Posted on 01/15/2006 2:24:14 PM PST by SmithL
WHEN GOV. Arnold Schwarzenegger came to office, his administration's goal was to reduce California's bloated prison population by 15,000. He also talked about putting a new emphasis on rehabilitation, even changing the name of the corrections department to the "Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation."
All this made sense. With 163,000 inmates, our prisons are crammed to twice their capacity. Three quarters of inmates land back in prison within three years, usually for technical parole violations.
That's why we are disturbed to learn that Schwarzenegger's $212 billion bond proposal includes billions of dollars to build two new prisons and increase the number of inmate beds in California by 83,000 in both county and state facilities.
In a telephone conference call last week, Schwarzenegger argued that the state's population is growing, and that California will need more prison space. He acknowledged that the crime rates statewide have dropped in recent years, but said that crime is linked to economic cycles, and if the economy deteriorates, crime rates could go up again. "We have to be prepared," he said.
As for the administration's embrace of rehabilitation, Mike Genest, the governor's finance director, noted that the 2006 budget includes $52 million for education and rehab programs. He says that overcrowded prisons make it difficult to implement these programs, and that new prison space is crucial to the success of the entire initiative.
We agree that the overcrowded prisons are intolerable. It's quite possible that, despite our building spree of the past several decades, more prison beds will be necessary.
But before embarking on another huge expansion of our correctional system, Schwarzenegger must present a comprehensive plan to reduce the prison population.
(Excerpt) Read more at sfgate.com ...
Quicker executions?
Hey lefties... I've got the sure-fire foolproof way to reduce prison populations. Tell the low lifes to quit committing crimes you dipsticks!
The left is still crying in their beer that three strikes is working.
This is just another Waaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa attack!
Not a word about 60% of the prison system population are illegals?
No new power plants, no new prisons. This is starting to sound like a David Spade commercial.
Outsource the incarcerating of California's criminals to Mexico in Mexico.
Build the Mexican prisons. Reimburse Mexico for the care for every live prisoner. The benefits are numerous:
1) Construction costs would be half of their domestic equivalents.
2) The cost of care would be 20% of the current domestic cost.
3) Strategically placed, the employment would help solve a Mexican crisis and remove the pressure for illegal immigration.
4) The prospect of Mexican incarceration would act as a compelling deterrent for domestic crime.
5) Smuggling contraband, prison unrest, the cost of expensive medical remedies, dickering with unions, fighting the NIMBY crowd all become just memories.
However a more typical liberal solution would be to redefine words to justify their actions. For example, "Three quarters of inmates land back in prison within three years, usually for technical parole violations." Getting caught selling drugs again is just a technicality, not a good reason to clutter our pristine jails. They also suggest "that parole agents should concentrate on parolees who represent the greatest risk." Somehow I don't think that the aforementioned 3/4 allows for much concentration of effort. Perhaps they might instead redefine "capacity." I'm sure jails were a lot more crowded 50 years ago and bet they are still more crowded south of the border. We used to be able to store more prisoners in less prison space before liberal judges redefined their standard of care. I don't advocate the Black Hole of Calcutta and there are real limits on how far you can go without losing control of the prisoners, riots, etc. However, with all the years of liberal judges California has had running the show I'd be amazed if there weren't some common sense corrections available in their standards.
Mexico would be fine.
Just release them all in downtown San Francisco. I don't see what the big deal is. Problem solved.
The only problem with your plan is would they stay in jail or would they conveniently escape and return here? If that became a problem then we should outsource the premature repeat offenders to Siberia. Round trip transportation costs make Siberia more expensive than Mexico, but probably it's still cheaper than holding them ourselves. There would be similar benefits for our wannabee friendly natives and the infrastructure, albeit in disrepair, already exists. It would be a BIG deterrent and escapes would be negligible. Also, I doubt we'd ever waste as much money on congressional fact finding missions there as we might in Mexico.
Short and sweet. I like.
Should anyone tell the lefties that Christian conversion has been the only form of rehab that has been remotely effective in curbing the behavior of repeat criminals? I don't think they'd like that very much.
Agreed.
What people seem to forget is that no one "rehabilitates" another person. You rehabilitate yourself.
All the education in the world won't help, if the person remains the same inside.
Arnold wants two more prisons because we need them.
