Posted on 07/01/2006 7:19:16 AM PDT by LouAvul
SAN FRANCISCO (AP) - A recent Supreme Court ruling that Congress can ban homegrown marijuana for medical use in California led Friday to the reinstatement of an Arizona man's overturned conviction for having homemade machine guns.
Prosecutors in both cases invoked the Constitution's interstate commerce clause, despite the fact that the cases centered on items that were homemade, or homegrown, and didn't involve commerce or crossing state lines. The courts ruled, however, that the items still can affect interstate commerce and therefore can be regulated by federal law.
In the machine gun case, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals on Friday reinstated the convictions of Robert Wilson Stewart, 67, of Mesa, Ariz. The three-judge panel reversed its own previous decision to overturn the convictions because he never tried to sell his weapons or transport them over state lines.
Federal agents raided Stewart's house in June 2000 and found five machine guns, which Stewart argued did not violate the congressionally mandated ban on certain assault weapons because they were homemade and not for sale. The appellate court initially agreed with Stewart and overturned his convictions in 2003, ruling the interstate commerce clause did not apply.
The three-judge panel, however, was ordered by the Supreme Court to reconsider its decision after the justices ruled in 2005 that the federal government could prosecute medical marijuana users and their suppliers even if their activity was confined to California.
In the marijuana case, brought by Oakland resident Angel Raich, the majority of Supreme Court justices ruled that the interstate commerce clause makes California's medical marijuana law illegal. The court said homegrown marijuana confined to the state still can affect the entire national market for the drug, allowing for federal regulation.
The same rationale was applied by the appeals court in the homemade machine gun case.
(Excerpt) Read more at modbee.com ...
Well, see! Now it all makes sense.
You think the Commerce Clause only allows Congress to regulate the carriers of commerce. If they're not a registered carrier, and Filburn is not, you think Congress is not constitutionally empowered to regulate.
I recall learning about Wickhard v Filburn in Law School and simply staring in shock.
The basic idea: Anything that, when aggregated across the nation, could affect interstate commerce is therefore subject to federal regulation.
Can anyone name anything that doesn't apply in a nation of 300 million?
paulsen spins:
Close. Anything that, when aggregated across the nation, could substantially affect the interstate commerce that Congress is constitutionally regulating is therefore subject to federal regulation.
Without the power to do that, individuals or states could undermine and subvert Congress' ability to regulate.
Teacher317:
Thanks for the refresher. =^)
What did you learn Teach? -- Paulsen contends that ~any~ thing can be 'constitutionally' regulated/prohibited. -- Ask him.. There are no limits to commerce clause powers in the socialistic, 'majority rules' world advocated by paulsen.
Personally, I much rather seeing decisions about things like this in Congressional hands than in those of the courts. At least when my representative or Senator votes on a bill restricting my rights I can vote their butt out of office during the next election.
Also think it's issues like these that really help us to understand our representatives and where they stand on the important issues. The Republican Congressmen have been taking a lot of heat for pushing their agenda right now because a lot of things on it may not pass, but to me, it's not just about trying to pass those pieces of legislation, it's about highlighting who's on what side of issues that are important to me.
An article talking about some of said agenda: http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-5915608,00.html
I guess this means the Federal government can regulate school bake sales. After all, Grandma's apple crisp can affect the national market for baked goods.
Why is it you have to posit that piece of crap, rather than assuming I think that the underlying circumstances should be the same as a basis for appliction of a prior decision as precedent? You don't seem to want any restrictions on what Congress can do.
The underlying circumstances* in the two cases were the same. YOU chose to ignore that and focused on the type of commerce being regulated. Since the type of commerce was different, you opened your yap and embarrassed yourself.
* From The Shreveport Rate Cases, 1914:
"It is for Congress to supply the needed correction where the relation between intrastate and interstate rates presents the evil to be corrected, and this it may do completely, by reason of its control over the interstate carrier in all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that it is necessary or appropriate to exercise the control for the effective government of that commerce."
Controlling an intrastate activity that is related to interstate commerce is the underlying circumstance.
Is that a problem if it does? Doesn't seem to be, since Congress is not regulating the interstate commerce of baked goods.
The ONLY time Congress can go into a state and regulate what's going on is if that activity "substantially effects" what Congress is trying to do under their constitutionally assigned powers. And even then, what Congress does IN the states is limited to legislation that is only necessary and proper for them to execute those constitutionally assigned powers. If that doesn't make sense, then you're being intentionally stubborn.
