JUNE 2003 mid : (CAIRO, EGYPT : US UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE BOLTON WARNS EGYPT ON ITS INVOLVEMENT WITH IRAQ & NORTH KOREA ON MISSILES & WMD PROGRAMS) The United States has again launched an examination of Egypt's missile and weapons of mass destruction programs. U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton held talks over the weekend in Cairo with Egyptian leaders on a range of what U.S. officials termed were sensitive subjects. They said the issues included Egypt's WMD and missile programs and Cairo's cooperation with Saddam Hussein's Iraq and North Korea.
"All of the testimony and evidence found in Iraq have shown significant Egyptian involvement in Iraq's missile and WMD programs," a U.S. official said. "The issue has become too big to ignore without undermining the credibility of the administration."
In December 2002, the United States asked Egypt to grant access to scores of scientists who were employed in Saddam's nuclear program. The Egyptian regime of President Hosni Mubarak did not cooperate with the U.S. request, officials said.
-------- "U.S. QUESTIONS EGYPT ON WMD, MISSILES ," by Middle East Newsline staff, Middle East Newsline, 6/17/03
NOVEMBER 2004 : (TRACES OF PLUTONIUM FOUND NEAR EGYPTIAN NUCLEAR FACILITY) VIENNA, Austria - U.N. experts have found traces of plutonium near an Egyptian nuclear facility and are investigating whether it could be weapons-related or simply a byproduct of the country’s peaceful atomic activities, diplomats told The Associated Press on Friday. -------- "UN: Traces of Plutonium Found in Egypt," November 5, 2004, via Little Green Footballs
ElBaradei has served as the Director General for the IAEA for two terms since December 1, 1997, and is now set for a third term after the current US administration reluctantly reversed its opposition to him in June 2005. According to the Washington Post* [1] several intercepts were made, on ElBaradei's phone calls concerning Iran's nuclear program, in which the Bush administration hoped to find information that would help to remove ElBaradei as director of the IAEA. [* Piasa's note: Thanks for leaking]ElBaradei has questioned the U.S. rationale for the war in Iraq since the 2003 Iraq disarmament crisis, when he, along with Hans Blix, led a team of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq, seeking evidence of weapons of mass destruction. He is also accused by the US for his lenient approach in dealing with the Iranian program.
There is no rival candidate for the upcoming term, though the US tried to convince Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, who declined, to run for the job. The decision of the IAEA board of governors was still postponed through May 2005. [2]
On 9 June, the US dropped its objections after a meeting between US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and ElBaradei, which opened the way to approval by the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on 13 June. [3] [edit] October surprise
Ten days before the 2004 US presidential election, a query by ElBaradei about 377 tons of missing explosives in Iraq surfaced in what many pundits had referred to as the then-expected "October surprise".... 143 posted on 07/31/2005 10:01:19 AM PDT by Sam Hill | To 141 |
All In The Family...At The United Nations
Oil for Food was established in 1995: Egyptian diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali was U.N. Secretary General. Geneva-based oil trading firm called AMEP (received Oil-For-Food Profits) run Fakhry Abdelnour, Mr. Boutros-Ghali's cousin.
AMEP board member Efraim Nadler, is Mr. Boutros-Ghali's brother-in-law and close friend to Benon Sevan, the former executive director of the Oil for Food program.
The Beneficiaries of Saddam's Oil Vouchers: The List of 270
Egypt: Khaled Gamal Abd Al-Nasser, son of the late Egyptian president, received 16.6 million barrels. 'Imad Al-Galda, a businessman and a member of the Egyptian parliament from President Mubarak's National Democratic Party, received 14 million barrels. Abd Al-Azim Mannaf, [5] editor of the Sout Al-Arab newspaper, received 6 million barrels. Muhammad Hilmi, editor of the Egyptian paper Sahwat Misr, [6] received an undisclosed number of barrels. The United Arab Company received 6 million barrels. The Nile and Euphrates Company received 3 million barrels. The Al-Multaqa Foundation for Press and Publication received 1 million barrels. [7]
Iraq calls for wider oil-for-food probe
Volcker said in the report there is no doubt that Saddam's government made money illegally and sought to reward friends and cultivate political influence. The major source of illicit funds to Iraq was from smuggling, to Jordan, to Turkey, eventually to Syria, and then to Egypt, he said.