CA's death row has over 700 inmates awaiting execution. At the rate we're going they *will* die from old age and not ever face their sentences. Even at one execution per month it would take over 50 years just to clean out the existing population.
The only problem with his plan is that it's an unconstitutional piece of garbage.
CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE | ||
www.cjcj.org |
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 54 Dore Street, San Francisco, CA 94103 | Tel: (415) 621-5661 | Fax: (415) 621-5466 |
CONTACT: Daniel Macallair
E-mail: [dmacallair@cjcj.org]
Tel: (415) 621-5661 x310
This unprecedented imprisonment increase is partly attributable to escalating drug arrests. These escalating drug arrests result from harsher sentencing statutes that have expanded the pool of prison-eligible offenders and promoted incarceration as a primary response to illicit drug use (Maxwell, 1999; Tonry, 1999).
California's uniquely harsher approach to drug crime is founded on deterrence and incapacitation theory. Deterrence and incapacitation theory promotes increased arrests, prosecutions, and prison sentences as the primary means to dissuade drug use and reduce street crime by removing the drug-involved offender from the community. The theory also holds that stricter sanctions targeting low level and first time drug offenders further reduces drug-related crime by increasing the personal costs of drug use among incipient users (Maxwell 1999; Tonry 1999; Henham 1999). The theory subscribes to the belief that failure to strictly enforce drug laws promotes other forms of crime as undeterred drug users seek money to supply their drug needs (Lurigo & Swartz, 1999).
Supporters of deterrence and incapacitation theory associate the recent declines in California crime rates as a testament to these policies (Jones 1999). Opponents argue that this theory is misguided and ineffective because simple punishment does not address the underlying causes of drug use and addiction (Sentencing Project, 1998). In addition, national statistics show that crime rates are declining across the nation regardless of individual state law enforcement policies (Tonry 1999).
As the nation's leader in drug law enforcement, California presents an unusual opportunity to examine the impact of arrest and incarceration drug control policies. As California drug arrests doubled from 131,000 in 1980 to 265,000 in 1998, major variations developed. In the 1980s, two-thirds of the state's drug arrest increases were high level felonies such as illegal drug manufacture, sale, or possession in large quantity. However, in the 1990s, nearly all drug arrest increases were for low level possession offenses.
These variations in arrest patterns are reflected in imprisonment rates (Table 2, illustrated in Figure 1). In 1980, only 379 Californians were sent to prison for drug possession offenses compared to 12,749 in 1999, a population-adjusted rate increase over 20-fold (2,244%). The per capita imprisonment growth rate for all drug offenses was 1,473%, while the per capita growth rate in prison commitments for sale/manufacture drug offenders was 1,048%. By the late 1990s, in a radical departure from the past, more than half of Californians imprisoned for drugs are locked up for possession (Table 2).
This dramatic rise in drug offender imprisonment throughout California is not uniform, as jurisdictions show wide variations in policy and practice. While many counties adopted strict doctrinaire enforcement policies that targeted serious and low level offenders, others opted to target more serious and chronic offenders. To determine the impact of differential enforcement policies, this study examines the state's 12 largest counties, which account for three-fourths of the state's population (25 million) and four-fifths of the state's drug arrests. This research analyzes the impact of strict drug law enforcement on violent crime, property crime, and drug abuse rates from 1980-98. According to deterrence and incapacitation theory, the counties that adopted strict enforcement approaches should show the greatest declines in drug-related crime and drug abuse (see figure 2).
In summary, the imprisonment increases for California drug law violators during the past two decades are the result of harsher sentencing of lower level drug users. This pattern suggests that incarceration has become the primary intervention tool for state drug prevention policy.
Although California laws are established by the state legislature, arrest, prosecution and sentencing decisions are county functions. Because California counties pursued drug policy enforcement in sharply different ways, wide variations exist on how laws are implemented at the county level. Most county police and district attorney offices vigorously pursued new harsh enforcement statutes and significantly increased drug arrests and imprisonment for all forms of drug offenses including misdemeanors. However, some counties like San Francisco, increased drug arrests and prosecutions for dealers and manufacturers but minimized severe penalties for drug possession. Although, overall, crime in California is down in the past eight years, data show that stricter drug enforcement is not associated with declines in crime rates or drug use:
The CJSC also provides detailed yearly index offenses as reported by law enforcement agencies in each county. Index offenses, as designated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, consist of four violent felonies (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault) and four property felonies (burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft, arson).
