***Ping-a-ling***
Thanks for post. I think some elements of it where in one or two of the hyperlinks folks provided us last week on the various Able Danger threads. I think I remember reading about the Iraqi Embassador to the Cheks in the 9/11 report. Have to revisit that report soon.
The 9/11 Report discounts the meeting in Ch 7 saying "[t]he available evidence does not support the original Czech report of an Atta-Ani meeting." While the 9/11 Commission may have missed that ABLE DANGER information, it is obvious that they investigated the Iraqi-Al Qaeda connection in the Czech Republic (they didn't overlook it). Do you think they lied about this item (since they deliberately and thoroughly investigated it)?
Yes. In my Adobe Acrobate Reader screen after loading the 9/11
Com report. Page 245. If you have the document on your system you can do a search of Prague. A few pages will be found. The bold faced subtile for that section is:
Atta's Alleged Trip to Prague.
......Shortly after 9/11, the source reported having seen
Atta meet with Ahmad Kahlil Ibrahim Samir Al Ani, an Iraqi
Diploat, at the Iraqi Embassy in Prague on April 9, 2001, at
11:00 A.M. This information was passed to CIA headquarters.
The U.S. Legal attache ("Legat") in Praque, the representative of the FBI, met with the Czech service's source. After meeting................blah blah blah.....
So this particular meeting between the Iraqi Embassador and Atta are mentioned in the 9/11 Report.
1982 - 1990 : (IRAQI INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AL MAMOURI IS EMPLOYED TO FORGE LINKS BETWEEN IRAQ & FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, THE GULF & SUDAN) Italian officials say that Mr al-Mamouri held the rank of general in the Iraqi secret service, and from 1982 to 1990 worked in the Special Operations Branch forging Baghdad’s links with Islamic fundamentalist groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Gulf and Sudan. - "Hijacker 'given anthrax flask by Iraqi agent'," by DANIEL MCGRORY, The London Times, SATURDAY OCTOBER 27 2001
1989 : (SUDAN : THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT aka NIF, LED BY HASSAN TURABI [aka AL TURABI , AL TOURABI], SEIZES POWER IN A COUP) Khartoum was an important center of Islamic political activity. Sudan's National Islamic Front, led by the fiery, Sorbonne-educated Hassan Turabi, seized power in a 1989 coup. ----- "Kerry’s new Snr Advisor for National Security rejected Sudan's 1998 offer to share info on al-Qaeda," Benador Associates, June 30, 2002
1989 : (SUDAN : NIF DECLARES JIHAD ON SOUTH) Sudan's cleric-backed National Islamic Front regime in the Arab and Muslim north declared a jihad on the south in 1989. ----- "Sudanese Jihadists Given Pass By Bush," by Art Moore, 2003 WorldNetDaily.com , April 24, 2003
1990s : (SUDAN : AL-TOURABI ARRANGES FOR BIN LADEN TO MEET IRAQI AGENT AL-HIJAZI, WHO WOULD EVENTUALLY HEAD IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, THE MUKHABARAT) During the early 1990s, Sudan’s Sheikh Hassan al-Tourabi of the Islamic National Front arranged meetings between bin Laden and Iraqi Intelligence officials. Bin Laden met with Faruq al-Hijazi, an Iraqi intelligence agent in the Sudan who would later head Iraqi intelligence for Saddam Hussein. There would be later meetings as well in 1994 and 1995.- Findlaw, Ashton, et al. v. al Qaeda
1990s : (ISLAMIC REFORM MOVEMENT GRADUALLY BECOMES DOMINATED BY RADICALS- HASSAN AL TURABI / AL TOURABI HOSTS ANNUAL ISLAMIC CONFERENCES IN KHARTOUM, SUDAN THAT DRAW THOUSANDS OF EXTREMISTS) During the 1990s, some committed Muslims around the world tried to forge a political movement to bridge the gap between the modern world and medieval scripture. But instead of engaging this movement, the United States lumped Islamic political groups together and viewed them all as dangerous. It clung to relationships with authoritarian regimes that felt threatened by Islamic groups and thus let well-organized radicals dominate the Muslim world's reformist movement. Khartoum was an important center of Islamic political activity. Sudan's National Islamic Front, led by the fiery, Sorbonne-educated Hassan Turabi, seized power in a 1989 coup. Turabi held annual conferences that attracted thousands of Muslim radicals to Khartoum to craft their vision for an Islamic utopia. Turabi described the conferences as venting sessions aimed at moderating extremist Islam's rhetoric. The U.S. government called them terrorist planning sessions and, rather than infiltrate and decipher their workings, demanded that Khartoum shut them down.
