"The left hasn't learned a damned thing from 9/11"
Yes they have - they have learned that their hatred of this country is real. Sadly that seems to be around 40 million people that voted for them.
The left? Well, some who claim they are on the right aren't a whole lot better. (Note: I used the word "claim" deliberately, many of the ones I'm thinking of are RINOs.)
History will be the witness if there are any other men with courage who are up to the job in the future.
Very interesting article!
bump for later
Ive learned that the left puts politics ahead of all, ahead of country, ahead of all things moral and right, ahead of facts, ahead of the lives of our troops and the security of our nation. Ive learned I will NEVER forgive them for what they have done.
If a Democrat President had made the same decisions, we all know they would be calling him the second coming.
They are mad. Gone from reality in their own Matrix-like world they have constructed.
Captain Ahabs all. And that kind of thing will not win elections.
Questions on DOCEX
17 questions the Senate Select Intelligence Committee should ask Negroponte, Maples, Goss, and Mueller.
by Stephen F. Hayes
02/01/2006 8:35:00 PM
THE SENATE SELECT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE meets at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday for an open hearing on worldwide threats. Among the attendees will be director of National Intelligence John Negroponte and DIA director Michael Maples.
For months, these officials have refused to answer questions about the ongoing exploitation of documents (known as DOCEX) recovered in postwar Iraq. While much of the questioning will rightly focus on current issues such as Iran, terrorist surveillance, Hamas, and Syria, these hearings present senators with an opportunity to press these intelligence officials on the DOCEX project--both its process and its results. Questions regarding DOCEX should be directed to Negroponte and Maples; others queries should be asked of Negroponte, Maples, CIA director Porter Goss, and FBI director Robert Mueller. If the intelligence community continues to block the release of recovered documents, its representatives should at least be required to provide reasons for their stonewalling and a sense of what we are learning from our limited exploitation thus far.
Here are some questions they should be required to answer:
(1) Intelligence officials who have worked on document exploitation tell us that there are roughly 2 million "exploitable items" captured in postwar Afghanistan and postwar Iraq. Of that number, they say, some 50,000 have been fully exploited. To the best of your knowledge, are those numbers accurate?
(2) Some of the documents are believed to contain intelligence that may have a direct bearing on the current insurgency in Iraq. If those numbers are accurate, why has the U.S. intelligence community exploited less than 3 percent of the overall document take?
(3) What can be done to expedite this process?
(4) Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Pat Roberts and House Intelligence Committee chairman Pete Hoekstra have recommended that the U.S. intelligence community "release these documents to the general public" and that we should "explore the establishment of one or more international academic commissions or institutes dedicated to the study of these documents and media." This request was sent to DNI Negroponte and dated November 18, 2005. The DNI press office will say only that the proposal is being studied. Will the documents be released publicly? If so, when? If not, why not?
(5) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently asked the DIA for a plan detailing how, exactly, the documents could be released in the event that a decision was made to release them. Has the DIA responded to Secretary Rumsfeld's request? If so, what is the plan?
(6) Have you seen evidence that the former Iraqi regime trained jihadists, including, but not limited to, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian Liberation Front, the GSPC from Algeria, and an organization known to the Iraqi regime as the Sudanese Islamic Army? If so, can you describe this evidence?
(7) Does the U.S. intelligence community, based on the very limited exploitation of documents performed to date, have an estimate of how many terrorists the former Iraqi regime trained between the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom? If not, why not?
(8) Among the documents reported in the press was an Iraqi Intelligence document from some time after January 1997. The document, first reported on June 25, 2004, in the New York Times, described the former Iraqi regime's outreach to Saudi opposition groups, including what it called the "Reform and Advice Committee" run by Osama bin Laden. The document further discusses the desire of the Iraqi regime to "continue the relationship" with bin Laden after he left Sudan for Afghanistan in 1996. Is there additional evidence that sheds light on that relationship?