Prisoner statistics were obtained from the California Department of Corrections' (CDC) Data Analysis Unit. The CDC's annual reports and special data retrievals for this study offer detailed information on prisoners and prison admittees by year, county, age, sex, race, offense, average term served, and cost of imprisonment. These statistics are among the most comprehensive prisoner statistics available nationwide.
County population data was obtained from the California Department of Finance's Demographic Research Unit. County drug arrest rates per 100,000 are determined by the following formula: (Drug arrests/county population) x 100,000
Crimes reported to law enforcement agencies likewise are divided by the population of each county for each year to produce an annual crime index for violent and property offenses.
Drug abuse is measured by rates of county drug-related deaths. Drug-related deaths, those from chronic drug abuse and from poisoning by drug overdose (accident, suicide, and undetermined as to intent), are available from the Center for Health Statistics, California Department of Health Services. Drug abuse death rates for 1996 through 1998 are shown by county.
Correlational analysis is used to determine the relationship between increased rates of arrest and imprisonments for drugs and crime and drug abuse death rates by county. A negative correlation (i.e., more drug arrests are associated with less crime) would support claims that increased drug law enforcement reduces crime. Conversely, a positive correlation (more drug arrests are associated with more crime) would not support the deterrence and incapacitation theory of strict drug enforcement advocates.
Misdemeanor drug arrest rates more than doubled in Fresno and Sacramento while falling sharply in San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Alameda counties. San Francisco presents the most extreme divergence: the state's highest arrest rate for drug felonies and its lowest for drug misdemeanors (see Table 4).1
Counties also showed distinctly varying rates and trends in drug offender imprisonment. In all 12 counties, the rate of drug imprisonment escalated dramatically, primarily due to harsher sentencing for drug possession. Riverside's absolute increase in drug imprisonment was the State's highest at 93.9 new annual drug prisoners per 100,000 population, while Contra Costa's was the lowest, at 22.6. Los Angeles recorded the largest increase in imprisonment for drug possession (48.8 per 100,000 population) while Contra Costa (9.8) and San Francisco (9.9) showed the smallest increases (see Table 5).
During this period, violent crime rates rose in nine of 12 counties, ranging from a 33% increase in Fresno to a 26% decline in San Francisco. Property offenses declined in all counties, ranging from an 11% decrease in Fresno to a 48% drop in Santa Clara. In 15 of the 18 separate comparisons, increased rates of drug arrests and imprisonment coincided with crime increases or slower crime decreases (Table 6 and Figure 3). In three of the 18 comparisons these associations were statistically significant.
Increased drug arrest rates were significantly correlated with slower declines in property crime (r = .64, p < .03), a result which held true when absolute changes in drug arrests and crime were substituted for percentage changes (r = .62, p < .04). Larger increases in felony drug arrests were strongly associated with slower declines in property crime (r = .73, p < .01) and larger increases in misdemeanor drug arrests were associated with increases in violent crime (r = .63, p < .03). Rising rates of drug imprisonment were not associated with changes in crime rates. In six of the nine comparisons (including all the comparisons for violent crime), increased rates of drug imprisonment were associated in a nonsignificant fashion with increased rates of crime. The associations for violent crime were the strongest (r = .20 to .30, p > .05), but all the others were near zero.
Several additional comparisons of drug arrest and imprisonment policies were examined to determine their relationships to crime reductions. Counties that (a) made fewer drug arrests and (b) concentrated their enforcement efforts on felony manufacture or sale rather than on simple-possession drug offenses were significantly more likely to experience declines in violent crime (r = -.63, p < .03). Those counties also experienced bigger reductions in property crime rates, though the results were not significant (r = -.31, p > .05).
This pattern also held true for drug imprisonment. Counties that rarely imprisoned low-level drug offenders showed the largest reductions in violent and property crime (r = -.53, p < .05).
County Drug Arrest and Imprisonment Levels and Crime Rates
As with drug imprisonment trends, counties differ radically in their rates of imprisoning drug offenders. For example, Riverside County residents are imprisoned for drug offenses at four times the rate of Contra Costa County residents. Los Angeles County residents are imprisoned for low-level drug possession at nearly five times the rate of San Francisco, Alameda, and Contra Costa residents (see Table 7).
