Posted on 09/22/2006 6:10:39 AM PDT by TrebleRebel
New Anthrax Theory Offered FBI Scientist Says Little Expertise Needed September 22, 2006 By DAVE ALTIMARI, Courant Staff Writer
Five years after an anthrax mail attack killed a Connecticut woman and four others, an FBI microbiologist has provided a little-noticed clue into why the criminal investigation has stalled. Contrary to a widely held theory among anthrax experts, the killer needed no sophisticated equipment or intimate knowledge to produce the anthrax mailed to two U.S. congressmen, Douglas Beecher wrote recently in a trade magazine for microbiologists. Anthrax experts and many media reports have long theorized that the killer would have needed to mix the deadly substance with an additive to aerosolize it - a feat most likely accomplished by a limited number of people with access to high-level labs such as those operated by the U.S. military. The FBI official's apparent dismissal of that theory is chilling in that it greatly broadens the potential pool of suspects, experts who have followed the case say. Beecher also wrote that previous theories "may misguide research and preparedness efforts and generally distract from the magnitude of hazards posed by simple spore preparations." "Individuals familiar with the compositions of the powders in the letters have indicated that they were [composed] simply of spores purified to different extents," Beecher wrote in his seven-page article in Applied and Environmental Microbiology. Beecher interviewed FBI personnel assigned to the investigation as well as agents assigned to the FBI lab in Quantico, Va. It is the first time since the FBI recovered the anthrax-laden letter sent to Sens. Thomas Daschle and Patrick Leahy in October of 2001 that the agency has revealed anything about the makeup of the powder. Beecher, a microbiologist in the FBI's hazardous materials response unit, was the agency's point man for publicly commenting on the attacks in 2001. The FBI has long suspected that the anthrax used in the killings either came from or was produced by someone affiliated with the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick, Md., but it has never said that the actual powder used in the attacks was made there. In his article, Beecher makes it clear that the anthrax did not have to be produced at the equivalent of a military lab such as USAMRIID. "A widely circulated misconception is that the spores were produced using additives and sophisticated engineering supposedly akin to military weapon production," Beecher wrote. "This idea is usually the basis for implying that the powders were inordinately dangerous compared to spores alone." Rutgers University biologist Richard H. Ebright, who has closely followed the anthrax investigation, said that Beecher's writings broaden the pool of potential suspects. "The FBI statement contradicts assertions that the attacks required the resources of a large state program and supports the view that the attacks could have been perpetrated by an individual or small group," he said. Another prominent anthrax expert, Louisiana State University Professor Martin Hugh Jones, said the article indicates that "with the right commercially available equipment one can readily produce a good product involving essentially individual spores." Jones estimates that it would cost $20,000 or so to buy the proper equipment. Despite the analysis, Jones said he still believes that the anthrax was produced in a sophisticated laboratory. "There would be too many quality control issues if someone were making this in their basement," Jones said. Jones said that the highly refined powder discovered in the Daschle/Leahy letters, which was ground so small that it literally flew off microscopes when experts tried to examine it, would be extremely difficult to produce outside of a controlled laboratory setting and probably was produced by an expert in handling the dangerous germ. Jones said it appears that the FBI's probe is stalled. Much-ballyhooed forensic testing that authorities hoped would pinpoint the exact laboratory that produced the strain of anthrax used in the attacks has not panned out. "I've not heard or seen anything from the FBI to indicate any forensic success in their investigations," Jones said. Beecher declined to comment Thursday on his article and referred questions to the agency's office of public affairs. Debbie Weierman, a spokeswoman for the FBI's Washington bureau, which is leading the "Amerithrax" investigation, said Thursday that the agency would not comment. The FBI issued a statement this week refuting claims that the case is no longer a priority or that the trail has gone cold. The acting assistant director in the Washington office, Joseph Persichini, said that the agency's commitment to solving the case is "undiminished."