I'm not embarrassed at all. They weren't regulating intrastate commerce, they were regulating the actions of the carriers, and any involvement of intrastate commerce was incicental and irrelevant to the outcome.
"It is for Congress to supply the needed correction where the relation between intrastate and interstate rates presents the evil to be corrected, and this it may do completely, by reason of its control over the interstate carrier in all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that it is necessary or appropriate to exercise the control for the effective government of that commerce."
What was relevant was that they were interstate carriers. Once that was established, the intrastate commerce issue was irrelevant. No carrier, no reason of control.
Also phooey on him because I always have the line "In death, we do have names" and the subsequent chant "His name is Robert Paulsen" (a scene from Fight Club) whenever I see his posts! =^)
If the Federal Government can regulate growing a half-dozen cannabis plants for personal consumption (not because it is interstate commerce, but because it is inextricably bound up with interstate commerce), then Congress’ Article I powers–as expanded by the Necessary and Proper Clause–have no meaningful limits.
J. Thomas dissenting
See what I mean? You think that's the only way Congress can regulate.
"What was relevant was that they were interstate carriers."
I thought you were against expanding the Commerce Clause and here you end up defending that expansion. Carriers are not commerce. The Commerce Clause says "to regulate commerce", yet you defend the regulation of carriers. My, my, my. Be still my heart.
But, for once you're right. The courts have ruled that Congress may regulate the interstate carriers because, duh, interstate carriers have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Shreveport came along and said that Congress may also regulate the carrier's intrastate activities -- not because they're carriers -- but because the carrier's intrastate activities have "such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce".
The Shreveport court tied everything to interstate commerce, not the fact that they were carriers. Otherwise the court would have simply ruled that, since Congress has chosen to regulate the carriers, they may regulate all operations of the carriers irregardless of the effect on commerce. They didn't.
Well, let's settle this once and for all by demonstrating the type of blowhard that tpaine actually is.
tpaine, I pinged you to answer one question -- please copy Teacher317 with your response. You say I claim there's no limits to commerce clause powers. Which interstate commerce, therefore, may Congress not regulate?
What this means is that UNLESS Congress is regulating the interstate commerce of X they could not regulate the personal consumption of X. Furthermore, the courts have ruled that the personal consumption of X MUST substantially effect Congress' ability to regulate the interstate commerce of X.
(Oh, and please explain how it is that Justice Thomas can say there are no "meaningful limits" to Congress' Article I powers right after he, personally, bitch-slapped Congress by ruling their commerce claused-based statutes in Lopez AND Morrison were unconstitutional and therefore void. Yep. Just like a teenager, Congress has the power to stay out all night ... as long as they're home by 10:00.)
Another "intentionally stubborn" begging of the question by paulsen.
Congress has no 'assigned power' to "go into a state" and "regulate whats going on".
Congress can only regulate commerce "among the several states", not within them.
And even then, what Congress does IN the states is limited to legislation that is only necessary and proper for them to execute those constitutionally assigned powers.
Considering that Congress itself decides what is "proper", this is no limit at all..
If that doesn't make sense, then you're being intentionally stubborn.
Paulsen, from a constitutional standpoint, nothing you say makes any sense.
-- Why would the framers limit the powers of Congress throughout the document, but leave a gaping hole allowing unlimited commerce power?
..by reason of its control over the interstate carrier...
It says what it says, and you're asserting otherwise, not matter how often or virulently will not change it.
The court observed that there IS a market - and explicitly did not care whether that market is legal.
"please explain how it is that Justice Thomas can say there are no "meaningful limits" to Congress' Article I powers"
It was a conditional clause, an 'if' statement.
IF a federal SWAT team can break your door down and arrest you for growing on your own property and there consuming homegrown vegetation, then there is no limit on what else they might do.
Well, they can do that and they have. The commerce clause can be used for any damn thing they like, because if the above can be construed as bound up with interstate commerce, I can't think of any post-Neandertal activity that isn't and that isn't as a result regulable.
Your supposition is absolutly correct, and neatly summarizes the exact arguments & reasoning used in the Raich ruling. Heck, you very nearly got it verbatum. Read the ruling itself and you'll be surprised at how spot-on you are.
Yes, they're that nuts.
"substantially" is being interpreted as meaning "at all in the slightest conceivable degree".
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