(9) Reporters from the Toronto Star and Sunday Telegraph found documents in the Iraqi Intelligence headquarters indicating that a "trusted confidant" of Osama bin Laden traveled to Iraq on March 5, 1998 for meetings with Iraqi Intelligence. According to the documents, the bin Laden envoy stayed at the expense of Iraqi Intelligence at the Mansour al Melia Hotel; he was scheduled to stay for one week but extended his visit to sixteen days. Does the DIA believe the documents are authentic? Does the U.S. intelligence community have evidence that corroborates the information in that document? If so, can you share it publicly? And if not in public, can you share the corroborating intelligence in closed session?
(10) Based on documents a reporter found in an Iraqi Mukhabarat safe house, the San Francisco Chronicle reported in April 2003 that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) was training Iraqi Intelligence operative as late as September 2002. Are those documents authentic? If so, what can we learn about Russian behavior with respect to Iraq that might be applicable to Russia's role on Iran?
(11) The U.S. military reportedly found Iraqi documents that indicate support from the former Iraqi regime to 1993 World Trade Center bomber Abdul Rahman Yasin. Despite the fact that Yasin is still listed as a "Most Wanted Terrorist," the FBI has refused to make these documents public. Why?
(12) In his recently released book, Ambassador Paul Bremer described a document written before the war by the director of Iraqi Intelligence. The memo described plans for an insurgency in the event of a U.S. invasion. Bremer received the document in July 2003. What other documents were found with this document? Will you release the document Bremer described to the public?
(13) Is there documentary evidence to suggest that the Iraqi regime provided support--financial and otherwise--to Abu Sayyaf terrorists in the Philippines? Is there other such evidence?
(14) Is there documentary evidence to suggest that the Iraqi regime provided support--financial and otherwise--to Ansar al Islam terrorists in northern Iraq? Is there other such evidence?
(15) There was much prewar discussion of the activities at Salman Pak, a facility identified by U.N. weapons inspectors as a terrorist training camp. What has the U.S. intelligence community learned about those activities since the March 2003 invasion? Has the intelligence community interrogated the military officials who ran Salman Pak? If so, what did they say? Can the intelligence community release to the public a declassified version of these debriefings? If not, why not?
Then, there are two final questions: On November 6, 2005, the New York Times published an article based in large part on a February 2002 DIA assessment of al Qaeda terrorist Ibn Sheikh al Libi. The redacted DIA assessment was provided by the DIA to Senator Carl Levin, who had requested its declassification. (The DIA also sent the assessment to the full committee.)
* Does the DIA make it a practice to declassify and release documents directly to individual senators? If not, how did that happen in this case?
* Senator Levin released the February 2002 DIA assessment to show that analysts had identified Ibn Sheikh al Libi as a likely fabricator even before Bush administration officials used his testimony in their public statements. What did other intelligence assessments of al Libi say? Were DIA assessments of al Libi between February 2002 and March 2003 consistent in their findings that al Libi was a likely fabricator? In short, was the passage Senator Levin released representative of the consensus view of the intelligence community with respect to Ibn Sheikh al Libi? Was there a consensus view?
With information collected by Operation Able Danger and the Docex Project being purposely blocked by the left who would ever know anything?
The "Left" "Progressive" "Democrats" are a bunch of America-hating Communists that would jettison what's left of our Constitution - they not so secretly want America to be smited so that it can be rebuilt in Mao Tse Stalin's image.
It's a first principle: The Dims never learn.
Gorelick-The-Traitor Bump
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NEVER FORGET
Even before the CLINTONS refused three free offers from the Sudan during the 1990's to give us our No. 1 terrorist enemy OSAMA bin LADEN on a silver platter before he could hit us real hard here at home, there was...
The Man Who Predicted 911: RICK RESCORLA, ..R.I.P.
http://www.RickRescorla.com
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=24361
NEVER FORGET
"waiting for the terrorists to strike before committing ourselves to countering them. In an era where weapons of mass destruction are becoming more widespread and easier to manufacture and/or acquire, this policy is not only suicidal, but morally reprehensible. It condemns hundreds perhaps thousands of innocent people to death all in the name of a simpering kind of internationalism, a belief that most countries are on the same page when it comes to combating terrorism. "