"Despite the frustrations that come with any complex investigation, no one in the FBI has, for a moment, stopped thinking about the innocent victims of these attacks, nor has the effort to solve this case in any way been slowed," Persichini said. Authorities identified one possible suspect when former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft labeled Steven J. Hatfill a "person of interest." Hatfill, a former germ expert at USAMRIID, fit the FBI's prevailing theory - that the attacks were carried out by a scientist who had access to the high-grade anthrax and the knowledge of how to physically manipulate it and use it as a weapon. Hatfill lost at least one job and eventually filed a lawsuit against the federal government, claiming that Ashcroft's comments have made him virtually unemployable. His lawsuit is pending. The first anthrax letters were postmarked Sept. 18, 2001, and went to various media organizations in New York and Florida. The second letters, carrying a more refined powder, were mailed to Daschle and Leahy about Oct. 9, 2001. Those letters passed through the Trenton, N.J., post office and the Washington, D.C., post office. The FBI believes that all the letters came from the same source. Shortly after the first letters were sent, Beecher debunked reports suggesting that the strain of anthrax found in Florida came from a particular lab or was manmade. Beecher noted that the point of modifying anthrax to make it more deadly would be to make it resistant to antibiotics, but that the anthrax found in Florida was not drug-resistant. The anthrax sent to the senators was drug-resistant. The letters paralyzed the nation's postal system and forced the government to spend billions to install sophisticated detection equipment at postal centers throughout the country. The Daschle letter was opened by a staff member, causing the shutting down of the Hart Senate Office Building for months while government officials tried to figure out how to clear it of anthrax. More than 20 people contracted inhalation anthrax, and five eventually died. Three were postal workers in New Jersey and Washington who had handled the contaminated letters. One was a 61-year-old woman who lived alone in New York City. The last person to die was Ottilie Lundgren of Oxford. The 94-year-old Lundgren died just before Thanksgiving in 2001. Investigators believe that Lundgren received a piece of junk mail that was contaminated with anthrax when it passed through the Trenton post office shortly after the Daschle and Leahy letters. Shirley Davis, Lundgren's niece, said that her aunt had a habit of violently ripping in half her junk mail and that investigators have told her they believe she ripped open the anthrax-contaminated letter and inhaled the spores. Late last year, the FBI brought the families of the five victims to Washington for a private update. Davis was too ill to go but said that agents occasionally contact her to let her know they have not forgotten about the case. "I've come to believe that they may never know who sent those letters," Davis said in an interview this week. "It's time to let my aunt rest in peace."
Paragraphs are our friends.
Gee, you have such big paragraphs
I bet it had something to do with a certain - ahem - "religion", myself.
This article from the FBI scientist cites this reference as the authority for no additives:
http://cryptome.quintessenz.at/mirror/anthrax-powder.htm
Ironically this article gives multiple named government sources who state there WERE additives. It does also, however, give a statement attributed to FBI scientist Dwight Adams that he made at a private briefing to Daschle and Leahy where he said there were no additives.
Here's the twist. Dwight Adams was deposed under oath a couple of months ago in the Hatfill versus Ashcroft lawsuit.
He basically admitted that he witheld information from them at that meeting concerning the nature of the anthrax powder that was sent to them.
What a Tangled Web We Weave . . . when first we practice to deceive.
I have to agree somewhat with the FBI on this. The person involved would have to some sophisticated equipment just to keep himself from being infected.
No, I'm not reading that either. Don't want it to ruin the affects of my coffee.
Formmating is your friend :)
Five years after an anthrax mail attack killed a Connecticut woman and four others, an FBI microbiologist has provided a little-noticed clue into why the criminal investigation has stalled.
Contrary to a widely held theory among anthrax experts, the killer needed no sophisticated equipment or intimate knowledge to produce the anthrax mailed to two U.S. congressmen, Douglas Beecher wrote recently in a trade magazine for microbiologists.
Anthrax experts and many media reports have long theorized that the killer would have needed to mix the deadly substance with an additive to aerosolize it - a feat most likely accomplished by a limited number of people with access to high-level labs such as those operated by the U.S. military.
The FBI official's apparent dismissal of that theory is chilling in that it greatly broadens the potential pool of suspects, experts who have followed the case say.