Finally, the Department of Corrections provided a special tabulation for the years 1997-99 of persons imprisoned for low-level drug possession with no prior violent or serious offense and no drug or other offenses. Again, counties differed radically in their rates of sending low-level drug offenders to prison (Table 8).
Orange and Los Angeles counties imprisoned drug possessors at levels five to seven times higher than in San Francisco Bay Area counties. Although detailed data are not available for 1980, the small number of drug possessors imprisoned at that time further demonstrates the drastic changes in drug sentencing polices over the past two decades.
The recent large increases in imprisonment for drug offenses show no discernible impact on crime rates. Rather, the pattern is a random one, with most high-incarceration counties showing no reduction in violent or property crime categories relative to low-incarceration counties. Riverside and Contra Costa counties, as seen, differ by 400% in drug imprisonment levels (Table 12) and by 500% in imprisonment for low-level drug offenses, but Contra Costa's violent crime rate is 30% lower than, and its total crime index rate virtually the same as, Riverside's (see Table 9).
The correlations between drug arrests and drug abuse rates (measured by drug-related death rates) produce a similar pattern (Table 10). Counties with higher rates of felony drug arrests are nearly always those with higher rates of drug abuse (r = .938, p < .0001). However, higher rates of misdemeanor arrests do not affect drug abuse rates (r = -.454, not significant).
Removing San Francisco, the most extreme county (in mathematical terms, an outlier that exerts excessive influence on correlation coefficients), yields weaker though similar results: felony drug arrests remain tied to local rates of drug abuse, while misdemeanor drug arrests are unrelated to drug abuse. This suggests that increased policing of felony drug offenses is a response to high rates of drug abuse, but misdemeanor drug arrests appear to have no relationship to, and no impact on, either crime or drug abuse.
Since 1990, many counties placed increased emphasis on the prosecution and imprisonment of low level drug offenders, especially for drug possession offenses. For example, in 1980, only seven people from San Diego County were sentenced to prison for low-level drug possession, while in 1999 the county sent 1,002 drug possession offenders to state prison. Los Angeles sentenced only 145 drug possession offenders to prison in 1980, yet sentenced 5,109 in 1999.
In addition, the data in Table 6 show the six counties that increased their imprisonment rates the most for low level drug possession actually experienced greater increases in violent crime rates from 1980 to 1999 (up 11%, on average) than the six most lenient counties (up 1%). Further, no major differences emerged in violent or property crime rates between strict-enforcing counties and more lenient or balanced counties. Increased drug arrests and imprisonment are not correlated with decreases in violent and property crime (in fact, they are more likely to be associated with increases), and high levels of drug arrests and imprisonment are not associated with lower rates of crime (the results are entirely random).
A conclusion that fits all the facts, then, suggests that some counties chose to combat their drug abuse and crime problems by making more felony and misdemeanor drug arrests, while other counties made fewer drug arrests and/or concentrated only on the worst (felony) drug offenses (manufacturing and trafficking). The latter group of counties had considerably more success in reducing crime regardless of the dimensions of their drug abuse and crime problems. Finally, counties that imposed high rates of imprisonment for drug violations generally experienced SLOWER declines in index felony offenses than low-imprisonment counties, though the results were not statistically significant.
A major reason for these outcome differences appears to be that simple possession drug offenses are not associated with high rates of crime or drug abuse -- with correlations close to zero. Therefore, increasing arrests for low level drug possession does nothing to control crime and may drain resources away from more productive strategies.
A second reason for the outcome differences is that felony drug offenses appear to reflect, rather than control, higher rates of drug abuse and crime. As shown, counties that stepped up felony drug arrest rates did not show the most impressive improvements in violent and property crime rates (although the San Francisco exception indicates that areas with extremely high rates of drug abuse may benefit from policing of the worst drug offenses). For most jurisdictions, however, increasing felony drug arrests is a very limited strategy to control rising drug abuse and crime.
Finally, counties that reduced misdemeanor drug arrests and switched to judicious enforcement of felony drug laws enjoyed the healthiest reductions in violent and property crime. Taken together, these findings strongly suggest that (a) strong enforcement of drug possession laws is ineffective in reducing crime, and (b) felony drug arrest is a strategy that should be used sparingly and carefully targeted.