Turabi raised deep concerns among U.S. allies in Riyadh, Cairo, Asmara, Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Kampala. Washington relied on their reading of events in Sudan, rather than on its own eyes and ears.
There were real grounds for concern. Sudan's new leaders expanded long-standing ties to Middle Eastern terrorist groups. Bin Laden and his followers arrived in 1991.
The "Blind Sheikh," Omar Abdel Rahman, an Egyptian later convicted of plotting to blow up New York landmarks, received his U.S. visa from Khartoum in 1993. ----- "Kerry’s new Snr Advisor for National Security rejected Sudan's 1998 offer to share info on al-Qaeda," Benador Associates, June 30, 2002
1990 - mid March 2003 : (IRAQ AL QAEDA/AL QAEDA IRAQ CONTACTS BEGIN; BIN LADEN SENDS EMISSARIES TO JORDAN TO MEET WITH IRAQI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS) According to the memo--which lays out the intelligence in 50 numbered points--Iraq-al Qaeda contacts began in 1990 and continued through mid-March 2003, days before the Iraq War began. Most of the numbered passages contain straight, fact-based intelligence reporting, which some cases includes an evaluation of the credibility of the source. This reporting is often followed by commentary and analysis. ..
The relationship began shortly before the first Gulf War. According to reporting in the memo, bin Laden sent "emissaries to Jordan in 1990 to meet with Iraqi government officials."
The primary go-between throughout these early stages was Sudanese strongman Hassan al-Turabi, a leader of the al Qaeda-affiliated National Islamic Front. Numerous sources have confirmed this. One defector reported that "al-Turabi was instrumental in arranging the Iraqi-al Qaeda relationship. The defector said Iraq sought al Qaeda influence through its connections with Afghanistan, to facilitate the transshipment of proscribed weapons and equipment to Iraq. In return, Iraq provided al Qaeda with training and instructors."
One such confirmation came in a postwar interview with one of Saddam Hussein's henchmen. As the memo details:
4. According to a May 2003 debriefing of a senior Iraqi intelligence officer, Iraqi intelligence established a highly secretive relationship with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and later with al Qaeda. The first meeting in 1992 between the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and al Qaeda was brokered by [* leader of Sudan's al Qaeda affiliated National Islamic Front, Hassan] al-Turabi. Former IIS deputy director Faruq Hijazi and senior al Qaeda leader [Ayman al] Zawahiri were at the meeting--the first of several between 1992 and 1995 in Sudan. Additional meetings between Iraqi intelligence and al Qaeda were held in Pakistan. Members of al Qaeda would sometimes visit Baghdad where they would meet the Iraqi intelligence chief [Mani abd-al-Rashid al-Tikriti] in a safe house. The report claimed that [Iraqi leader] Saddam [Hussein] insisted the relationship with al Qaeda be kept secret. After 9-11, the source said Saddam made a personnel change in the IIS for fear the relationship would come under scrutiny from foreign probes. ------- "The U.S. government's secret memo detailing cooperation between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. ," by Stephen F. Hayes, 11/24/2003, the Weekly Standard, Volume 009, Issue 11
1991 : (BIN LADEN GROUP ARRIVES IN SUDAN) There were real grounds for concern. Sudan's new leaders expanded long-standing ties to Middle Eastern terrorist groups. Bin Laden and his followers arrived in 1991. -----Kerry’s new Snr Advisor for National Security rejected Sudan's 1998 offer to share info on al-Qaeda Benador Associates ^ | June 30, 2002
1991 spring : (IRAQ TRANSFERS WEAPONS PROGRAMS TO LIBYA & SUDAN) Then, in the Spring of 1991, once the extent of the post-War inspection regime became clarified, especially given the type and amount of data provided to the West by numerous defectors, a second round of hasty smuggling took place. Essentially, the core of the next-generation projects of the Iraqi WMD programs was moved to safe-havens. A lot of know-how and key subsystems were shipped out with the idea of building alternate production facilities in the host countries. Most important are the programs transferred to Libya and Sudan -- two of Iraq's closest allies during the Gulf War that have strong aspirations for WMD of their own. Libya, long struggling to overcome embargoes and the cancellation of arrangements for the supply of technology and systems from Western Europe, has been looking for the Iraqi embargo-busting knowledge and for Iraqi proven solutions for Libyan problems. Sudan needs WMD in order to hit the Black rebels in the south and deter Western intervention against the Islamist terrorism empire. Hence, Iraq found eager and willing partners for its efforts to circumvent the world's campaign against its WMD. - Yossef Bodansky, "The Iraqi WMD Challenge - Myths and Reality," TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515 , February 10, 1998