Beecher also wrote that previous theories "may misguide research and preparedness efforts and generally distract from the magnitude of hazards posed by simple spore preparations." "Individuals familiar with the compositions of the powders in the letters have indicated that they were [composed] simply of spores purified to different extents," Beecher wrote in his seven-page article in Applied and Environmental Microbiology.
Beecher interviewed FBI personnel assigned to the investigation as well as agents assigned to the FBI lab in Quantico, Va.
It is the first time since the FBI recovered the anthrax-laden letter sent to Sens.
Thomas Daschle and Patrick Leahy in October of 2001 that the agency has revealed anything about the makeup of the powder.
Beecher, a microbiologist in the FBI's hazardous materials response unit, was the agency's point man for publicly commenting on the attacks in 2001.
The FBI has long suspected that the anthrax used in the killings either came from or was produced by someone affiliated with the U.S.
Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick, Md., but it has never said that the actual powder used in the attacks was made there.
In his article, Beecher makes it clear that the anthrax did not have to be produced at the equivalent of a military lab such as USAMRIID.
"A widely circulated misconception is that the spores were produced using additives and sophisticated engineering supposedly akin to military weapon production," Beecher wrote.
"This idea is usually the basis for implying that the powders were inordinately dangerous compared to spores alone." Rutgers University biologist Richard H.
Ebright, who has closely followed the anthrax investigation, said that Beecher's writings broaden the pool of potential suspects.
"The FBI statement contradicts assertions that the attacks required the resources of a large state program and supports the view that the attacks could have been perpetrated by an individual or small group," he said.
Another prominent anthrax expert, Louisiana State University Professor Martin Hugh Jones, said the article indicates that "with the right commercially available equipment one can readily produce a good product involving essentially individual spores." Jones estimates that it would cost $20,000 or so to buy the proper equipment.
Despite the analysis, Jones said he still believes that the anthrax was produced in a sophisticated laboratory.
"There would be too many quality control issues if someone were making this in their basement," Jones said.
Jones said that the highly refined powder discovered in the Daschle/Leahy letters, which was ground so small that it literally flew off microscopes when experts tried to examine it, would be extremely difficult to produce outside of a controlled laboratory setting and probably was produced by an expert in handling the dangerous germ.
Jones said it appears that the FBI's probe is stalled.
Much-ballyhooed forensic testing that authorities hoped would pinpoint the exact laboratory that produced the strain of anthrax used in the attacks has not panned out.
"I've not heard or seen anything from the FBI to indicate any forensic success in their investigations," Jones said.
Beecher declined to comment Thursday on his article and referred questions to the agency's office of public affairs.
Debbie Weierman, a spokeswoman for the FBI's Washington bureau, which is leading the "Amerithrax" investigation, said Thursday that the agency would not comment.
The FBI issued a statement this week refuting claims that the case is no longer a priority or that the trail has gone cold.
The acting assistant director in the Washington office, Joseph Persichini, said that the agency's commitment to solving the case is "undiminished."
"Despite the frustrations that come with any complex investigation, no one in the FBI has, for a moment, stopped thinking about the innocent victims of these attacks, nor has the effort to solve this case in any way been slowed," Persichini said.
Authorities identified one possible suspect when former U.S.
Attorney General John Ashcroft labeled Steven J.
Hatfill a "person of interest." Hatfill, a former germ expert at USAMRIID, fit the FBI's prevailing theory - that the attacks were carried out by a scientist who had access to the high-grade anthrax and the knowledge of how to physically manipulate it and use it as a weapon.
Hatfill lost at least one job and eventually filed a lawsuit against the federal government, claiming that Ashcroft's comments have made him virtually unemployable.
His lawsuit is pending.
The first anthrax letters were postmarked Sept.
18, 2001, and went to various media organizations in New York and Florida.
The second letters, carrying a more refined powder, were mailed to Daschle and Leahy about Oct.
9, 2001.
Those letters passed through the Trenton, N.J., post office and the Washington, D.C., post office.
The FBI believes that all the letters came from the same source.