Higher rates of arrests, stricter laws, and more aggressive sentencing policies do not deter many drug users exposed to these penalties. This leads to a revolving door scenario in which drug-involved offenders appear repeatedly before the courts. One study found 60 percent of opiate-dependent Federal parolees were reincarcerated within 6 months of release -- virtually all for narcotics-related crime -- at an incarceration cost of more than $27,000 per person, per year.United States. Justice Department research also concluded that drug treatment is effective even with the most hardened addicts. Studies show that concerted efforts towards treatment can reduce drug use and drug related crime by over 40 percent (Harell, Cavanaugh, & Roman, 2000).
Given the continued emphasis in California on law enforcement strategies despite the dearth of evidence showing effectiveness, future drug policy research should examine the political basis of current approaches. Questions to examine are whether current policies are better designed to accommodate vested interest groups and political agendas than to serve as a reasonable solution to the legitimate social issue of drug abuse.
Harrell A, S. Cavanagh, J. Roman. 2000. Evaluation of the D.C. Superior Court Drug Intervention Programs. Washington DC: United States Department of Justice.
Henham, Ralph. 1999. "Theory, Rights and Sentencing Policy." International Journal of the Sociology of Law. 27 167-183.
Jones, Bill. 1999. "Why the Three Strikes Law is Working in California." Stanford Law & Policy Review. 11:1 23-27.
Lurigio, Arthur, James A. Swartz. 1999. "The Nexus Between Drugs and Crime: Theory, Research, and Practice." Federal Probation 82:67-72.
Maxwell, Sheila R. 1999. "Conservative Sanctioning and Correctional Innovations in the United States: An Examination of Recent Trends." International Journal of the Sociology of Law. 27 401-412.
Sentencing Project. 1998. Drug Policy and the Criminal Justice System. Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project.
Tonry, Michael. 1999. "Why Are U.S. Incarceration Rates So High?" Crime and Delinquency. 45 419-437.
The Justice Policy Institute is a research and public policy organization in San Francisco, CA and Washington, DC. JPI is a project of the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. This research was funded by generous contributions from the Heller Charitable & Educational Fund, Working Assets, and the Open Society Institute.
This site and its contents © 2002 Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice |
CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE | ||
www.cjcj.org |
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 54 Dore Street, San Francisco, CA 94103 | Tel: (415) 621-5661 | Fax: (415) 621-5466 |
CONTACT: Daniel Macallair
E-mail: [dmacallair@cjcj.org]
Tel: (415) 621-5661 x310
This unprecedented imprisonment increase is partly attributable to escalating drug arrests. These escalating drug arrests result from harsher sentencing statutes that have expanded the pool of prison-eligible offenders and promoted incarceration as a primary response to illicit drug use (Maxwell, 1999; Tonry, 1999).
California's uniquely harsher approach to drug crime is founded on deterrence and incapacitation theory. Deterrence and incapacitation theory promotes increased arrests, prosecutions, and prison sentences as the primary means to dissuade drug use and reduce street crime by removing the drug-involved offender from the community. The theory also holds that stricter sanctions targeting low level and first time drug offenders further reduces drug-related crime by increasing the personal costs of drug use among incipient users (Maxwell 1999; Tonry 1999; Henham 1999). The theory subscribes to the belief that failure to strictly enforce drug laws promotes other forms of crime as undeterred drug users seek money to supply their drug needs (Lurigo & Swartz, 1999).
Supporters of deterrence and incapacitation theory associate the recent declines in California crime rates as a testament to these policies (Jones 1999). Opponents argue that this theory is misguided and ineffective because simple punishment does not address the underlying causes of drug use and addiction (Sentencing Project, 1998). In addition, national statistics show that crime rates are declining across the nation regardless of individual state law enforcement policies (Tonry 1999).
As the nation's leader in drug law enforcement, California presents an unusual opportunity to examine the impact of arrest and incarceration drug control policies. As California drug arrests doubled from 131,000 in 1980 to 265,000 in 1998, major variations developed. In the 1980s, two-thirds of the state's drug arrest increases were high level felonies such as illegal drug manufacture, sale, or possession in large quantity. However, in the 1990s, nearly all drug arrest increases were for low level possession offenses.