Scandal in Baghdad: Millions Missing - French, Chinese Companies Involved
"The winners in the Iraqi cellular license tender were Saddam's most senior financiers, their Egyptian and Iraqi supporters, the bank BNP Paribas, European cellular corporations - particularly Alcatel and Chinese telecom interests such as Huawei," states the May 2004 Defense Department report.
And also, beyond Iraq--from Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK", 1999 [pdf file link]:
Due to the poor state of relations between Moscow and P’yongyang, the DPRK was not able to secure the FROG-7B directly from the Soviet Union. Attempts to acquire the FROG-7B were therefore limited to those countries that had previously received the system from the Soviet Union; were on good terms with the DPRK; and were willing to incur Moscow’s displeasure by selling or transferring the systems to the DPRK. At the time only a few countries met all of those conditions, including Egypt, Romania, and Syria.
As a result of the precipitous decline in Egyptian-Soviet relations and in return for the DPRK’s assistance during the October 1973 War, Egypt’s President Anwar el Sadat transferred a small number of Soviet-supplied FROG-7B TELs and rockets to the DPRK and agreed to cooperate in the field of missile development. This transaction may have been repayment for DPRK assistance during the 1973 War, or for spare parts and weapons acquired after the war.
SNIP
In 1979 the existing, though incipient, ballistic missile program was reorganized into an ambitious effort to achieve this goal.37 With this reorganization, both the FROG and HQ-2/SA-2 programs appear to have been refocused. The FROG program began to concentrate solely on maintenance of existing systems, while the HQ-2/SA-2 program focused on production and improvement of the SAM versions of these systems.38
Significant obstacles stood in the way of an indigenous capability to design and produce ballistic missiles. Most importantly, the DPRK did not have the skilled manpower or technology to design a ballistic missile from the ground up, as all its relevant expertise was confined to SAM, anti-ship cruise missile, and artillery rocket programs. To overcome these limitations, the DPRK again turned to Egypt, and the two countries concluded a series of new agreements to cooperate in missile development. The central focus of this cooperation was a program to reverse-engineer the Soviet R-17E (the version of the Scud B exported to Egypt) as an interim step towards future production of indigenously designed ballistic missiles with greater ranges and improved accuracies. Part of this agreement called for the exchange of scientists and technicians between the two countries. Egypt had long desired to produce long-range ballistic missiles, and shortly after the October 1973 War, it had initiated several feasibility studies for an improved Scud B.39 Cairo viewed cooperation with P’yongyang as a means to advance its own ballistic missile ambitions while conserving its resources. In addition to this expanded cooperation with Egypt, the DPRK apparently 37 The exact date of this reorganization is presently unknown. The 1979 date used here represents the best estimate currently available.
SNIP
It is estimated that between 1987 and 1992, the DPRK exported 250 missiles and related technology worth $580 million to Egypt, Iran, Libya, and Syria. Hwasong 5 and Hwasong 6 missiles are estimated to cost $1.5 to $2 million apiece.97
SNIP
Throughout the 1990s, there have been reports that Egypt, Libya, and Syria have been interested in obtaining or producing the No-dong. To date, there are no known sales of complete missile systems to any of the three countries.
Egypt’s involvement in the No-dong program is believed to be limited to the acquisition of Nodong-related technology or components. It continues to cooperate with the DPRK in a broad range of ballistic missile development activities. For example, in July 1999, the DPRK shipped Egypt specialty steel—with missile applications—through a PRC company in Hong Kong. Meanwhile, missile technicians continue to travel between the two countries.140