Shortly after the first letters were sent, Beecher debunked reports suggesting that the strain of anthrax found in Florida came from a particular lab or was manmade.
Beecher noted that the point of modifying anthrax to make it more deadly would be to make it resistant to antibiotics, but that the anthrax found in Florida was not drug-resistant.
The anthrax sent to the senators was drug-resistant.
The letters paralyzed the nation's postal system and forced the government to spend billions to install sophisticated detection equipment at postal centers throughout the country.
The Daschle letter was opened by a staff member, causing the shutting down of the Hart Senate Office Building for months while government officials tried to figure out how to clear it of anthrax.
More than 20 people contracted inhalation anthrax, and five eventually died.
Three were postal workers in New Jersey and Washington who had handled the contaminated letters.
One was a 61-year-old woman who lived alone in New York City.
The last person to die was Ottilie Lundgren of Oxford.
The 94-year-old Lundgren died just before Thanksgiving in 2001.
Investigators believe that Lundgren received a piece of junk mail that was contaminated with anthrax when it passed through the Trenton post office shortly after the Daschle and Leahy letters.
Shirley Davis, Lundgren's niece, said that her aunt had a habit of violently ripping in half her junk mail and that investigators have told her they believe she ripped open the anthrax-contaminated letter and inhaled the spores.
Late last year, the FBI brought the families of the five victims to Washington for a private update.
Davis was too ill to go but said that agents occasionally contact her to let her know they have not forgotten about the case.
"I've come to believe that they may never know who sent those letters," Davis said in an interview this week.
"It's time to let my aunt rest in peace."
I copy/pasted and made my own paragraphs...blew the font up, too...large font is my friend
This estimate is based on buying glove boxes, etc. from places like Cole-Palmer, new.
Here is one for less than $2,000 on...EBAY!
There are others, plus plenty at surplus dealers everywhere.
http://cgi.ebay.com/Solid-State-Equipment-Corp-SSEC-Glove-Box_W0QQitemZ160030952418QQihZ006QQcategoryZ26260QQrdZ1QQcmdZViewItem?hash=item160030952418
The rest is just glassware and reagents and media.
When the attacks were in the news, the "Sophisticated dispersion additives" were nothing but Bentonite and Cab-o-Sil™.
Powdered Kitty Litter and fumed silica.
One crank/loonie in a cellar could do it. It is even within the technical capability of a few "Certain Fourth- century Barbarians".
Thank you
You can see those estimates were from government workers! Why not just use a glove bag? Or an aquarium turned on its side with long gloves duct taped to the opening? Hazmat suits are often sealed with duct tape around the boot and gloves!
*Blush* I forgot duct tape.
I must be low on testostrone....
(More Power, More Power!)
Doesn't pass the smell test for me. If the product were really that unsophisticated, then the government wouldn't have had any trouble duplicating it, which they admitted years ago to being unable to do.
bump
I think that it really isn't that sophisticated. The big difference is in the efficiency of the dispersal. A clown could come up with a powder that could be dusted into the air. But the dust would quickly settle and not be effective as a weapon. A real genius of a scientist and a sophisticated lab would be needed to make the stuff so finely divided that it would disperse and stay airborn for a very long time and in high enough concentration. No high tech would be needed for a brief, localized dust cloud in front of someone opening their mail.
Thanks for recalling the man in Fla who sought treatment for Anthrax sores. I was beginning to think I was the only one who remembered that. Also the Muslims in NJ who actually sent the letters were never sufficiently investigated. I'll always believe they were the ones who mailed it after Atta received it from Saddam, and after 9/11. It was just another part of the 9/11 attack.
Dr. Spertzel is well-known as one of the foremost experts on biological weapons on the planet, and all of the anecdotal evidence about where the investigation is(n't) indicates that he knows what he's talking about. After five years the government can't replicate the product, and they're clueless about not just perp, but the lab itself.
Furthermore, just plain old common sense would lead one to think that if this type of attack were fairly easy to pull off, then every kook out there with a grudge would be trying and it would be happening with a lot more frequency than it does. The fact that these attacks were so unique is more proof of just how difficult is actually is to pull off.
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