These variations in arrest patterns are reflected in imprisonment rates (Table 2, illustrated in Figure 1). In 1980, only 379 Californians were sent to prison for drug possession offenses compared to 12,749 in 1999, a population-adjusted rate increase over 20-fold (2,244%). The per capita imprisonment growth rate for all drug offenses was 1,473%, while the per capita growth rate in prison commitments for sale/manufacture drug offenders was 1,048%. By the late 1990s, in a radical departure from the past, more than half of Californians imprisoned for drugs are locked up for possession (Table 2).
This dramatic rise in drug offender imprisonment throughout California is not uniform, as jurisdictions show wide variations in policy and practice. While many counties adopted strict doctrinaire enforcement policies that targeted serious and low level offenders, others opted to target more serious and chronic offenders. To determine the impact of differential enforcement policies, this study examines the state's 12 largest counties, which account for three-fourths of the state's population (25 million) and four-fifths of the state's drug arrests. This research analyzes the impact of strict drug law enforcement on violent crime, property crime, and drug abuse rates from 1980-98. According to deterrence and incapacitation theory, the counties that adopted strict enforcement approaches should show the greatest declines in drug-related crime and drug abuse (see figure 2).
In summary, the imprisonment increases for California drug law violators during the past two decades are the result of harsher sentencing of lower level drug users. This pattern suggests that incarceration has become the primary intervention tool for state drug prevention policy.
Although California laws are established by the state legislature, arrest, prosecution and sentencing decisions are county functions. Because California counties pursued drug policy enforcement in sharply different ways, wide variations exist on how laws are implemented at the county level. Most county police and district attorney offices vigorously pursued new harsh enforcement statutes and significantly increased drug arrests and imprisonment for all forms of drug offenses including misdemeanors. However, some counties like San Francisco, increased drug arrests and prosecutions for dealers and manufacturers but minimized severe penalties for drug possession. Although, overall, crime in California is down in the past eight years, data show that stricter drug enforcement is not associated with declines in crime rates or drug use:
The CJSC also provides detailed yearly index offenses as reported by law enforcement agencies in each county. Index offenses, as designated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, consist of four violent felonies (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault) and four property felonies (burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft, arson).
Prisoner statistics were obtained from the California Department of Corrections' (CDC) Data Analysis Unit. The CDC's annual reports and special data retrievals for this study offer detailed information on prisoners and prison admittees by year, county, age, sex, race, offense, average term served, and cost of imprisonment. These statistics are among the most comprehensive prisoner statistics available nationwide.
County population data was obtained from the California Department of Finance's Demographic Research Unit. County drug arrest rates per 100,000 are determined by the following formula: (Drug arrests/county population) x 100,000
Crimes reported to law enforcement agencies likewise are divided by the population of each county for each year to produce an annual crime index for violent and property offenses.
Drug abuse is measured by rates of county drug-related deaths. Drug-related deaths, those from chronic drug abuse and from poisoning by drug overdose (accident, suicide, and undetermined as to intent), are available from the Center for Health Statistics, California Department of Health Services. Drug abuse death rates for 1996 through 1998 are shown by county.
Correlational analysis is used to determine the relationship between increased rates of arrest and imprisonments for drugs and crime and drug abuse death rates by county. A negative correlation (i.e., more drug arrests are associated with less crime) would support claims that increased drug law enforcement reduces crime. Conversely, a positive correlation (more drug arrests are associated with more crime) would not support the deterrence and incapacitation theory of strict drug enforcement advocates.
Misdemeanor drug arrest rates more than doubled in Fresno and Sacramento while falling sharply in San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Alameda counties. San Francisco presents the most extreme divergence: the state's highest arrest rate for drug felonies and its lowest for drug misdemeanors (see Table 4).1
Counties also showed distinctly varying rates and trends in drug offender imprisonment. In all 12 counties, the rate of drug imprisonment escalated dramatically, primarily due to harsher sentencing for drug possession. Riverside's absolute increase in drug imprisonment was the State's highest at 93.9 new annual drug prisoners per 100,000 population, while Contra Costa's was the lowest, at 22.6. Los Angeles recorded the largest increase in imprisonment for drug possession (48.8 per 100,000 population) while Contra Costa (9.8) and San Francisco (9.9) showed the smallest increases (see Table 5).
