start its work in Iraq at the earliest opportunity. It is important that UNSCOM's successor, UNMOVIC, commands a mandate of equal strength to that of its predecessor to enable it to conduct further inspections of Iraq's WMD activity effectively. We urge the Government strongly to resist any attempt to dilute the international inspectors' powers of inspection or to compromise with Iraq on the composition of the Commission. We agree with the Government that "for so long as Iraq denies UNMOVIC access there can be no progress towards the suspension and eventual lifting of sanctions."[49]