1992 : (THE FIRST MEETING BETWEEN THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND AL QAEDA IS BROKERED BY HASSAN AL-TURABI, LEADER OF SUDAN'S AL-QAEDA-AFFILIATED NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT; IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR FARUQ HIJAZI AND SENIOR AL QAEDA LEADER AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI WERE IN ATTENDANCE ---See IRAQ AL QAEDA/AL QAEDA IRAQ) 4. According to a May 2003 debriefing of a senior Iraqi intelligence officer, Iraqi intelligence established a highly secretive relationship with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and later with al Qaeda. The first meeting in 1992 between the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and al Qaeda was brokered by [* leader of Sudan's al Qaeda affiliated National Islamic Front, Hassan] al-Turabi. Former IIS deputy director Faruq Hijazi and senior al Qaeda leader [Ayman al] Zawahiri were at the meeting--the first of several between 1992 and 1995 in Sudan------- "The U.S. government's secret memo detailing cooperation between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. ," by Stephen F. Hayes, 11/24/2003, the Weekly Standard, Volume 009, Issue 11
1992 - 1995 : (SUDAN : SERIES OF MEETINGS BETWEEN THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND AL QAEDA; OTHER MEETINGS WERE IN PAKISTAN AND IRAQ; IN IRAQ MEMBERS OF AL QAEDA WOULD SOMETIMES MEET IRAQI INTELLIGENCE CHIEF MANI ABD AL RASHID AL TIKRITI IN A SAFE HOUSE ---See IRAQ AL QAEDA/AL QAEDA IRAQ) 4. According to a May 2003 debriefing of a senior Iraqi intelligence officer, Iraqi intelligence established a highly secretive relationship with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and later with al Qaeda. The first meeting in 1992 between the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and al Qaeda was brokered by [* leader of Sudan's al Qaeda affiliated National Islamic Front, Hassan] al-Turabi. Former IIS deputy director Faruq Hijazi and senior al Qaeda leader [Ayman al] Zawahiri were at the meeting--the first of several between 1992 and 1995 in Sudan. Additional meetings between Iraqi intelligence and al Qaeda were held in Pakistan. Members of al Qaeda would sometimes visit Baghdad where they would meet the Iraqi intelligence chief [Mani abd-al-Rashid al-Tikriti] in a safe house. The report claimed that [Iraqi leader] Saddam [Hussein] insisted the relationship with al Qaeda be kept secret. After 9-11 [2001], the source said Saddam made a personnel change in the IIS for fear the relationship would come under scrutiny from foreign probes. ------- "The U.S. government's secret memo detailing cooperation between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. ," by Stephen F. Hayes, 11/24/2003, the Weekly Standard, Volume 009, Issue 11
1993 : (1993 IRAQI DOCUMENT -FOUND IN MARCH 2004 - LISTS OSAMA BIN LADEN AS A COLLABORATOR WITH THE IRAQI IIS AND STATES THAT HE IS IN GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IRAQI IIS SECTION IN SYRIA ) Washington Times Pentagon correspondents Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough reported March 19 [2004] on a 20-page, Arabic-language document from the Iraqi Intelligence Service. Stamped "top secret," it lists IIS "collaborators," among them, "the Saudi Osama bin Laden." It says he is a "Saudi businessman and is in charge of the Saudi opposition in Afghanistan...And he is in good relationship with our section in Syria." Signed "Jabar," the 1993 record seemed authentic to an American official who reviewed it.-- "Clarke’s Not Blind; Even the Dems’ favorite grandstander sees the Saddam-9/11 link.," By Deroy Murdock, National Review Online , March 26, 2004, 8:58 a.m., http://www.nationalreview.com/murdock/murdock200403260858.asp
APRIL 1993 : (ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON FORMER PRESIDENT BUSH MAY HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED BY IRAQI FAROUK HIJAZI) [Iraqi ambassador/ Mukhabarat Intelligence service director of internal affairs Farouk Hijazi] Hijazi... was the man the Washington believes organized the April 1993 assassination attempt on President Bush's father during a visit to Kuwait. - "COWED SYRIA YIELDS SADDAM'S SPY BOSS," by NILES LATHEM, New York Post, 4/26/03