During this period, violent crime rates rose in nine of 12 counties, ranging from a 33% increase in Fresno to a 26% decline in San Francisco. Property offenses declined in all counties, ranging from an 11% decrease in Fresno to a 48% drop in Santa Clara. In 15 of the 18 separate comparisons, increased rates of drug arrests and imprisonment coincided with crime increases or slower crime decreases (Table 6 and Figure 3). In three of the 18 comparisons these associations were statistically significant.
Increased drug arrest rates were significantly correlated with slower declines in property crime (r = .64, p < .03), a result which held true when absolute changes in drug arrests and crime were substituted for percentage changes (r = .62, p < .04). Larger increases in felony drug arrests were strongly associated with slower declines in property crime (r = .73, p < .01) and larger increases in misdemeanor drug arrests were associated with increases in violent crime (r = .63, p < .03). Rising rates of drug imprisonment were not associated with changes in crime rates. In six of the nine comparisons (including all the comparisons for violent crime), increased rates of drug imprisonment were associated in a nonsignificant fashion with increased rates of crime. The associations for violent crime were the strongest (r = .20 to .30, p > .05), but all the others were near zero.
Several additional comparisons of drug arrest and imprisonment policies were examined to determine their relationships to crime reductions. Counties that (a) made fewer drug arrests and (b) concentrated their enforcement efforts on felony manufacture or sale rather than on simple-possession drug offenses were significantly more likely to experience declines in violent crime (r = -.63, p < .03). Those counties also experienced bigger reductions in property crime rates, though the results were not significant (r = -.31, p > .05).
This pattern also held true for drug imprisonment. Counties that rarely imprisoned low-level drug offenders showed the largest reductions in violent and property crime (r = -.53, p < .05).
County Drug Arrest and Imprisonment Levels and Crime Rates
As with drug imprisonment trends, counties differ radically in their rates of imprisoning drug offenders. For example, Riverside County residents are imprisoned for drug offenses at four times the rate of Contra Costa County residents. Los Angeles County residents are imprisoned for low-level drug possession at nearly five times the rate of San Francisco, Alameda, and Contra Costa residents (see Table 7).
Finally, the Department of Corrections provided a special tabulation for the years 1997-99 of persons imprisoned for low-level drug possession with no prior violent or serious offense and no drug or other offenses. Again, counties differed radically in their rates of sending low-level drug offenders to prison (Table 8).
Orange and Los Angeles counties imprisoned drug possessors at levels five to seven times higher than in San Francisco Bay Area counties. Although detailed data are not available for 1980, the small number of drug possessors imprisoned at that time further demonstrates the drastic changes in drug sentencing polices over the past two decades.
The recent large increases in imprisonment for drug offenses show no discernible impact on crime rates. Rather, the pattern is a random one, with most high-incarceration counties showing no reduction in violent or property crime categories relative to low-incarceration counties. Riverside and Contra Costa counties, as seen, differ by 400% in drug imprisonment levels (Table 12) and by 500% in imprisonment for low-level drug offenses, but Contra Costa's violent crime rate is 30% lower than, and its total crime index rate virtually the same as, Riverside's (see Table 9).
The correlations between drug arrests and drug abuse rates (measured by drug-related death rates) produce a similar pattern (Table 10). Counties with higher rates of felony drug arrests are nearly always those with higher rates of drug abuse (r = .938, p < .0001). However, higher rates of misdemeanor arrests do not affect drug abuse rates (r = -.454, not significant).
Removing San Francisco, the most extreme county (in mathematical terms, an outlier that exerts excessive influence on correlation coefficients), yields weaker though similar results: felony drug arrests remain tied to local rates of drug abuse, while misdemeanor drug arrests are unrelated to drug abuse. This suggests that increased policing of felony drug offenses is a response to high rates of drug abuse, but misdemeanor drug arrests appear to have no relationship to, and no impact on, either crime or drug abuse.
Since 1990, many counties placed increased emphasis on the prosecution and imprisonment of low level drug offenders, especially for drug possession offenses. For example, in 1980, only seven people from San Diego County were sentenced to prison for low-level drug possession, while in 1999 the county sent 1,002 drug possession offenders to state prison. Los Angeles sentenced only 145 drug possession offenders to prison in 1980, yet sentenced 5,109 in 1999.
In addition, the data in Table 6 show the six counties that increased their imprisonment rates the most for low level drug possession actually experienced greater increases in violent crime rates from 1980 to 1999 (up 11%, on average) than the six most lenient counties (up 1%). Further, no major differences emerged in violent or property crime rates between strict-enforcing counties and more lenient or balanced counties. Increased drug arrests and imprisonment are not correlated with decreases in violent and property crime (in fact, they are more likely to be associated with increases), and high levels of drug arrests and imprisonment are not associated with lower rates of crime (the results are entirely random).
A conclusion that fits all the facts, then, suggests that some counties chose to combat their drug abuse and crime problems by making more felony and misdemeanor drug arrests, while other counties made fewer drug arrests and/or concentrated only on the worst (felony) drug offenses (manufacturing and trafficking). The latter group of counties had considerably more success in reducing crime regardless of the dimensions of their drug abuse and crime problems. Finally, counties that imposed high rates of imprisonment for drug violations generally experienced SLOWER declines in index felony offenses than low-imprisonment counties, though the results were not statistically significant.
A major reason for these outcome differences appears to be that simple possession drug offenses are not associated with high rates of crime or drug abuse -- with correlations close to zero. Therefore, increasing arrests for low level drug possession does nothing to control crime and may drain resources away from more productive strategies.
A second reason for the outcome differences is that felony drug offenses appear to reflect, rather than control, higher rates of drug abuse and crime. As shown, counties that stepped up felony drug arrest rates did not show the most impressive improvements in violent and property crime rates (although the San Francisco exception indicates that areas with extremely high rates of drug abuse may benefit from policing of the worst drug offenses). For most jurisdictions, however, increasing felony drug arrests is a very limited strategy to control rising drug abuse and crime.
Finally, counties that reduced misdemeanor drug arrests and switched to judicious enforcement of felony drug laws enjoyed the healthiest reductions in violent and property crime. Taken together, these findings strongly suggest that (a) strong enforcement of drug possession laws is ineffective in reducing crime, and (b) felony drug arrest is a strategy that should be used sparingly and carefully targeted.
Higher rates of arrests, stricter laws, and more aggressive sentencing policies do not deter many drug users exposed to these penalties. This leads to a revolving door scenario in which drug-involved offenders appear repeatedly before the courts. One study found 60 percent of opiate-dependent Federal parolees were reincarcerated within 6 months of release -- virtually all for narcotics-related crime -- at an incarceration cost of more than $27,000 per person, per year.United States. Justice Department research also concluded that drug treatment is effective even with the most hardened addicts. Studies show that concerted efforts towards treatment can reduce drug use and drug related crime by over 40 percent (Harell, Cavanaugh, & Roman, 2000).
Given the continued emphasis in California on law enforcement strategies despite the dearth of evidence showing effectiveness, future drug policy research should examine the political basis of current approaches. Questions to examine are whether current policies are better designed to accommodate vested interest groups and political agendas than to serve as a reasonable solution to the legitimate social issue of drug abuse.
Harrell A, S. Cavanagh, J. Roman. 2000. Evaluation of the D.C. Superior Court Drug Intervention Programs. Washington DC: United States Department of Justice.
Henham, Ralph. 1999. "Theory, Rights and Sentencing Policy." International Journal of the Sociology of Law. 27 167-183.
Jones, Bill. 1999. "Why the Three Strikes Law is Working in California." Stanford Law & Policy Review. 11:1 23-27.
Lurigio, Arthur, James A. Swartz. 1999. "The Nexus Between Drugs and Crime: Theory, Research, and Practice." Federal Probation 82:67-72.
Maxwell, Sheila R. 1999. "Conservative Sanctioning and Correctional Innovations in the United States: An Examination of Recent Trends." International Journal of the Sociology of Law. 27 401-412.
Sentencing Project. 1998. Drug Policy and the Criminal Justice System. Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project.
Tonry, Michael. 1999. "Why Are U.S. Incarceration Rates So High?" Crime and Delinquency. 45 419-437.
The Justice Policy Institute is a research and public policy organization in San Francisco, CA and Washington, DC. JPI is a project of the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. This research was funded by generous contributions from the Heller Charitable & Educational Fund, Working Assets, and the Open Society Institute.
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